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Chapter 1 Introduction  
1.1 Motivation 
As the world continues its irrevocable transition to an international information 
economy, investments in research and development (R&D) contribute the most to 
wealth creation. Besides the well-known problem of positive externalities granted by 
R&D projects, the high adjustment costs of knowledge investment, uncertainties 
related to the result of R&D projects and informational asymmetry on the projects’ 
states make obtaining external finance for innovation and R&D projects may be more 
costly compared to similar funding for physical capital investment and hence lead to 
underinvestment in R&D.1 Even though equity finance such as angel fund and venture 
capital may be able to alleviate the R&D funding problem to some extent, it has a very 
restricted application in several countries only. Many innovative firms, which have 
already obtained some valuable patents or other types of IP after the venture capital or 
initial public offering at the start-up stage, may still need more external financing to 
get the capital necessary for further development or production, but do not want 
dilution of ownership. The lack of established historical records, sufficient cash flow 
and tangible assets as collateral are their biggest obstacles for getting access to 
external credit. Empirical evidence shows that, ceteris paribus, credit rationing affects 
more the R&D participation decision more than the level of R&D spending decision, 
especially for firms that are both young and small (like small and medium-sized 
enterprises, SMEs).2 So, many welfare-enhancing investment opportunities would be 
foregone because of the credit rationing instead of just being delayed.  
As a solution to this R&D funding problem, the use of intellectual property (IP) as 
collateral to secure debts or obligations has received an increasing worldwide attention 
in recent years, because IP are usually the most and maybe the only valuable assets for 
many R&D intensive firms.3 Economic models show that the assignment of patents as 

1 See Bronwyn H. Hall, “The Financing of Research and Development,” Oxford Review of Economic Policy 
18, no. 1 (March 1, 2002): 35–51 (pointing out the existence of the "funding gap" for R&D activities and 
identifying the reasons for the funding difficulty). 
2 See Mancusi and Vezzulli (2014) “R&D and Credit Rationing in SMEs”, infra note 113. 
3 See European Commission (2014) Final Report from the Expert Group on Intellectual Property Valuation, 
infra note 207 at 27 (“More generally, IP assets are being increasingly written into the contracts governing 
broad asset-backed loans. While intangibles have always been included in a blanket lien on all assets, it is 
 ʹ
collateral determines the savings of firms and magnifies the effect of innovative rents 
on investment in R&D.4 The survey and choice experiment of Rassenfosse and 
Fischer (2016) on practitioners also confirms that, on top of the signalling effect 
conveyed by parents, offering key patents as collateral is even more important to the 
lender than offering tangible assets. 5  Nevertheless, the exploitation of IP 
collateralization in practice is still below the expectation.6 
Numerous academic studies as well as policy and legal efforts have been done in 
exploring or removing the obstacles to the prevalence of IP collateralization in practice. 
In previous literature, two categories of obstacles have been discussed. One category is 
mainly about the liquidation value of encumbered IP, such as, severely discounted 
forced-liquidation value; the fluctuation in the liquidation value of IP and the lack of 
generally accepted valuation methodologies.7 However, most of the efforts take the 
theories used for explaining traditional secured transaction as given and try to find 
ways to make IP have the same characteristics as ordinary tangible assets instead of 
exploring the possible effects of IP’s characteristics on the theories of secured 
transactions. So, the resulting suggestions for promoting IP collateralization are mainly 
about improving IP valuation methodologies,8 using IP with a bigger market size and 
greater redeployability as collateral,9 and using structured IP securitization to reduce 
the influence of IP holder on the collateral value of IP and to diversify the portfolio.10 
While we acknowledge the contribution of these efforts, some limitations should be 
mentioned. First, these efforts reflect the caution regarding the liquidation value of IP 
but cannot provide enough justifications for promoting IP collateralization. The 
proposed suggestions are reasonable but would be applicable to a very limited range of 

becoming more commonplace for creditors to focus their analysis more directly on intangibles, either as a 
separate asset or as an integral part of overall company value.”) 
4 See Amable, Chatelain and Ralf (2010) “Patents as Collateral”, infra note 125.  
5 See Rassenfosse and Fischer (2016) “Venture Debt Financing: Determinants of the Lending Decision”, infra 
note 250. 
6 See European Commission (2000) “Funding of New Technology-Based Firms by Commercial Banks in 
Europe”, infra note 142 (positing that despite its potential for innovation financing, IP-based finance 
(including collateralization) is widely believed to be under-exploited, especially by those young SMEs that 
would need it most).. 
7 See detailed discussion on IP valuation in Section 2.3.2.2. 
8 See the discussion on the efforts in Section 2.3.2.2 D. 
9 See, e.g. Odasso and Ughetto (2011) “Patent-Backed Securities in Pharmaceuticals: What Determines 
Success or Failure?” infra note 193 
10 See, for example, Chu (1998) “Bowie Bonds: A Key to Unlocking, the Wealth of Intellectual Property”, 
infra note 117; Gabala (2003) “Intellectual Alchemy: Securitization of Intellectual Property as an Innovative 
Form of Alternative Financing”, infra note 117.  
 ͵
IP or in very few countries with sophisticated finance markets for structured 
transactions and thus deprive many valuable IP of being used as collateral. Second, the 
mere emphasis on the liquidation value of collateralized IP cannot explain some 
phenomena in practice. If the liquidation value is the main concern of the lenders, it is 
difficult to explain why offering key patents as collateral is equally and sometimes 
even more important for many lenders than offering tangible assets, as evidenced by 
the survey of Rassenfosse and Fischer (2016).11 
Meanwhile, numerous legal efforts have been made for reducing the transaction costs. 
The legal efforts can be categorized into two main approaches. The first approach 
focuses on reminding practitioners of the issues that need attention in the due diligence 
process, and pointing out the problems in perfecting security interests at the registries, 
especially in the UK and the US.12 The second approach of the legal efforts is from 
the perspective of legislators. It has been acknowledged that in this knowledge 
economy, the secured transaction law needs to be adapted to meet the challenges 
bought by IP. After realizing that the fragmentation of laws gives rise to substantial 
legal uncertainties and risks, the establishment of an integrated legal framework, 
which is comprised of unitary rules for a fair and effective management of IP assets 
and the safe conclusion of secured transactions, is envisaged by numerous legal 
initiatives at both the national level (as in China) and the international level (especially 
those led by the UNCITRAL).13 However, in the same way as the academic efforts, 
most of these legal efforts do not really take into account the divergences between the 
economic rationales underlying ordinary tangible movables and that underlying IP. 
They have not fully taken into account the possible effects of IP’s special 
characteristics on the fundamental theories of the law of secured transactions.  

11 See Rassenfosse and Fischer (2016) “Venture Debt Financing: Determinants of the Lending Decision”, 
infra note 250.  
12 See the discussion about the practical legal issues regarding IP collateralization in the UK in, for example, 
Lipton (2002) “Intellectual Property in the Information Age and Secured Finance Practice”, infra note 154; 
Andrea Tosato, “Security Interests over Intellectual Property,” Journal of Intellectual Property Law & 
Practice 6, no. 2 (2011): 93–104. See the discussion about the US in, for example, Brennan (2001), 
“Financing Intellectual Property Under Federal Law: A National Imperative (Electronic Version),” infra note 
302; Murphy (2002), “Proposal for a Centralized and Integrated Registry for Security Interests in Intellectual 
Property”, infra note 494. See the international comparative studies in, for example, Lipton (2010) “Security 
Interests in Intellectual Property”, infra note 145; Brennan (2001) “Financing Intellectual Property under 
Revised Article 9: National and International Conflicts (Electronic Version),” infra note 302. 
13 See, for example, Tosato (2009) “The UNCITRAL Annex on Security Rights in IP: A Work in Progress”, 
infra note 591; See Brennan (2009), “International Intellectual Property Financing: An Overview,” supra 
note 261. 
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These problems remind us that, in order to give plausible explanations to these 
phenomena and to find suitable legal rules and policies for promoting IP 
collateralization, it might be necessary to go back to the fundamental law and 
economics theories about secured transaction law and IP law to find out the real roles 
that collaterals play in the secured transactions, and to explore how the special 
characteristics of IP would affect these roles when IP are used as collateral. Only a 
further and more comprehensive exploration of the advantages and challenges brought 
by IP collateralization from the perspective of law and economics analysis can help us 
answer the basic question of why it is important to study the use of IP as 
collateralization in secured transactions. The reasons should lead us to find a more 
practical way to promote IP collateralization in practice. At the same time, this 
exploration can also help us get a better understanding about the fundamental 
theoretical issues in secured transaction law and IP law. 
1.2 Research Questions 
This whole project is about promoting the use of IP rights (in the general sense, 
including the rights of an IP owner, licensor and licensee) as collateral in debt finance, 
in order to solve the problem in funding R&D activities and to foster innovation.  
It is worthy to clarify here that IP collateralization is just considered as a possible 
solution to the funding problems when certain conditions are met. IP is the 
intermediate result of innovation processes, and in many cases, maybe the only 
valuable asset of many technology-intensive firms at that stage. Allowing IP to be 
exploited for supporting external finance is expected to alleviate the financial 
constraints that R&D projects are facing in some instances. Nevertheless, IP 
collateralization is not the only solution and it is certainly not the solution for all 
projects. 
Of course, not all IP possess economic impacts. The use of IP as collateral is 
inherently more risky compared to using other tangible assets. The lenders/creditors 
shall carefully select and accept those valuable IP as collateral only. This dissertation 
does not attempt to argue that any given IP should be used as collateral, or to 
specifically identify which kinds of IP are valuable to be used as collateral, or to 
instruct the practitioners on how to structure the transactions. These practical issues 
are left with financial experts in IP valuation and secured transactions to deal with. 
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Instead, we explore the theoretical reasons to explain two main questions. First, why 
has the practice accepted some IP as collateral from the perspective of law and 
economics? Second, why is supporting IP collateralization socially beneficial? We aim 
to ensure that the relevant legal issues would not be the deal-breakers when both the 
borrowers and the lenders have already reached a willingness of accepting some IP as 
collateral. Therefore, we identify the legal impediments that may obstruct transactions 
and expect to improve the legal framework to facilitate the transactions.  
The overall research question of this dissertation is:  
What is the preferred legal framework to optimize the use of IP as collateral in 
debt finance in order to solve the problems in funding R&D activities and to 
foster innovation?  
To explore and answer this research question, we first need some theoretical support 
for the legal and policy intervention in promoting IP collateralization from the law and 
economics perspective. Law and economics analysis usually starts from the Coase 
Theorem, which holds that in a perfect market where transaction costs are negligible 
and costless bargaining is possible (including perfect information), the voluntary 
negotiations and bargains between the parties in the market can lead to socially 
efficient results.14 Then the law does not matter for the social efficiency but only for 
the distribution of wealth. For justifying law or any form of government intervention 
(taxes, fines, or liability), there should be reasons contributing to a market failure, such 
as asymmetrical information, transaction cost, and positive or negative externalities. 
The logic behind the analysis would be, is there any market failure? Should law 
intervene? If yes, then how should the law intervene?  
So, the first question is: why should we advocate IP collateralization in the first place? 
For answering this question, we need to explore the following sub-questions. 
- What are the real problems behind the difficulty of SMEs to fund their R&D 
activities?; 

14 The mainstream law and economics literature agree that the Coase Theorem is built on Ronald Coase’s 
eminent article on social cost in 1960, i.e., Ronald H. Coase, “The Problem of Social Cost,” The Journal of 
Law and Economics 3, no. 1 (1960): 1–44, supra note 19, see in, for example, Guido Calabresi, “Transaction 
Costs, Resource Allocation and Liability Rules--A Comment,” Journal of Law and Economics 11 (1968): 67–
74; and Richard A. Posner, “Law and Economics in Common-Law, Civil-Law, and Developing Nations,” 
Ratio Juris 17, no. 1 (2004): 66–79. 
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- What are the alternative options that high-tech SMEs can go for with financial 
needs? 
- What are the advantages and drawbacks of the other financial alternatives? 
- What are the advantages and drawbacks of IP collateralization? 
- What characteristics of IP make IP good collateral? 
Then, when we want to discuss how we should design surrounding laws and policies 
to support IP collateralization, we need find answers to the following sub-questions. 
- What are the legal problems?  
- What are the reasons causing these problems?  
- How do the characteristics of IP make differences? 
- What should be our guiding principles in solving these problems? 
- What should be the criteria for assessing the effectiveness and efficiency of the 
legal framework for IP collateralization? 
In the end, as our main purpose, we want to know whether the current Chinese rule, 
US rule and the UNCITRAL supplement have met the criteria? If not, what legal 
suggestions can we propose?  
The answers to these research questions are expected to contribute to the debate on the 
reforming legal rules for IP collateralization in general and on the ongoing reform 
efforts in China in particular.  
1.3 Plan of Chapters 
For addressing the research questions described above, this dissertation is composed of 
six chapters. 
After this introductory chapter, Chapter 2 lays the theoretical foundations for 
supporting the promotion of IP collateralization. It firstly gives an overall picture of 
the funding problem that small and medium high-tech firms face in funding research 
and development activities. It briefly explores how information asymmetry gives rise 
to funding problems and affects the availability of funding alternatives. Then it 
examines the pros and cons of each practical funding alternative and how they address 
the information asymmetry problems. The examination points out how the importance 
of debt finance in funding R&D has been neglected in previous literature and 
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identifies the cases where debt finance is preferred. Then it gives a detailed discussion 
on the potential pros and cons of using IP as collateral in debt finance, the 
under-expected performance in practice and the possible impediments to its practical 
application. For further exploration of the economic reasons for promoting IP 
collateralization, it goes back to the basic theories of debt finance and recalls the role 
of collateral in solving the informational asymmetry problems. It then examine how 
the characteristics of IP can fit into the basic theories of debt finance and actually 
make IP good collateral in solving the informational asymmetry problems. It illustrates 
why promoting IP collateralization for innovating firms is an important topic in need 
of further research.  
The general background discussion in Chapter 2 has pointed out that transaction costs 
are the major factor that can affect the effective use of IP as collateral. The legal 
framework governing IP collateralization directly determines the transaction costs, the 
contracting time, the certainty of the transaction result and the incentives of relevant 
parties. IP collateralization, however, involves legal issues in both IP laws and secured 
transaction laws. The main legal problem is caused by the tension between IP laws and 
secured transaction laws. The tension comes from the dogmatic separation and 
fragmentation among national laws. Chapter 3 reviews the economic theories of credit 
access and that of IP protection to clarify the ultimate economic objectives and 
function that the legal framework of IP collateralization wants to achieve and fulfill. It 
discusses how the economic rationales and legal regime of IP protection are different 
from those of other assets; and how the differences determine the need of IP 
collateralization for special legal rules. Then it establishes the general efficiency 
criteria regarding the creation, perfection, and enforcement of the security interests in 
IP. The review, on the one hand, points out the issues where IP law and secured 
transaction law may cause potential conflicts when establishing a unitary legal regime 
for IP collateralization; and on the other hand, also helps us establish a conceptual 
assessment framework for the comparative study in Chapter 4. 
The comparative examination in Chapter 4 is carried among the corresponding 
domestic laws in China and the US, and the international efforts made by the 
UNCITRAL on the document, i.e., UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Secured 
Transactions: Supplement on Security Rights in Intellectual Property (the UNCITRAL 
Supplement). The comparative study is expected to show the difficulties in 
coordinating the two sectors of laws and to shed light on our understanding of how to 
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build up an efficient legal regime for IP collateralization. In the theoretical part, the 
main L&E theories regarding secured transaction law will be re-examined in the 
context of IP collateralization with taking into account the special characteristics of IP. 
After this overall examination on the general legal framework for IP collateralization, 
Chapter 5 addresses a specific legal issue in practice to illustrate and further explore 
the divergences between IP law and secured transaction law. It looks into the 
enforceability of anti-assignment or anti-attachment clauses in the IP licenses in the 
case of IP Collateralization. It is an excellent example of illustrating the case where IP 
law and secured transaction have different tendencies when addressing the same issues. 
It shows that the secured transaction law, with the objective of expanding the scope of 
assets eligible for being used as collateral for provision of low-cost credit, tends to 
invalidate anti-assignment clauses in IP licenses in order to enable licensees to use the 
full value of their interests under IP licenses as security to finance their profitable 
projects. But invalidating the anti-assignment clauses may reduce the licensor’s 
control over their innovations. On the other hand, with the objective of awarding the 
innovators and providing incentives for innovation, IP laws tend to enforce the 
anti-assignment clauses so that the licensors can keep their control over the 
exploitation of the invention underlying the license and also the license counterparty. 
However, enforcing anti-assignment clauses could also allow licensors to hold-up its 
consent in order to drag profits from the licensee’s use of license as collateral. The 
failure to internalize all the profit of using IP license as collateral would be a 
disincentive for licensees to borrow and invest. The licensor’s hold-up can change the 
equilibrium of the lending decision and result in less available credit. This chapter uses 
a formal debt finance model to show the negotiations among licensors, licensees, and 
creditors when they make license decisions and lending decisions. The analysis shows 
how different legal rules, i.e., the UNCITRAL Supplement rule, US UCC-9 rule and 
Chinese rule, can change the time of negotiation and the bargain powers among parties, 
and consequently change the equilibrium of the lending decision, and eventually have 
an impact upon investment decisions and the total social welfare. 
Chapter 6 concludes this dissertation by summarizing all key findings, highlighting the 
contributions for theory and practice, pointing out what is missing in this dissertation 
and suggesting the avenues for future research.  
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1.4 Methodology 
Throughout the thesis, various methodologies are employed for serving different 
purposes. In some chapters, several methodologies are employed at the same time. 
1.4.1 Law and Economics 
The economic analysis of law, or law and economics, as a methodology, may be 
defined as the application of economic theory and methods to examine the “formation, 
structure, processes and impact of law and legal institutions”.15 It can be traced back 
to Bentham and Adam Smith as early as 1830s, but its current prominent influence 
shall be contributed to greatly by the Chicago School since the 1960s.16 The idea that 
the principles and reasoning of neo-classical economics can be applied to understand 
and evaluate legal rules and institutions is based on a crucial (but also controversial) 
assumption that people behave rationally for their self-interest most of the time in their 
social human behavior, in the same way as they are making explicitly economic 
decisions (i.e., the “Rational Choice Model”).17  
Since the Judge Learned Hand’s first use of a formal mathematical model (the Hand 
Rule) to determine negligence in 1947,18 and the eminent works of Coase (1960), 
Calabresi (1961) and Becker (1968) in the 1960s,19 economic analysis, and especially 
sophisticated mathematical models, has been applied to law to interpret how law 

15 See Ejan Mackaay, “HIistory of Law and Economics,” in Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, Volume I. 
The History and Methodology of Law and Economics, ed. Boudewijn Bouckaert and Gerrit De Geest 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2000), 65–117 at 65. 
16 For the discussions on the early history of the law and economics movement, see Mackaay (2000), 
“HIistory of Law and Economics,” ibid; and Richard A. Posner, “The Law and Economics Movement: From 
Bentham to Becker,” in The Origins of Law and Economics: Essays By The Founding Fathers (The Locke 
Institute), ed. Francesco Parisi and Charles Kershaw Rowley (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2005), 328–49. 
17 See Ronald H. Coase, “Economics and Contiguous Disciplines,” The Journal of Legal Studies 7, no. 2 
(1978): 201–11. 
18 See the famous case U.S. v. Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d 169 (2nd Cir. 1947) (using the “Hand Rule” to test if 
an injurer’s precaution level is efficient).  
19 See Ronald H. Coase, “The Problem of Social Cost,” The Journal of Law and Economics 3, no. 1 (1960): 
1–44 (on externalities and legal liability); Guido Calabresi, “Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law 
of Torts,” The Yale Law Journal 74, no. 4 (1961): 499–553 (on accident law); Gary Becker, “The Economics 
of Crime and Punishment,” Journal of Political Economy 76, no. 2 (1968): 169–217 (on crime and law 
enforcement). 
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creates incentives for behavior.20 Miceli and Baker (2013) address the issue that 
“Economic analysis differs from other approaches to the study of law most notably in 
its use of formal models to describe human behavior, and in particular, how people 
will respond to different legal rules. The usefulness of models is that they allow the 
analysis to focus on answering a specific question with respect to the particular rule 
under scrutiny, and to derive a clear understanding of what its effects will be, much as 
a controlled laboratory experiment allows a researcher to isolate a specific physical or 
chemical effect.”21  
Economic analysis can be applied to modeling law in two distinct approaches, namely, 
positive and normative. A positive analysis answers the question of “what are the 
effects of legal rules on the behavior of relevant actors?”22 The modeling aims at 
understanding the economic logic and impact of a particular existing legal rule, by 
using economic theory to describe the incentive effects of legal rules and to predict 
behavior in a particular institutional setting. A normative analysis answers the question 
of “Are these effects of legal rules socially desirable?”23 The modeling aims at 
prescribing a better outcome or policy, by employing some analysis framework of 
welfare economics to assess social desirability based on some articulated social norm 
such as (productive or allocative) efficiency, fairness, or justice. Both approaches can 
be employed at the same time to identify the effects and desirability of a specific legal 
rule and to propose a legal rule better at regulating conducts.  
In Chapter 5, when exploring the enforceability of an anti-assignment or 
anti-attachment clause in IP license in the context of IP collateralization, we use a 
simple debt finance moral hazard model to examine how parties would react and make 
negotiation under different rules (positive analysis) and to evaluate if these rules lead 
to socially efficient results (normative analysis). In the analysis, Kaldor-Hicks 
efficiency is used as the assessment criterion. 
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20 For the discussion on the history and expansion of economic models of law, see Thomas j. Miceli and 
Matthew J. Baker, “Introduction,” in Research Handbook on Economic Models of Law, ed. Thomas j. Miceli 
and Matthew J. Baker (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2013), 1–13. 
21 See Miceli and Baker (2013) “Introduction”, ibid at 1.  
22 See Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, “Economic Analysis of Law,” in Handbook of Public Economics 
(Volume 3), ed. Alan J. Auerbach and Martin Feldstein (Elsevier, 2002), 1661–1784 at 1665-1666 (defining 
"economic analysis of law" as "an emerging field under which standard tools of microeconomics are 
employed to identify the effects of legal rules and their social desirability"). 
23 See Kaplow and Shavell (2002) “Economic Analysis of Law”, ibid at 1666. 
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However, modeling law has also been criticized for its abstract assumptions, single 
value criterion, or exclusion of many influential factors, such as historical, political, and 
social factors, just in order to simplify the complex real world for fitting into the formal 
mathematical analysis framework. By contrast, institutional economics views the 
market as an evolutionary process and a result of the complex interaction among various 
institutions, especially economic, legal and political institutions.24 Law and markets 
interact as alternative social institutions for coordinating human behaviors. Both law 
and economics, as two disciplines of social science, add different insights to our 
understanding of our economic activities and social policies. “Economics adds the 
insights of economic science; law adds the understanding of complex institutions, 
politics, and social policies."25  
It is therefore suggested to look into the reality, by exploring the historical, political, 
and social, as well as economic factors, rather than relying on abstract mathematical 
modeling only. Legal changes on property rights should be expected to reflect 
economic needs and changes. 26  The law and economics analysis calls for a 
comprehensive analysis of the actual economic conditions, taking into account the 
institutional forms and factual or historical background within which legal rules and 
transactions take place.27 The comprehensive analysis provides richer explanations for 
the phenomena under investigation. It helps in deepening the analysis to reflect the 
various public policy objectives of legal rules, rather than focusing on a single 
criterion, i.e., the “efficiency”.  
In Chapter 2, we establish the reasons for policy and legal intervention in promoting IP 
collateralization, by looking into the real funding problems that high-tech SMEs are 
facing in their R&D investments, mainly the asymmetric information problems in the 
ex ante and ex post lending relationships and the associated high transaction costs. It 
explores how different alternatives solve the information problems and points out the 
pros and cons of each financial alternative. Then it discusses in which cases debt 
finance might be possible and beneficial. By going back to the basic theory of debt 

24 Ibid, at 77-80. 
25 See Geoffrey P. Miller, “Law and Economics versus Economic Analysis of Law,” American Bankruptcy 
Institute Law Review 19, no. 2 (2011): 459–70, at 460 (stating that "Law and economics, …, is a genuine 
partnership of two disciplines, each with something to contribute. Economics adds the insights of economy 
science; law adds the understanding of complex institutions, politics, and social policies") 
26 See Heath Pearson, Origins of Law and Economics: The Economists’ New Science of Law, 1830-1930 
(Historical Perspectives on Modern Economics) (Cambridge University Press, 1997) at 33. 
27 See JLEO, “Editors’ Foreword,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 1, no. 1 (1985): 3–4 at 3. 
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finance and explaining the roles of IP as collateral in solving the information problems, 
it provides theoretical supports to accept IP collateralization as an alternative solution 
to solve the funding problem.  
Then, Chapter 3 explores how the law should intervene in establishing an integrated 
legal framework for IP collateralization, by examining the economic incentives of 
market participants and taking into account the institutional forms within which the IP 
collateralization transaction occurs. In the end, based on the criteria set in Chapter 3, 
we examine the effectiveness and efficiency of existing legal rules in different 
jurisdictions in Chapter 4 from a general framework perspective.  
1.4.2 Comparative Law and Economics Analysis 
Mattei et al. (2000) state that comparative law and economics “is situated at the 
crossroads of two different scholarly traditions, comparative law and economic 
analysis of the law. Comparative law and economics combines the instruments and 
methodologies of both these two disciplines because in this way it is possible to better 
understand the reasons of existing legal rules and institutions and of their evolution.”28 
It is based on the belief that the economic evaluation of a specific legal issue or rule 
cannot be done without looking into the whole legal framework setting and its 
historical development.29 
Instead of discussing the specific legal provisions only, comparative law and 
economics also addresses the historically evolutionary background, which can help us 
better understand the structural nature of different institutional settings.30 The broader 
discussion helps in identifying the reasoning and considerations hidden behind 
different formal rules. It provides the background information for grasping the whole 
legal framework and for discussing specific legal rules. The comparative law and 
economic analysis usually adopts a “functionalism approach”, which “measures legal 

28 See Ugo A. Mattei, Luisa Antoniolli, and Andrea Rossato, “Comparative Law and Economics Law,” in 
Encyclopedia of Law and Economics (Volume I), The History and Methodology of Law and Economics, ed. 
Boudewijn Bouckaert and Gerrit De Geest (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2000), 505–538, 
http://encyclo.findlaw.com/0560book.pdf at 505. 
29 See Mackaay (2000), “HIistory of Law and Economics,” supra note 15, at 83-86. 
30 Ibid, at 508 (stipulating that comparative law analysis can be “static” and “dynamic”. The latter “tries to 
give account of the mutual interactions between legal systems in the course of history and mainly focuses on 
legal change.”) 
 ͳ͵
rules not by their doctrinal consistency but by their ability to fulfill societal needs”.31 
It also focuses more on the resulting functional differences rather than on the formality 
divergence in the legal rules.  
The methodology of “comparative law and economics analysis” is adopted in Chapter 
4 and 5. The legal systems under analysis include Chinese law, US law and the 
UNCITRAL Supplement.  
Chinese law is chosen because of China’s economic importance in the world and its 
urgent need for an efficient legal framework of IP collateralization for stimulating 
R&D investments. China has made legal changes and implemented many policies to 
stimulate and promote IP collateralization in recent years. Some practical observers 
notice that “while many banks and financial institutions remain cautious about the idea 
of IP assets as collateral” in many countries, both eastern and western, “China is one 
place where banks have not hesitated to hand out loans backed by IP assets”.32 This 
study would be the first literature having an overall review of the status quos of IP 
collateralization in China and giving critically examination on those legal changes.  
US law is chosen for its influence on the modern secured transaction system all over 
the world and its high level of IP protection. So the conflicts between secured 
transaction law and IP law occurring in the US legal regime are more obvious and 
representative. As a typical common law jurisdiction, the US can be used as an 
opposite counterpart to compare with the civil law model represented by Chinese law.  
The UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions: Supplement on Security 
Rights in Intellectual Property (the UNCIRTAL Supplement) is the first and also one 
of the most important international initiatives in addressing the legal problems in IP 
collateralization. The overall objective of the UNCIRTAL Supplement is to enhance the 
availability of low-cost secured credits to IP right holders. Although the UNCITRAL 
Supplement has not been implemented in the national level, it reflects some of the 
recent achievements in the secured transaction law sector and provides plenty of basic 
principles for modernizing laws for IP collateralization.  
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31 See Ralf Michaels, “The Second Wave of Comparative Law and Economics,” University of Toronto Law 
Journal 59 (2009): 197–213 at 201. 
32 See Jacob Schindler, “There is still a fight on to become Asia's IP hub, but it may be an idea whose time 
has come and gone”, 06-05-2016, available at: 
http://www.iam-media.com/blog/detail.aspx?g=a82ddfc4-cc9a-4242-9332-0465144be46b.  
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By adopting a functional approach, instead of discussing the differences in 
terminology or formality or the legal origins, we focus on examining how the rules 
work in solving the divergences between IP laws and secured transactions (positive 
analysis) and evaluating if they are effective and efficient in risk-control and 
transaction cost reduction (normative analysis).  
For the analysis on a specific legal matter, we also address the draft process and the 
evolutionary background in each jurisdiction, which contain important information for 
the economic analysis of legal rules. For example, in Chapter 5, in the discussion of 
the US rule, checking the evolutionary background of the UCC 9-408 helps us 
understand where this rule comes from and why this legal change works for other 
licenses, and helps us check if this legal change also works for IP licenses.  
1.4.3 An Integrated Approach 
The author is fully aware of the fact that IP is a general concept which embraces a 
bundle of protection regimes. There are different statutory schemes for each category 
of IP, such as patents, trademarks and copyrights. Although the exact economic 
rationales are different for various categories of IP, the fundamental economic 
rationale underlying the IP protection regime is similar. In principle, the IP system 
provides the incentive to create (or establish recognition) by granting investors with 
the statutory exclusive rights and rewarding successful creators through monopoly 
profits.  
The common “monopoly profit” given by the IP protection system is the essential 
reason why IP can be used as collateral. IP, as a kind of intangible asset, has economic 
value for both of the IP holder-debtor and the secured creditor. The IP system assigns 
the innovators with exclusive property rights over the knowledge and information (for 
a certain period of time) in exchange for sufficient public disclosure of the innovative 
knowledge. The temporary statutory exclusivity given by the IP laws allows IP holders 
to restrict access to the knowledge/innovation/reputation they produce and to charge a 
monopoly price (or licensing fee) that exceeds the marginal cost for an authorized 
access. This statutory exclusivity is designed to enable innovators to cover their initial 
investment and to earn profits. So, IP clearly has economic value to the IP 
holder-debtor. Meanwhile, the statutory exclusivity might be wanted by other players 
in the market in order to use the underlying invention or to exclude others from using 
 ͳͷ
it. IP therefore also has liquidation value to the secured creditor. In this sense, patents, 
copyrights and trademarks share the same economic rationale for being used as 
collateral. 
Therefore, this dissertation adopts an integrated approach and uses the generic term 
“IP” in a general way. As the discussion mainly deals with the difficulties in funding 
R&D activities and patent is the main protection regime for the outputs of R&D 
activities, in the chapters for providing theoretical supports (Chapter 2, 3 and 5), the 
analysis will focus on patents in order to illustrate the relevant issues and have a 
deeper discussion of the chapters for providing theoretical supports. In most cases, the 
analytical reasoning can also apply to the use of other types of IP as collateral in other 
industries as well, since the main information problems discussed in funding the R&D 
activities also exist in other industries, just with different levels of severity. The other 
types of IP like copyright and trademarks will be briefly mentioned when the 
differences in the exact underlying economic rationales matter (such as at the end of 
Section 2.4.2.1). 
In Chapter 4, the one specifically on legal issues, all the three main types of IP will be 
discussed in greater detail. As a matter of fact, the existence of significant disparities 
among legal rules for patents, copyrights and trademarks on many core issues is one of 
the main observations from the comparative legal study. The examination shows that, 
in Chinese law, the significant disparities on the rules for different types of IP are 
mainly the results of the absence of unitary guidance and the lack of coordination 
among the laws, not for catering to different economic rationales (Section 4.2 and 
4.6.2.1). 
Furthermore, this dissertation focuses on small and medium sized technology-driven 
enterprises (high-tech SMEs), since they need external funding the most (Section 
2.1.2), but they suffer the most severe information problems (Section 2.1.2 and 
Section 2.2.5). They have fewer financial alternatives than large or more established 
firms. As a response to the lack of assets as collateral in debt finance, creating security 
interests over IP has been proposed as a solution to reduce the cost of debt finance for 
funding R&D projects, because IP are the most valuable but also maybe the only 
valuable assets of many technology-intensive SMEs. And when SMEs use IP 
collateralization, they may face a higher risk of litigation challenging the validity or 
ownership of the encumbered IP (Section 2.3.2.1 A). Therefore, we use high-tech 
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SMEs as a typical representative to illustrate the crucial problems. This focus does not 
prevent the results of the analysis from being applicable to large firms in other 
industries. 
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Chapter 2 Finance of R&D Projects and Security Interests in 
IP  
As a starting point, this chapter aims to capture the complexity of the problems in 
funding R&D, to give a comprehensive review on the existing literature and point out 
the problems thereof, and to draw a framework for further research in the next 
chapters. At first, it briefly explores the factors that contribute to the financing 
constraints in funding R&D projects. Special attention will be paid to the asymmetric 
information problems attached to technology-driven firms. The section explains how 
informational asymmetries affect a firm’s finance choice and involves a brief review 
of existing, theoretical and practical solutions to the informational asymmetries 
problem. The second examines the pros and cons of each solution and points out how 
the importance of debt finance in funding R&D has been neglected in existing 
literature. The third section turns to a more detailed discussion on the potential pros 
and cons of using IP as collateral in debt finance, the under-expected performance in 
practice and the possible impediments to its practical application. It goes back to the 
basic theories of debt finance and recalls the role of collateral in solving the 
informational asymmetry problems. It then examines how some characteristics of IP 
can fit into the basic theories of debt finance and actually make IP good collateral in 
solving the informational asymmetry problems.  
2.1 Problems in Funding R&D Activities 
Although the value of R&D is substantial against the backdrop of the current 
knowledge-based economy, many R&D projects are suffering financial constraints. 
Some unique characteristics of the intangible outputs resulting from the R&D 
investments cause the financial constraints.  
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2.1.1 Internal Funding - Appropriability Problem 
2.1.1.1 Non-rivalry of knowledge 
The best-known reasons for the underinvestment in R&D projects are the high initial 
fixed investment cost and the “public good” characteristics of the main output.33  
An R&D project is typically associated with high initial fixed costs, mainly on the 
labour (transaction-specific human capital). The fixed cost has to be incurred in 
advance. If the project fails, the value of alternative uses (or by alternative users) of 
the intermediate results is low. In the case of success, different from most of other 
kinds of investment whose outputs are tangible assets, the main output of R&D 
projects is the result of human intellect, that is, the knowledge of how to make new 
goods or services.  
However, knowledge is a kind of intangible asset whose consumption is “non-rival”, 
i.e., the use of knowledge by one firm or individual does not diminish its utility to 
others.34 And once knowledge is created, it is difficult to keep it secret or exclude 
others from exploiting it. As the cost of imitating an invention is very low, the public 
can easily free rides on the investors or innovators’ costly efforts in developing 
innovations.35 The inventor cannot cover their high initial fixed investment in the 
R&D. Therefore, the total social returns to the investment in developing the 
knowledge cannot be fully appropriated by its investor undertaking the R&D 
investments. This is a typical problem of “positive externalities” or “spill-over”. There 
would be underinvestment because of the lack of rational incentive for investors or 

33 See Richard R Nelson, “The Simple Economics of Basic Scientific Research,” Jounal of Political 
Economy 67, no. 3 (1959): 297–306.  
34 See Kenneth Joseph Arrow, “Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Innovation,” in The 
Rate and Direction of Innventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors, ed. Richard R Nelson (New Jersey: 
Princeton, 1962), 609–26. 
35  See, e.g., Bronwyn H. Hall, “The Private and Social Returns to Research and Development,” in 
Technology, R&D, and the Economy, ed. Bruce L.R. Smith and Claude E. Barfield (Washington, DC: 
Brookings Institution and the American Enterprise Institute, 1996), 140–83 (showing the social returns to 
R&D is higher than its private returns); also Richard C. Levin et al., “Appropriating the Returns from 
Industrial Research and Development,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1987, no. 3 (Special Issue 
On Microeconomics) (1987): 783–831. 
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innovators to invest in R&D activities for the production of innovation. The problem is 
also known as the “appropriability problem”.36 
2.1.1.2 IP Protection solution 
Several solutions have been suggested and implemented to provide returns and 
rewards to the investment in knowledge, in order to correct the appropriability 
problem. These solutions include trade secrecy, governmental subsidies, public 
funding, prizes, R&D tax incentives, research partnerships, and the IP protection 
system.37 Among all these solutions, the IP protection system is dominant particularly 
in industries with a longer product lifecycle, or more frequent employee switches, and 
for protecting innovations with greater value.38 
The IP system embraces a bundle of protection regimes. There are different statutory 
schemes for each category of IP, such as patents, trademarks and copyrights. Since the 
comprehensive Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS Agreement) was enacted worldwide by the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
in 1994, the statutory schemes of IP are broadly harmonized to a certain extent, despite 
continuing variations in the level and scope of legal protection among jurisdictions. 
While this thesis discusses the whole IP system in a general way, it deals with the main 
technological outputs from R&D activities and the remaining chapters will therefore 
focus on patents and with some brief references to other types of IP. 

36  See further discussion on the “appropriate problem” in, e.g., Sidney G. Winter, “The Logic of 
Appropriability: From Schumpeter to Arrow to Teece,” Research Policy 35, no. 8 (2006): 1100–1106; 
Andrés López, “Innovation and Appropriability: Empirical Evidence and Research Agenda,” in The 
Economics of Intellectual Property: Suggestions for Further Research in Developing Countries and 
Countries with Economies in Transition (World Intellectual Property Organization, 2009), 1–40. 
37  See the comparison on the pros and cons of different incentive mechanisms, including prizes, 
government-supported research and the patent system, in Joseph E. Stiglitz, “Economic Foundations of 
Intellectual Property Rights,” Duke Law Journal 57, no. 6 (2008): 1693 – 1724 at 1721-1724. 
38 See, e.g., Vincenzo Denicolo and Luigi Alberto Franzoni, “Weak Intellectual Property Rights, Research 
Spillovers, and the Incentive to Innovate,” American Law and Economics Review 14, no. 1 (2012): 111–140 
(with a "ratio test" model, showing that "exclusive IP rights are preferable when competition from potential 
imitators is weak, the innovation attracts large R&D investments, and research spillovers are small"). See the 
summary of literature in Carl Benedikt Frey, Intellectual Property Rights And The Financing Of 
Technological Innovation: Public Policy and the Efficiency of Capital Markets (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 
Publishing Ltd, 2013), at 22. 
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Although the precise economic justifications are also different for various categories 
of IP,39 in principle, the IP system solves the “appropriability problem” by rewarding 
successful research through monopoly profits. It integrates the positive externalities of 
R&D investments into the market price system by transforming non-rival intangible 
knowledge into tradable property rights. The IP system assigns the innovators with 
exclusive property rights over the knowledge and information (for a certain period of 
time) in exchange for sufficient public disclosure of the innovative knowledge.40 The 
IP rights empower investors with monopoly status to impose prohibitions against 
unauthorized exploitation of the commercially valuable knowledge they produce or to 
charge the access of authorized users with a price that exceeds the marginal cost of 
production. The higher price enables investors to cover their initial investment and to 
drive profits.  
In addition, Schumpeter (1976) argues that the monopoly profit also creates incentives 
for rivals and imitators to compete for innovation, in order to replace the existing 
monopolist.41 The “Schumpeterian competition” implies “temporary” monopolies and 
intensive competition on continuous innovation. In the argument, the IP system is 
considered to be efficient from a dynamic perspective, because it provides investors 
with economic incentives to invest in R&D and to disclose information about the 
innovations, and subsequently promotes the final access to the innovations. 

39 The homepage of WTO gives a very general explanation on the social purpose of IP regime. For 
Copyrights, “The main social purpose of protection of copyright and related rights is to encourage and reward 
creative work.” For trademarks, “The protection of such distinctive signs aims to stimulate and ensure fair 
competition and to protect consumers, by enabling them to make informed choices between various goods and 
services.” For Patents, “The social purpose is to provide protection for the results of investment in the 
development of new technology, thus giving the incentive and means to finance research and development 
activities.” And “A functioning intellectual property regime should also facilitate the transfer of technology in 
the form of foreign direct investment, joint ventures and licensing.” available at: 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/intel1_e.htm. See the precise economic justifications for various 
categories of IP in, e.g. Lionel Bently and Brad Sherman, Intellectual Property Law, 2nd ed (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004) at 32-7 (copyrights), 327-9 (patents), 699-702 (trademarks); Suzanne Scotchmer, 
Innovation and Incentives (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004) at 65-91, and William M. Landes and Richard A. 
Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law (Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 
2003). See other non-economic justifications for the IP system in, e.g., Justin Hughes, “The Philosophy of 
Intellectual Property,” Georgetown Law Journal 77 (1988): 287–366. 
40 See the definition of IP at the WTO homepage, i.e., IP are “the exclusive rights given to creators over the 
use of the creations of their minds for a certain period of time.” available at: 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/intel1_e.htm. 
41 See Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, 6th 1976 ed. (Routledge, 2006) at 
81-96 (Chapter 7 on “The Process of Creative Destruction”). 
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However, the statutory exclusivity granted by IP has always been questioned on the 
basis that it creates static inefficiency, distorted incentives and high transaction cost. 
First and intuitively, allowing innovators to charge a monopoly price creates static 
inefficiency. With the non-rivalry nature of knowledge, from the static perspective, 
productive efficiency is achieved when the market price is equal to the marginal costs 
of production and distribution. Charging the monopoly that exceeds the marginal cost 
of production restricts the access to knowledge and increases the cost of using 
knowledge. Therefore, the term of protection 42  and other specific eligibility 
requirements are brought into the legal system of IP as its basic policy, in order to 
achieve a balance between the social interests derived from providing economic 
incentives to creators and the social costs bought by limiting the free spread of 
knowledge and ideas. The benefits of widespread diffusion can be achieved when the 
term of protection expires.  
Second, IP protection may misallocate resources and impede innovation. Dasgupta and 
Stiglitz (1980) point out that the “Schumpeterian competition” might be too optimistic 
because the “monopoly power, once established, can easily be perpetuated”.43 The 
monopoly profit gives protected innovators distorted incentives to impede innovations 
in order to maintain or enhance their monopoly status. Instead of investing money into 
further R&D, monopolists may invest money into non-R&D related activities, such as 
marketing, raising rivals’ costs and overinvesting in applications for bad patents, only 
for the purpose of increasing the entry barriers to rivals.  
For example, some non-practicing “patent assertion entities” (PAEs) have emerged in 
the market. The PAEs generate revenue by asserting patents against business that are 
already practicing the patented technologies. The PAEs may have positive (as an 
intermediary between patent holders and users) or negative (as “patent trolls”) 
consequences. The patent trolls adopt an opportunistic patenting strategy, just aiming 
to generate payments from aggressively charging against inadvertent infringers 
(usually large companies) a price far beyond the actual value or contribution of the 

42 Despite the protection terms may vary in different jurisdictions, typically, copyright is protected for the 
author’s life plus 50 years or 70 years; a patent is protected for 20 years from the date of filing the application; 
a trademark in theory can last indefinitely but subject to registration renew. See the minimum standards in 
Article 33 of the TRIPS Agreement. 
43 See Partha Dasgupta and Joseph E. Stiglitz, “Uncertainty, Industrial Structure, and the Speed of R&D,” 
Bell Journal of Economics 11, no. 1 (1980): 1–28. 
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patents.44 The patent trolls’ misuse of the patent system brings in unnecessary and 
costly patent litigations.45 On the other side, in order to circumvent monopolies and 
these patent trolls, the rivals may make lots of unnecessary expenditure on getting 
around patents rather than on innovating for improvements. All the expenditure on 
monopoly enhancement, opportunistic patenting or circumvention, lowers welfare. 
Therefore there are a bundle of legal rules for restricting the patent holders’ capability 
of setting up a barrier to entry, such as the breadth of claims, the standard of novelty, 
as well as the procedures for granting and challenging patents. 
Third, the statutory monopoly power allows the IP owners to hold-up or gives rise to a 
typical “anti-commons” problem. The IP owners may hold-up in the negotiation for 
licensing or assignment for further developments or alternative applications.46 And 
the proliferation of fragmented IP rights may give rise to a typical “anti-commons” 
problem, which happens when a single object has numerous uncoordinated rights 
holders who can block each other and in the end no single party can make efficient use 
of the object.47 The hold-up and the anti-commons problem can result in underuse of 
the knowledge. The anti-trust law therefore imposes restrictions on licensing practices, 
settlement agreements and non-disclosure policy to prohibit IP owners from engaging 
in abusive and anti-competitive behaviors. 
Fourth, there are some other problems arising from the inherent design of the IP legal 
regime. From economic perspective, the optimal term of IP protection should vary 
from innovation to innovation (or at least from industry to industry) based on the 

44 See Tim Pohlmann and Marieke Opitz, “Typology of the Patent Troll Business,” R&D Management 43, no. 
2 (2013): 103–20.  
45 In eBay Inc. v Merck Exchange, L.L.C., the US Supreme Court holds that an injunction should not be 
automatically issued based on a finding of patent infringement alone; instead, the plaintiff must demonstrate 
entitlement to a permanent injunction under a traditional “four-factor injunction test”. Since eBay v Merck 
Exchange ended the Federal Circuit’s practice of automatically granting permanent injunctions for patent 
infringement, the non-practicing patentee’s capability of putting threat of an injunction simply for undue 
leverage in negotiations has been greatly reduced. See eBay v Merck Exchange (547 U.S. 388 (2006) and 
Jaideep Venkatesan, “Compulsory Licensing of Nonpracticing Patentees After eBay v. MercExchange,” 
Virgina Journal of Law & Technology 14, no. 26 (2009): 27–47. 
46 See Robin Feldman and Mark A. Lemley, “Do Patent Licensing Demands Mean Innovation?,” Iowa Law 
Review 101, no. 1 (2015): 137–189 (critizing the innovation hold-up problem caused by the IP protection and 
questioning if the licensing can facilitate innovation or technology implementation).  
47 See Michael A. Heller and Rebecca S. Eisenberg, “Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in 
Biomedical Research,” Science 280, no. 5364 (1998): 698–701 (pointing out that the proliferation of IP rights 
in biomedical research may paradoxically lead to fewer useful products for improving human health). 
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economic value and market demand of the underlying knowledge or innovation.48 
However, the current IP regime provides the same legal framework to all knowledge 
and innovations. The one-fits-all protection framework lacks the flexibility to reward 
corresponding to the social costs or benefits of the knowledge.  
Fifth, IP is a kind of intangible property created by law, without clear physical 
longitude or latitude. The difficulty in delineating boundaries results in numerous 
disputes over the ownership or infringement. The associated risks of infringement and 
litigation introduce uncertainty and bring high transaction cost to the enforcement of 
protection.49 
For all these benefits and costs, all legal rules and polices regarding IP always involve 
a trade-off between the dynamic efficiency derived from providing incentives for 
innovation and the final access to the innovations on the one hand, and the static 
inefficiency and other costs caused by the statutory exclusivity on the other hand. Any 
legal rules and policies regarding IP are justifiable only if the dynamic efficiency can 
offset the static inefficiency and costs.50 This trade-off should therefore always be 
kept in mind and be the main criteria for evaluating various legal rules in the 
remaining parts of this dissertation. 
2.1.2 External Funding - Information Asymmetries 
2.1.2.1 The “Valley of Death” and the “Funding Gap” for external finance 
Even though the “appropriability problem” has been solved or mitigated by IP 
protection or other incentive mechanisms, such as subsidies, tax incentives, prizes or 
public funding, R&D projects may still suffer the problem of getting “external” funds. 
For a long time a phenomenon of “valley of death” has been observed between 

48 The literature usually use the “ratio test” originally developed in Kaplow (1984) to evaluate and discuss 
the optimal level of protection, see Louis Kaplow, “The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal,” 
Harvard Law Review 97, no. 8 (1984): 1813–92. 
49 See Stiglitz (2008), “Economic Foundations of Intellectual Property Rights,” supra note 37 at 1711.  
50 At the WTO website, it emphasizes that “it should also be noted that the exclusive rights given are 
generally subject to a number of limitations and exceptions, aimed at fine-tuning the balance that has to be 
found between the legitimate interests of right holders and of users.” See at 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/intel1_e.htm. 
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research results and their application or commercialization.51 R&D projects usually 
require substantial investments and take a long period of time before generating 
earnings sufficient enough for further self-development. Many firms could face 
periodic financial deficits and need external funding when their internal funding dries 
up. This is especially true for those small and medium sized technology-driven firms, 
which have very limited internal funding. With the difficulty of getting external 
funding, many preliminary results from R&D projects, like publications, prototypes or 
patents, cannot be developed further to become real applications or products that can 
be exploited or distributed in the market. The valley of death obstructs research from 
having an actual impact on the society. Furthermore, as innovation is a dynamic 
process, there might be more than one “valley of death” throughout the long journey 
till the time of application or commercialization.52 
With empirical examination, Hall (2002, 2010) explains that the phenomenon of 
“valley of death” occurs because of the high cost of getting external finance for 
R&D.53 There is a “funding gap” for R&D investments, i.e., the external finance 
providers would ask for a higher rate of return than the internal finance. The 
informational asymmetry problem between external investors and innovators is 
considered as a core reason for the funding gap.54 The informational asymmetries are 

51 See, e.g., House of Commons of the United Kingdom, “Bridging the Valley of Death: Improving the 
Commercialisation of Research” (London, 2013), available at: 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmsctech/348/348.pdf at 8 (defining the 
"valley of death" as "the point where a business, often a technology based business, has a working prototype 
for a product or service that has not yet been developed enough to earn money through commercial sales. The 
company needs to find sufficient money to develop the prototype until it can generate sufficient cash, though 
sales to customer, that would allow it to be self sufficient and grow."). 
52 See House of Commons of the United Kingdom (2013) “Bridging the Valley of Death: Improving the 
Commercialisation of Research”, ibid, at 9-11. 
53 See the survey of the literature evidencing the “funding gap” in Hall (2002) “The Financing of Research 
and Development”, supra note 1 (positing that “it may still be difficult or costly to finance R&D using capital 
from sources external to the firm or entrepreneur. That is, there is often a wedge, sometimes large, between 
the rate of return required by an entrepreneur investing his or her own funds and that required by external 
investors. By this argument, unless an inventor is already wealthy, or firms already profitable, some 
innovations will fail to be provided purely because the cost of external capital is too high, even when they 
would pass the private-returns hurdle if funds were available at a ‘normal’ interest”). 
54 Another main factor is the high adjustment cost of knowledge investment, which is caused by the 
constitution of R&D expenditure. Salaries of highly educated scientists and engineers constitute a large 
percentage (in practice 50% or more) of the R&D expenditure. The departure of these crucial employees 
might seriously delay or completely fail on-going R&D projects. The innovators therefore tend to smooth 
their spending over time, for keeping their human resource stable but therefore cannot swiftly adjust their 
costs to market changes. The high adjustment cost increases the equilibrium rate of return required by 
external finance. See detailed discussions in Hall (2002) “The Financing of Research and Development”, 
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caused by the high degree of uncertainty regarding the outputs of R&D projects and 
the difficulty in exchanging useful information between innovators and external 
investors.  
2.1.2.2 High uncertainty in outcomes 
On the one hand, the nature of the output of R&D projects determines that there is 
high degree of uncertainty associated with the potential outcomes.  
First, R&D projects are inherently risky. There are great uncertainties associated with 
the value of specific knowledge of how to make new goods or services. Very few 
R&D projects can get desirable results. Even in the case of successful development, 
the market value of the results depends on the future markets and consumer 
behaviours, which are also difficult to predict. Empirical studies provide evidence that 
the value distribution of innovative knowledge is highly skewed, i.e., while only very 
few projects result in high returns, most turn out to have little or no value.55 
Second, the value distribution also changes over time during the R&D process. The 
uncertainties about the value distribution have an option-like character, i.e., they tend 
to be greatest at the beginning and gradually decrease with further development.56 
Whereas value distribution gradually becomes more certain throughout the time, a 
project that does not pass the test of an expected rate of return at the beginning may 
turn out to be very profitable later; and vice versa. For this reason, it is not very 
effective to use a test of the expected rate of return to screen out projects.  
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supra note 1; Charles P. Himmelberg and Bruce C. Petersen, “R & D and Internal Finance: A Panel Study of 
Small Firms in High-Tech Industries,” The Review of Economics and Statistics 76, no. 1 (1994): 38–51. 
55 See, e.g., Simon Kuznets, “Inventive Activity: Problems of Definition and Measurement,” in The Rate and 
Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors, ed. Richard Nelson (Princeton University Press, 
1962), 19–52 (the early literature evidencing the skewness of distribution of value among R&D projects);.F. 
M. Scherer and Dietmar Harhoff, “Technology Policy for a World of Skew-Distributed Outcomes,” Research 
Policy 29, no. 4–5 (2000): 559–566 (empirically research on the statistical distribution properties of the returns 
from invention and innovation); Gerald Silverberg and Bart Verspagen, “The Size Distribution of Innovations 
Revisited: An Application of Extreme Value Statistics to Citation and Value Measures of Patent Significance,” 
Journal of Econometrics 139, no. 2 (2007): 318–339 (by using patent licensing revenue data from European 
Patent Office (EPO) and United State Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) and taking the patent citations 
as a value indicator, showing that the overall distribution of innovations appears to be log-normal, and 
suggesting that the tails should be analysed by extreme value statistics). 
56 See Bronwyn H. Hall and Josh Lerner, “The Financing of R&D and Innovation,” in Handbook of Law and 
Economics Volume 1, ed. Bronwyn H. Hall and Nathan Rosenberg (Amsterdam: Elsevier-North Hollan, 
2010), 609–39. 
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Third, the actual value of the output is also exploitation-specific, i.e., some innovation 
might only be valuable in the hand of a specific exploiter, or with different valuations 
in the hands of different exploiters. Therefore, the capability of firms to realize the 
commercial potential and the efforts that the firms actually put in the R&D are crucial 
as to the resulting value.  
Faced with these uncertainties, asking for high premiums to cover the uncertainties 
and continuing to monitor and re-assess after providing the finance might help the 
financers to reduce the risk.57 Chung et al. (2003) show evidence that, in practice, a 
higher ratio of outside directors on the board and more financial analysts involved in 
the transaction seem to be able to reduce the negative effects of uncertainties.58 
However, these methods can greatly increase the transaction cost of external finance as 
well.  
2.1.2.3 Difficulty in conveying information to external investors 
On the other hand, many factors in practice obstruct innovators from conveying 
information to external investors and also impede external investors from assessing the 
innovators.  
First, it is difficult or very expensive for external financiers to make a specific 
evaluation. The uniqueness of innovation and the non-transparency of the markets for 
technology and IP (the appropriable format of innovative knowledge) make the 
external financiers unable to use any existing projects as references to evaluate the 
commercial potential of R&D investments. 59  As the actual value is also 
exploitation-specific, the external financiers have to access the capability of firms to 
realize the commercial potential. However, the assessment can be very difficult, 
especially for new firms without sufficient historical track records.  
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57 See OECD, Enquiries into Intellectual Property’s Economic Impact (Chapter 9 - IP-Based Financing of 
Innovative Firms), 2015, available at https://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/Chapter9-KBC2-IP.pdf, at 460. 
58 See Kee H. Chung, Peter Wright, and Ben Kediab, “Corporate Governance and Market Valuation of 
Capital and R&D Investments,” Review of Financial Economics 12, no. 2 (2003): 161–172 (with an empircal 
study, showing that "the market valuation of the firm's capital and R&D investments depends critically on 
analysts following and board composition, but not on institutional holdings"). 
59 Ashish Arora and Alfonso Gambardella, “Ideas for Rent: An Overview of Markets for Technology,” 
Industrial and Corporate Change 19, no. 3 (2010): 775–803 (pointing out there are no available market 
prices to drive information about value of technology or IPR; and emphasizing the importance of looking into 
"the demand for external technology, the role of uncertainty in technology markets, and the dynamic 
interaction between industry structure and the market for technology"). 
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Second, there is no effective way for small firms to signal their quality and credibility. 
Small firms are generally not publicly traded and do not have audited financial 
statements to share with external investors. Meanwhile, the lack of historical track 
records makes it basically impossible for start-up innovators to establish reputation 
either. Even for those firms with audited financial statements, the existing accounting 
standards and financial reporting standards make the corporate annual reports 
incapable of providing sufficient quantitative or qualitative information on intangible 
assets. For example, the International Accounting Standards (IAS) and the US 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) require firms to analyse all 
investments in research all at once, which is against the reality that R&D expenditure 
is usually spent smoothly over time and embedded in the human capital of the firm’s 
employees.60 This requirement removes the R&D expenditure off the balance sheet 
immediately, without indicating the associated economic benefits that would arise later. 
The off-balance sheet treatment of R&D expenditure and the invisibility of many 
valuable intangible assets in current accounting standards result in the corporate 
annual reports failing to accurately reveal information about innovators.61  
As a result, the market do not systematically nor correctly take into account R&D 
expenditure in their risk assessment and valuation, despite the fact that R&D expenses 
and the resulting intangible assets, especially IP, have become a dominant factor in the 
determination of the commercial value of businesses. The empirical study of Eberhart 
et al. (2004) provide that, although R&D expenses are beneficial investments, the 
market is slow in recognizing the extent of this benefit and investors tend to 
under-react, and are particularly slow in recognizing the relatively greater benefit to 
high-tech firms.62 In some countries, such as Italy, R&D investrment is not valued by 
the equity market or by the debt market.63 
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60 See Frey (2013) “Intellectual Property Rights And The Financing Of Technological Innovation: Public 
Policy and the Efficiency of Capital Market”, supra note 38 at 40; and OECD (2015) “Enquiries into 
Intellectual Property’s Economic Impact”, supra note 57 at 460. 
61 See Richard Petty and James Guthrie, “Intellectual Capital Literature Review: Measurement, Reporting 
and Management,” Journal of Intellectual Capital 1, no.2 (2000): 155-176. See further discussion on 
problems in accounting standards in Section 2.3.2.2 D. 
62 See Allan C. Eberhart, William F. Maxwell, and Akhtar R. Siddique, “An Examination of Long-Term 
Abnormal Stock Returns and Operating Performance Following R&D Increases,” The Journal of Finance 59, 
no. 2 (2004): 623–650 (examing a sample of 8,313 US cases between 1951 and 2001 and showing that the 
sample firms experience significantly positive "long-term" abnormal operating performance following their 
(unexpected) R&D increases, which implies an under-reaction to R&D expense; and the high-tech firms have 
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2.1.2.4 Adverse selection problem and moral hazard problem 
The aforementioned high degree of uncertainty and the difficulty of 
conveying/examining information give rise to the asymmetric information between the 
external investors and the internal innovators. The innovators are involved in the 
day-to-day management of their firms and thus have more information about the 
quality and states of their R&D projects, and the actual efforts they have invested in 
implementing the funded projects, than the external investors. These informational 
asymmetries regarding the quality of R&D projects and the innovators’ actual efforts 
can have a great impact on the cost of external finance.64  
From an ex ante perspective, before making the funding decisions, the inside 
entrepreneur has better information on the quality of the project (including its own 
capability in finishing the project) than the outside investors. There is a typical 
application of the “adverse selection” problem in a “lemon market”, which happens 
when the external investors cannot effectively differentiate the few good R&D projects 
from the large number of bad projects (the “lemons”).65 The external investors have to 
ask for an intermediate price at the pooling equilibrium, in order to compensate for the 
loss from picking a bad project and to ensure no negative payoffs on average. The 
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significantly higher long-term abnormal stock returns than low-tech firm, which implies an even more severe 
under-reaction in recognizing the relatively greater benefit to high-tech firms).  
63 See Bronwyn H. Hall and Raffaele Oriani, “Does the Market Value R&D Investment by European Firms? 
Evidence from a Panel of Manufacturing Firms in France, Germany, and Italy,” International Journal of 
Industrial Organization 24, no. 5 (2006): 971–993 (showing that R&D in publicly traded Italian firms is not 
valued by financial markets on average). Similarly, Elisa Ughetto, “Does Internal Finance Matter for R&D? 
New Evidence from a Panel of Italian Firms,” Cambridge Journal of Economics 32, no. 6 (April 9, 2008): 
907–925 (with an investment on the relationship between finance and R&D for a panel of more than 1000 
Italian manufacturing firms, the result shows that it is still the cash flow that plays an important role in 
explaining capital investment, especially for small firms. While Italy has a typical bank-based system, firms 
use virtually no debt to finance R&D at all). 
64  The financial constraints stemming from the informational asymmetry problem have been 
comprehensively discussed in theory. David De Meza and David C. Webb, “Too Much Investment: A 
Problem of Asymmetric Information,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 102, no. 2 (May 1, 1987): 281–
292 (showing that, when both equity and credit are available, with an appropriate choice of financial 
instrument, no credit or equity rationing would occur. Investors would prefer equity in the case of information 
asymmetry concerning the expected return of an investment, while preferring credit in the case of 
informational asymmetries concerning the risk of an investment). However, Thomas Hellmann and Joseph E. 
Stiglitz, “Credit and Equity Rationing in Markets with Adverse Selection,” European Economic Review 44, 
no. 2 (February 2000): 281–304 (demonstrating that if the informational asymmetries relate not only to the 
expected return but also to the risk of an investment, demonstrate that both credit and equity rationings can 
occur simultaneously and entrepreneurs would therefore face financing constraints). 
65 See George A. Akerlof, “The Market for ‘Lemons’: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism,” The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 84, no. 3 (1970): 488–500 (using “lemons” to refer to “bad products”, i.e. 
used cars with problems). 
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intermediate price includes the lemon premium against bad projects and therefore is 
too expensive for the good projects. But it is acceptable for the bad projects, which 
would have been asked for an even higher price in a separated equilibrium. So the 
intermediate price can trigger a chain reaction: it attracts firms with bad projects only 
while driving away those with good projects.  
From the ex post perspective, after the funding has been provided, there is a 
principal-agent relationship between the investors (as the principal) and the innovators 
(as the agent). The innovators have better information on the states of their R&D 
projects and on their efforts than the external investors. The intrinsic high degree of 
uncertainty regarding the R&D projects mentioned above and the investors’ lack of 
knowledge of the specific business allow innovators to easily justify the 
under-performance, additional unexpected costs, the need of shifting to riskier or 
conservative strategies. Since investors cannot effectively monitor and evaluate the 
performance of innovators, the funded innovators can take their informational 
advantages by acting opportunistically in their own interest at the expense of the 
interest of investors. For their own interests, the funded innovators may adopt riskier 
strategies, or be too risk-averse for short-term goals, or not work as hard as they 
should, or use the funds for other purposes. The asymmetric information regarding the 
quality of an R&D project and the actual efforts that the innovator put in the project 
makes it difficult for investors to know if the failure of an R&D project is a result of 
the project’s intrinsic risks or the innovator’s opportunistic behaviour. When it is the 
latter case, the external investors would have to bear the costs caused by the 
innovator’s opportunistic behaviour, that is, the “agency costs”. Then there would be 
the “moral hazard” problem, which is likely to occur when the external investors have 
greater interests in the firm than the internal innovators.66 
In a dynamic way, the ex post moral hazard problem further exacerbates the ex ante 
adverse selection. The ex ante concerns on the agency costs caused by the moral 
hazard problem push the rational external investors to require an even higher price, in 

66 See Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency 
Costs and Ownership Structure,” Journal of Financial Economics 3, no. 4 (1976): 305–360 at 333-343. It is 
interesting to mention that, as the most SMEs are managed by their own principal owners or partners, the 
conventional agency problems in corporate governance caused by the separation of ownership and control are 
irrelevant in most cases for SMEs. One exception may occur where external equity investors have greater 
interests in the firm than the internal managers. See Allen N. Berger and Gregory F. Udell, “The Economics 
of Small Business Finance: The Roles of Private Equity and Debt Markets in the Financial Growth Cycle,” 
Journal of Banking & Finance 22, no. 6–8 (1998): 613–673 at 629. 
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the form of a higher interest rate or expected return, for covering the agency costs. 
However, the higher price would drive good firms out of the market, or induce more 
risk-shifting behavior. Then only the less skilled or bad-faith innovators would accept 
those harsh conditions to finance their risker projects. External investors would find 
that raising the interest rate or expected return beyond a certain level would actually 
reduce the profitability of an investment, because of the worse application pool and the 
increased possibility of default. So the investors may restrict the supply of credit or 
equity even when they actually have sufficient funds to provide or when the firms 
would like to pay a higher price. R&D projects therefore suffer financial constraints, 
especially those conducted by small-and-medium technology-intensive firms, which 
suffer more severe informational asymmetries.67 
2.2 Alternative Financial Sources for Funding R&D Activities 
This thesis suggests promoting the use of IP as collateral in debt finance as a solution 
to the R&D external finance problem, and aims to examine and design legal rules for 
facilitating such use. Before discussing the pros and cons of using IP as collateral in 
debt finance, it would be helpful to have an overview of the alternative sources of 
funding available to high-tech firms. This overview will help to get a better 
understanding of how the problems of information asymmetry affect the cost and 
availability of external funding for SMEs, as well as how the other alternatives 
mitigate the problems. The understanding can help us to identify the conditions under 
which debt finance has comparative advantages over the alternatives and inspire us to 
explore how the use of IP as collateral in debt finance can mitigate the information 
problem.  
2.2.1 The Financial Growth Cycle of R&D Investment 
While the Modigliani-Miller Theorem implies that a firm’s capital structure is 
irrelevant in a perfect market,68 corporate finance theories and empirical studies agree 

67 See Hall and Lerner (2010) “The Financing of R&D and Innovation,” supra note 56; Dietmar Harhoff, 
“Are There Financing Constraints for R&D and Investment in German Manufacturing Firms?” In The 
Economics and Econometrics of Innovation, edited by Encaoua David, Bronwyn H. Hall, François Laisney, 
and Jacques Mairesse, 399–434. Boston, MA: Springer US, 2000 (the survey of German enterprises show 
that "the cash flow sensitivity of investment in small firms is likely to reflect financing constraints"). 
68  The Modigliani-Miller Theorem argues that, in a perfectly efficient market without informational 
asymmetries, taxes, bankruptcy costs or agency costs, the value of a firm is only determined by the real assets 
that the firm has, regardless of the firm’s capital structure. How the firm’s capital is raised, whether by debt 
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that asymmetric information between investors and firms would increase the costs of 
external finance and have impacts on the firms’ finance choice and capital structure.69 
Nevertheless, theoretical implications and practical reality do not always perfectly 
match about how the firm’s capital structures are affected. For example, the Pecking 
Order Theory implies that, where informational asymmetry is presumably an 
important problem, firms would prioritize their sources of financing: first internal 
funds, then debt, and equity as the last resort.70 In practice, however, there is no 
constant preference of debt over equity.71 Instead, it is observed that there is a 
financial growth cycle and the companies’ financial considerations on investment 
decisions and the available finance resources are different at various stages in the 
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or equity and whatever their proportions, affects only the division of cash-flows among investors, but not the 
firm’s costs of capital. The Modigliani-Miller Theorem is also referred as the “Modigliani-Miller Capital 
Structure Irrelevance Principle”. See the detailed discussion in Franco Modigliani and Merton H. Miller, 
“The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment,” The American Economic Review 
48, no. 3 (1958): 261–97. 
69 For a literature review on the how the asymmetric information problem have effects on firms’ finance 
choice and capital structure, see Milton Harris and Artur Raviv, “The Theory of Capital Structure,” The 
Journal of Finance 46, no. 1 (1991): 297–355. For a literature review on the empirical studies on the effects, 
see for example, Philippe Aghion et al., “Technology and Financial Structure: Are Innovative Firms 
Different?,” Journal of the European Economic Association 2, no. 2–3 (April 2004): 277–88. 
70 According to the Pecking Order Theory, firms firstly choose to use internal funds to finance their projects. 
Because of the lemon premiums and agency costs caused by the problems of adverse selection and moral 
hazard related to asymmetric information, internal finance would be cheaper than external finance and 
therefore be preferred. Secondly, in the case with insufficient internal funds, if being given the choice 
between equity and debt, managers would prefer debt to undervalued equity. With asymmetric information, 
investors cannot accurately value the equity being issued for financing growth opportunities. Investors would 
acquire equity only if the growth opportunity turns out to have a positive net present value (NPV) and also 
the new shares are not overvalued. However, managers who act on behalf of current shareholders would not 
issue undervalued new shares, in which case the value of the existing shares would be diluted and the value 
would be transferred from existing shareholders to new shareholders – the equity investors. On the other hand, 
debt investors have a prior claim on the firm’s assets and are less exposed to valuation errors. Debt investors 
would therefore ask for lower risk premiums. Mangers, who are optimistic about the future of the firm and 
believe that their equity is undervalued, would therefore prefer debt to undervalued equity. For this reason, 
the issue of new equity can be considered as a pessimistic signal. Lastly, only if debt becomes too costly, for 
example, in the case that the firm has already been highly leveraged and therefore faces a high risk of 
bankruptcy, equity finance would be used as a last resort to avoid financial distress. See the detailed 
discussion in Stewart C. Myers and Nicholas S. Majluf, “Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions 
When Firms Have Information That Investors Do Not Have,” Journal of Financial Economics 13, no. 2 
(1984): 187–221. 
71 Actually, Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) find strong support for the prediction of Pecking Order Theory 
in a sample of 157 firms that had traded continuously over the period 1971 to 1989. See Lakshmi 
Shyam-Sunder and Stewart C. Myers, “Testing Static Tradeoff against Pecking Order Models of Capital 
Structure,” Journal of Financial Economics 51 (1999): 219–44. However, some other empirical studies done 
with larger samples did not find such a constant preference, see, for example, Murray Z. Frank and Vidhan K. 
Goyal, “Testing the Pecking Order Theory of Capital Structure," Journal of Financial Economics 67, no. 2 
(2003): 217–248 (by testing a broad cross-section of publicly traded American firms for 1971 to 1998, 
finding no such a preference of debt over equity).  
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cycle.72 
In the context of financing technological innovation, companies’ financial preferences 
and options change throughout the financial growth cycle as follows,73 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Sources of funding throughout the growth cycle  
This graph shows that, while growing throughout the financial growth cycle, small 
technology-driven firms gain further experience and suffer less informational 
asymmetries. They gradually have better access to external finances. At the early 
start-up phase, firms mainly use internal funds to finance their projects and the 
external finance available at this phase is angel finance. From the late start-up phase to 
the middle growth phase, they can gain access to external private capital markets, 
including venture capital and creditor loans.74 Then those firms that are able to 
survive to the middle growth phase or continue to grow till the maturity phase can get 
external finances from the public capital markets for instance public equity and public 
debt market. Although the growth cycle does not fit all small business, it shows that, in 
general, equity finances are used more frequently than debt finances.  

72 See Berger and Udell (1998) “The Economics of Small Business Finance: The Role of Private Equity and 
Debt Markets in the Financial Growth Cycle”, supra note 66 at 629. 
73 See Frey (2013) “Intellectual Property Rights And The Financing Of Technological Innovation: Public 
Policy and the Efficiency of Capital Market”, supra note 38 at 43. 
74 It is noting that, in Berger and Udell (1998) “The Economics of Small Business Finance: The Role of 
Private Equity and Debt Markets in the Financial Growth Cycle”, supra note 66, the scope of debt finance is 
broadly defined, including not only those provided by financial institutions (commercial banks, finance 
companies; other financial institutions); but also those by non-financial business and government (trade credit, 
other business, and government) and those by individuals (principal owner, credit card, other individuals). 
However, in reality, the financial institutions contribute most of the external debt finance. 
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Before looking into IP collateralization, we firstly have a brief overview of the 
financing alternatives that a small technology-driven firm may face. The overview 
helps us understand how the information and incentive problems are addressed 
respectively and what the role of IP is in these alternative financing mechanisms.  
2.2.2 Internal Finance 
At the start-up phase, firms need substantial investments to start research and the 
preliminary operation. At this stage, the uncertainties regarding R&D projects are the 
highest. The commercial potential of the projects still relies on some preliminary ideas 
and few concrete project results would have been developed. In addition, external 
investors cannot trace sufficient previous operation history or reputation record of the 
innovator. They thus have difficulty in evaluating the profitability of the project and 
the credibility of the innovator. Moreover, the performance of the project at this 
early-stage is not easily observable or verifiable for outsiders. External investors thus 
find that it would be hard to figure out whether the on-going project is doing well or 
not. The adverse selection problem and the moral hazard problem stemming from 
asymmetric information are the most serious at this stage.  
The funding gap between internal finance and external finance caused by the 
asymmetric information problem is therefore the largest at this phase. The cost of 
external finance is greatly increased by the transaction costs of information disclosure 
and contracting. However, these costs can be avoided in the case of internal finance. So 
it is natural to predict that the internal finance is the main resource for firms at this 
stage. This predication is also evidenced by empirical studies. For example, 
Himmelberg and Petersen (1994) and Harhoff (2000) demonstrate that there is a 
significantly positive correlation between R&D projects and internal finance at this 
phase.75 Companies mainly rely on their internal funds to finance their operation, such 
as cash flows, loans from friends and family members, as well as bank loans with 
personal guarantees. 76  These empirical observations are consistent with the 
implication of the Pecking Order Theory: internal funds are preferred first.  
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75 See an empirical study in the US in Himmelberg and Petersen (1994) “R&D and Internal Finance: A Panel 
Study of Small Firms in High-Tech Industries”, supra note 54; See an empirical study in Germany in Harhoff 
(2000), “Are There Financing Constraints for R&D and Investment in German Manufacturing Firms?”, supra 
note 67. 
76 See Berger and Udell (1998) “The Economics of Small Business Finance: The Role of Private Equity and 
Debt Markets in the Financial Growth Cycle”, supra note 66 at 626 (noticing that despite some empirical 
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The funding gap between internal finance and external finance caused by the 
asymmetric information problem is the largest at this phase. However, the fact is that 
“technology companies usually have to invest heavily before they can demonstrate the 
potential to be profitable”.77 Therefore, while internal funds are insufficient, the 
innovators have to look for expensive external finance.  
2.2.3 Angel Finance 
In the case of informational asymmetries, equity finance is expected to be a very 
expensive external financing method for R&D projects, since their equity would be 
systematically undervalued by external private equity investors or in the public capital 
market. In the standard form of the Pecking Order Theory, with inadequate internal 
funds and asymmetric information, debt finance would be preferred to equity finance. 
However, this order seems to be reversed in practice. In practice, at the early start-up 
phase, the main (or in many cases the only) external financial resource is angel finance, 
a kind of direct private equity investment from angel investors.  
Angel investors typically consist of high net worth individuals, such as retired 
entrepreneurs or executives. Angel finance market is an informal market. Each angel 
investor or angel group has its own speciality, usually the industry sector they have 
stayed in for a long period. At the start-up phase, the innovators provide a formal 
business plan based on their preliminary production idea to angel investors for 
attracting investment. Angel investors rely on their business acumen and experiences 
to select projects in their specialized fields. In many cases, angel investors might even 
know the feasibility and marketability potential of the R&D projects better than the 
innovators themselves, who might lack prior research, production or marketing 
experience and tend to be over-optimistic about their projects.78 OECD’s report (2015) 
points out that, in the angel investors’ selection, “the presence of IPR can be a strong 
signal of the firm’s potential: angel investors are typically interested in the protection 
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studies have shown that, although financial institutions (commercial banks, finance companies; other 
financial institutions) do provide a lot of business loans to small start-up firms even without tangible assets as 
collateral, most of these loans are pledged by personal collaterals or guarantees given by inside owners of the 
start-up firms. So, much of the “external” debt finance from financial institutions is in fact a kind of “internal” 
finance supported by the inside owners personal assets.  
77 See House of Commons of the United Kingdom (2013) “Bridging the Valley of Death: Improving the 
Commercialisation of Research”, supra note 51 at Report para 26, Written Evidence 123, intro, and Written 
Evidence 153, para 6. 
78 See Andrew Wong, Mihir Bhatia, and Zachary Freeman, “Angel Finance: The Other Venture Capital,” 
Strategic Change 18, no. 7–8 (2009): 221–230. 
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of the technology and the barriers to entry granted by patents of copyrights. Also, the 
firms that attract angel investor are normally very small, and IP could be the only asset 
such firms have that can be evaluated objectively”.79 
After the selection of projects, angel investors then use their own money, experience 
and network to provide finance, valuable management advice and important contacts. 
The advice and counsel that angel investors provide are considered to be quite 
important. However, on average angel investors do not demand as much control as 
venture capitalists do and bring less financial expertise to the firm; and the angel 
market tends to be restricted to the local area to mitigate the information problem.80  
Angel investments usually take the form of equity investments or convertible debt 
contracts but do not employ contractual design to safeguard their investment. They 
reply more on common equity claims, which do not offer any protection in case of 
bankruptcy. 81  This is because angel investors care more about the industrial 
development in specific business sectors and the average return rather than the money 
returns on each individual investment. So, they measure risk and profit at the 
aggregate portfolio level rather than the specific project level. They establish project 
portfolio and use the high return from the rare successful projects to cover the loss in 
most failed projects. They typically target R&D companies with very significant 
upside potential and demand high returns on their exit strategy defined in the 
investment contract.82 For offsetting the extremely high risks and the potential of 
equity dilution from future investment rounds, angel investors demand high returns. 
Over the last twenty years, for reducing the search cost and expanding the fund 
pooling for larger investments, networks of angels have emerged in order to share deal 
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79 OECD (2015) “Enquiries into Intellectual Property’s Economic Impact”, supra note 57 at 462. 
80 See Berger and Udell (1998) “The Economics of Small Business Finance: The Role of Private Equity and 
Debt Markets in the Financial Growth Cycle”, supra note 66 at 630. 
81 See Catherine Casamatta, “Financing and Advising: Optimal Financial Contracts with Venture Capitalists,” 
The Journal of Finance 58, no. 5 (2003): 2059–2085. 
82 Despite their better capacities in identifying good projects and nurturing firms, angel investors still face a 
high risk of project failure. For example, in the United States, 27% companies invested by angel funds ended 
up in bankruptcy in 2007. The “best practices” are considered to be 20-30 times return over a 5-7 year 
holding period. However, even requiring such a high rate of return, the actual effective internal rate of return 
for a successful portfolio is typically only 20-40%. And The main exit strategies include initial public 
offering (IPO) and merger and acquisition (M&A). In 2007, 4% angel investors exited via IPO and 65% 
exited via M&A. See Jeffrey E. Sohl, The Angel Investor Market in 2007: Mixed Signs of Growth (report of 
the Center for Venture Research at the University of New Hampshire), (2008), available at: 
https://paulcollege.unh.edu/sites/paulcollege.unh.edu/files/2007_Analysis_Report_0.pdf. 
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flow and due diligence work.83 
At the early start-up phase, because of the lack of any tangible or intangible assets, 
established credibility and production history, debt finance and other alternatives are 
basically unavailable. With the absence of an alternative choice, a firm would accept 
the very costly angel finance if it can be selected by angel investors. The reality is that 
angel investors are typically interested in small businesses in high-growth and 
high-risk sectors. It has developed into an important financial resource for start-up 
high-tech companies to finance R&D activities, especially in the UK and the US.84 
The vast majority of start-up firms in other places just simply cannot get access to 
angel finance and therefore may not be able to survive to the later phases.  
2.2.4 Venture Capital 
When it comes to the late start-up phase and the growth phase, a firm which has been in 
business for a certain period of time and has obtained some preliminary results from its 
R&D project may still need finance for further research, product development, initial 
marketing, or market expansion. The risks at these phases are lower than at the early 
start-up phase but still significant, because the firm has a short operation record and may 
still have not established any earning history yet. Angel finance may not be available 
any more, because the angel investor’s high-return demand becomes too expensive for 
firms and angel investors are usually not interested in firms at these phases. At this 
phase, the firms in private ownership mainly go to the venture capital market, which is 
more formal than the angel finance market, for external resources.85 
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83 See William R. Kerr, Josh Lerner, and Antoinette Schoar, “The Consequences of Entrepreneurial Finance: 
Evidence from Angel Financings,” Review of Financial Studies 27, no. 1 (2014): 20–55. 
84 For example, in the United States 2012, 268,160 active individual investors invested in total $22.9 billion 
into 67,030 companies. The average angel investment size was $341,800 and the average equity received was 
12.7 percentage. See Jeffrey E. Sohl, “The Angel Investor Market in 2012: A Moderating Recovery 
Continues,” 2013, https://paulcollege.unh.edu/sites/paulcollege.unh.edu/files/2012_analysis_report.pdf.; see 
also OECD (2015) “Enquiries into Intellectual Property’s Economic Impact”, supra note 57 at 462.  
85 Venture capital finance can be traced back to the formation of the American Research and Development 
Corporation in 1946. The industry boomed in the US during the late 1970s and early 1980s, mainly due to 
regulatory changes that allowed pension fund managers to invest in high-risk assets. In 1979 the Department 
of Labor reinterpreted the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) to permit pension fund 
investment in venture capital, under the “prudent man rule”, i.e. the managers measure risk at the aggregate 
portfolio level and hence the investment in venture capital is allowed provided it does not endanger the entire 
portfolio. See Samuel Kortum and Josh Lerner, “Assessing the Contribution of Venture Capital to Innovation,” 
The RAND Journal of Economics 31, no. 4 (2000): 674–92. 
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Venture capital (VC) is a kind of intermediated private equity investment, where the 
VC management firms act as financial intermediary and advisory firms. The VC 
management firms pool funds from institutional investors and wealthy individuals, by 
joining partnerships for a certain long duration. In the partnerships, the general partners 
usually consist of senior managers of the VC management firms while the limited 
partners are the actual fund providers. The VC management firms channel the pooled 
funds to target firms by means of equity capital contributions. Empirical research shows 
that venture capitalists typically accompany the target firms to growth for up to ten 
years.86 At the end of the period, venture capitalists exit the funding relationship and 
liquidate their holdings by selling these target firms to corporate acquirers or by taking 
the firms public via initial-public-offering (IPO). Ultimately, venture capitalists 
distribute the profits back to fund providers. Venture capitalists generate most of their 
profits by taking the very few successful firms to go public via IPO and try to time IPO 
when stock market valuations are relatively high.87 If a VC management firm does not 
do well and the whole project portfolio turns out to be in loss, the firm may have to 
return the remaining back to the original investors or get liquidated.  
The VC firms mitigate the information problems in funding R&D projects by their 
active involvements in screening, contracting, monitoring and value adding.88 First, 
they are specialized in particular business sectors and diligently scrutinize young firms 
before providing capital. Their expertise and the positive signal from prior angel 
investors allow them to undertake pre-investment screening to alleviate the ex ante 
adverse selection problem.89 Second, VC firms employ contractual clauses, such as 
representation on the board of directors, disproportionate allocation of control to VC 
firms and negative covenants coupled with veto power at shareholder meetings, as the 
control mechanisms to allow them to achieve an intense monitoring over the on-going 
operations and to take effective interventions in necessary situations.90 Third, VC firms 
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86 See Leslie A. Jeng and Philippe C. Wells, “The Determinants of Venture Capital Funding: Evidence 
Across Countries,” Journal of Corporate Finance 6, no. 3 (2000): 241–289; Gompers et al., “Venture Capital 
Investment Cycles: The Impact of Public Markets,” Journal of Financial Economics 87, no. 1 (2008): 1–23. 
87 Ibid. 
88 See e.g. Hall and Lerner (2010) “The Financing of R&D and Innovation”, supra note 56; Steven N. 
Kaplan and Per Strömberg, “Venture Capitalists As Principals: Contracting, Screening, and Monitoring,” 
American Economic Review 91 (2001): 426–30. 
89 They tend to invest in firms that have been funded by angel finance in the prior phases. See Berger and 
Udell (1998) “The Economics of Small Business Finance: The Role of Private Equity and Debt Markets in 
the Financial Growth Cycle”, supra note 66 at 630. 
90 See Tereza Tykvová, “What Do Economists Tell Us about Venture Capital Contracts?,” Journal of 
Economic Surveys 21, no. 1 (2007). 
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use staged capital infusion to align their interests with firms in order to control the ex 
post moral hazard problems. After providing the starting funds in the first stage, each 
subsequent stage of investment is conditional on achieving some specified “milestones” 
set out in the previous round. Fourth, the active involvement in the management of the 
target firms enables venture capitalists to transfer their expertise and add value to the 
target firms.91 They bring in professional management expertise, participate in strategic 
planning, provide managerial advice, and sometimes are even directly involved in 
operational decision making. Fifth, venture capitalists often hold extensive control over 
the personnel appointment, the recruitment and replacement of key managers, in the 
funded firms to protect themselves from being held-up by the insider managers.92 All 
these control mechanisms help reduce not only the lemon premium and agency costs but 
also the endogenous uncertainty caused by the firm’s efforts. VC funds, whether private 
or government-sponsored, have become necessary intermediaries to allocate resources 
to industries that are of paramount importance to the long-term prospects of economies 
but might not be able to be funded because of the high risk of failure associated with 
them.  
However, as summarised by Hall and Lerner (2010), several problems restrict the 
application of venture finance as a generally applicable solution to bridge the funding 
gap. First, just like angel investors, venture capitalists are also very selective and 
mainly target several in just a few the high-risk & high-profit industrial sectors, such 
as software, telecommunications and biotechnology, 93  where VCs can provide 
substantial managerial contribution.94 Second, since an active and efficient public 
stock market for smaller companies is essential for the VC firms to exit with profits, 
VC finance has a very restricted application in several countries with highly developed 

91 Many empirical studies show that the firms backed by venture capital have a better performance than those 
funded by other alternative financial sources. The assessment has been done from many perspectives, 
including survival rate, employment and sales growth, stock market performance. See an overview of the 
empirical studies at Gordon C. Murray, “Venture Capital and Government Policy,” in Handbook of Research 
on Venture Capital, ed. Hans Landstroom (Edward Elgar, 2007), 113–154 at 132-134. 
92 See Thomas Hellmann, “The Allocation of Control Rights in Venture Capital Contracts,” The RAND 
Journal of Economics 29, no. 1 (1998): 57–76. 
93 See, for example, George W. Fenn, Nellie Liang, and Stephen Prowse, “The Private Equity Market: An 
Overveiw,” Financial Markets, Institutions and Instruments 6, no. 4 (November 1997): 1–106 (finding that 
VC backed-firms going public are much more likely to be in the computer-related and medical-related 
industries). 
94 See Jean-Etienne de Bettignies and James A. Brander, “Financing Entrepreneurship: Bank Finance versus 
Venture Capital,” Journal of Business Venturing 22, no. 6 (2007): 808–832 (VC tends to be preferred to bank 
finance when VC productivity is high and entrepreneurial productivity is low). 
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public equity markets for IPOs only, mainly in the UK, the US and Israel.95 Third, 
stock markets also suffer information problems and therefore systematically 
undervalue the intangible investments of technology-driven companies, although the 
R&D spending is associated with subsequent abnormally good operating 
performance.96 Fourth, the firms should be ready to sacrifice a lot of their sovereignty 
in management and personnel in exchange and may have to suffer the problems caused 
by the conflicting interests of the VC investors.97 
In summary, VC finance is also an important but very expensive financial source with 
limited applications for funding R&D projects. It is most attractive to innovators who 
need a large amount of urgent money for their high-risk & high-profit projects and 
want to share the risk with less risk-averse investors, but is not suitable for innovators 
who have medium-risk & medium-profit projects, nor for those who want to keep 
ownership and control of their firms. And the VC investments are often too large for 
start-up firms in some fields. The overwhelming majority of technology-intensive 
firms just simply have no chance to get access to venture capital at all.98 
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95 See OECD (2015) “Enquiries into Intellectual Property’s Economic Impact”, supra note 57 at 462. 
Nevertheless, even in the two main markets, after the “.com” bubble broke at the early 2000s, raising large 
amounts of money through IPOs is not easy any more. 
96 See William A. Sahlman, “The Structure and Governance of Venture-Capital Organizations,” Journal of 
Financial Economics 27, no. 2 (1990): 473–521 (providing that venture capital discounts typically in the 
range of 25% to 50%.). 
97 See House of Commons of the United Kingdom (2013) “Bridging the Valley of Death: Improving the 
Commercialisation of Research”, supra note 51 at Report, para 28-29 (pointing out that, after getting money 
from venture capital, the original entrepreneurs usually see their interest in the company diminish very fast, 
even to 50% only; and venture capital usually develop companies just for the sole purpose of selling them); 
Hellmann (1998) “The Allocation of Control Rights in Venture Capital Contracts”, supra note 92 (noticing 
that staged finance may encourage the entrepreneur to focus on short-term goals instead of wealth 
maximization). Sophie Manigrat, Katleen Baeyens, and Wim Van Hyfte, “The Survival of Venture Capital 
Backed Companies,” Venture Capital 4, no. 2 (2002): 103–124 (taking the survival of a sample of 565 Belgian 
VC backed companies and 565 comparable non-VC backed companies, showing that VC backed companies do 
not have a higher probability of surviving than comparable non-VC backed companies, because VC companies 
manage their investments on a portfolio basis not a specific case, and they do not care much about reducing risk. 
The interests of the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist may diverge, especially when the business activities 
are not developing as expected). 
98 Every year, only six to eight hundred of the total two million new businesses in the United States can get 
venture capital funding. See Berger and Udell (1998) “The Economics of Small Business Finance: The Role 
of Private Equity and Debt Markets in the Financial Growth Cycle”, supra note 66 at 629; see the discussion 
on the venture capital in China in, e.g., Jun Zhang, “Venture Capital in China,” in China as an Innovation 
Nation, ed. Yu Zhou, William Lazonick, and Yifei Sun (Oxford University Press, 2016), 68–97. 
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IP can play a prominent role in the context of VC finance in many perspectives.99 At 
the pre-investment selection stage, firms use IP to signal to the VC investors their 
“superior technological capabilities of the management” and the “prospect of future 
profits”.100 During the funding period, IP can be taken as a performance criterion to 
assess if the funded firm has achieved the milestones set out in the staged capital 
infusion plan. At the exit stage, a well-defined patent strategy may help alleviate the 
under-pricing in the IPO process, but to a lower extent.101 
2.2.5 Debt Finance  
In the debt finance, the lending investor (as the creditor)102 provides a certain amount 
of capital as a loan, and the borrowing firm (as the debtor) is obligated to repay a fixed 
amount, i.e., the principal loan plus the agreed interest rate, at the end of the loan term. 
Both of the creditor and the debtor know how much they would get or repay. 
Compared to equity finance, debt finance does not cause a dilution of ownership or 
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99 See the comprehensive summaries of the existing literature on the signaling effect of patents in attracting 
venture capitalists in Daniel Hoenig and Joachim Henkel, “Quality Signals? The Role of Patents, Alliances, 
and Team Experience in Venture Capital Financing,” Research Policy 44, no. 5 (2015): 1049–1064 at 1051; 
and also in Hanna Hottenrott, Bronwyn H. Hall, and Dirk Czarnitzki, “Patents as Quality Signals? The 
Implications for Financing Constraints on R&D,” Economics of Innovation and New Technology 25, no. 3 
(2016): 197 – 217 at 199-200. 
100 See Sebastian Hoenen et al., “The Diminishing Signaling Value of Patents between Early Rounds of 
Venture Capital Financing,” Research Policy 43, no. 6 (2014): 956–989 (suggesting that the signalling effect 
of patents might be strong at the first round of VC investment, since the information asymmetries are most 
severe at this stage); David H. Hsu and Rosemarie H. Ziedonis, “Resources as Dual Sources of Advantage: 
Implications for Valuing Entrepreneurial-Firm Patents,” Strategic Management Journal 34, no. 7 (2013): 
761–781 (providing that a startup's patent application stock positively correlates with the investor estimation 
of start-up value; and arguing that the signaling value of patents is contingent on the strength of alternative 
quality signals in a start-up's resource bundle, and therefore is particularly important for ventures without 
alternate means of conveying quality and matters more in the early rounds of VC funding). However, some 
other literature show different results, for example, Hoeing and Henkel (2015) “Quality Signals? The Role of 
Patents, Alliances, and Team Experience in Venture Capital Financing” supra note 99 at 1051 (after having 
surveyed 102 European VCs investing in German high-tech startups, finding no indication that patents serve 
as technology signals in attracting VC financing. Note: the authors admit that they cannot control for other 
signaling functions, such as professionalism or technical know-how of the entrepreneurial team; but they also 
think the other signaling effects are of minor importance for venture capitalists). 
101 See Michael B. Heeley, Sharon F. Matusik, and Neelam Jain, “Innovation, Appropriability, and the 
Underpricing of Initial Public Offerings,” The Academy of Management Journal 50, no. 1 (2007): 209–225 
(showing that the impact of patents on reducing information asymmetries at the IPO stage with regard to the 
potential value of a firm and its innovative effort is significant only when the link between patents and 
inventive returns is transparent). 
102 For making the legal analysis in the later sections clearer and more formal, this thesis makes a distinction 
between pre-lending relationship and post-lending relationship. The parties in the pre-lending relationship are: 
borrower and lender. Their correspondents in the post-lending relationship are: debtor and (un)secured 
creditor. 
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control, and hence would be most attractive to small and medium firms, which are 
usually owner-managed.103 
In accordance with the Pecking Order Theory, technology-driven firms, especially 
those with a high intangible-to-total assets ratio, would prefer debt to equity in funding 
R&D projects.104 Nevertheless, the reality is that equity finances like angel finance 
and venture capital seem to be more commonly used despite their very high costs. This 
discrepancy comes from the fact that, in the standard form of the Pecking Order 
Theory, it is implicitly assumed that debt finance is an available option and the cost of 
debt is generally lower than the cost of undervalued equity. However, in the case of 
funding R&D projects of technology-intensive firms, the implicit assumptions may not 
always be true.  
When making a lending decision, the lender has to assess the risk of the loan and 
calculate the interest rate, depending on the inherent risk of the project and also the 
capability and efforts of the borrower. Section 2.1.2.4 has explained how the 
asymmetric information concerning the project, the capability and efforts of the 
borrower can result in the “adverse selection” and “moral hazard” problems in all 
kinds of external finance. The worse thing is that the highly risky nature of R&D 
projects and the fixed repayment nature of debt make the problems especially severe 
in debt finance. These problems seriously shrink the availability credit in a form of 
“credit-rationing”.105 
The seminal work of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) explains that “the interest rate a bank 
charges may itself affect the riskiness of the pool of loans by either: 1) sorting 
potential borrowers (the adverse selection effect); or 2) affecting the actions of 
borrowers (the incentive effect).”106 Lenders would find that raising the interest rate 
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103 See House of Commons of the United Kingdom (2013) “Bridging the Valley of Death: Improving the 
Commercialisation of Research”, supra note 51, Report, para 33 (finding that even large firms find issuing 
debt is attractive because “they can make a return on investment over long time period and choose investors 
that share in their objectives, all without reducing the equity stake of existing shareholders.”). 
104 See the discussion on Pecking Order Theory in supra note 70. 
105 The term of “credit rationing” in the dissertation is defined the same as in Joseph E. Stiglitz and Andrew 
Weiss, “Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information,” The American Economic Review 71, no. 3 
(1981): 393–410 at 394-5 (stipulating "We reserve the term credit rationing for circumstances in which either 
(a) among loan aapplicants who appear to be identical some receive a loan and others do not, and the rejected 
applicants would not receive a loan even if they offered to pay a higher interest rate; b) there are identifiable 
groups of individuals in the population who, with a given supply of credit, are unable to obtain loans at any 
interest rate, even though with a larger supply of credit, they would."). 
106 See Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) “Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information,” ibid. 
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beyond a certain level would actually reduce the expected return, since the increased 
interest rate can amplify the “adverse selection” and lead to more severe “moral 
hazard”, which consequently increases the possibility of default. Therefore, at a certain 
interest rate, rational lenders would prefer to limit the supply of credits, although they 
actually have sufficient funds to provide and there are demands for higher interest 
rates.  
Below we give a literal explanation on the reasoning in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) for 
credit rationing. The explanation is also the foundation of the discussion in Section 2.4 
for arguing why IP assets are good collateral. 
2.2.5.1 Adverse selection problem  
The interest rate of a loan is determined by the risk of this lending for the lender, 
which depends on the quality of the project to be funded and the borrower’s capacity 
of undertaking the project (hereafter “the quality of loan applicant”). However, in the 
case with imperfect information about the quality of the loan applicant, the interest 
rate itself can affect the riskiness of loan applicants in the pooling equilibrium.  
When a borrower approaches a potential lender, the borrower typically assures the 
lender that - this is a good project; it has the capacity to finish the project with desired 
results; the investment project will generate sufficient positive net value; and it will 
pay back the lender. However, as the borrower has better information about the quality 
of the project and its capability of undertaking the project than the external lender, its 
assurance may not always be credible to the lender. As borrowers cannot credibly 
communicate their risk type through observable characteristics, it is difficult for the 
lender to observe the capability of the borrower or to verify the borrower’s assurance. 
The lender cannot effectively distinguish good projects from bad projects, or 
distinguish honest borrowers from dishonest ones.  
Therefore, in the pooling equilibrium, the lender has to ask for an intermediate interest 
rate (including the lemon premium against bad projects/borrowers). The intermediate 
interest rate can trigger adverse selection, i.e., it attracts bad projects or dishonest 
borrowers (lemons) only while driving away those with good projects or honest 
borrowers. Lenders would find that raising the interest rate beyond a certain level 
would actually reduce the expected return, since the increased interest rate can amplify 
the “adverse selection” and lead to a worse application pool and the increased 
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possibility of default.107 
However, the high uncertainties in the outcomes of R&D investments (Section 2.1.2.2) 
and the difficulty of conveying/examining information (Section 2.1.2.3) give rise to 
more severe information asymmetries, which make the credit-rationing problem 
caused by adverse selection much more severe in debt finance for R&D activities. 
First, the risk of lending to R&D activities is very high for the lenders. Debt finance 
has a feature that the repayment to the creditor is fixed in the loan contract. If the 
project succeeds, the lender gets the fixed amount, i.e., the principal loan plus the 
agreed interest rate in the loan contract; if the project fails, the lenders only gets what 
is recovered from the salvage value of the remaining, which might be less than the 
principal loan or even nothing. Therefore, unlike equity funders, lenders have no 
incentives to gamble on a risky investment for a higher return. They particularly prefer 
to fund firms that have low-risk projects, have predictable and stable cash flows, or 
have assets or intermediate outputs with higher redeployability in case of distress, in 
order to lower the probability of failure or to ensure repayment in the case of failure. 
However, R&D investments are highly risky by its nature. Furthermore, the majority 
of the investment goes to the human resources and knowledge accumulation, which 
have very low redeployability in case of distress. Once the projects fail, the lenders do 
not get much recovery from the salvage value at all. Therefore, the lender has to ask 
for high interest rates just for compensating for the high risks they are taking, even for 
good-quality borrowers. 
Second, with the highly skewed distribution of outcomes from R&D investments (i.e., 
while a large percentage of R&D investments result in very little or no economic value, 
only a relatively very small portion of R&D investments would result in high value), 
most loan applicants would be with low quality. If a pooling equilibrium could be 
reached, the immediate interest rate would be particularly high for good loan 
applicants. More likely, the high interest rate just drives all good loan applicants out of 
the market, and no pooling equilibrium can be reached at all.  
Debt finance is therefore either very costly for R&D investments, or even unavailable. 
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107 See also Akerlof (1970) “The Market for ‘Lemons’: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism,” 
supra note 65 and the accompanying text. 
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2.2.5.2 Moral hazard problem  
The risk of lending also depends on the borrower’s actual efforts in the project after 
getting the loan. In the case with imperfect information about borrowers’ actual efforts, 
a high interest rate can induce borrowers to take opportunistic decisions at the cost of 
the lenders. 
Debt finance has a feature that the repayment to the creditor is fixed in the loan 
contract. The fixed debt repayment determines that, if the project succeeds, all residual 
gains after the repayment accrue to the borrower; if the project fails, all the loss is 
borne by the lender. Therefore, in the case with asymmetric information concerning 
the borrower’s efforts in the project, an unmonitored borrower (and its equity investors) 
may make ex post opportunistic decisions, even though the strategy greatly increases 
the probability of failure and actually has a negative net present value. The borrower 
may choose to invest in riskier projects, in the hope of getting a higher return in the 
unlikely case of success in order to get higher expected private interests 
(“risk-shifting”).108 The lender does not share the potentially higher returns but has to 
bear the higher expected loss caused the increased probability of failure. Also, the 
borrower may choose to be lazy and exert low efforts, which can bring the borrower 
with the private benefits from saving the cost of exerting efforts, but can increase the 
probability of failure and also the lender’s expected loss.  
With the anticipation of the debtor’s opportunistic behavior, the creditors may ex ante 
further increase the interest rates as the moral hazard premium to cover the additional 
risk. However, the higher interest rates, in turn, may ex ante amplify the “adverse 
selection” further by attracting lower quality borrowers and also ex post induce more 
opportunistic behaviour, which consequently increases the probability of failure and 
may actually lead to a reduction in profits to the lender. In the end, lenders would 
prefer to ration credit supply rather than increase the interest rate. 
2.2.5.3 Shortage of tangible collateral  
Credit rationing is an equilibrium market response for rational lenders in the case with 
imperfect information, but not a “desired outcome for society”. The market 
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108  See Jensen and Meckling (1976) “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and 
Ownership Structure,” supra note 66 (referring that the debtors have the “overinvestment” incentive to 
gamble with creditor’s money).  
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equilibrium reached under credit rationing does not clear the market and leaves market 
with excess demand for credit at the equilibrium interest rate, even in the case with 
sufficient credit supply. As a result of the imperfect information on the risk type of 
applicants, identical applicants may be treated differently. Of all the applicants who 
appear to be identical, some receive a loan and others do not, and the rejected 
applicants would not receive a loan even if they offered to pay a higher interest rate; 
and in extreme cases, some groups just cannot get access to credit at all.109 Credit 
rationing is associated with high social cost because many social wealth-enhancing 
transactions may be forgone just for the shirking of credit with imperfect information. 
Collateral is commonly used in debt finance as a solution to alleviate the credit 
rationing problem. It is used as an important complementary selection criterion and 
disciplinary tool to mitigate the information asymmetries underlying the credit 
rationing (see further discussion in Section 2.4). In the secured debt finance, collateral 
is provided by the grantor (in most cases the borrower itself or sometimes a third party 
associated with the borrower) to the lender, for guarantying the payment of the debt. 
Then the lender (as the secured creditor) gets some legal claims or equitable rights, 
known as “security interests”, over the encumbered collateral. Upon the default of the 
borrower, the security interests entitle the secured creditor to seize, sell or follow other 
statutory procedures to dispose of the encumbered collateral.110 The essence of 
security interests is that the secured creditor should be vested with the priority to 
receive the payments from the disposition of the encumbered collateral, as being paid 
off the secured debt. Through this way, the secured creditor is guaranteed to receive 
adequate repayment in the event of the debtor’s default (or at least have some recovery, 
so the overall lending risk is lower).  
However, providing tangible assets as collateral is one of the biggest obstacles for 
technology-intensive firms to get access to debt finance.111 Technology-intensive 
firms often have valuable intangible assets like IP but have difficulty in providing 
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109 See the definition of “credit rationing” in supra note 105. 
110 See Lipton (2002) “Intellectual Property in the Information Age and Secured Finance Practice”, infra note 
154 at 358 (pointing out that: “At its most basic secured [debt] finance involves the manipulation of rights 
and obligations in property to give a loan financier additional comfort over and above the borrower’s 
contractual obligations to repay the loan with interest (and penalties where applicable). What the lender 
fundamentally requires is some legal or equitable right in the property that will allow it to take hold of the 
property on default by the borrower, and on-sell it to a third party to recoup its lending losses.”). 
111 See Iwan Davies, “Secured Financing of Intellectual Property Assets and the Reform of English Personal 
Property Security Law,” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 26, no. 3 (2006): 559–83. 
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sufficient traditional tangible collateral that the lenders would like to accept. Therefore, 
financial institutions typically constrain lending until the balance sheet of the firm 
contains more tangible assets. Such a credit-rationing problem is especially severe for 
firms that are both recently established and small, which suffer the most severe 
information problems, and need external funding the most but may have the least 
tangible assets. For these high-tech SMEs, debt finance is costly or simply unavailable. 
That is one of the main reasons that equity finance dominates over debt finance.112 
The credit-rationing problem would result in severe macroeconomic social loss. 
Mancusi and Vezzulli (2014) use an economic model and empirical survey evidence to 
show that, ceteris paribus, credit rationing has a greater affect on the R&D 
participation decision than on the level of R&D spending decision.113 It means that 
when facing credit rationing, R&D investors tend to abandon some projects, instead of 
spreading out money and investing less on each project. This finding implies that a lot 
of R&D investment opportunities with great potential for knowledge creation and 
wealth accumulation may totally be foregone, not just be delayed.  
Expanding the availability of debt finance for R&D activities are of great social 
importance, especially if we take into account the fact that, in almost all countries, the 
traditional debt market is substantively more important than the venture capital market 
from a quantity perspective. 114  The most beneficial party would be these 
technology-intensive firms with medium-growth & medium-risk R&D projects, which 
are the majority of R&D projects but beyond the reach of angel finance and venture 
capital, especially for those in countries with bank-based financial systems. These 
firms do not grow exponentially any more, but they keep growing and become more 
stable. They can also have dramatic economic effects on “employment, tax revenue 
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112 See Andrew Winton and Vijay Yerramillib, “Entrepreneurial Finance: Banks versus Venture Capital,” 
Journal of Financial Economics 88, no. 1 (2008): 51–79 (finding that equity finance dominates over bank 
finance when the firm's development strategic uncertainty is high, the probability of success is low and the 
liquidation value from collateral is low).  
113 See Maria Luisa Mancusi and Andrea Vezzulli, “R&D and Credit Rationing in SMEs,” Economic Inquiry 
52, no. 3 (2014): 1153–1172 (examining the effects of credit rationing on R&D investment by using survey 
and account data of a large sample of Italian manufactural SMEs; the result shows that creditng rationing has 
a signifant negative effect on both the probability of setting up R&D activities and the level of R/D 
investment; and the effect on the former is larger). 
114 See, for example, Katleen Baeyens and Sophie Manigart, Follow-on Financing of Venture Capital Backed 
Companies: The Choice between Debt, Equity, Existing and New Investors, Vlerick Leuven Gent Working 
Paper Series 2006/05, 2006 (showing that, in Belgium, a country whose financial and institutional settings are 
bank-centered, debt is the most important source of funding for young technology-intensive firms. A firm 
only raises equity when its debt capacity is exhausted, as the last resort).  
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and everything else”.115  Therefore, helping these firms with medium-growth & 
medium-risk get funds from investors and banks can have significant economic benefit 
for the society. 
2.3 Overview of Using IP as Collateral in Debt Finance  
2.3.1 General Discussion  
2.3.1.1 Justifications for IP collateralization 
As a response to the lack of assets as collateral in debt finance, creating security 
interests over IP has been proposed as a solution to reduce the cost of debt finance for 
funding R&D projects, because IP are the most valuable but also maybe the only 
valuable assets of many technology-intensive SMEs. Harhoff (2011) points out that 
allowing IP, the “intermediate results of innovation processes”, to be exploited for 
supporting external finance can alleviate the financial constraints that R&D projects 
are facing.116 In practice, four main categories of IP-based debt finance have been 
employed: the mainstream IP-backed lending (otherwise also called IP 
collateralization), IP securitization,117 IP sale and lease back,118 and venture debt119. 
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115 See House of Commons of the United Kingdom (2013) “Bridging the Valley of Death: Improving the 
Commercialisation of Research”, supra note 51, Report, para 34 (emphasizing the social importance of 
helping these firms getting funds). 
116 See Dietmar Harhoff, “The Role of Patents and Licenses in Securing External Finance for Innovation,” in 
Handbook of Research on Innovation and and Entrepreneurship (Elgar Original Reference), ed. David B. 
Audretsch et al. (Edward Elgar, 2011), 55–73 (positing “If a market for intermediate results of innovation 
processes existed, then the financing constraints of innovative firms would presumably be less pronounced. 
Intermediate results could be licensed, sold, leased or become part of other financial transactions, which 
would relax the financing constraints problem.”) 
117 In an IP securitization transaction, an “originator” firm transfers IP asset or the rights to its projected 
revenues (e.g. royalties) to a “special purpose vehicle” (SPV), which then issues securities in the capital 
markets in its own name but the fund raised is channeled back to the originating company. The securities 
issued by the SPV are in theory separated from the firm’s risks and therefore can receive more favorable 
credit ratings. The transaction is structured in order to help the originating firm improve the chance of getting 
finance or lower the cost of finance. The most famous case of IP collateralization is the “David Bowie bonds” 
in 1997. However, it might be a choice for large IP-portfolio with stable cash flows and in very few countries 
with sophisticated finance markets for structured transactions. Very few successful cases have been 
established. See, e.g., Nicole Chu, “Bowie Bonds: A Key to Unlocking, the Wealth of Intellectual Property,” 
Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal (Comm/Ent) 21 (1998): 469–500; John M. Jr. 
Gabala, “Intellectual Alchemy: Securitization of Intellectual Property as an Innovative Form of Alternative 
Financing,” John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law 3, no. i (2003): 307–330. 
118 In an “IP sale and lease back” transaction, the debtor sells its IP to the creditor (with a restrictive term 
that gives the debtor the option to buy back the IP asset at a predefined price) in exchange for immediate 
funding. Then the debtor get a license back from the creditor for the continued use of the underlying 
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In essence, the role of IP as collateral in these mechanisms is the same; the three latter 
mechanisms are just more advanced derivatives of the first mechanism.  
In principle, for being able to be used as collateral, an asset only needs to satisfy two 
conditions. First, it has economic value, for both the debtor and the secured creditor. 
Second, it can be separated from the business of the grantor/debtor and be 
independently assigned in case of financial distress. Historically, the typical assets 
encumbered are tangible assets that meet the two basic criteria, such as real estates, 
plant, equipment, inventories, or automobiles. IP can be used as collateral because they 
also meet the two basic criteria.  
For the first criterion, IP do have economic value for both the IP holder-debtor and the 
secured creditor. The temporary statutory exclusivity given by the IP laws allows IP 
holders to restrict access to the knowledge/innovation they produce and to charge for a 
monopoly price (or licensing fee) that exceeds the marginal cost for an authorized 
access. This statutory exclusivity is designed to enable innovators to cover their initial 
investment and to drive profits. So, it clearly has economic value to the IP 
holder-debtor. Meanwhile, the statutory exclusivity might be wanted by other players 
in the market in order to use the underlying invention or to exclude others from using 
it. It therefore also has liquidation value to the secured creditor.  
For the second criterion, as there is no general statutory restriction on the assignability, 
IP can be separated from the business of the innovator and be independently 
assignable or disposable when the obligations cannot be fulfilled. Upon the debtor’s 
default, the secured creditor can execute its security interests over the encumbered IP. 
The security interests allow the secured debtor to liquidate the encumbered IP through 
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encumbered IP. This kind of transaction may impose on the creditor too many burdens regarding maintaining 
and protecting the encumbered IP and therefore is less common in practice. See Federico Munari, Cristina 
Odasso, and Laura Toschi, “Patent-Backed Finance,” in The Economic Valuation of Patents: Methods and 
Applications, ed. Federico Munari and Raffaele Oriani (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011), 309–
36. 
119 In a venture debt transaction, the venture debt providers combine their loans with warrants for the right to 
purchase equity. This structure combines the properties of debt and equity. It has the same effect as a 
convertible debt contract. The warrants give the debt providers the right to convert the debt claim into equity. 
This structure allows the debt provider to get refund from the liquidation in the case of default and to share 
profits in the case of success. The profit sharing helps reduce the cost of loan. Venture debt providers are 
specialized banks or non-bank lenders. See, e.g., Darian M. Ibrahim, “Debt as Venture Capital,” University of 
Illinois Law Review 4 (2010): 1169–1210.  
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certain statutory procedures and to get repaid from the liquidation value prior to other 
junior creditors, for recouping its lending losses.  
2.3.1.2 Direct benefits of IP collateralization 
Using IP as collateral in debt finance has some obvious benefits. For individuals and 
companies that have valuable IP but lack sufficient traditional tangible assets, using IP 
as collateral facilitates them to gain better access to low-cost credit. First, it enables 
IP-intensive firms to use the “intermediate results of innovation processes” to increase 
the value of their collateral portfolios and consequently increases their chances of 
accruing a greater incremental capital at better rates.120 Second, it offers IP-intensive 
firms a faster way to improve their liquidity. In the normal way of IP exploitation, 
materializing the cash flow from an IP licensing or sale may take years. Using IP as 
collateral in debt finance allows these firms to collect the present value of future cash 
flows in a lump sum today rather than waiting until the time of their materialization. In 
other words, it provides IP-intensive firms with a faster way to unlock the monetary 
value of their IP assets for supporting the working capital needs in times of financial 
difficulty. Third, it may also help IP-intensive firms to share some of the risk 
associated with the exploitation of IP to some lenders (note: not risk-shifting121).122 
From the social perspective, this risk-sharing would be socially beneficial if lenders 
are in a better position in monitoring or controlling the risk associated with the 
exploitation of IP than the IP holders (i.e., being the cheaper risk-avoiders). Although 
most lenders usually do not directly get involved in post-lending monitoring or 
controlling, some specialized lenders may do have their advantages in these matters.  
Using IP as collateral in debt finance is expected to be most helpful for those 
innovative firms between the late start-up phase and the growth phase. After the early 
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120 See Harhoff (2011) “The Role of Patents and Licenses in Securing External Finance for Innovation,” 
supra note 116. 
121 We make a distinction between “risk-sharing” and “risk-shifting”. Risk-sharing happens when both 
parties engage in some actions that are for some reasons not explicitly contractable. With proper contractual 
design, the parties are correctly induced by economic incentives to share risk aims at minimizing the 
efficiency loss by making both parties residual claimants. Risk-shifting happens when one party is induced to 
intentionally shift its own risk to another party for its own benefits, as discussed in 2.2.5 that a debtor is 
induced to choose highly risky actions to shift the additional cost of increased risk to the lender. See, e.g., 
Saltuk Ozerturk, “Risk Sharing, Risk Shifting and the Role of Convertible Debt,” Journal of Mathematical 
Economics 44, no. 11 (2008): 1257–1265. 
122 See Joseph A. Agiato, “The Basics of Financing Intellectual Property Royalties,” in From Ideas to Assets: 
Investing Wisely in Intellectual Property, ed. Bruce M. Berman (New Jersey: John Wiley and Sons, 2002), 
423 ff. 
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start-up phase, innovative firms might have already obtained some valuable patents. 
By then, the uncertainty and risk regarding their R&D still exist but have also 
decreased to a lower level that might be acceptable for traditional banks and financial 
institutions. As mentioned at Section 2.2.5, debt finance does not lead to any dilution 
of the ownership or dramatic change of the current equity structure, which does 
happen in angel finance and venture capital. Using IP as collateral in debt finance 
would be especially attractive for firms which have already obtained some valuable IP 
but still need further external finance to get the capital necessary to further their 
research, technological application or to expand their market, but do not want further 
dilution of ownership.  
For lenders such as commercial banks and financial institutions, accepting IP as 
collateral may help them spread their investment risk and find new profit sources. This 
advantage is especially attractive against the backdrop of the economic development. 
For now, as a consequence of the global financial crisis in 2008, banks and financial 
institutions tend to squeeze credits and display caution vis-à-vis those traditional 
categories of assets that investors used to invest in during the past years, such as real 
estate. One of the lessons we can learn from the sub-prime crisis is that there is no 
completely safe collateral (the secured transaction over real estates is called a 
mortgage). The debt risk can be reduced by accurate risk-assessment and 
asset-diversity. “Some IP commentators find IP to be less correlated with the broader 
financial market than traditional asset classes like real estate and commodities”.123 
Therefore, accepting valuable IP as collateral can help lenders diversify their 
investment portfolios. Furthermore, accepting IP as collateral may also give fund 
providers an important opportunity to invest in the technological economy through 
lending money to IP holders, which has lower risk than directly participating in equity 
finance.124  
As to the development of IP as a whole, using IP as security in debt finance may have 
beneficial macro-economic effects. With funds secured by IP, borrowers can further 
their on-going R&D activities. Amable et al. (2010) employ a model to show that the 
assignment of patents as collateral determines the savings of firms and can magnify 
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123 The citation is from Singapore IP Steering Committee (2013) “Intellectual Property (IP) Hub Master 
Plan: Developing Singapore as a Global IP Hub in Asia,” infra note 134 at Para 3.3.5. 
124 See Tao Dong, Research on the System of Intellectual Property Securitisation (⸕䇶ӗᵳ䇱ࡨॆࡦᓖ⹄
ウ) (Beijing: Tsinghua University Press, 2009. 
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the effect of innovative rents on investment in R&D.125 It reveals that, when faced 
with random and lumpy investment in R&D, high growth rates of innovations may be 
achieved with the use of patents as collateral, despite the financial constraints. 
Realizing the potentials of IP in attracting debt finance, innovative firms are ex ante 
incentivized to invest more in the creation and management of IP assets for future 
funding.126 In order to be able to share profits from the high growth rates of 
innovations, banks and financial institutions are also called upon to be more 
enthusiastic for getting more familiar with IP in order to enhance their professional 
competence in evaluating and monitoring IP.127 From the perspective of dynamic 
efficiency, these benefits of using IP as collateral in promoting investment in 
innovation would be even more obvious in the long run.  
2.3.1.3 Practice of IP collateralization 
Given the aforementioned benefits, IP collateralization has been practiced in many 
jurisdictions for a long time. 
In the United States, the precedents of IP collateralization can even be traced back to 
the 1880s when Thomas Edison used his patent for the incandescent electric light bulb 
as collateral to borrow money for starting his own company, the General Electronic 
Company. 128  The pervasive use of IP collateralization helps companies raise 
significant financing. Relecura (2015) reviews 896,254 patent-based transactions 
comprising 333,577 patents happening from 2009 to 2014, and finds several main 
trends: (1) the key companies securing loans using patents include General Motors, 
Avago, Alcatel Lucent and Kodak; (2) as banks are the primary financing entities 

125 See Bruno Amable, Jean-Bernard Chatelain, and Kirsten Ralf, “Patents as Collateral,” Journal of 
Economic Dynamics and Control 34, no. 6 (2010): 1092–1104. 
126 See Jeffrey R. Kuester and Lawrence R. Thompson, “Risks Associated with Restricting Business Method 
and E-Commerce Patents,” Georgia State University Law Review 17 (2001): 657 at 688 (evidencing that one 
of the main reasons for businesses attempting to patent e-commerce software is to increase their chances of 
obtaining finance from lenders); Gaétan Rassenfosse, “How SMEs Exploit Their Intellectual Property Assets: 
Evidence from Survey Data,” Small Business Economics 39, no. 2 (January 13, 2012): 437–452 (based on an 
international survy done by the European Patenting Office, showing that attacting investors or licensing is 
one of the main ‘monetary motivations’ for the surveyed SMEs to apply for patents).  
127 See Keith E. Maskus et al., “Intellectual Property Rights and Economic Development in China,” In 
Intellectual Property and Development: Lessons from Recent Rconomic Research, edited by Carsten Fink and 
Keith E. Maskus, 295–331. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005 at 295. 
128 See Shawn K. Baldwin, “"To Promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts": A Role for Federal 
Regulation of Intellectual Property as Collateral,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 143, no. 5 (1995): 
1701–1738 at 1701. 
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involved in these transactions, other financial institutions, like investment banking, 
venture capital, and financing arms of companies are also providing IP backed 
financing; (3) JP Morgan Chase, Bank of America, Citigroup, Wells Fargo, 
Wilmington Trust, and Deutsche bank are the top financing entities advancing loans to 
companies with patents as collateral; (4) government institutions and Union Trust, for 
example the U.S. Treasury and the UAW Retiree Medical Benefits Trust, have 
advanced IP backed loans as well; (5) the active sectors employing IP backed 
financing include digital data processing, digital communication, IT methods for 
management, telecommunication, semiconductors, and television & video 
transmission.129 
In Germany, preliminary statistics show that from 2001 to 2005 about 40 transactions 
with the amount of EUR 140 million were concluded and realized in the Landesbank 
Rheinland-Pfalz, which has accepted technical documentation of research projects as 
additional collateral for the financing of R&D projects of medium size companies. In 
addition, since 2006 Germany’s Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin) has 
begun to allow banks to accept patents as a sole security for bank lending.130  
In Japan, the use of IP as collateral for bank loans was led by the Development Bank 
of Japan (DBJ), which is a government-related bank in charge of making and 
implementing national economic policies. In 1995, in order to promote the cultivation 
and development of start-up companies, the DBJ in cooperation with private financial 
institutions began to provide IP-based long-term loans to Japanese SMEs to assist 
them in “utilizing their IP for bridging loans and leverage purposes”.131 According to 
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129 The Top 10 US companies raising financing from patents-backed transactions (by the number of patents 
used as collateral) are: General Motor (15,866), Avago Technologies (12,946), Alcatel Lucent (10,023), 
Kodak (8,438), Freescale (8,149), Seagate (5,910), Dell (4,609), Avaya (3,162), Chrysler (2,914), Ps4 Luxco 
(2,313). And the Top 10 financing entities providing funds with accepting patents as collateral (by the 
number of patents used as collateral) in the US are: JP Morgan Chase (48,804), Bank of American (46,897), 
Citigroup (34,658), Wells Fargo (32,716), Wilmington Trust (31,369), Deutsche Bank (27,172), Credit Suisse 
(18,758), The Bank of New York Mellon (16,142); GE Capital (12,774); US Treasury (12,212). Digital data 
processing (11.33%), digital communication (9.79%) followed by medical devices (5.76), semiconductors 
(5.36%) and transportation (5.23%) are the key industries involved in the transactions related to IP backed 
financing. See the report at Relecura, “Relecura IP Intelligence Report: IP Backed Financing Overview of 
Trends,” 2015, https://relecura.com/reports/IP_Backed_Financing.pdf.  
130 See Shigeki Kamiyama, Jerry Sheehan, and Catalina Martinez, “Valuation and Exploitation of Intellectual 
Property,” in OECD Science, Technology and Industry Working Papers, 2006/05, 48. OECD Publishing, 
2006.  
131 See Masatoshi Kuratomi, “Intellectual Property and Bridging Loans: Their Emerging Roles in Venture 
Finance and Business Rehabilitation in Japan,” in Risk Management and Innovation in Japan, Britain and the 
United States, ed. Ruth Taplin (New York: Routledge, 2005), 162–74. 
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preliminary statistics, from 1995 to March 2004, more than 230 IP-based loans with a 
total amount of ¥13.2 billion had been granted by the DBJ to facilitate venture firms. 
Moreover, another loan program was established by the DBJ in 2004 to advance its 
achievements in IP collateralization.132 
For large firms in the United Kingdom, IP secured finance has been a common 
practice. For instance, “large organisations including Philips, GKN, Costain, Diageo 
and TUI have adopted imaginative structures that leverage IP and/or the income 
streams derived from it.”133  
And many other jurisdictions have adopted different polices to promote IP 
collateralization.  
For example, in Singapore’s plan of becoming a “Global Hub of IP” for IP transactions 
and management in 2013, “introducing an IP financing scheme, where the value of the 
IP assets of the borrower would be partially underwritten by the Government to 
encourage banks to accept them as collateral in support of the loan” has been included 
in the main strategies of increasing access to IP financing.134 In 2014, a US$70 million 
Intellectual Property Financing Scheme (IPFS) was launched by the Intellectual 
Property Office of Singapore (IPOS) to support local businesses to use their granted 
patents, granted trademarks and copyright related rights as collaterals for bank 
loans.135 Within the scheme, the IPOS decided to partially underwrite the loans issued 
by participating financial institutions (PFIs), including the AFC Merchant Bank, DBS 
Bank Ltd, Oversea-Chinese Banking Corporation Ltd and United Overseas Bank Ltd. 
With the underwriting of the government, banks do not need to bear all the risk in case 
of default. The IPOS has also established a panel of nine valuers to help local companies 
discover the worth of their intangible assets.136 In the end of May 2016, the first case of 
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132 See Masatoshi Kuratomi (2005), ibid. 
133 See “Intellectual Property Awarenes Network (IPAN) Briefs on Topical Intellectual Property Issues-Brief 
18: Intellectual Property, Finance and the Economy,” no. April (2016): 58–64, 
http://ipaware.net/sites/default/files/IPAN_Issue-briefs_2016_003503_apr16.pdf, at 62. 
134  See Singapore IP Steering Committee, “Intellectual Property (IP) Hub Master Plan: Developing 
Singapore as a Global IP Hub in Asia,” April 2013, https://www.ipos.gov.sg/Portals/0/Press Release/IP 
HUB MASTER PLAN REPORT 2 APR 2013.pdf, at Recommendation 2-1 and Para 3.3.10. 
135 See more information about the Intellectual Property Financing Scheme of Singapore at the website of the 
Intellectual Property Office of Singapore, available at, 
http://www.ipos.gov.sg/IPforYou/IPforBusinesses/IPFinancingScheme.aspx. 
136 The nine valuers are: Baker & McKenzie.Wong & Leow, CONSOR Intellectual Asset Management, 
Deloitte & Touche Financial Advisory Services Pte Ltd, Duff & Phelps Singapore Pte Ltd, Ernst & Young 
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loan application using IP as collateral was approved in Singapore to a local company, 
Masai Group International, funded by DBS Bank Ltd, one of the four PFIs supported by 
the IPFS scheme.137 The IPOS has extended the IPFS scheme for another two years till 
31 March 2018, as expecting more applications for IP collateralization. 
Similarly, in 2013, the Malaysia Government also launched an Intellectual Property 
Financing Scheme, with the support of a US$65 million fund administered by Malaysia 
Debt Venture, specifically for enabling SMEs to “use their IPRs as an additional source 
of collateral to obtain funding and spurring more investments for companies with 
technology capabilities, in turn encouraging innovation.” 138  The scheme allows 
companies to leverage their IP to secure financing of up to US$2.25 millon, or 80% of 
the value of their IPR, whichever is lower, for the maximum period of 5 years. Under the 
scheme, the government provides a 2% interest subsidy and a guarantee of 50% of the 
loan via the Credit Guarantee Corporation Malaysia Berhad. The Intellectual Property 
Corp of Malaysia was mandated to handle the related IP valuation matters.  
Among all these promoting efforts from the government, the results in China are the 
most significant. Since 2008, the Chinese government initiated a national pilot-scheme 
on exploring different policies encouraging IP collateralization, such as using 
mechanisms like interest subsidies and intermediary services to reduce the cost of IP 
collateralization for SMEs, establishing professional financing service platforms, and 
promoting cooperation between valuation institutions and banks. With the facilitation of 
these efforts, IP collateralization has achieved remarkable growth. In 2015 alone, the 
total amount of loans secured by patents reached RMB 56 billion (approximately 
US$8.1 billion) (see more detailed discussion in Section 4.2.1). 
Many Chinese practitioners have accumulated substantial experience in handling IP 
collateralization. For example, in October 2006, the Beijing Branch of the Bank of 
Communications, the Jingwei Law Office of Beijing, the Liancheng Assets Appraisal 
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Solutions LLP, EverEdge Global (NZ) Ltd, KPMG Services Pte Ltd, PricewaterhouseCoopers Advisory 
Services Pte Ltd, Valuation Consulting LLP. Ibid. 
137 See more information at the IPOS IP Financing Scheme Media Release 2 June 2016: Cash for intellectual 
property through loan financing now a reality in Singapore, available at, 
http://www.ipos.gov.sg/MediaEvents/Readnews/tabid/873/articleid/340/category/Press%20Releases/parentId
/80/year/2016/Default.aspx 
138 See more information about the key features of the Intellectual Property Financing Scheme at the 
homepage of the Malaysia Debt Venture (MDV), available at, 
http://www.mdv.com.my/en/product-services/government-schemes/intellectual-property-financing/. 
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Co., Ltd and the Beijing Zihexin Insurance Ltd. formally signed a four-party 
agreement to build a united service platform named Zhanyetong to carry out a routine 
finance service concerning IP collateralization.139 Throughout the years, the platform 
has developed a routine procedure for IP collateralization (with the use of facilitation 
from the government). The routine procedure has been employed by many other 
Chinese banks as well. 
 
Figure 2.2 Event flowchart of IP Collateralization in China (Zhanyetong Platform) 
At the global level, IP collateralization has been accepted as a way of exploitation in 
law. A survey conducted in 2006 by the International Association for the Protection of 
Intellectual Property (AIPPI) on contracts regarding IP rights, such as assignments, 
licenses and security interests, shows that “in the great majority of countries IP rights 
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139  See more information at the website of Bank of Communications: 
http://www.bankcomm.com/jh/cn/newRecommend/zyt.html;  
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can be used to provide security.” 140  Another survey conducted by the World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) in 2009 on the practice of IP financing also 
shows that the laws in 40 out of the 66 respondent Member States do have legal 
provisions addressing using IP as collateral in debt finance.141  
2.3.2 Obstacles to IP Collateralization in Practice 
Although IP collateralization may appear promising and has been practiced for a long 
time in many jurisdictions, its prevalence in practice is still below expectation. The 
European Commission’s survey on European commercial banks in 2000 shows that, 
although with permission in the legal text, none of the 50 respondent banks “routinely 
accepts intangible assets as collateral for loans to new technology-based firms” at that 
time.142 Scholars have long studied the factors that contribute to the reluctance of 
financial institutions to accept IP as collateral, mainly the associated legal risks and the 
uncertainty in the value of IP.  
2.3.2.1 Legal uncertainties in IP collateralization 
A. Risk of litigation over the encumbered IP 
When a lender accepts an IP as collateral, he has to realize that he might have a high 
risk of facing litigations over the ownership, validity or infringement. As discussed in 
Section 2.1.1.1, knowledge itself is non-rival and non-exclusive. The regime of IP 
protection is designed to establish the statutory exclusivity to enable the innovators to 
gain profits, in order to solve the appropriability problem in R&D investment. 
However, this kind of statutory exclusivity has no clear physical boundary. The 
difficulty in delineating boundaries results in numerable disputes. 
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140  See Luis-Alfonso Duran, “Question 190, Guidelines for National and Regional Group Reports,” 
International Association for the Protection of Intellectual Property (AIPPI), 2006, available at: 
https://www.aippi.org/?sel=questions&sub=listingcommittees&viewQ=190#190. 
141 See WIPO, “WIPO Questionnaire on Security Interests in Intellectual Property,” in WIPO Information 
Paper on Intellectual Property Financing & Annex, WIPO/IP/FIN/GE/09/7 (Geneva, 2009), 129–157, at 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/copyright/en/wipo_ip_fin_ge_09/wipo_ip_fin_ge_09_7-annex1.pdf.. 
142 See European Commission, Funding of New Technology-Based Firms by Commercial Banks in Europe 
(Luxembourg: Office for Offcial Publications of the European Communities, 2000), at 44 (this survey 
interviewed branches of 50 commericial banks in Europe which are geographically close to science parks 
where one would expect to see many new technology-based firms. The bank interviewed include large 
national banks and small regional institutions. The survey shows that "good practice … does not extend to 
accepting IP as security primarily because banks feel unable to realise any residual value"). 
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As a starting point, not all forms of IP are subject to registration; for example, the 
copyright protection over creative expressions is granted without prior registration. 
This kind of automatic protection system is created for providing effective protection 
to creators, but also gives rise to the difficulty for potential lenders to ascertain the 
ownership and content of the encumbered IP.  
For registered IP, a successful registration and a grant of IP protection do not 
necessarily guarantee the validity of the IP protection. There still exists the risk of 
being challenged or being invalidated subsequent to the initial grant. For example, a 
registered trademark may be challenged as being “generic”, while a patent may be 
challenged as lacking novelty, inventiveness or industrial applicability. 143  The 
technological boundaries described in the patent claims which “are too broad or not 
detailed enough can increase the likelihood of overlapping with other patents and can 
create doubts regarding the real applications of the invention.”144 The risk of being 
challenged is actually very high nowadays, especially when invalidating IP has already 
become a common defense strategy used by the defendants in IP-related 
proceedings.145  Once an IP is found invalid or unenforceable, its capability of 
bringing cash flow and liquidation value would just disappear.  
And even for valid IP protection, the rules of joint ownership or ownership 
presumption, or ways of exploitation (for example, the licensing relationship can bring 
in the involvement of third parties such as licensors or licensees of the borrower), can 
multiply the complexity of the above problems (see more detailed discussion in 
Section 3.3.2.2), and lead to disputes over ascertaining the ownership or validity of the 
encumbered IP. 
Allison et al. (2004) have done a comprehensive study comparing the characteristics 
of patents that ended up in litigation with those having not been litigated.146 The 
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143 Article 27 (1) of the TRIPS Agreement provides that only inventions satisfying the statutory requirements 
of patentability that are novel (has not been previously patented), involve an inventive step over past 
inventions (not be obvious), and be capable of industrial application (be useful) can be awarded valid patents.  
144 The citation is from the OECD (2015), “Enquiries into Intellectual Property’s Economic Impact (Chapter 
9 - IP-Based Financing of Innovative Firms)”, supra note 57 at 466. 
145 See Jacqueline Lipton, “Security Interests in Intellectual Property,” in The Reform of UK Personal 
Property Security Law: Comparative Perspectives, ed. John de Lacy (Oxon: Routledge-Cavendish, 2010), 
285–307 at 300. 
146 See John R Allison et al., “Valuable Patents,” Georgetown Law Journal 92, no. 3 (2004): 435–80 (The 
whole sample was comprised of approximately three million unlitigated patents and around 6,800 litigated 
patents involving in infringment litigation terminated in 1999 or 2000. The refined comparision looked into a 
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empirical study reveals that litigation tends to occur to patents having more total 
claims, independent claims, backward citations (references cited in the patent), and 
forward citations (references to the patent made by later patents).147 These identified 
characteristics are also commonly considered to be the patent value indicators.148 
Their finding reveals a significant positive correlation between litigation and patent 
value. In other words, it implies that these patents that are valuable to be used as 
collateral are also the common targets for patent litigation. Therefore, the risk of 
litigation is a crucial factor that lenders have to be aware of when they accept patents 
as collateral. The result is consistent with the interesting observation from Hoenig 
(2012), who finds that the fund providers “who have experienced a patent lawsuit or 
hold a law degree appreciate patents much less than their peers”.149 
Allison et al. (2004) also show that patents issued to individuals and small companies 
are substantially more likely to be litigated than those originally issued to large 
corporations.150 The observation implies a higher litigation risk in patents to small 
business. This phenomenon may occur because small inventors are the ones least 
likely to have all the resources for innovation, production and market distribution, and 
therefore more often to use licensing to bring revenue.151 The licensing practice brings 
in more parties and uncertainties.152 In addition, small businesses may be more often 
targeted for their limited resource of handling expensive litigations, or their weaker 
bargaining power in defending themselves or in reaching a settlement in the patent 
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random sample of 1,000 unlitigated patents issued between 1996-1998 by the USPTO, and 300 patents issued 
during the same period and involved in infringment litigation terminated during 1999-2000). 
147 See Allison et al. (2004) “Valuable Patents,” ibid, at 451-460. 
148 See infra note 172 – 174, and the accompanying text.  
149 See Daniel Hoenig, “The Role of Patents in Venture Capital Financing - an Empirical Analysis from 
Different Perspectives” (Technische Universität München, 2012), http://d-nb.info/1031551743/34 (the main 
conclusion of the PhD Dissertation is that "even though patents in general play an important role as selection 
criterion in venture capital financing, their value contribution is in some respects clearly limited."). The other 
findings were later published in Hoenig and Henkel (2015), “Quality Signals? The Role of Patents, Alliances, 
and Team Experience in Venture Capital Financing.” supra note 99.  
150 See Allison et al. (2004) “Valuable Patents,” supra note 146 (The result shows that, in the sample, as only 
37% of the patents are issued to small entities, 39.2% of patents issued to individuals and small companies 
were litigated while only 13.6% of the patents issued to large corporations were litigated. The authors 
explained that the phenomena might because of that “small entities are more innovative” and that “they are 
less conservative about commencing litigation”) 
151 See Landes and Posner (2003) The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law, supra note 39 at 
330.  
152 See the detailed discussion on the additional parties and interests in Section 3.3.2.  
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disputes. 153  In other words, the litigation risk of using IP collateral could be 
comparatively higher for small business.  
The associated high risk of litigation brings lenders with substantial transaction cost on 
hiring lawyers and introduces uncertainty in the liquidation value of IP, especially 
when accepting IP provided by small inventors as collateral. The lenders have to 
ensure that there is no dispute (or at least very low probability of litigation) over the IP 
rights offered as collateral. Enhancing transaparency and reliability in the information 
about ownership, transfers and licensing of IP may help reduce information 
asymmetries or legal uncertainties. And the general legal environment for IP 
enforcement and litigation is also crucial for preserving the value of IP and for 
establishing the confidence of lenders in accepting IP as collateral.  
B. Heavy burdens on due diligent lenders 
Aside from the inherent litigation risk, some other legal aspects of IP, such as 
ambiguous legal boundaries, finite IP protection, and the requirements on continuous 
registration renewal or exploitation, also impose parties in transactions with heavy 
burdens on due diligence throughout the whole transaction. 
First, the ambiguous legal boundary in IP law requires the active participation of 
lawyers and accountants in the transactions. Although the basic economic rationale 
under IP protection is similar, there are different statutory schemes for each kind of IP 
and variations in the level and scope of legal protection among jurisdictions.154 Then 
the scope and content of IP are also continuously evolving and progressively 
expanding with the developments in both science and technology, for fitting new 
outputs of human intellect into the IP protection system.155 The ambiguous legal 

153 See Allison et al. (2004), “Valuable Patents,” supra note 146 at 468-469 (explicating “Large companies in 
many industries hold patents for defensive purposes – to deter other large companies from suing them. The 
result is a sort of “mutually assured destruction” in which very few companies actually sue for patent 
infringement because they know that, if they do, their opponents will also be able to sue them for patent 
infringment. If there are any patent disputes at all between these companies, they tend to end in royalty-free 
cross-licenses.”) 
154 See Jacqueline Lipton, “Intellectual Property in the Information Age and Secured Finance Practice,” 
European Intellectual Property Review 24, no. 7 (2002): 358–367; Lipton (2010) “Security Interests in 
Intellectual Property”, supra note 145. 
155 See, for example, Lipton (2002) “Intellectual Property in the Information Age and Secured Finance 
Practice”, supra note 154.; Howard P. Knopf, “The Database Dilemma in Canada: Is ‘Ultra’ Copyright 
Required?,” University of New Brunswick Law Journal 48 (1999): 164–88. (discussing the uncertainty about 
the scope of IP for databases in Canada and the U.S.A). 
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boundary in IP law can scare away many potential debt finance providers that are not 
so familiar with IP as with traditional tangible assets. Although the lenders can leave 
the detailed issues for lawyers and accountants to deal with, they still should be aware 
of the evolving boundaries and have a basic idea about what rights can be categorized 
as IP, what rights are comprised in each type of IP, or what rights in which types of IP 
are valuable and are legally allowed to be used as collateral. The answers to these 
questions directly determine the liquidation value. However, just getting the basic idea 
about these questions requires a case-by-case analysis and assistance from experts in 
IP, in cooperation with experts in secured transaction. Acquiring the expert opinions 
can largely increase the transaction cost. 
Second, the finite IP protection requires lenders to have a careful legal check before 
accepting an IP as collateral. As discussed in Section 2.1.1.2, the statutory monopoly 
status given by IP law provides the source of economic value of IP. However, such a 
monopoly status is restricted by its statutory term of protection for balancing out the 
static inefficiency. Following the expiry date, IP protected works lose their statutory 
exclusivity and fall into the public domain. As these works can be freely exploited by 
the whole society, the liquidation value in encumbered IP is thereby vastly diminished. 
For this reason, checking if the remaining legal protection term of the IP to be 
encumbered matches the loan term or not, is an essential part of the due diligence 
process in the creation of security interests in IP.156  
Third, the requirements on continuous registration renewal or exploitation require the 
lenders to closely monitor over the encumbered IP after the transaction has been made. 
Almost in all jurisdictions the protection to patents and trademarks is subject to 
continuous registration renewal or exploitation.157 Safeguarding the continuous valid 
legal protection over an encumbered IP is crucial for ensuring the realization of 
security interests in IP (see also Section 3.4.4). For this reason, the lenders have to 
closely monitor the exploitation of the encumbered IP and may have to take active 
actions to ensure continued valid legal protection over the encumbered IP. 
All these burdens highly increase the cost of loans for lenders and eventually increase 
the transaction cost of IP collateralization for the borrowers.  
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156 See Vanya Bromfield and John Runeckles, “Taking Security over Intellectual Property: A Practical 
Overview,” European Intellectual Property Review 28, no. 6 (2006): 344 ff. 
157 See more detailed discussion in infra note 309 and Section 3.4.4. 
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C. Legal risks over the transaction 
Apart from the above legal risks over the IP to be used as collateral, the lenders have 
to be aware of the legal risks in concluding the transaction. As noted in the survey of 
the WIPO in 2009, in the countries where IP collateralization has been specifically 
accepted in law, the relevant issues are mainly addressed by a mixture of laws, 
including laws on security interests, IP laws158 and other relevant laws, such as 
bankruptcy laws or the laws on civil procedure.159 The fragmentation among laws 
results in lots of discrepancies and uncertainties to the transactions. These divergences 
complicate the process of concluding an IP collateralization transaction and increase 
the associated legal risks and costs.160 
Dealing with these legal uncertainties requires a comprehensive and extremely 
complicated case-by-case due diligence process, which needs coordinated professional 
legal advice from both specialists in IP law and specialists in secured transactions law. 
However, a successful cooperation between specialists in IP and specialists in secured 
transactions is difficult to achieve in practice. The deep gap between the two different 
languages of finance professionals and IP professionals may make the two groups of 
specialists speak past each other and disagree about the meaning of relevant words.161 
The inconsistencies between IP laws and secured transaction laws add to the difficulty 
of specialists to communicate, which ultimately may lead to conflicts caused by 
different legal systems, value orientations and business cultures. For this reason, a 
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158 See WIPO (2009 )“WIPO Questionnaire on Security Interests in Intellectual Property,” supra note 141. In 
the WIPO’s survey, “IP laws” are defined as “legislative enactments, administrative regulations, or judicial 
decrees that generally constitute the body of IP law in each country (including at the federal and provincial 
level) or region”. 
159 Ibid. In the response to Question 2 of the WIPO’s survey, among 66 respondent Member States, “a 
minority of 12% of responding Member States’ laws addressed security interests in IP by relying on IP law 
provisions only, while some 49% use a mixture of IP law and other laws. A significant proportion of 
responding Member States, some 43% stated that other sources of law than IP law covered the issue (and for 
30% of these countries, this was only for copyright-related transactions). Finally, 22% of responding Member 
States did not have any law addressing the issue”. Moreover, the response to Question 3 also reveals that, in 
most cases, major issues regarding security interests in IP (such as, the creation or granting of security 
interests in IP, the methods for achieving the third-party effectiveness of the security interests in IP, the rules 
of priority of security interest in IP as to other assignments, licenses or security interest, and the enforcement 
of security interests in IP) are addressed by laws other than IP laws. 
160 See Iwan Davies, “Technology-Based Small Firms and the Commoditization of Intellectual Property 
Rights,” in The Reform of UK Personal Property Security Law: Comparative Perspectives, ed. J. d. Lacy 
(Oxon: Routledge-Cavendish, 2010), 308 at 308. 
161 See the examples discussed in Section 3.5.2 on the terminology ambiguity as to “priority” in the context 
of secured transaction law and in the context of IP law; also in Section 4.2.2.2 A on the terminology 
ambiguity as to “moral rights” (IP law) and “personal rights” (property law) in Chinese law. 
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successful cooperation between experts in the field of secured financing and IP law 
will depend upon ‘cultural exchange’ and ‘bilingualism’. Unfortunately, very few 
lawyers are familiar with these two sectors of laws at the same time and know how to 
make an appropriate legal arrangement to guarantee sufficient protection to either the 
borrower or the lender. These problems make the transactions much more expensive 
than they need to be.  
And in many other cases, legal uncertainties may simply preclude socially 
welfare-enhancing IP collateralization transactions from happening. Neither borrowers 
nor lenders would accept IP collateralization without the assurance of sufficient legal 
protection. The legal problems over the transaction are also the focus of the following 
chapters of this dissertation (Chapter 3-5). 
2.3.2.2 Uncertainties in the value of IP 
In secured transactions, lenders are protected against the lending risk by the 
liquidation value of the collateral. Therefore, when it comes to the issue on using IP as 
collateral for obtaining debt finance, the first intuitive concern of many people is about 
the high level of uncertainty related to the value of the encumbered IP. The 
uncertainties mainly come from the legal nature and purpose of the IP protection 
system. 
A. The highly skewed distribution of value 
First of all, similar to the distribution of value among R&D projects, 162  the 
distribution of value among patents is also highly skewed, i.e., while a large 
percentage of issued patents have very little or no economic value, only a relatively 
small portion of patents actually have any value at all.163 With the skew of the 
distribution of patent value or importance, the mere “number of patents” adds little 
explanatory power for sales, profits, or market value. The fear of accepting valueless 
patents as collateral might be one of the major impediments for lenders to accept 

162 See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
163 See e.g., F. M. Scherer, “Firm Size, Market Structure, Opportunity, and the Output of Patented 
Inventions,” The American Economic Review 55, no. 5 (1965): 1097–1125 (as the first econommic literature 
empirically demonstrate that the distribution of value among patents is highly skewed, showing that the 
distribution of value among patents is with most of the observations lying in the range of low profit values 
but 'with a very long tail into the high value side).  
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patents as collateral.  
The highly skewed distribution of patent value does not necessarily mean that 
“acquiring a patent is almost like buying a lottery ticket.”164 There are many reasons 
for the existence of so many valueless patents. First, some patents cover worthless 
inventions or contain badly drafted claims incapable of protecting the underlying 
valuable invention.165 This type of patent intrinsically has no value at all. Second, 
many patents are not applied for application, but for other purposes, for instance, for 
signalling technological capability to external investors,166 for being used as defensive 
mechanisms or “bargaining chips” in cross-licensing negotiations,167 or for increasing 
the entry barriers to rivals.168 This type of patent is actually valuable but just has no 
direct value of application. And for the third type of patents, they may potentially be 
valuable, but fail to be applied for realizing their value because of the owners’ 
mismanagement or negligence.169 Therefore, “some patents really do have no value 
whatsoever” and “some patents are intrinsically more valuable than others”.170 In fact, 
many patent owners have a strong sense of which specific patents of their portfolio are 
“truly core”; and in many cases, “the value of patents is often evident early in the 
process”.171 
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164 See F. M. Scherer, “The Innovation Lottery,” in Expanding the Boundaries of Intellectual Property: 
Innovation Policy for the Knowledge Society, ed. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, 
and Harry First (Oxford University Press, 2001), 4–21 (arguing that the patent system is a giant lottery and 
getting a patent is almost equivalent of buying a lottery ticket). The author of this dissertation does not agree 
with this view.  
165 See Allison et al. (2004) “Valuable Patents”, supra note 146 at 437 (giving examples of patents covering 
worthless patents; and pointing out that many “patent claims are drafted narrowly and require for 
infringement the inclusion of an element that is easy to design around”). 
166 See infra note 240 - 241 and the accompanying text in Section 2.4.2.1 
167 See, e.g., Bronwyn H. Hall and Rosemarie Ham Ziedonis, “The Patent Paradox Revisited: An Empirical 
Study of Patenting in the U.S. Semiconductor Industry, 1979-1995,” The RAND Journal of Economics 32, no. 
1 (2001): 101–28 (showing that the purposes for defense and bargain chips are particularly prevalent in the 
industries driven by complex and cumulative technologies, such as semiconductors or telecommunications, 
but might be negligible in others). 
168 See Stiglitz (2008), “Economic Foundations of Intellectual Property Rights,” supra note 37 (discussing 
the misuse of patent system for increasing the entry barriers to rivals). 
169 See Kevin G. Rivette and David Kline, Rembrandts in the Attic: Unlocking the Hidden Value of Patents 
(Harvard Business Press, 2000) (arguing that many valuable patents are simply overlooked by their owners). 
170 See Allison et al. (2004) “Valuable Patents.” supra note 146, footnote 10 and its accompanying text. 
171 See Allison et al. (2004) “Valuable Patents.” supra note 146, at 461 (positing that “patent value is not just 
something that academics can identify after the fact, but something that patent owners themselves can predict 
in advance.”); at footnote 111 (the interview with the general counsel of a major software company reveals 
that “my R&D guys know which twenty of our 600 applications are truly core, and which 580 would be nice 
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The difficulty is that, with the information asymmetry that the lenders would know 
less about the value of the patents than the patent holders/borrowers, how can the 
external lenders effectively identify these valuable patents. For now, there have been 
extensive academic and practical efforts on identifying objective value indicators to 
distinguish the small percentage valuable patents from the massive valueless patents at 
least to a meaningful degree. It has been commonly accepted that some patents having 
particular characteristics, such as more total claims,172  more backward citations 
(references cited in the patent) or forward citations (references to the patent made by 
later patents),173 or a larger patent families (the collections of all documents filed in 
different jurisdictions with coverage of the same invention)174 are more likely to have 
higher value. These value indicators are also commonly adopted in IP valuation 
methodologies to evaluate IP.175 
We need to re-emphasize the position of this dissertation stated at the beginning in 
Section 1.2 “Research Question” that “this dissertation does not attempt to argue that 
any given IP should be used as collateral”. Not all IP possess economic impacts. The 
use of IP as collateral is inherently more risky compared to using other tangible assets. 
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to have. For those twenty, the sky’s the limit [in prosecution fees]”); and see also footnote 9, 107-114 and 
accompanying text. 
172 The logic is that the number of claims is related to the breadth of protection and the investment in drafting 
claims reflects the inventor’s perception of the value of the invention. See e.g., Allison et al. (2004) 
“Valuable Patents.” supra note 146, at footnote 58 (positing that “the average number of claims in a set of 
patents is related to patent value”). 
173 The “claims” in a patent describes the specific features of the innovation that are novel. The logic is that 
the number of citations indicates the validity of the patents and the practical significance of the underlying 
inventions. See, e.g., Dietmar Harhoff, Frederic M Scherer, and Katrin Vopel, “Citations, Family Size, 
Opposition and the Value of Patent Rights,” Research Policy 32, no. 8 (2003): 1343–1363 (by using over 
1,100 German patents in 1977 and via survey with each patent-holder for a subjective financial range of 
valuations, empicailly showing that large international families, the number of references to the patent 
literature as well as the citations a patent receives are positively related to its value); Bronwyn H. Hall, Adam 
Jaffe, and Manuel Trajtenberg, “Market Value and Patent Citations,” The RAND Journal of Economics 36, no. 
1 (2005): 16–38 (exploring "the usefulness of patent citations as a measure of the ‘importance’ of a firm’s 
patents, as indicated by the stock market valuation of the firm’s intangible stock of knowledge’ and showing 
that patent citations indicate important extra information in addition to R&D and simple patent counts, in the 
determination of value); Mark Hirschey and Vernon J. Richardson, “Are Scientific Indicators of Patent 
Quality Useful to Investors?,” Journal of Empirical Finance 11, no. 1 (2004): 91–107 (empically showing 
that “patent citation information may indeed help investors judge the future profit-earning potential of a 
firm’s scientific discoveries”). 
174 The logic is that a large patent family means greater market coverage and reflects the applicant’s 
willingness and determination of securing the sell in the respective markets with bearing the additional costs 
of application. See, e.g., Peter Neuhäusler and Rainer Frietsch, “Patent Families as Macro Level Patent Value 
Indicators: Applying Weights to Account for Market Differences,” Scientometrics 96, no. 1 (2013): 27–49 
(empically showing that patents representing large international patent families are particularly valuable). 
175 See more detailed discussion on IP valuation in Section 2.3.2.2 D. 
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The lenders/creditors shall carefully select and accept those valuable IP as collateral 
only.  
The market has developed many ways to control the risks. As a matter of fact, IP assets 
have a long history of being included in a “blanket lien on all assets”,176 it is just 
“becoming more commonplace for creditors to focus their analysis more directly on 
intangibles (like IP), either as a separate asset or as an integral part of overall company 
value”.177 Gambardella et al, (2011) show that, while “which particular patent or 
invention is most valuable is harder to predict”, it has been a common practice for 
firms to “create value by raising the number of patents or inventions that they 
produce”.178 The diversification may help the lenders to lower the risk of accepting 
valueless IP.  
B. Susceptibility to market changes 
While in general the value of an IP comes from the monopoly status given by the IP 
laws, the actual value of a specific given IP is also determined by the IP holder’s 
capability of exploiting its monopoly status, which is heavily contingent on the 
competitive position of the holder and the demand for the protected invention.  
Firstly, the IP holder can exploit its monopoly status only if the IP represents some 
technological advantage that cannot be easily circumvented by the competitors.179 
With the rapid development in the sectors of science and technology, IP holders have 
to face severe competition in the market and may suddenly loss their competitive 
advantages. A quick depreciation may be a result of the technological innovation of the 
competitors, which may suddenly reduce the demand for the invention protected under 
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176 See European Commission (2014) Final Report from the Expert Group on Intellectual Property Valuation, 
infra note 207 at 29 (positing that “The general consensus amongst those interviewed is that IP is too risky to 
be used as collateral for traditional loans. Some respondents noted that while IP is too risky as a sole basis for 
lending decisions, it may be considered as part of a loan package.”). 
177 See European Commission (2014) Final Report from the Expert Group on Intellectual Property Valuation, 
infra note 207 at 27. 
178 See Alfonso Gambardella, Dietmar Harhoff, and Bart Verspagen, The Determinants of the Private Value 
of Patented Inventions (WIPO/IP/ECON/GE/2/11/INF.1) (Geneva: WIPO Seminar Series on “The 
Economics of Intellectual Property”, 2011), available at 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/mdocs/en/wipo_ip_econ_ge_2_11/wipo_ip_econ_ge_2_11_determinants.
pdf. 
179 See. e.g., Nancy T. Gallini, “Patent Policy and Costly Imitation,” The RAND Journal of Economics 23, no. 
1 (1992): 52–63 (positing that the difficulty of inventing around a patent is important in determining its 
value.)  
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the IP.  
Meanwhile, with the trend of globalization, lenders should also be aware of the fact 
that the territorial nature of the protection of IP may also seriously erode the value of 
the encumbered IP. Other parties may be able to encroach on the right in another 
jurisdiction and exploit a similar product in an increasingly global market without 
directly breaching the domestic laws of the place where the secured transactions were 
concluded. Thus, not only the competition from domestic competitors but also those 
from foreign competitors should be taken into account ahead at the lending decision 
time.  
Furthermore, mismanagement, infringements from third parties and compulsory 
licensing obligations pursuant to the law or even some product accidents beyond the 
control of the IP holders can quickly depreciate the value as well.180 
Therefore, in reality, most IP has a much shorter commercial life than the maximum 
legal life. For example, in China, although the invention patents are given a maximum 
protection of 20 years (with continuous payment for the annual maintenance fee),181 
just 49.2% of the granted invention patents have been kept for longer than 5 years 
while only 7.6% for more than 10 years.182 Many patent holders give up their patents 
by simply stopping paying for the annual maintenance fee, either because these patents 
are inherently with low value, or they have lost their commercial value very fast with 
the passage of time, or both.183  
As the value of IP is so susceptible to changes in the market, the lenders should not 
only check the remaining legal life of the encumbered IP but also consider the risk that 
the encumbered IP may experience severe value depreciation during the loan term 
because of the market change. A good evaluation of IP requires an accurate forecast of 
future revenues, depending on a correct assessment of the exploiting capability of the 
IP holder and a good judgment about the market change.  
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180 See James Bessen and Michael J. Meurer, Patent Failure - How Judges, Bureaucrats, and Lawyers Put 
Innovators at Risk (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008);  
181 Article 43, Patent Law of China (2008). 
182 Planning and Development Department of SIPO (ഭᇦ⸕䇶ӗᵳተ㿴ࡂਁኅਨ), “Annual Report of 
Patents in Force in China 2014 ( ѝ ഭ ᴹ ᭸ у ࡙ ᒤ ᓖ ᣕ ੺ 2014)” (2015), 
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/tjxx/yjcg/201512/P020151231619398115416.pdf at 10-12. 
183 See Zvi Griliches, “Patent Statistics as Economic Indicators: A Survey,” Journal of Economic Literature 
28 (1990): 1661–1707 (the patent-renewal rates are used to determine that “the majority patents are either of 
low value, or that their value depreciates (obsoletes) rapidly, or both”). 
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C. Severely discounted liquidation value 
In secured transactions, the lenders are secured by the repayments from the liquidation 
value of collateral. Nevertheless, when accepting an IP as collateral, the lenders need 
to know the differences in the three valuations of an IP: the value to the current IP 
holder (value in use), the fair market value of the IP, and the liquidation value of the 
IP. 
Firstly, the fair market value of an IP is different from its value to the IP holder. Fair 
value is the amount at which an asset could be bought or sold in a current transaction 
between willing parties. In contrast to typical tangible goods, the true value of a 
specific IP is based on its “value in use,”184 and highly idiosyncratic, i.e., it is highly 
dependent on the means or strategy of exploitation and the presence of the other 
supplementary assets or conditions, such as the surrounding patent portfolio and the 
function that the patents serve within the portfolio.185 Some IP may be valuable only 
in the hands of some specific holders, such as their creators or current holders, but 
have low or no value for other acquirers at all. Therefore, an IP, which is valuable to 
the current IP holder (i.e., the borrower), may have low fair market value. Meanwhile, 
it is worth noting that IP is disposed differently in merge and acquisition transaction 
(M&A) and in a liquidation sale. In an M&A transaction, IP in the targeted firm is 
transferred as an essential aspect of the whole firm. With the transfer of all 
supplementary assets of the targeted firm, IP usually keeps the “value in use” in a 
going concern.186 However, in a liquidation sale, if an IP is disposed of as an 
individual asset independent from other supplementary assets or conditions, it can only 
be measured at the fair market value. Therefore, IP may be worth much less in an IP 
collateralization than in an M&A transaction. 
Furthermore, the liquidation value of an IP is also different from the fair market value 
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184 See Ron Laurie, “The Evolving Role of IP in M&A: From Deal-Breaker to Deal-Maker,” in From Assets 
to Profits: Competing for IP Value & Return, ed. Bruce M. Berman, 2nd editio (New Jersey: John Wiley and 
Sons, 2009), 215–232 at 219. 
185 See, e.g., Ming-Cheng Wu and Chun-Yao Tseng, “Valuation of Patent – a Real Options Perspective,” 
Applied Economics Letters 13, no. 5 (2006) (using the real options model and showing that the patent value 
increases with the underlying assests, measured with the the total number of patents granted to a firm at a 
particular time). Markus Reitzig, “What Determines Patent Value? Insights from the Semiconductor Industry,” 
Research Policy 32, no. 1 (2003): 13–26 (through a survey about 127 patents held by one firm, showing that 
the importance of each single patent depends on its position or function in the corporate portfolio). 
186 See, Lanning Bryer and Melvin Seminsky, eds., Intellectual Property Assets in Mergers and Acquisitions 
(John Wiley & Sons, 2001). 
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of the IP. While the fair market value happens between willing parties with neither 
party under the compulsion to transact, the liquidation value is the value that interested 
buyers would pay if the IP holder was forced to liquidate assets immediately. It 
depends on the demand for that asset at the time of liquidation. While determining the 
fair market value of an IP is already very challenging, predicting the forced-liquidation 
value brings more challenges. In most cases, a specific IP has limited redeployability, 
because it can be used for a specific purpose or in a specific situation. For this reason, 
the market demand for a specific IP only may be very limited or even unavailable in a 
distressed default sale. With the limited redeployability, the forced-liquidation value 
may suffer a very severe discount from the fair market value paid in ordinary 
situations.  
And even for those IP with high redeployability, the forced-liquidation value still may 
suffer severe discount for the weak bargaining power that the IP holder has at a 
liquidation sale and many other uncertainties. The sale of patents of Eastman Kodak 
Co. (referred as "Kodak" hereafter) in 2013 is an excellent example to illustrate all the 
uncertainties in a forced-liquidation sale.187 In 2011, after having reported loss for 5 
years, Kodak was struggling to file for bankruptcy protection. Then, 284 Partners, a 
consultancy company which had just helped Nortel selling a portfolio of 6000 wireless 
communication patents to Apple, Microsoft, and Research in Motion for $4.5 billion in 
the same year, confidently “reckoned that a set of 1700 Kodak imaging and printing 
patents could fetch up to $2.6 billion on the open market” for the high demand for these 
patents in the market. Some other firms gave similar high evaluations of between $1.8 
billion $4.5 billion.188 However, in December 2012, these patents were actually sold to 
a consortium of bidders, which included the world’s 12 biggest technology companies, 
for $525 million only.189 Such a vast divergence between the estimation and the actual 

187 See further factual details about the Kodak transaction in Mark Harris  (2014) “The Lowballing of Kodak's 
Patent Portfolio: The bankrupt giant found that its huge trove of IP could fetch only pennies on the dollar”, 
IEEE Spectrum, available at 
http://spectrum.ieee.org/at-work/innovation/the-lowballing-of-kodaks-patent-portfolio. 
188 Ibid. For example, the MDB Capital Group predicted that “the digital-imaging patents owned by Kodak 
may be worth $3 billion in a sale.” See “Kodak Worth More in Breakup With $3 Billion Patents: Real M&A”, 
2011, Bloomsburg, available at 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-08-17/kodak-worth-five-times-more-in-breakup-with-3-billi
on-patents-real-m-a. 
189 The 12 companies were Apple, Microsoft, Google, Samsung, Adobe, Facebook, Amazon, Shutterfly, 
BlackBerry-maker Research In Motion, Fujifilm, HTC and Huawei Technologies. See further details about the 
transaction in “Bankrupt Kodak sells off patents to investors for $525m”, 19-12-2012, BBC News, available at 
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price was mainly because Kodak had a very weak bargaining power at the 
negotiation. 190  During the negotiation, Kodak was facing time pressure from the 
bankruptcy process so it had to settle the deal as soon as possible. And all the bidders 
were gathered together as a consortium and left Kodak with no alternative buyers. In the 
end, Kodak had to accept whatever price the consortium offered. The fire-sale price was 
even much less than the licensing fees Kodak had from these patents in previous years.  
With all these uncertainties, both the borrowers and the lenders must be aware of the 
fact that the liquidation value of an IP is not always positively related with its value to 
the IP holder. Sneed and Johnson (2008) use data from real transactions to examine 
the determinants of patent value in an auction environment.191 Aside from confirming 
that forward citations are clearly associated with greater financial value, the study has 
some interesting findings. Firstly, patents with broader scope (measured by the 
number of International Patent Class assigned to the patent) do have greater value 
when are sold, but they might be less likely to sell, because “buyers are looking for 
concisely packaged lots rather than broadly defined lots”. Second, while family size is 
considered to be positively associated with the patent value,192 it actually decreases 
both the probability of sale and the sold price, maybe because it increases the 
maintenance fees and the risk of litigation. Third, some other factors also affect the 
sold price of an IP. For example, it finds that “patents from less important inventors 
garnered higher values than lots from important inventors, perhaps because of a 
suspicion that larger inventors know more about the technological space and are 
selling off unimportant patents while saving the critical areas for themselves.” The 
findings confirm that the liquidation value of IP is determined mainly by the demand 
side.  
By contrast, the liquidation value has a more direct positive relationship with the 
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http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-20787024.   
190 See Mark Harris  (2014) “The Lowballing of Kodak's Patent Portfolio: The bankrupt giant found that its 
huge trove of IP could fetch only pennies on the dollar”, supra note 187. Nevertheless, Sarah Mitroff (2012) 
“Kodak Sells Digital Camera Patents to Apple, Google and Other Tech Giants”, available at: 
https://www.wired.com/2012/12/kodak-patents/ (arguing that the low liquidation value is “also because Kodak 
extensively licensed these patents to other companies. “That makes the portfolio far less valuable, because 
there’s very little exclusivity when a patent has already been licensed to someone else,” says Harvard Business 
School professor and former Kodak VP Willy Shih.”).  
191 See Katherine A. Sneed and Daniel K. N. Johnson, “Selling Ideas: The Determinants of Patent Value in 
an Auction Environment,” R&D Management 39, no. 1 (2008): 87–94 (using financial data collected at the 
first two Ocean Tomo live patent auctions, in April and October of 2006, which consist of 121 patent lots 
including 51 sales). 
192 See the discussion on “family size” at supra note 174. 
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redeployability of the encumbered IP. Munari et al. (2011) study the determinants of 
IP-secured transactions, by using empirical data to analyze the potential of 
patent-backed transactions depending on the features of patents and the financial and 
economic context variables. Their case study in pharmaceuticals shows that patents 
with bigger market size and greater redeployability are more likely to be used as 
collateral.193 The results also confirm that the liquidation value is the main concern 
that the lenders care about in practice.  
All these uncertainties in liquidation value would impose heavy burdens in terms of 
time and transaction costs, and increase the practical difficulties of IP collateralization, 
which is expected to operate profitably and effectively. The survey done by the 
European Commission (2014) argues that the “lack of liquidity through an established, 
free secondary market and the perception of risk related to lending against IP assets” 
are the critical reasons for the under-exploitation of IP collateralization.194 
In order to incentivize lenders and other market participants to accept IP 
collateralization, different efforts have been made to reduce all the uncertainties in the 
liquidation value of IP. Some efforts are on improving the immature secondary trading 
markets, by creating new market infrastructures or trading platfroms with 
standardization, openness and security.195 These efforts in building an active market 
are expected to make the IP exchanges easier and faster. A quick and low-cost 
liqudiation of the encumbered IP not only helps to ensure the realization of the 
collateral value of IP and alleviate the discount in liquidation, but also helps to 
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193 See Cristina Odasso and Elisa Ughetto, “Patent-Backed Securities in Pharmaceuticals: What Determines 
Success or Failure?,” R&D Management 41, no. 3 (2011): 219–239. 
194 See European Commission (2014) Final Report from the Expert Group on Intellectual Property Valuation, 
infra note 207 at 33. 
195  Some platforms are created by private entities. For example, the website “Patentauction” 
(https://www.patentauction.com) was created to provide a free online platform for innovators to post their 
inventions for licensing or sale. And Ocean Tomo, a Chicago-based IP firm, introduced the world's first public 
auction platform for patents, trademarks and copyrights in April 2006, exited in 2009 and re-entered the IP 
auction market in Spring of 2015, see more information at http://www.oceantomo.com/auctions/. Some 
exchange platforms are created by public entities. For example, the Hong Kong government in 2014 launched 
(originally conceived in 2011) the Asia Intellectual Property Exchange (AIPE), comprising of around 
20,000-30,000 registered patents from 21 ‘strategic partners’, as a trading platform for IP, see further 
information at http://www.asiaipex.com/Home/Index_EN. In the United Kingdom, the government-sponsored 
online platform Copyright Hub (www.copyrighthub.co.uk) is designated to make making licensing simpler. 
Similarly, in Singapore, promoting auctions of IP assets and developing a one-stop licensing platform that 
allows users to easily obtain license are also included in its “Global IP Hub” plan, see Singapore IP Steering 
Committee (2013) “Intellectual Property (IP) Hub Master Plan: Developing Singapore as a Global IP Hub 
in Asia", supra note 134. See the summary of more efforts in OECD (2015) “Enquiries into Intellectual 
Property’s Economic Impact”, supra note 57, at 466-471. 
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detrminate the fair market price and improve the validity of transactional methods (or 
market approaches) of IP valuation.196 Meanwhile, some countries, like Singapore, 
Malasyia and China, have implemented policies to lower the risk for participants, such 
as establishing IP risk insurance against ligitation and creating risk-sharing 
mechanisms against bank loans.197  
D. Difficulties in IP valuation and problems in accounting standards 
When making their lending decisions, the lenders have to evaluate all these risks as to 
the borrowers’ capability of generating future revenues and as to the liquidation value 
of the collateral. Taking into account all the aforementioned high legal and market 
uncertainties, an ex ante assessment of the future revenues and the hypothetical future 
forced-liquidation value of the encumbered IP in an immediate distressed default sale 
is very difficult. 
As a matter of fact, the value of any form of asset may be subject to a certain level of 
uncertainty, for reasons such as physical or commercial deterioration and changes in 
the relevant market during the loan term. For the normal tangible assets, sophisticated 
asset valuation methodologies have been developed and employed to effectively 
reduce the uncertainties and control the relevant risks. 
However, all the aforementioned high legal and market uncertainties regarding IP 
render the soundest methodologies for the valuation of most tangible assets less 
effective as far as IP assets are concerned.198 For example, the cost approach assumes 
that the costs for the internal development or an external acquisition of an asset can 
indicate the asset’s future economic value. This approach barely works for IP, since the 
reproduction and replacement cost of a specific IP may have little relevance to the true 
future revenue of that IP. Even the investment on R&D does not provide any 
predication for the future value. Similarly, the usual income approach is based on the 
fundamental assumption that the past performance of an asset can indicate its future 
development. This approach may be applicable to those kinds of IP that have a long 
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196 See detailed discussion on market approaches in IP valuation in infra note 217 and its accompanying text. 
197 For efforts in Singapore and Malasyia, see supra notes 134-138 and their accompanying text; for efforts 
in China, see Section 4.2.1. 
198 See more detailed discussions on valuation methods in, e.g., Kamiyama et al. (2006) “Valuation and 
Exploitation of Intellectual Property”, supra note 130 at 20. 
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and stable historical performance, but has little applicability to IP which lack sufficient 
earning history. Moreover, the market approach needs extensive data of comparable 
transactions of similar assets in the marketplace to determine the discount rate of 
forced-liquidation value. Unfortunately, IP assets, by nature, are creative and 
idiosyncratic in their scope, depth, strength and importance, so it is difficult to find 
comparable benchmarked transactions. Furthermore, the IP collateralization 
transactions are usually private between parties. The lack of sophisticated public 
markets for IP transactions and the absence of transparency in IP transactions make the 
access to the desired information for comparison extremely difficult. Nevertheless, the 
Nortel case in 2011 and Kodak case in 2013 show that, even in cases with 
“comparable” transactions, the evaluations may still fail to be informative and end up 
with significant divergences as to the actual transaction value.199  Therefore, IP 
valuations may have to be on a case-to-case basis and cannot be done with a single 
valuation approach only.  
The problems in IP valuation also make the current accounting systems hardly able to 
recognize or reveal the full value of IP.200 In order to ensure certainty in financial 
reports and make sure that the results are comparable, the accountings standards put 
strict requirements on identifying assets. For instance, the International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS), the most prevalent internationally accepted accounting 
standards, permits “asset recognition” only if the intangible assets satisfy the 
“probability recognition criterion”, i.e. “it is probable that the future economic benefits 
that are attributable to the asset will flow to the entity”.201 In other words, the IFRS 
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199 See more detailed discussion on the Nortel case and the Kodak case in supra notes 187-190, and the 
accompanying text. 
200 See, e.g., Roya Ghafele, “Accounting for IP?,” Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice 5, no. 7 
(May 4, 2010): 521–30 at 521 (positing that "the various challenges associated with determining the value of 
internally held IP, paired with the inherent volatility associated with the value of some forms of IP, can be 
cited as major reasons why accountants have been reluctant to report fully on IP."). However, at page 525, 
Ghafele also points out “tax condersidations” as one of the curicial reasons for the accounting’s reluntance to 
fully embrace the concept of IP and recognize the value of internally generated and used IP in the accounting 
standards. Irena Rodov and Philippe Leliaert, “FiMIAM: Financial Method of Intangible Assets 
Measurement,” Journal of Intellectual Capital 3, no. 3 (2002): 323–36 (arguing that current " accounting is 
dominated by traditional factors of production and ignores the importance of proprietary knowledge as a 
factor for wealth creation or destruction."). 
201 International Accounting Standard (IAS) is a part of the body of the International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS). IAS 38 (Intangible Assets) classifies patents and trademarks as intangible assets but 
permits the recognition only if the intangible assets satisfy both the “probability recognition criterion”, i.e. “it 
is probable that the future economic benefits that are attributable to the asset will flow to the entity” and the 
“cost criterion”, i.e. “the cost of the asset can be measured reliably.” For IP that is acquired separately or in a 
business combination, the “probability recognition criterion” is always considered to be satisfied and 
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only recognizes IP that is clearly associated with direct revenue streams, such as those 
IP in licensing transactions, or IP acquired through acquisitions or business 
combinations; and the licensed or acquired IP are initially recognized at the licensing 
fee or purchase price, with some subsequent revaluations.202  
However, the “internally generated IP for internal use only” does not satisfy the 
“probability recognition criterion” and therefore cannot be represented on company 
balance sheets as assets. When the internally generated IP assets are also used 
internally, they may have significant value contribution to the firm’s performance by 
helping IP holders maintain its competitive advantage in market, such as blocking 
products of competitors, being used as a bargaining chip in cross-licensing deals, and 
preventing or defending themselves against infringement suits. Nevertheless, they may 
not directly bring any explicit revenue streams or cash flows and therefore cannot be 
recognized as “assets” on the balance sheets. In the end, if an IP is generated for 
internal use only, it may appear to be worth nothing on the balance sheet. With the 
ignorance of the contribution of internally generated IP to business performance, the 
accounting reports may fail to reveal the true value of IP assets and the firm value. 
Ghafele (2010) cites the 2005 acquisition of Gillette by Procter & Gamble as an 
example to illustrate the problems.203 While the reported net book value of Gillette 
(with a full compliance with current accounting standards) was at $3.5 billion only, the 
firm was eventually purchased at the price of $57 billion. The significant divergences 
between the reported net book value and the actual purchase price mainly because the 
major value derived from Gillette’s internally generated patents and trademark 
protected brands, such as Gillette razors, Duracell batteries and Braun and Oral-B 
dental care products, just cannot be shown on the accounting reports.204  
In the case where an IP is generated internally, all the costs of R&D and investments in 
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recorgnized at cost. For the IP generated internally, when the “probability recognition criterion” is not met, 
the relevant expenditures shall be recognized as an expense when it is incurred [IAS 38.68]. However, brands, 
mastheads, publishing titles, customer lists and items similar in substance that are internally generated should 
not be recognised as assets [IAS 38.63]. All reseearch costs are charged as expense [IAS 38.54]. Development 
costs are capitalised only after technical and commercial feasibility of the asset for sale or use have been 
established. This means that the entity must intend and be able to complete the intangible asset and either use it 
or sell it and be able to demonstrate how the asset will generate future economic benefits [IAS 38.57]. IP shall 
be initially measured at cost and can be reevaluated to fair value. See detailed information at 
http://www.iasplus.com/en/standards/ias/ias38,  
202 Ghafele (2010), “Accounting for IP?,” supra note 200. 
203 The case was first discussed in the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs 
Conference of 2006, see Ghafele (2010) “Accounting for IP?,” supra note 200 at 521.  
204 Ibid. 
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generating the patents are identified as “expense” and should be reported only at one 
single point in time, although these expenditures are usually spent smoothly over 
time. 205  This requirement also removes the expenditures off the balance sheet 
immediately, without indicating the associated economic benefits that would arise later. 
If these resulting IP assets are also used internally, then all the R&D expenditure 
appears as purely costs on the balance sheet, with no direct profits that can be reflected 
under the current accounting standards. The efforts on R&D and IP management are 
therefore under appreciated. By contrast, if the IP holder later decides to license-out or 
sell the internally generated IP, then the revenues from the transaction can show up on 
the balance sheet as revenue, but the revenue may look like suddenly coming out of 
nowhere.206 The connection between the expenditures and the revenues is missing in 
the financial reports.  
The different treatments of IP for various purposes of use create lots of 
inconsistencies.207 The problems also exist in other accounting standards, such as the 
US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (US-GAAP) and the EU Accounting 
Directive.208 
The difficulty in evaluating IP and the invisibility of many valuable IP accounting 
standards gives rise to two main problems. Firstly they may give rise to the existence 
of significant divergences between lenders’ and debtors’ perceptions as to how much 
the IP assets can secure. The divergences complicate the negotiation process and 
consequently increase the transaction cost of IP collateralization. Furthermore, the lack 
of trust in the valuation results often leads to over-collateralization. For example, in 
those Chinese banks accepting IP as collateral, the maximum amount of loan is around 
only 15-30% of the valuation of the encumbered IP.209 The over-collateralization 
greatly increases the cost of loans for borrowers. Secondly, they make it difficult to 
reveal and communicate the value of IP among market participants in a standardized 

205 Ibid and see also Frey (2013) “Intellectual Property Rights And The Financing Of Technological 
Innovation: Public Policy and the Efficiency of Capital Market”, supra note 38 at 40; and OECD (2015) 
“Enquiries into Intellectual Property’s Economic Impact”, supra note 57 at 460. 
206 See Ghafele (2010), “Accounting for IP?,” supra note 200 at 525. 
207  See further discussion on the problems of recognizing IP in accounting standards in European 
Commission, Final Report from the Expert Group on Intellectual Property Valuation (Luxembourg, 2014), at 
https://ec.europa.eu/research/innovation-union/pdf/Expert_Group_Report_on_Intellectual_Property_Valuatio
n_IP_web_2.pdf. 
208 See the comparison with the US-GAAP and the EU Accounting Directive in European Commission 
(2014), Final Report from the Expert Group on Intellectual Property Valuation, ibid. 
209 See infra note 402 and the accompanying text. 
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language. With the information asymmetry regarding the quality of projects and IP 
assets, IP holders cannot make credible declaration and explanation of the value of their 
IP assets and firms, whereas the external investors cannot understand nor make effective 
ex ante assessments of the future revenues and the liquidation value of encumbered 
IP.210 The external investors therefore have to ask for higher premium against the risk 
of accepting valueless IP or funding in bad projects, which increases the cost of debt 
finance for IP-intensive firms or simply makes debt finance impossible.211  
The problems in valuation and accounting standards intensify the difficulties of using 
IP as collateral. However, they are not the reasons to prevent IP from being used as 
collateral. Improving IP valuation and accounting standards is equally important for 
mergers and licensing transaction, for insurance, bankruptcy and liquidation, for 
litigation, for the determination of taxable value and for providing an actuarial basis 
for establishing robust markets for all kinds of IP transactions. 
In recent years, many efforts have been taken to improve the IP valuation 
methodologies in order to increase the assessment certainty. For example, the World 
Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) has published a number of documents 
specifically for IP valuation and has organized several training programs to provide 
valuation guidance for practitioners.212 Similarly, the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) also started a programme entitled “Creating 
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210 See, e.g., David Aboody and Baruch Lev, “The Value Relevance of Intangibles: The Case of Software 
Capitalization,” Journal of Accounting Research 36 (Studie (1998): 161–91 (arguing that “the volatility of 
technology stocks is further nourished by accounting standards that make it hard for investors to track how 
innovation relates to business.”). European Commission (2014) Final Report from the Expert Group on 
Intellectual Property Valuation, supra note 207 at 31 (positing that “Better informed lending decisions – 
obtaining insights into off-balance sheet assets (which generally include most, if not all, of a business’s IP and 
intangibles) provides lenders with a more representative picture of a company’s resources and value. Lenders 
need to gain confidence in managing the particular risk profiles associated with these assets. This involves 
familiarisation, training, and the adoption of recognised standards for intangible asset value management. 
Banks are not equipped with sufficient knowledge relating to IP assets and IP value. Risk assessment does not 
consider the valuation of IP as a supporting process. Internally generated IP is seldom represented on company 
balance sheets. It is therefore incumbent on a company’s directors to understand and explain their IP and 
intangibles in language a lender will understand.”) 
211 See also the discussions on the adverse effects of the informational asymmetry for external investments in 
Section 2.1.2.3, 2.2.5 and 2.4. 
212  See the list of documents issued by the WIPO on improving IP valuation at: 
http://www.wipo.int/sme/en/documents/valuationdocs/index.htm; and see the detailed information as to the 
training programs at: http://www.wipo.int/sme/en/index.jsp?sub_col=sme-doc&cat=ip%20financing. 
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Value from Intellectual Assets” to develop more effective valuation criteria for IP.213  
The IP valuation industry has grown and matured to develop with the development of 
the knowledge-based economy. For now, the common IP valuation methodologies can 
be categorized into four main families of methods: transactional methods, income 
methods, replacement cost methods, and some other non-traditional methods.214 The 
transactional methods (or market approaches) measure the value of an IP by the 
actual price paid for a similar intangible under similar circumstances.215 The “fair 
market value” and “arm’s length standard” are the most common valuation criteria. 
The “relief from royalty approach” is a transactional method.216 These efforts to 
improve the immature marketplaces for IP transactions help the determination of fair 
market price and the validity of the transactional methods.217 The income methods 
measure the value based on the ability of IP to directly or indirectly generate future 
income, by measuring the projected cash flows, the economic life of the IP, and 
discounted with the expected cost of financing the IP in question. The replacement 
cost methods are based on the “principle of substitution” and measure the estimated 
cost to create a replacement asset with similar commercial utility by designing around 
the legal protection of the subject IP. Furthermore, in the past years of practice, some 
option-like non-traditional methods were developed for evaluating the expected value 
of IP in question, based on the occurrence of future contingent events. The expected 
value is usually calculated by the employment of various mathematical models, such 
as real options, binomial models, and Monte Carlo simulations, depending on “the 
probability of the favorable event occurring that will make the IP valuable” and on 
“the payoff if the favorable event occurs”.218  
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213 See further information about the OECD’s program on “Creating Value from Intellectual Assets” at: 
http://www.oecd.org/document/34/0,3746,en_2649_34797_37815842_1_1_1_1,00.html.  
214 See, e.g., Paul Flignor and David Orozco, “Intangible Asset & Intellectual Property Valuation: A 
Multidisciplinary Perspective,” WIPO Homepage, 2006, 
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/sme/en/documents/pdf/IP_Valuation.pdf.  
215 For the problems of the market approach, see discussion in surpa note 199 and accompanying text. 
216 In the “relief from royalty approach”, the valuation is based on the estimation of what a business would 
pay to license its own IP assets in a similar arm’s-length transaction. The value of IP is then calculated as the 
present value of the avoided hypothetical royalty charges. See, e.g., Robert F. Reilly, “The Relief from 
Royalty Method of Intellectual Property Valuation,” Insights Autumn (2008): 20–43, 
http://www.willamette.com/insights_journal/08/autumn_2008_2.pdf. 
217 See the detailed discussion in supra note 195 and accompanying text.  
218 See Flignor and Orozco (2006), “Intangible Asset & Intellectual Property Valuation: A Multidisciplinary 
Perspective,” surpa note 214 (explaining: “the real option method is based on the successful Fischer-Black 
valuation model for pricing options (calls and puts) of financial stocks. The basic premise behind the real 
 ͹͹
Nevertheless, none of these IP valuation methods works for all purposes.219 The 
careful selection of appropriate valuation method should be determined by a clear 
definition of the subject asset, the context, purpose and scope of the valuation, and 
shall be based on proper valuation assumptions. 
2.3.3 Critics of the Existing Efforts 
With so many concerns on the uncertainties in the value of IP and so many efforts to 
improve the IP valuation, the survey report of the European Commission’s Expert 
Group on IP valuation reveals that - it is “striving to find a simple, risk free method 
that can be used by all to value IP may not be the answer to unlocking the barriers to 
IP backed lending.”220 The expert group has asserted that in fact “the available 
methods for IP (valuation) are valid, consistent, and well accepted within different 
professional categories. The problem rests on the limited knowledge of their existence 
and the reciprocal lack of confidence in the results from the professional 
categories”.221 Therefore, the biggest challenge is actually on how to build and increas 
public awareness and help lenders gain confidence in managing the particular risk in 
IP collateralization.222  
The lack of knowledge and confidence come from the absence of experience. The 
European Commission (2000) has confirmed that the “relatively limited experience” 
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option method is that an investment with an asymmetric payoff (i.e., a potentially large payoff and only 
limited losses) will have an increased value as the level of uncertainty, known as volatility, increases. 
Consequently, real option methods have been most useful where large capital investments are required with a 
highly uncertain and far away payoff, such as the pharmaceutical and oil exploration industries. “Monte Carlo 
simulations”, named for the gambling games popularized at the Mediterranean resort models a low 
probability payoff over multiple iterations. Monte Carlo simulations are used to estimate the spread of 
diseases, engineering tolerances and even the probability of the Chicago Cubs winning the World Series! 
“The binomial expansion method”, or decision tree, is the most intuitive of these methods. In the binomial 
expansion the required events and decisions are modeled explicitly, each with their own probabilities. An 
important aspect of building a binomial expansion is to ensure all potential alternatives and scenarios.). 
219 See other reviews of the models of IP valuation in, e.g., Nick Bontis, “Assessing Knowledge Assets: A 
Review of the Models Used to Measure Intellectual Capital,” International Journal of Management Reviews 
3, no. 1 (2001): 41–60; Kamiyama et al. (2006) “Valuation and Exploitation of Intellectual Property”, supra 
note 130 
220 See European Commission (2014), Final Report from the Expert Group on Intellectual Property 
Valuation, supra note 207 at 33. 
221 The citation is from the OECD (2015), “Enquiries into Intellectual Property’s Economic Impact (Chapter 
9 - IP-Based Financing of Innovative Firms)”, supra note 57 at 459.  
222 See “Intellectual Property Awarenes Network (IPAN) Briefs on Topical Intellectual Property Issues-Brief 
18: Intellectual Property, Finance and the Economy.” (2016), supra note 133 at 61 (positing that help lenders 
gain confidence “involves familiarisation, training, and the adoption of recognised standards for intangible 
asset value management.”). 
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of banks in managing the relevant risks and the limited “supply of expertise” are the 
main reasons that keep European commercial banks from providing IP-based loans to 
high-tech SMEs.223 The unfamiliarity and lack of knowledge or confidence increase 
the practitioners’ caution with the use of IP as collateral. Over-cautious lenders tend to 
perceive an exaggerated level of risk. Another report from European Commission 
(2014) posits that the reluctance to accept IP as collateral can be addressed only “as 
the market gains greater experience in IP transactions and as IP becomes recognised as 
a tradable asset”, and “in order to enhance market confidence in IP having tradable 
value and monetise innovative ideas, market intervention is required in relation to 
reducing the real or perceived risk to lenders.”224 
We can see that, in order to incentivize lenders and other market participants to accept 
and use IP collateralization, different efforts have been made, such as developing 
secondary market to facilitate liquidation of encumbered IP (Section 2.3.2.2 C), 
improving IP valuation (Section 2.3.2.2 D). Some countries have implemented policies 
to lower the risk for participants, such as establishing IP risk insurance against 
ligitation and creating risk-sharing mechanisms against bank loans. For example, the 
Singapore government provides a specific policy scheme to partially underwrite the 
loans secured by IP, and the Malaysian government provides an interest rate subsidy 
and an additional guarantee scheme (Section 2.3.1.2). And some governments are 
using pilot-schemes to test different policies (like China) (Section 4.2.1). While we 
fully acknowledge the contribution of these efforts to reduce the “real risks” of IP 
collateralization, we also notice that these efforts seem to focus on the repayment 
function of collateral only.  
These efforts may not help much in reducing the “perceived risks” of inexperienced 
lenders. With the mere focusing on the repayment function of collateral, lenders look 
into the liquidation value of IP only. Inexperienced lenders tend to exaggerate the 
relevant risks to a level much higher than the real risks. They typically accept IP with 
high liquidation value and tend to make a severe discount on the IP valuation to 
compensate the exaggerated risks. Many valuable IP would be deprived of being used 
as collateral because the heavy discount rate reduces the amount of debt they can 
secure. They become insufficient for the intended borrowing. Only a very limited 

223 See European Commission (2000), Funding of New Technology-Based Firms by Commercial Banks in 
Europe, supra note 142, at 5, 37 and 42.  
224 See European Commission (2014), Final Report from the Expert Group on Intellectual Property 
Valuation, supra note 207, at 33. 
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range of IP with very high liquidation value might be accepted as collateral. And in 
some cases, even IP with high liquidation value may not be used as collateral, since 
the heavy discount rate makes the borrowing too costly for the borrowers, especially 
for good borrowers. Many R&D investment opportunities with great potential may 
therefore be foregone because of insufficient collateral. The forgone transactions 
would have happened if not for the exaggerated risks. The wrong perception of risks 
restricts financial institutions from participating and getting familiar with IP 
collateralization. As expertise cannot be gained through experience, wrong perception 
of risks cannot be corrected. With this vicious circle, credit rationing would stay 
severe and few transactions would be concluded. Financial institutions would never 
have an opportunity to accumulate experience or to establish confidence. All the 
market participants, including financial institutions and IP holders, cannot realize the 
financial potential of IP. In the long term, IP collateralization, this profitable and 
valuable mechanism for funding R&D, would remain at an undeveloped level.  
Second, the mere emphasis on the liquidation value of collateralized IP cannot explain 
some phenomena in practice. If the liquidation value is the main concern of the lenders, 
it is difficult to explain why offering key patents as collateral is equally and sometimes 
even more important for many lenders than offering tangible assets, as evidenced by 
the survey of Rassenfosse and Fischer (2016).225 
Third, the mere focusing on the repayment function of collateral cannot provide 
enough justifications for promoting IP collateralization. The eminent works in secured 
transactions, such as Lacker (1991), find that one important condition that is required 
for a collateralized loan contract to be optimal in controlling the ex post misbehaving 
is that the collateral should be more valuable to the borrower than to the lender.226 In 
this case, the liquidation means a transfer of the collateral from the borrower, the party 
with a higher valuation, to the lender (or an assignee), the party with a lower valuation. 
Therefore, the liquidation sale itself is associated with social loss. As IP assets usually 
have severely discounted liquidation value (Section C), the social loss from the 
disposal of encumbered IP in liquidation can be significant. Therefore, we need more 
plausible justifications for supporting all these efforts of governments on promoting IP 
collateralization. 

225 See Rassenfosse and Fischer (2016) “Venture Debt Financing: Determinants of the Lending Decision”, 
infra note 250.   
226 See Jeffrey M. Lacker, “Why Is There Debt?,” FRB Richmond Economic Review 77, no. 4 (1991): 3–19; 
also Tirole (2006), The Theory of Corporate Finance, infra note 256 at 177-180. 
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Most of the efforts take the theories used for explaining traditional secured transaction 
as given and try to find ways to make IP have the same characteristics as ordinary 
tangible assets instead of exploring the possible effects of IP’s characteristics on the 
theories of secured transactions. These efforts do not appear to have looked into the 
other roles that the collateral plays in the secured transactions. Examining the roles of 
collateral in secured transactions, and taking into account the features of IP, may help 
us better understand the importance and social benefits of promoting the use of IP as 
collateral. 
These problems remind us that, in order to give plausible explanations for these 
phenomena and to find suitable legal rules and policies to promote IP collateralization, 
it might be necessary to go back to the fundamental law and economics theories about 
secured transaction law and IP law to find out the real roles that collaterals play in the 
secured transactions, and to explore how the special characteristics of IP would affect 
these roles when IP is used as collateral. Only a further and more comprehensive 
exploration of the advantages and challenges brought by IP collateralization from the 
perspective of law and economics analysis can help us answer the basic question of 
why it is important to study the use of IP as collateral in secured transactions. The 
reasons should lead us to find a more practical way to promote IP collateralization in 
practice. At the same time, this exploration can also help us get a better understanding 
about the fundamental theoretical issues in secured transaction law and IP law. 
2.4 Theoretical Supports for IP Collateralization 
2.4.1 General L&E Theories of Secured Transactions 
Intuitively, with the repayment function, collateral indemnifies a secured creditor 
against potential loss by ensuring it has some “salvage” value if the investment fails. It 
is not difficult to understand why a lender would like to ask for and accept collateral. 
However, providing collateral is also very costly for a borrower, especially taking into 
account the legal restrictions on disposing of the collateral and the high costs of 
contracting, evaluating the collateral, filling for security registration and foreclosure in 
the case of default. Therefore, the reasons for which a borrower would like to use 
collateral and the relevant social benefits are much more complicated than the intuition 
and have been comprehensively examined by theoretical and empirical studies. 
 ͺͳ
From the perspectives of the whole society, secured transactions are considered to be 
socially beneficial227 and the social benefits of secured transactions are stemming 
from the role of collateral in mitigating the problems caused by the information 
asymmetries in debt finance (see Section 2.2.5). In response to the “adverse selection” 
problem and the “moral hazard” problem, there are two main branches of theories in 
law and economics literature explaining how the information asymmetries are 
mitigated by collateral: the “signaling theory” and the “bonding theory”.228  
2.4.1.1 The adverse selection problem and the signaling theory 
From an ex ante perspective, the proponents of the “signaling theory” explain that, 
when faced with the adverse selection problem caused by the asymmetric information 
about the risk-type of the borrowers (Section 2.2.5.1), the high quality borrowers can 
use the provision of collateral to signal their credible commitment on repayment, by 
demonstrating their beliefs in the quality of the proposed projects and also their 
superior repayment capability to the lenders.229 In this way, high-quality borrowers 
can avoid being pooled with low-quality borrowers.  
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227 The early literature on secured transactions had a long debate over the “puzzle of security interests”. It 
was argued that, while secured creditors provide advantageous terms, the unsecured secured creditors provide 
more disadvantageous terms. So the puzzle is: if a debtor’s aggregate cost of capital is neutral, why does a 
debtor bother to use secured security? See a comprehensive overview of the debate in James W. Bowers, 
“Security Interests, Creditors’ Priorities, and Bankruptcy,” in Property Law and Economics (Encyclopedia 
Law And Economics, 2nd Edition), ed. Boudewijn Bouckaert (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2010), 270–317 at 
279-283). There is also a lot of literature criticizing the “distributive effects” of secured transactions. They 
argue that that secured transactions are socially undesirable become of the redistribution of wealth away from 
the involuntary or “non-adjusting creditors”, those creditors who are unable to adjust the terms to fully reflect 
their subordination to secured claims and the risk they are facing, like tort claimers and employees. See, for 
example, Lucian Arye Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried, “The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in 
Bankruptcy,” The Yale Law Journal 105, no. 4 (1996): 857–934 (the first literatue that uses the terminology 
“non-adjusting creditors”). See also John Armour, “The Law and Economics Debate About Secured Lending: 
Lessons For European Lawmaking?,” in European Company And Financial Law Review - Special Volume 2: 
The Future of Secured Credit in Europe, ed. Horst Eidenmüller and Eva-Maria Kieninger (De Gruyter Recht, 
2008), 3–29 (reviewing the empirical literature and arguing that the empirical findings tend to suggest that 
there are aggregate positive benefits, since the benefits from secured transactions greatly outweigh the social 
costs of any transactions motivated by redistribution). 
228 See a compressive summary of the two theories in John Armour (2008), “The Law and Economics Debate 
About Secured Lending: Lessons For European Lawmaking?,” supra note 227. See other reviews, in, e.g., 
George G. Triantis, “Financial Slack Policy and the Laws of Secured Transactions,” The Journal of Legal 
Studies 29, no. 1 (2000): 35–69; Tirole (2006) The Theory of Corporate Finance, infra note 256, 164-170 and 
251-254. 
229 See e.g., Helmut Bester, “Screening Vs. Rationing in Credit Markets with Imperfect Information,” The 
American Economic Review 75, no. 4 (1985): 850–855; Helmut Bester, “The Role of Collateral in Credit 
Markets with Imperfect Information,” European Economic Review 31, no. 4 (1987): 887–899; Anjan V. 
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The signaling theory is based on the assumption that pledging collateral constitutes a 
costly signal. And it is less costly for a “high-quality” borrower to provide collateral 
than a “low-quality” borrower, because a high quality borrower faces a lower 
probability of losing the encumbered collateral in default. Then providing more 
collateral allows the high-quality borrowers to separate themselves from the low 
quality ones and to get advantageous loan terms for their lower risk of failure in the 
separating equilibrium. The signaling theory predicts a negative relationship between 
default risk and the presence of collateral. It is expected to see that high-quality 
borrowers will be more willing to provide collateral. However, the empirical evidence 
finds that the presence of collateral increases with default risk.230 Collateral is more 
often used by younger and smaller firms and in projects with a high probability of 
default, which are considered as low-quality borrowers.231 
Armour (2008) explains the inconsistency between theoretical prediction and the 
empirical observation by pointing out that the early application of the signaling model 
in the literature was “mis-specified” as to the real cost of using collateral.232 It 
explains that, as a consequence of default, a borrower/debtor loses the asset used as 
collateral anyway, either to the secured creditor or other unsecured creditors. So, using 
assets as collateral does not increase a borrower/debtor’s cost in the case of default. A 
borrower/debtor’s real cost of using collateral comes from the restrictions over 
alienation of the encumbered collateral before the default.233 A security interest in 
collateral continues after a sale, exchange, or other disposition, unless authorized by 
the secured creditor. The security interest impedes the sale or other dispositions of the 
encumbered collateral and thereby constrains the availability of internal funds. The 
cost of restrictions is only incurred as long as the borrower/debtor does not default. In 
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Thakor and David Besanko, “Collateral and Rationing: Sorting Equilibria in Monopolistic and Competitive 
Credit Markets,” International Economic Review 28, no. 3 (1987): 671–89. 
230 See, e.g., James R. Booth and Lena Chua Booth, “Loan Collateral Decisions and Corporate Borrowing 
Costs,” Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 38, no. 1 (2006): 67–90 (finding that the presence of collateral 
increases with default risk). 
231 See, e.g., John D. Leeth and Jonathan A. Scott, “The Incidence of Secured Debt: Evidence from the Small 
Business Community,” Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 24, no. 3 (1989): 379–394 (with data 
from two samples of over 1,000 small business loans in the US, it is found that the incidence of secured debt 
is positively related to probability of default, loan size, loan maturity and marketability of assets). Allen N. 
Berger and Gregory F. Udell, “Collateral, Loan Quality and Bank Risk,” Journal of Monetary Economics 25, 
no. 1 (1990): 21–42 (the presence of collateral is associated with riskier loans and/or riskier borrowers). 
232 See Armour (2008), “The Law and Economics Debate About Secured Lending: Lessons For European 
Lawmaking?,” super note 227 at 7. 
233 See George G. Triantis (2000), “Financial Slack Policy and the Laws of Secured Transactions,” supra 
note 228.  
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other words, the marginal cost of using collateral is actually decreasing with the 
probability of default. A low-quality borrower, who has a higher probability of default 
(i.e., a lower probability of not default), actually has a lower cost of using collateral, 
and is therefore more willing to provide collateral.  
Armour’s explanation is consistent with the empirical evidence. Nevertheless, this 
explanation implies that providing collateral is in fact a signal of being a “low-quality” 
debtor and would consequently lead to more disadvantageous terms in the loan 
contract.  
2.4.1.2 The moral hazard problem and the bonding theory 
By contrast, from an ex post perspective, the “bonding theory” explains that, with 
asymmetric information regarding the states of an investment project and in the case 
of an incomplete loan contract, collateral can solve the post-lending moral hazard 
problem, by helping creditors achieve an alignment of interests and play a disciplinary 
role in the behavior of the debtors.234 
On the one hand, the restrictions over alienation of the encumbered collateral limit the 
borrower’s capability of obtaining other funds, by selling the encumbered collateral or 
using the collateral to borrow more, to fund the more risky strategy, which increase the 
probability of failure.235 On the other hand, the use of collateral increases the debtor’s 
loss in the case of default and prevents asset substitution. So the debtors have no 
incentives to be lazy or indulge in ex post risk-shifting behavior any more, since such 
misbehavior can also increase the probability of failure, which consequently brings 
higher cost to the borrowers themselves as well. The presence of collateral ensures that 
the debtor cannot opportunistically avoid the cost of failure by asset substitution.236 
The bonding of interests ensures that, after obtaining the debt finance, the debtor will 
be induced to keep its original commitment, without engaging in wealth-reducing 
opportunistic misbehavior. In other words, collateral is also a “self-enforcing” 
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234 See Arnoud W. A. Boot et al., “Secured Lending and Default Risk: Equilibrium Analysis, Policy 
Implications and Empirical Results,” The Economic Journal 101, no. 406 (1991): 458–472. 
235 See Alan Schwartz, “Priority Contracts and Priority in Bankruptcy,” Cornell Law Review 82, no. 6 (1997): 
1396–1419 (collteral binds debtors not to engage in future finance which may dilute the value of earlier 
loans). 
236 See Clifford W. Jr. Smith and Jerold B. Warner, “Bankruptcy, Secured Debt, and Optimal Capital 
Structure: Comment,” The Journal of Finance 34, no. 1 (1979): 247–51(positing that the secured debt is one 
way of precluding asset substitution by borrowers). 
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mechanism of incomplete loan contract, which helps reduce the creditor’s monitoring 
cost as well.237 In total, the disciplinary role of collateral can reduce transaction cost 
caused by information disclosure, contracting and monitoring. 
The bonding theory predicts that more collateral will be required by the creditor in the 
cases with more serious information problems in the post-lending relationship, which 
is exactly what occurs in the case of R&D investments. From the perspective of the 
secured creditor, using collateral lowers the overall default risk. So, ceteris paribus, a 
secured lender would be more likely to provide credit with more advantageous loan 
terms, like with a larger amount, or a lower interest rate, or a longer maturity, than an 
unsecured one.  
2.4.1.3 The paradox between theories 
While both theories predict that the borrowers with more serious information problems, 
ex ante and also ex post, will provide more collateral, they have opposite predictions 
on the effect of providing collateral on the loan contract terms. On the one hand, the 
“bonding theory” indicates that younger and smaller firms in high-tech industries, 
which suffer more serious information problems in the post-lending relationship, 
would be asked for more collateral. The use of collateral controls misbehaving and can 
help the debtors to obtain more advantageous terms. Nevertheless, on the other hand, 
the “corrected signaling theory” indicates that, ex ante, providing collateral is a 
low-quality signal, which would consequently lead to more disadvantageous terms. 
Reading the two theories together indicates that some benefits brought by the 
disciplinary role of collateral would be offset by the cost brought by the low-quality 
signaling effect of using collateral. 
Some empirical studies, for example, Booth et al. (2006) and Benmelech and Bergman 
(2009), have shown that the use of collateral does help debtors get more advantageous 
terms and lower the cost of debt finance.238 These empirical findings can only prove 
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237 See Robert J. Barro, “The Loan Market, Collateral, and Rates of Interest,” Journal of Money, Credit and 
Banking 8, no. 4 (1976): 439–56. Daniel K. Benjamin, “The Use of Collateral to Enforce Debt Contracts,” 
Economic Inquiry 16, no. 3 (1978): 333–59. 
238 See James R. Booth and Lena Chua Booth, “Loan Collateral Decisions and Corporate Borrowing Costs,” 
Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 38, no. 1 (2006): 67–90 (finding that the presence of collateral 
increases with default risk, consistent with low quality borrowers reducing their risks and borrowing costs 
through the use of collateral). Efraim Benmelech and Nittai K. Bergman, “Collateral Pricing,” Journal of 
Financial Economics 91, no. 3 (2009): 339–360 (using a data set of secured debt issued by U.S. airlines and 
finding that the ability to pledge collateral, and in particular redeployable collateral, lowers the cost of external 
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that the advantageous effect indicated by the bonding theory is larger than the 
disadvantageous effect indicated by the signaling theory. However, we still cannot 
directly observe how serious is the disadvantageous effect indicated by the signaling 
theory. If without the low-quality signaling effect, the debtor might have been able to 
get even more advantageous terms with the use of collateral. 
2.4.2 The Advantages of IP Collateralization 
Putting IP under the L&E theories of collateral can help us understand why IP can be 
good as collateral and the reasons for promoting IP collateralization. 
2.4.2.1 Signalling effect 
According to information theory, a good-quality signal as a “sorting mechanism” in 
debt finance (1) should be highly informative about the good quality of the borrower, 
(2) should be more costly for low-quality borrowers to provide, and (3) should be 
easily observed and verified by the potential lenders.239 We take patents as an example 
to show that IP satisfies all the three requirements and hence can be a highly 
informative signal for good-quality borrowers to distinguish themselves, and 
consequently reduce information asymmetries between the borrowers and the external 
loan providers. The rationality is similar for copyrights and trademarks. 
A. Highly informative signal 
First, patents are highly informative about the quality and potential of the borrowers.240  
On the one hand, patents predict the applicability of the underlying technology, give 
the patenting firm competitive advantages and enable the patenting firm to gain profit 
from exploitation or licensing, so they convey “direct” information for predicting the 
firm’s future performance. Plenty of empirical studies show the positive correlation 
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financing and increases debt capacity). 
239 See Myers and Majluf (1984) “Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have 
Information That Investors Do Not Have,” supra note 70. 
240 See, e.g., Clarisa Long, “Patent Signals,” The University of Chicago Law Review 69, no. 2 (2002): 625–
679 (one of the first examples of literature to argue the patents as an effective mean to provide quality signal 
for reducing the information asymmetries between the patenting firm and external investors). Annamaria 
Conti, Marie Thursby, and Frank T. Rothaermel, “Show Me the Right Stuff: Signals for High Tech Startups,” 
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 22, no. 2 (2013): 341–364 (empirically showing that patents 
have great impact on the venture capitalist's funding decision). The signaling effects are similar for debt 
providers in this regard.  
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between patents with a firm’s cash flow,241 survival rate,242 market value,243 and 
growth rate. 244  Better future performance indicates a higher probability of 
repayment.245 
On the other hand, on top of the direct information, patents also have some signalling 
effects on indicating the borrower’s capability (both managerial and technological) 
and confidence. The grant of a patent is conditional on the examination of the 
corresponding authority, i.e., patent office. Developing patents that can pass the 
examination require a lot of efforts and resources in R&D and management, so the 
presence of certain IP reveal “indirect” information about the borrower’s capabilities 
of R&D, human resource and management.246 Meanwhile, the application for patents 
and the following maintenance are expensive both in terms of money and time. Only 
innovators with confidence in getting the patents and applying the technologies in 
practice for profit would bear the cost of getting patents in order to secure the profits. 
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241 See, e.g., Edward Levitas and M. Ann McFadyen, “Managing Liquidity in Research-Intensive Firms: 
Signaling and Cash Flow Effects of Patents and Alliance Activities,” Strategic Management Journal 30, no. 6 
(2009): 659–678 (using a sample of 108 US-based biotechnology firms, showing that patents provide 
important signaling mechanisms and consequently mitigate or even lower the firm’s need to hold liquid assets). 
242 See, e.g., Stefan Wagner and Iain M. Cockburn, “Patents and the Survival of Internet-Related IPOs,” 
Research Policy 39, no. 2 (2010): 214–228 (through examining the survival rate of 356 Internet-related firms 
listed on the NASDAQ from the late 1990s till 2005, showing that processing patents (no such a correlation 
found as to business method patents) is positively associated with survival rate, because of the conferred 
competitive advantages (or simply a signal of the firm’s quality).  
243 See, e.g., Dirk Czarnitzki, Bronwyn H. Hall, and Raffaele Oriani, “Market Valuation of US and European 
Intellectual Property,” in The Management of Intellectual Property, ed. Derek Bosworth and Elizabeth 
Webster (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2006), 111–131 (by using stock market value as an indicator of the 
firm’s expected economic results from investing in knowledge capital, showing that patent counts correlate 
positively with firms’ market value). 
244 See, e.g., Christian Helmers and Mark Rogers, “Does Patenting Help High-Tech Start-Ups?,” Research 
Policy 40, no. 7 (2011): 1016–1027 (by using data on all high- and medium-tech start-ups in the UK in 2000, 
showing that patentees have higher asset growth than non-patentees of between 8% and 27% per annum) .   
245 Nevertheless, we also need keep in mind that that IP rights are merely a small component in the innovation 
ecosystem. Patents are one of various influences on firm market value. They do positively influence market 
value or profits, but patent value does not equal market value or profits. Patents are just one crucial value 
indicator 
246 See, e.g., Hottenrott et al. (2016) “Patents as Quality Signals? The Implications for Financing Constraints 
on R&D,” supra note 99 at 200 (pointing out that “if lenders assume that patents correlate with 
difficult-to-measure firm characteristics that are not necessarily directly related to the firms' patented 
inventions, patents may still be a useful signal. For instance, patents provide information about the firms' 
ability to perform valuable research as patents measure the outcome of past R&D and thus "advertise" the 
firms' innovation capabilities.”); See Harhoff (2011) “The Role of Patents and Licenses in Securing External 
Finance for Innovation,” supra note 116 (arguing that patents may signal the quality of the firms' R&D staff 
and its ability in the management of IP). 
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So, the existence of patents, and even just pending patent applications, is able to signal 
valuable information as to the borrower’s prediction of future performance.247  
Both the capability and the confidence imply a high probability of success. Signalling 
the information via patent portfolios would be cheaper than via other means. As the 
application and grant of copyright and trademark are comparatively cheaper and easier, 
their signal effects are also less informative.248  
B. Costly signal 
Second, patents are costly signals, especially for low-quality borrowers. Developing 
and applying for patents require a lot more efforts and resources for borrowers with 
low technological capability. So a high-quality borrower can use the presence of 
patents, even just pending patent applications, to signal its good capability in 
developing technologies and its confidence in applying the technologies in practice for 
profits. The quality signal is sent in a way different from the case of using the normal 
assets as collateral (discussed in Section 2.4.1.1).  
When using normal assets, such as machinery, equipment, inventory, and real estate, 
which contain no direct information about the quality of the borrower, as collateral, 
the borrowers have to use the “amount of the collateral” to separate themselves. In this 
case, the legal restrictions over alienation of the encumbered collateral imposed by the 
security interests (which are only incurred as long as the debtor does not default) play 
the crucial role. The more collateral that is provided, the higher the cost of non-default 
would be. Then only low-quality borrowers would like to provide a certain amount of 
collateral, because of their low probability of non-default. So, willingness to provide 
collateral actually becomes a bad-quality signal.  
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247 See, e.g., Joel A.C. Baum and Brian S. Silverman, “Picking Winners or Building Them? Alliance, 
Intellectual, and Human Capital as Selection Criteria in Venture Financing and Performance of 
Biotechnology Startups,” Journal of Business Venturing 19, no. 3 (2004): 411–436 (providing that even 
pending patent applications may be regarded as proxies for technological quality); Hottenrott et al. (2016) 
“Patents as Quality Signals? The Implications for Financing Constraints on R&D,” supra note 99 
(empirically finding that "the mitigating effect of patent applications is not due to the actual ex-post value of 
the patented technology" and conluding that "patents do have some signaling effect beyond the fact that they 
proxy for the underlying technological and economic value of the patented invention". "the (signaling) effect 
on external financing tends to be driven by the mere presence of patents rather than observable ex post 
indicators of the value of those inventions"). 
248 See OECD (2015) “Enquiries into Intellectual Property’s Economic Impact”, supra note 57. 
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By contrast, in this case of IP collateralization, IP contains direct information about 
the quality of the borrower. The legal restrictions and the amount of IP to be 
encumbered still matter because they determine the cost of transaction and the debtor’s 
incentive to participate in the transaction. Nevertheless, in comparison, the cost of 
obtaining IP matters much more. With the high cost for a low-quality borrower to 
obtain and provide IP as collateral, the low-quality borrower cannot provide more IP 
in order to pretend to be of high-quality. So, the amount of IP to be encumbered 
ensures a good-quality signal, which could help the borrowers to get more 
advantageous terms. The paradox discussed above in Section 2.4.1.3 is solved.  
C. Easily observable signal 
Third, it is also easy for the potential lenders to observe and verify the good-quality 
sorting signal provided by patents. As the patent office has done the examination, the 
potential lenders can put less effort into evaluating the patents to be encumbered. As 
patent information is publicly available at the registry, the cost of obtaining the 
information is low for lenders.249 The good-quality sorting signals help lenders assess 
the quality of projects and creditability of the borrower and therefore reduce the ex 
ante information asymmetries. Accepting IP as collateral is attractive to the debt 
financers when evaluating the specific IP or the IP portfolio is easier than assessing the 
expected profitability of the whole borrowing firm. 
In a nutshell, providing IP as collateral is an effective good-quality signal to reduce 
the information asymmetries between the borrowers and external lenders. Compared 
to providing ordinary assets as collateral (with a bad-quality signal), ceteris paribus, 
the good-quality signal helps the borrowers to get even more advantageous terms on 
the top of (not offsetting) the benefits brought by the disciplinary role of collateral, 
and consequently to further reduce the cost of debt finance. Rassenfosse and Fischer 
(2016) have done a choice experiment over financial practitioners that are specialized 
in providing loans to finance growth of high-tech startups. They find that lenders have 
a strong preference for start-ups that offer patents as collateral. Their findings confirm 
that patents play an important signaling effect in venture lending decisions.250 The 
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249 See Long (2002), “Patent Signals,” supra note 240.   
250 See Rassenfosse and Fischer (2016), “Venture Debt Financing: Determinants of the Lending Decision.” 
supra note 119 (the analysis relies on a discrete choice experiment conducted with 55 senior venture lenders 
working for companies that cover at least 60 percent of the U.S. venture debt market. The result shows that 
lenders have a strong preference for start-ups that offer patents as collateral and the provision of patents as 
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emiprical study of Hottenrott et al. (2016) also shows that patents do provide good 
quality signals to external debtor investors that mitigate financing constraints; and 
small firms benefit more from patent signals than large firms because they are 
suffering more serious information problems.251  
The presence of IP also plays an important signaling role in attracting equity investors 
like angels and venture capitalists (Section 2.2.4). The first crucial difference is the 
focus of the investors. Equity investors share profits and care more about the future 
cash flow and overall profitability. They therefore mainly use IP as a crucial index to 
assess the expected profitability (the upside) of the whole firm and do not focus 
exclusively on the IP. By contrast, debt investors use IP to assess the overall default 
risk (the downside) and reply on the liquidation value. More attention is paid on a 
specific IP or the IP portfolio.252 The second and also a more important difference is 
the content of signals. In this debt finance setting, the borrowing firms not only signal 
their better capability in the management of technology and repayment, but also signal 
their commitment in repayment (reading together with the bonding effect discussed 
below). 
2.4.2.2 Bonding effect 
Though the liquidation of collateral is often used as a backstop to offset the lender’s 
losses upon the borrower’s default, another primary function of collateral is to avoid 
losses in the first place, by ensuring the borrower’s voluntary compliance with the 
terms of the loan contract.253 
The eminent works in secured transactions, such as Lacker (1991), find that one 
important condition that is required for a collateralized loan contract to be optimal in 
controlling the ex post misbehaving is that the collateral should be more valuable to 
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collateral significantly increase the chance of obtaining venture debt. Note: this study is on venture debt, a 
hybrid version of debt with all the basic characteristics of debt). 
251 See Hottenrott et al. (2016) “Patents as Quality Signals? The Implications for Financing Constraints on 
R&D,” supra note 99. This empirical study examines financial constraints in the market for bank finance as 
bank loans constitute the major external financing source for firms in most European countries. It uses a large 
sample of data of established R&D active firms (not start-ups), and studies the relationship between patents 
and external financial resources by using patents filed at the European Patent Office (rather than the US 
Patent Trademark Office)). 
252 See OECD (2015) “Enquiries into Intellectual Property’s Economic Impact”, supra note 57 at 460-461. 
253 See Ronald J. Mann, “Verification Institutions in Financing Transactions,” Georgetown Law Journal 87, no. 
7 (1999): 2225–2272 (discussing how a one-sided punitive hostage/collateral arrangement provides a useful 
solution by enhancing the cost of a breach yet minimizing the incentive to opportunism). 
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the borrower than to the lender.254 In this case, the liquidation means a transfer of the 
collateral from the borrower, the party with a higher valuation, to the lender (or an 
assignee), the party with a lower valuation. The value loss in the transfer would be 
eventually borne by the borrower. And all these legal restrictions imposed by the 
secured transaction law on the encumbered collateral make it difficult for the borrower 
to opportunistically substitute the collateral. The lenders can use the threat of 
destroying the collateral upon the borrower’s default to ensure that the borrower would 
behave. So, the larger the difference in valuation is, the greater the disciplinary role 
that the collateral can play. Furthermore, the low liquidation value also reduces the 
lender’s incentive to misappropriate the collateral, to initiate inefficient liquidation or 
to sabotage the investment. Economists sometimes refer to this finding as “the fairy 
tale of the ugly princess”.255 
So, from the perspective of the bonding theory, IP, a kind of low deployable asset 
whose liquidation value may suffer a very severe discount from the debtor’s valuation, 
is actually good collateral (more like a hostage). For the lender, the higher the 
percentage of the IP values in the total assets of the borrower, the greater the 
disciplinary role that the encumbered license can play. 256  The mere threat of 
foreclosure can be a powerful mean for the lenders to exert pressure upon the 
borrowers not to default on their obligations, because the borrowers, especially those 
startups, are really afraid of being deprived of such valuable assets at least to them.  
This prediction is consistent with the observations in Rassenfosse and Fischer (2016), 
which finds that offering key patents as collateral is even more important to the 
lender than offering the ordinary tangible assets. If no disciplinary role is involved, 
then the lenders would prefer tangible assets for the repayment reason. Using key 
patents as collateral are preferred because it signals a serious commitment and allows 
the lender to make credible threats. The fear of losing the key patents can play a 
substantial self-disciplinary role.  
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254 See Lacker (1991), “Why Is There Debt?”, supra note 226. 
255  See Oliver E. Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relational 
Contracting (New York: The Free Press, 1985) at 170-177 (the term "ugly princess" is used to describe a type 
of collateral/hostage that has high value to the obligor but limited direct value to the obligee). See also the 
discussion on the adoption of this collateral/hostage in different kinds of loans in Richard R. W. Brooks, 
“Credit Past Due,” Columbia Law Review 106, no. 4 (2006): 994–1028. 
256 See Jean Tirole, The Theory of Corporate Finance (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006) at 
177-180. 
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2.4.2.3 Implications 
Instead of focusing on the repayment function of collateral as a backup plan for default 
only, advocating the signaling and self-disciplinary roles that IP can play in the lending 
relationship can help financial institutions understand how accepting IP as collateral 
can alleviate the informational asymmetries and reduce the risk of default in the first 
place.  
In the screening process prior to lending, the good-quality signaling role of IP helps 
financial institutions predict R&D projects with a good future and select borrowers 
with higher capabilities of R&D and technological management as well as greater 
commitment to perform. The selection can reduce the overall risk of defaulting. In the 
post-lending relationship, the large difference in the valuation of the encumbered IP 
between the borrower and the lender makes IP a good hostage. The valuation 
difference ensures the borrower’s voluntary compliance with the terms of the loan 
contract and also removes the lender’s incentive for initiating inefficient liquidation. 
The two positive effects together can reduce the overall risk of default. Consequently, 
the reduction of default risk help the debtors get more advantageous terms and make 
all welfare-enhancing transactions happen.  
Of course the repayment function of collateral still matters in the lending relationship. 
A lender’s expected repayment upon the debtor’s default is determined by both the 
probability of default and the repayment from the liquidation value of the collateral. 
So, the liquidation value of the encumbered IP can have two opposite effects on the 
cost of the transaction.  
On the one hand, from the perspective of the bonding effect, the liquidation value of 
the encumbered IP is negatively related with the probability of default. A low 
liquidation value may indicate a large difference in valuation between the borrower 
and the lender. The larger the valuation difference is, the greater the bonding effect of 
the collateral is, and then the lower the probability of default would be, which can 
consequently reduce the interest rate that the lender would charge.  
On the other hand, from the perspective of the repayment function of collateral, the 
liquidation value of the encumbered IP is positively related to the payment that the 
lender would get upon the debtor’s default. So, a low liquidation value indicates a high 
interest rate. Then it is more costly for the borrower to use the IP as collateral. As a 
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result, if an IP collateralization can occur, it implies that the parties believe gains from 
the correct alignment of incentives outweigh the costs from the adverse investment 
incentives that the loan creates. 
2.5 Conclusion  
Although IP collateralization seems to become a popular topic in IP finance and many 
governments have issued policies or specific funding schemes to support it as a 
solution to alleviate the finance constraints faced by SMEs in funding their R&D 
activities, the fundamental question regarding “why IP collateralization should be 
advocated in the first place” has not been correctly addressed.  
To explore this question, we first need to understand the reasons for the finance 
constraints, i.e., the informational asymmetries between the inside innovators and the 
external investors. The literature review reveals that the informational asymmetries are 
particularly serious in funding R&D activities, given the high degree of uncertainty 
regarding the outputs of R&D projects and the difficulty of exchanging information 
between innovators and external investors. The amplified informational asymmetries 
cause a serious adverse selection problem in the ex ante funding relationship and a 
moral hazard problem in the ex post funding relationship. The two problems together 
greatly increase the cost of external finance, especially for young high-tech SMEs. 
One unrealized problem in the existing efforts on promoting IP collateralization is that, 
these efforts seem to think IP should be treated the same as other tangible assets. Their 
presupposition is that, as good tangible collateral should be with high liquidation value 
only, the same criterion shall apply to IP as well. Most efforts are trying to solve the 
problems bought by the uncertainty in the liquidation value of IP and its limited 
redeployability at the forced-disposition, in order to reduce the risk in getting 
insufficient repayment. They therefore focus on the repayment function of collateral 
only. 
By contrast, we need to go back to the basic economic theories of security interests 
and re-examine the roles of collateral in secured transactions. This re-examination 
reveals that the real reasons making secured transactions socially beneficial are not the 
repayment function of collateral (which is actually costly), but the signalling role of 
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collateral in solving the pre-lending adverse selection problem, and its 
self-disciplinary role in solving the post-lending moral hazard problem.  
In this regard, some characteristics of IP actually make it good collateral. First, IP is 
highly informative about the quality, potential and confidence of the borrowers. IP is 
more costly for low-quality borrowers to provide, and can be easily observed and 
verified by the potential lenders. Therefore providing IP as collateral is sending an 
effective good-quality signal to reduce the ex ante information asymmetries and helps 
financial institutions select borrowers with better R&D projects, higher technological 
management capability as well as greater commitment to perform. Second, the 
uncertainty in the liquidation value of IP and its limited redeployability at the 
forced-disposition result in a large difference in the valuation of the encumbered IP 
between the borrower and the lender. The large valuation difference actually makes IP 
a good collateral (or more like a hostage), because it can play a substantial 
self-disciplinary role to ensure the borrower’s voluntary compliance with the terms of 
the loan contract and also removes the lender’s incentive for initiating inefficient 
liquidation. The better selection and alignment of incentives together can lower the 
overall risk of defaulting in the first place, and reduce information costs and 
monitoring costs for the lenders. In the end, more welfare-enhancing transactions 
might be financed with a lower cost of debt finance. 
By looking into the advantages brought by the special characteristics of IP, instead of 
just focusing on trying to treat IP as ordinary tangible assets, our exploration has 
several main implications.  
First, it gives better explanations to some phenomena in practice, such as why some 
lenders would like to accept some IP which is only valuable for the debtors as 
collateral and why some lenders care about IP, especially the crucial IP, even more 
than about other tangible assets of the debtors (as evidenced by the survey of 
Rassenfosse and Fischer (2016).257 
Second, it offers new insights into the selection criteria for accepting IP as collateral. 
Being aware of the roles of IP in avoiding default can alleviate the financial 
institutions’ reluctance to participate in IP collateralization. Instead of focusing on the 
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257 See Rassenfosse and Fischer (2016) “Venture Debt Financing: Determinants of the Lending Decision”, 
supra note 250.  
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IP with high liquidation value only, financial institutions should also pay attention to 
the use of IP as a “sorting mechanism” to identify good borrowers and as a 
“disciplinary mechanism” to engage in post-lending monitoring. They may also start 
to accept IP that may have low redeployability but have good signaling effects and 
may provide a good self-disciplinary role as collateral. The two roles in reducing the 
overall risk of default are not less important than the repayment of the salvage value.  
This exploration allows us to provide some clarification on the differences in the 
selection criteria for IP collateralization and for IP securitization. In these two types of 
IP-based debt finance, IP plays different roles in their different transaction structures. 
IP securitization is a “structured finance” with more complicated transaction 
arrangements. The most famous case of IP securitization is the “David Bowie bonds” 
in 1997.258 In an IP securitization transaction, an “originator” firm transfers its IP 
assets (or the rights to the projected revenues from its IP assets, e.g. royalties) to a 
“special purpose vehicle” (SPV), which then issues securities or bonds in the capital 
markets in its own name but the fund raised is channeled back to the originating firm. 
The securities or bonds issued by the SPV are in theory separated from the firm’s risks 
and therefore can receive more favorable credit ratings. The transaction is structured to 
isolate the influence of IP holder on the collateral value of encumbered IP, in order to 
help the originating firm improve the chance of getting finance or lower the cost of 
finance. However, this isolation also makes the roles of IP in signaling the quality of 
borrowers and in disciplining the borrowers, the main advantages in IP 
collateralization, totally disappear. IP securitization focuses on the capability of 
encumbered IP in bringing income streams and their liquidation value only. It 
therefore particularly prefers to accept IP with stable cash flows or with high 
liquidation value, and typically diversifies the large IP-portfolio to reduce risks. By 
contrast, IP collateralization should focus more on IP with good signaling effect and 
self-disciplinary effect.  
The new insights to the selection criteria expand the scope of IP eligible for 
collateralization. The expansion encourages more financial institutions to participate. 
Greater participation can help the practitioners to become familiar with the transaction 
and accumulate relevant knowledge and experience, which consequently enable them 
to improve the valuation methodologies so that they can assess the business risks more 
objectively with higher accuracy and also be able to adopt corresponding solutions 
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better. The legal experts can also become specialized in this specific transaction 
structure and know better in controlling the relevant legal issues by properly drafting 
the security agreements and effectively perfecting the security interests in IP against 
all conflicting claims. The operation of more transactions can achieve the economies 
of scale and lower the transaction costs. With this virtuous circle, in the long term, IP 
collateralization can become simple, routine and certain. More R&D projects with 
great potential can be financed at low cost. With the awareness of the financial 
potential of IP, innovative SMEs also have more incentives to improve their IP 
management and are more willing to patent their inventions. The whole society can 
benefit from the better IP management and higher incentives in innovation and 
information circulation. 
Third, our exploration may provide some implications for policies in future. On the 
one hand, the government may change their policy focus. Currently, those policies on 
promoting IP collateralization, like providing interest subsidies for cost reduction or a 
supplementary guarantee fund for credit enhancement, mainly focus on sharing the 
risk for the lenders. Knowing the roles of IP as collateral in reducing the overall risk of 
defaulting, the government may want to move the policy focus towards helping 
lenders gain better capability in identifying that IP with strong signaling effect or with 
more substantial self-disciplinary role. This approach can help the lenders reduce the 
lending risk in the first place.  
On the other hand, our exploration also provides additional reasons for the government 
to support IP collateralization. It has been widely accepted that the government is bad 
in “picking winners” in funding R&D activities, given the information problems and 
its lack of specialty on predicting technology. If market participants can gradually gain 
better capacity in identifying good borrowers (with good projects and better innovative 
capability) via the signaling effects of IP, the government can support “winners” via 
supporting IP collateralization. In this way, the government does not need to directly 
make choices in terms of which projects or investors to fund. It can let the market 
participants collect information, identify good projects, make evaluation, and conduct 
risk management. The market participants are more specialized in playing these roles. 
The government can assist the funding by sharing risks and reducing the cost for the 
market participants. This way of funding supports can reach the “winners” more 
accurately. 
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In any case, the intrinsic risky nature of R&D activities and the uncertainties in IP 
determine that IP collateralization is always associated with high risk. This dissertation 
is not trying to argue that all IP should be used as collateral. It reminds us that we 
should pay attention to other roles that IP plays in the lending relationship. In the end, 
it would be important for the financial lenders to be left to undertake their own due 
processes in assessing risk, selecting loan applicants and collateral, and conducting its 
loan management. This dissertation does not attempt to provide more detailed 
discussion on how practitioners could identify valuable IP that can be used as 
collateral, or instruct the practitioners to structure the transactions. In the remaining 
chapters, we want to ensure that the legal issues do not further intensify the difficulties. 
The legal framework should not become an impediment when the market actually has 
agreed to accept IP as collateral.  
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Chapter 3 The Effectiveness Criteria as to the General Legal 
Framework for IP Collateralization 
3.1 Uncertainties in Legal Framework 
Apart from the uncertainties and risks in the liquidation value of IP, which are 
discussed in Chapter 2 and left for financial experts to deal with, the other main factor, 
which precludes valuable IP assets from being used productively to secure loans, is the 
problems in the legal framework governing IP collateralization, which directly 
determine the transaction costs, contracting time, certainty of the transaction result and 
the incentives of relevant parties. An appropriate legal framework can help investors 
control financial risks.  
The World Bank Principles for Effective Insolvency and Creditors Rights Systems 
(Revised 2005) has emphasized that: “[d]iscrepancies and uncertainties in the legal 
framework governing security interests are the main reason for the high cost and 
unavailability of credit.”259 In the case of IP collateralization, the discrepancies and 
uncertainties mainly come from the dogmatic separation and fragmentation among 
laws and the special intersectional status of IP collateralization. IP collateralization is 
situated at the intersection of two separated sub-fields of law, IP laws and secured 
transaction laws, which are traditionally subject to different legal frameworks and with 
various value orientations.260  
With the aim of encouraging the creation and dissemination of new works of the mind, 
IP laws focus on rewarding the endeavor of creators by promoting the recognition, 
protection and traditional exploitation of IP. IP laws tend to favor the use of an 
“asset-specific approach”, which pays more attention to the specific characteristic of 
IP and addresses mainly the creation, exploitation, and enforcement of IP rights. They 
generally do not address specific issues regarding the financial exploitation of IP. 
However, these IP rules may have an impact on secured transactions. 
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259 Introduction, World Bank Principles for Effective Insolvency and Creditor Rights System (Revised 2005), 
originally issued at April 2001, revised at December 2005, available at: 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/GILD/Resources/FINAL-ICRPrinciples-March2009.pdf. 
260  See Howard P. Knopf, “Security Interests in Intellectual Property: An International Comparative 
Approach,” International Intellectual Property Law & Policy 7, no. 90 (2002) at 13. 
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By contrast, the traditional secured transaction laws are developed with a view of 
spurring the availability of low-cost secured debt credit. They focus on establishing an 
effective security regime with clear rules regarding publicity, priority and enforcement 
to ensure the safety of transaction. They are in favor of an “enterprise-centered 
finance”, which emphasizes “the continuing business operations of the debtor and its 
shifting stock of asset rather than any one specific asset”261 They traditionally deal 
with transactions regarding tangibles (and their related receivables) but do not pay 
enough attention to the specific characteristic of IP nor consider the uncertainty and 
diversity induced by the nature of IP protection.  
The dogmatic separation in the legal frameworks of these two subfields results in 
discrepancies or gaps in the conjunction fields. The lack of coordination then gives 
rise to uncertainties and conflicts between various sources of laws. These divergences 
complicate the process of concluding an IP collateralization transaction and increase 
the associated legal risks and costs (Section 2.3.2.1 C). In this case, some socially 
welfare-enhancing IP collateralization transactions might be forgone by the legal 
problems, even in the case where the borrowers have valuable IP that can be used as 
collateral and the lenders would like to accept the IP as collateral. If mutually 
consented welfare-enhancing transactions were foregone simply because of legal 
uncertainties or restrictions, there would be a strong implication of market failure. 
Therefore, the establishment of an integrated legal framework, which comprises 
unitary rules not only for the safe conclusion of secured transactions but also for a fair 
and effective management of IP assets, is expected to solve the tension between IP 
laws and secured transaction laws.262 A more consistent legal framework for IP 
collateralization should be more effective and be able to facilitate IP holders to obtain 
better access to low cost credit, without undermining their incentives to innovation. 
For establishing this integrated legal framework, we need to understand how the legal 
framework should actually facilitate access to credit and at the same time provide 
incentives to innovation. This understanding requires us to have a deep knowledge of 
the economic effects of legal rules regarding IP collateralization.  
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262 See Brennan (2009), “International Intellectual Property Financing: An Overview,” supra note 261 at 12. 
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3.2 Introduction of Effectiveness Criteria as to the Legal 
Framework of Secured Transaction 
Law and economics scholars usually try to use economic analysis to describe the 
structure and function of law, so as to explore how the law can be improved to achieve 
the goal of maximizing the total social welfare. In the discussion of the essentials of 
legal framework for IP collateralization, this chapter follows the same approach to 
bridge the gap between economic analysis and legal reasoning. It aims at examining 
whether a legal framework for IP collateralization maximizes the total social welfare. 
For achieving this objective, we need firstly to answer a crucial question, i.e., what are 
the crucial general criteria for assessing the effectiveness of the legal frameworks on 
IP collateralization?  
Different legal effectiveness criteria have been defined in some previous studies on the 
secured transaction legal framework for personal property. Although these studies are 
not exactly in the context of IP collateralization, some of their main observations 
would generally apply.  
For instance, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) has 
given a brief discussion on the criteria for an effective and efficient secured transaction 
legal framework reform. Its criteria are mainly objective-oriented: an efficient legal 
framework for secured transactions is expected to be able to (1) achieve the most basic 
legal function of allowing the creditors to have priority recourse to the collateral; and 
(2) maximize the economic benefits, by making the system for creation and 
enforcement of security interests work in a simple, fast, inexpensive, certain way and 
be able to fit to the local context.263 
Meanwhile, after going through plenty of literature and legal documents, Williams et 
al. (2010) give a comprehensive summary of the criteria for an efficient secured 
transaction legal framework governing personal property.264 Their criteria are more 
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263 See Frederique Dahan and John Simpson, “Legal Efficiency of Secured Transactions Reform: Bridging 
the Gap between Economic Analysis and Legal Reasoning,” in Secured Transactions Reform And Access To 
Credit (Elgar Financial Law), ed. Frederique Dahan and John Simpson (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2009), 
122–138 at 132. 
264 See Mark Williams, Haitian Lu, and Chin Aun Ong, Secured Finance Law in China and Hong Kong 
(Cambridge University Press, 2010) at 13-19.  
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function-oriented: an efficient secured transaction legal framework should effectively 
fulfill four basic functions: (1) reducing the risk for creditors, (2) allowing the debtors 
to continue to utilize the collateral, (3) protecting the third parties against the collateral 
related fraud, and (4) minimizing the transaction cost of secured transaction 
arrangement, through four functional mechanisms, namely, (a) creation, (b) perfection, 
(c) publicity and (d) enforcement of such security.265 
We can derive some important ideas from their ways of setting the effectiveness 
criteria.  
- As the starting point, we need to have a clear and well-defined picture of the 
ultimate economic objectives that the secured transaction legal framework wants to 
achieve;  
- Secondly, we need to identify the basic legal functions that the legal framework 
has to fulfill in order to achieve the ultimate economic objectives; 
- Thirdly, the general effectiveness criteria are established by clarifying how specific 
legal functional mechanisms should work for fulfilling these basic functions.  
Following this approach, this chapter firstly reviews the economic theories of credit 
access and IP protection to clarify the ultimate economic objectives and functions that 
the legal framework of IP collateralization wants to achieve and fulfill. Then it 
establishes the general effectiveness criteria regarding the creation, perfection, and 
enforcement of the security interests in IP. The review, on the one hand, identifies 
several potential and actual conflicts and inconsistences may occur between IP law and 
secured transaction law when establishing a unitary legal regime for IP 
collateralization; and on the other hand, also helps us establish a conceptual 
assessment framework for the comparative study in the subsequent Chapter 4.  
3.3 Objectives and Functions 
The legal framework for IP collateralization is complicated, since it has to 
simultaneously achieve the objectives of both secured transaction law and IP law, or to 
make an appropriate balance when the objectives are in conflict. In essence, IP 
collateralization is a kind of secured transaction. So we start from the essence of 
secured transaction law and then discuss how the incorporation of the objectives of IP 
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laws would give rise to changes or conflicts.  
3.3.1 General Discussion for All Secured Transactions 
The secured transaction law promotes a competitive and profitable debt credit industry, 
by spurring the availability of low-cost secured credit and guaranteeing the safety of 
financial funds but without imposing excessive costs. It is therefore focused on how to 
allow debtors to easily use the full value inherent in their assets to support credit in a 
safe, fair, efficient and transparent capital market.266  
Achieving this objective requires an appropriate balance of the competing interests of 
all the parties that have legitimate interests in secured transactions. Security interest is 
mixed with in personam interests between the debtor and the secured creditor and in 
rem interests against third parties. Merrill and Smith (2001) classify the parties 
affected by a secured transaction into three groups, “in terms of the third-party 
interests that they do or do not implicate”.267  
- The first group consists of the direct parties to the original security agreement, i.e., 
the secured creditor and the debtor, who are in an in personam relationship.  
- The second group consists of those third parties who might deal with the same 
encumbered collateral, mainly including the subsequent creditors and 
assignees.268 The subsequent assignees and subsequent creditors get involved 
when either the secured creditor or the debtor assigns its interests in the collateral 
or use the collateral to secure another loan. These third parties all deal directly or 
indirectly with the secured creditor or debtor, but their rights are affected only 
indirectly by the security agreement. Merrill and Smith (2001) refer them as the 
“quasi-multital” third parties.269 
- The third group includes those third parties who have a pure in rem relationship 
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266 See Investment Climate Advisory Services of the World Bank Group, “Secured Transactions Systems 
and Collateral Registries” (Washington DC, 2010), 
https://www.wbginvestmentclimate.org/uploads/SecuredTransactionsSystems.pdf. 
267 See Thomas W. Merrill and Henry E. Smith, “The Property/Contract Interface,” Columbia Law Review 
101, no. 4 (2001): 773–852 at 835-836. 
268 In the discussion of Merrill and Smith (2001) “The Property/Contract Interface,” ibid at 835, the second 
group also includes another “compound-paucital case”, in which one lender enters into a large number of 
similar small-stakes contracts with debtors. This case mainly happens in consumer finance and thus is 
irrelevant to our discussion on IP collateralization.  
269 The term of “quasi-multital” third parties is created by Merrill and Smith (2001) “The Property/Contract 
Interface,” ibid at 835 
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with the secured creditor and the debtor, for instance, tort claimers and other 
non-adjusting creditors, potential violators of the property rights of the secured 
creditor, and other market participants. The original security agreement could also 
impinge on the rights and affect the behavior of these third parties. Nevertheless, 
the scope of the third group is too broad and many associated problems are not 
unique to security interests.270 
This thesis therefore mainly discusses parties that are actual participants in real 
businesses with direct economic interests in the secured transaction decisions, i.e. the 
first and second groups of parties, including secured creditors, debtors, as well as 
subsequent creditors and assignees.271 
Several eminent cross-country empirical studies have shown that creditor rights are 
crucial for the functioning of the financial system.272 The most serious concern of a 
creditor is the risk of being unable to recover the amount due. Secured creditors, 
mainly banks and financial institutions, accept collateral mainly because the security 
interests over the encumbered collateral give them two important rights that an 
unsecured creditor does not have. The first right is the “repossessory right”, which 
allows the secured creditors to seize and dispose of the collateral upon the debtor’s 
default.273 The second one is the “priority right”, which allows the secured creditors 
to have a priority in recourse before the other competing parties from the disposition 
of the collateral at the foreclosure sale.274 These two rights together help the secured 
creditors ensure the certainty of debt repayment. In this regard, a secured transaction 
legal framework should be able to allow the secured creditors to effectively employ 
the two rights to reduce the creditor’s financial risk. 
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270 The costs and benefits security interests as to the parties in the third group are mainly discussed in the 
theoretical debate on the “puzzle of security interests”, see the summary of “puzzle of security interests” in 
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271 This narrowed down approach is also adopted in Williams et al. (2010) “Secured Finance Law in China 
and Hong Kong”, supra note 264 at 7.  
272 Rafael La Porta et al., “Legal Determinants of External Finance,” The Journal of Finance 52, no. 3 
(1997): 1131–1150 (with a sample of 49 countries, showing that countries with poorer investor protections, 
measured by both the character of legal rules and the quality of law enforcement, have smaller and narrower 
capital markets, including both equity and debt markets); Ross Levine, Norman Loayza, and Thorsten Beck, 
“Financial Intermediation and Growth: Causality and Causes,” Journal of Monetary Economics 46 (2000): 
31–77 (empically showing that cross-country differences in legal creditor rights help account for differences 
in financial development, and suggesting that legal reforms that strengthen creditor rights, contract 
enforcement can boost financial development and accelerate economic growth). 
273 See Merrill and Smith (2001) “The Property/Contract Interface,” supra note 267 at 834. 
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A debtor’s main concern, however, is that the secured creditor’s security interests may 
restrict and impede it from using the encumbered collateral productively in the 
ordinary course of business.275 The restrictions imposed over the collateral by security 
interests are a kind of important cost that a debtor has to take into account (the cost of 
restrictions is only incurred as long as the debtor does not default). The more extensive 
the restrictions which the security interests can put for the debtor’s use of the 
encumbered collateral, the more costly the debt finance is for the debtor, especially for 
those high-quality ones which would have a high cost because of their high probability 
of non-default (see detailed discussion in Section 2.4.1.1). So, the restrictions can 
trigger an adverse selection problem. Thus, a secured transaction legal framework 
should keep the restrictions at the minimum necessary level to ensure the debtor’s 
continuing utilization of its encumbered IP in the widest possible range of situations.  
In the case of third parties, the subsequent creditors and assignees may be affected 
by the existence and terms of the security agreement. In turn, any future loans made by 
the subsequent creditors, and any subsequent assignments of interests in the collateral, 
either by the creditor or the debtor, can also impair the original creditor’s ability to 
collect the original loan back. All the parties therefore have the incentive to take into 
account the effects of the security interest on the value of all present and future 
interests in the collateral. For all the third parties, clearly there is a need for 
information on the secured transaction and the status of the collateral. The original 
secured creditor also wants to ensure its security interests can be effective against the 
third parties. Therefore, a secured transaction legal framework must contain an 
effective mechanism to publicize important information about the secured transaction 
(including the status of the encumbered collateral) and establish a clear priority order 
for completing claims from all parties.276 
From the social welfare perspective, an efficient legal regime is always expected to 
maximize the social surplus from the activities. Generally, the social surplus comes 
from the difference between the social value and the social cost created by the debt 
finance. The social value comes from the value created by the secured transactions 
(see the detailed discussion in Section 2.3.4). The social cost is mainly the total 
transaction costs encountered during the whole process of the transaction, from the 
creation, to the perfection, to the enforcement of security interests. Generally, high 
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transaction costs in any of these aspects would reduce the expected benefits that the 
debtor can get from the secured transaction and eventually change the market 
equilibrium. Some socially welfare-enhancing investment opportunties may be 
forgone. There is a strong implication of market failure. Fairgrieve (1998) reveals that 
all these transaction costs would be ultimately borne by the debtor. 277  High 
transaction costs in any of these aspects mean that only large borrowers who can bear 
such expense can obtain credit. So it has a more severe effect on SMEs, who actually 
are in greater needs of credit. Thus, for the interests of the whole society, the legal 
framework has to minimize the total cost of secured transactions.  
3.3.2 Additional Considerations for IP Collateralization  
In the case of IP collateralization, evaluating the effectiveness of the legal framework 
is more difficult, since IP laws also have their own objectives to pursue and more 
parties may be involved. The costs and benefits are complicated. How to coordinate 
the objectives and balance the interests of different parties is the ultimate goal of the 
legal framework for IP collateralization.  
3.3.2.1 The objective of IP laws 
Although the specific economic reasoning behind each kind of IP is not quite the same, 
the core idea of the IP system is to provide economic incentives to innovation. In 
essence, the IP regime (with the exception of trademarks) provides limited statutory 
exclusivity to the innovators and creators in exchange for the creation and disclosure 
of innovations and creative works. For providing sufficient incentives, it helps 
innovators and creators to exploit the legitimate exclusivity to maximize the economic 
benefits that can be derived from their innovations and creative works.  
The laws for IP collateralization should not undermine the objective of IP law. If IP 
collateralization only puts the emphasis on promoting debt finance, but discourages IP 
exploitations and consequently reduces the economic benefits that an IP owner can 
draw from its innovations, then the ultimate objective of IP law in promoting 
innovation would be undermined. The reduced incentives to innovation constitute a 
form of social costs. 

277  See Duncan Fairgrieve, “Reforming Secured Transaction Laws in Central and Eastern Europe,” 
European Business Law Review 9, no. 7/8 (1998): 254–258 at 256. 
 ͳͲͷ
3.3.2.2 Different modes of IP collateralization  
A. IP licensing  
IP has some different ways of exploiting other traditional assets. Nowadays, IP 
licensing has become a main way of IP exploitation, especially in the software industry. 
Based on a license agreement, an IP rights owner (as the licensor) grants the other 
party (as the licensee) the permission to (exclusively or non-exclusively) exploit the 
innovation underlying the IP protection in exchange for an agreed payment. With the 
license, the exploiter’s exploitation would be an infringement of the patent. For 
different types of IP, license agreements can be in the form of copyright license 
agreement, technology license agreement, trademark license and franchise agreement. 
A license can also be in the form of a contractual license or a non-contractual license 
(as in the case of a statutory or a compulsory license), an exclusive or a non-exclusive 
license. The agreed payment can be in the form of a fixed fee or royalties, or down 
payment plus a running royalty. 
Licensing is pro-competitive and socially beneficial when it can combine 
complementary factors of innovation and production. As many innovations need many 
generations of improvement to be commercially exploitable, very few innovators have 
the capability to make all the improvements alone. In the case of “basic and applied 
research”278 and “research tools”279, licensing helps compensate the first innovator for 
the foundation established for the successive innovators. It not only removes the first 
innovator’s incentive to block but also encourages the later innovators’ incentive to 
develop follow-up applications or complementary inventions. And few innovators 
have the resources in all aspects of innovation, production and market distribution. In 
the cases where innovators are not best situated to commercialize their innovations, 
licensing can increase the productive efficiency by allowing the better-situated players 
to adapt, exploit and distribute the innovations.280 In these above cases, licensing 
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278 “Basic research and applied research” refers to the case where a single innovation may lead to many 
different second-generation innovations. For example, the discovery of laser may have many surgical 
applications or military supplies. See Scotchmer (2004) “Innovation and Incentive”, supra note 39 at 
135-142.  
279 “Research tools” refers to the case where a second-generation product requires the input of many different 
first-generation products. For example, the development of a new phone usually needmany 
telecommunication patents. See Scotchmer (2004) “Innovation and Incentive”, supra note 39 at 142-146. 
280 See Scotchmer (2004) “Innovation and Incentive”, supra note 39 at 162-169. 
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leads to an efficient use of IP, improves the welfare of consumers as well as of the IP 
holder. The robustness of licensing markets, therefore, plays a critical role in 
encouraging investment in innovative activities.281 
In a licensing relationship, both the licensor and the licensee have some interests with 
monetary value under the license agreement. 
For an IP owner/licensor, giving a license can retain the ownership and control over IP, 
and meanwhile broaden the reach of IP into different and more markets and bring an 
additional source of revenue. In addition, IP licenses also provide IP owners/licensors 
a way to maintain market power via cross licensing or help to attract external finance 
to mitigate financial constraints.282 Under normal circumstances, the licensor has 
many contractual rights, such as the right to compel the licensee to advertise or use the 
licensed IP or related products in line with terms in the license agreement and the right 
to terminate the license agreement upon the licensee’s breach. The main monetary 
interest the licensor has in a license is the right to collect the agreed payment. 
Licensing is one of the main ways that create rewards for innovation. 
For a licensee, the license grants him the authorization to manufacture, sell, import, 
export, distribute or market various goods or services in accordance with the terms of 
the license. Without the license, these exploitations may be prevented. For instance, a 
cell phone manufacturer may not be able to produce or sell phones without the license 
to use a certain patented telecommunication technology. Getting a license helps the 
licensee to save the R&D costs in developing the protected innovation itself or 
engineering-around. The permission to use or exploit IP may also help the licensee to 
obtain some competitive advantage over its competitors.283 The main monetary value 
of a license to the licensee comes from the authorization to use or exploit the 
underlying innovation protected by IP without being worried about being sued by the 
IP holder (the licensor). 
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281 However, licensing can be abused as well. See, e.g., Scotchmer (2004) “Innovation and Incentive”, supra 
note 39 at 169-185 (providing that firms may also use collusive licensing strategies, such as, patent pools and 
R&D joint ventures, to maintain or exploit their market power). Antitrust scrutiny may be triggered in the 
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competitors' development efforts and appropriate value via licensing revenues) 
283 See more detailed discussion in the social benefits of IP licensing in Section 3.2.2.  
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IP licensing, as a special way of IP exploitation introduces different modes of IP 
collateralization, depending on what interests are used as collateral. The exercise of 
the secured creditor’s rights upon default of the debtor will often result in the debtor’s 
encumbered interests being transferred and, thus, the identity of the IP owner, licensor 
or licensee, might change. The change affects the interests of more third parties, 
especially more “quasi-multital” third parties, who deal directly or indirectly with the 
secured creditor or debtor, but their interests are affected only indirectly by the 
security agreement.284  
We hereby demonstrate the complexity of the different modes of IP collateralization in 
the following scenario. We illustrate how owners, licensors and licensees of IP can use 
these monetary interests as collateral for credit and how the interests of third parties 
might be affected.  
Company ܮ holds a patent over a crucial telecommunication technology. Cell 
phone manufacturer ܺ is not able to produce or sell phones without the license 
from ܮ to use the patented telecommunication technology. With the license, the 
cell phone manufacturer ܺ can produce or sell phones and have an annual profit 
of 100 million dollars. Therefore, the patent holder ܮ (as the licensor) and the 
phone manufacturer ܺ (as the licensee) have reached a license agreement, 
under which the licensee ܺ agrees to pay the licensor ܮ a royalty of 20 million 
for the authorization to incorporate the patented telecommunication technology 
into its phone production. Similarly, some other manufacturers in the market, 
like ܻ and ܼ, also want to buy the patent or get a license so that they can 
incorporate the patented telecommunication technology into their phone 
production, in order to obtain some competitive advantage over the competitors. 
There might be three different modes of IP collateralization. 
B. The use of interests of an IP owner as collateral 
Company ܮ, as the owner of the patent, may want to use the “patent” as collateral to 
borrow money from banks. Knowing that the patent is highly demanded in the market, 
bank ܤ accepts the patent as collateral and issues the loan. Upon company ܮ’s 
default on repaying the loan, the bank ܤ wants to enforce the security interests by 

284 See the discussion of “quasi-multital third parties” in supra note 269. 
 ͳͲͺ
assigning the encumbered patent to the assignee ܼ in the foreclosure sale and to use 
the payment to recover the loan. The relationships can be illustrated as follows,  
Case 1 
The priority order among the security interests of the lender bank ܤ, the interests of 
pre-exiting licensee ܺ, the future licensee ܻ, and the assignee ܼ is crucial in figuring 
out the answer to many important questions, such as, whether the existing license to 
phone manufacturer (as a licensee) ܺ would be subject to the bank (as the secured 
creditor) ܤ’s later security interests; if the patent owner ܮ, also reaches a license 
agreement with another phone manufacturer ܻ, whether the after-acquired license to 
 would be subject to the creditor ܤ’s prior security interest.285 The answers to these 
questions determine whether the bank ܤ can actually enforce its security interests and 
get recovery. They also determine whether the licensees, ܺ and ܻ, still have valid 
licenses to exploit the patent and to whom they should perform their obligations under 
the licenses.  
C. The use of interests of an IP licensor as collateral 
Company ܮ, as an IP licensor, might also want to use “its right to royalties from 
licensee ܺ” as collateral to borrow money from banks. Knowing that the royalty 
payment is sufficient to pay off the loan, bank ܤ accepts the licensor ܮ’s right to 
royalties as collateral and issues the loan. Upon company ܮ’s default on repaying the 
loan, the bank ܤ wants to enforce the security interests by assigning the encumbered 
right to royalties in the foreclosure sale or by directly collecting the royalties. The 
relationships can be illustrated as follows,  
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Case 2 
Similarly, the priority order among the conflicting interests of the competing claimants 
determines if bank ܤ can actually enforce its security interests and obtain recovery 
from the royalty payment, and to whom the licensees ܺ (or some after-acquired 
licensees) should pay their royalties. The answers determine the lender’s incentive to 
provide a loan and the licensees’ cost of paying royalties. 
D. The use of interests of an IP licensee as collateral 
The cell phone manufacturer ܺ, as the licensee, may also want to use its “interests in 
the license”, mainly “the authorization to exploit the patent”, as collateral. Knowing 
that the authorization to incorporate the patented telecommunication technology into 
phone production can bring ܺ  substantial revenue and the authorization to 
exploitation is also demanded in the market by other phone manufacturers, the bank ܤ 
might want to accept the licensee’s interests in the license as collateral and issue the 
loan. Upon the licensee ܺ’s default on repaying the loan, the bank ܤ wants to 
enforce the security interests by assigning the “licensee’s interests in the license” in 
the foreclosure sale. The relationships can be illustrated as follows,  
Case 3 
The assignment of the license upon the default of the licensee ܺ affects the interests 
of the licensor/patent holder ܮ. The legal question whether licensees are allowed to 
use their interests in “the authorization to exploit the patent” as collateral determines 
the licensee’s ability to leverage the monetary value in the license and affects its 
borrowing capability. How much control the licensor has in protecting itself from the 
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potential detrimental effects of assigning the license to another party in the case of the 
licensee/debtor’s default determines the IP owner/licensor’s incentive to give a license 
and also the bank’s capacity in enforcing its security interests.  
E. More complicated social costs and benefits 
Therefore, we see that, in all the three modes, the legal rules on the scope of IP rights 
(or interests) eligible for collateral286 and on the priority order among conflicting 
interests of competing claimants 287  directly determine the lender’s incentive to 
provide the loan, and the borrower’s borrowing capability, and the licensor’s incentive 
to give licenses (or licensee’s incentive to get licenses). The availability of these types 
of arrangement and how they work directly determine the social value and cost of IP 
collateralisation. 
In the special case of IP collateralization, the components of social value and costs are 
more complicated.  
First, since more third parties are involved in IP collateralization, the calculation of 
social surplus should also take into account the values and costs incurred by the other 
parties, especially those additional third parties (such as licensors and licensees) 
mentioned above.288  
Second, the social value includes not only the value from the investments funded by 
the debt finance, which may not be available without using IP as collateral, but also 
the value from the additional incentives to innovation provided by the profits from the 
debt finance. As IP collateralization also becomes a possible way of IP exploitation, 
the expected economic profits that IP owners and exploiters can derive from 
innovations are also increased. The higher expected economic benefits would provide 
innovators with more incentives to innovation.  
Third, as we discussed above, IP collateralization should not undermine the objectives 
of IP law. If IP collateralization only puts the emphasis on promoting debt finance, but 
discourages IP licensing or other ways of IP exploitation and consequently reduces the 
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286 See further discussion in Section 3.4.2, 4.2.2.2, 4.3.2.2, 4.4.2.2 and 4.5.1.2.  
287 See further discussion Section 3.5.2, 4.2.3.3, 4.3.3.3, 4.4.3.2 and 4.5.2.3. 
288 See the discussion of “quasi-multital” in supra note 269. It refers to he third parties who deal directly or 
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economic benefits that an IP owner can draw from its innovations, then the ultimate 
objective of IP law in promoting innovation would be undermined. The reduced 
incentives to innovation constitute a form of social costs. Thus, an efficient legal 
framework for IP collateralization is expected to keep all these parties’ incentives in IP 
exploitation. 
3.3.3 Functions and Functional Mechanisms 
In summary, an efficient secured transaction legal framework for IP collateralization 
must therefore ensure the following functions:  
1 Reducing the financial risk for secured creditors;  
2 Maximizing the continuing exploitation of encumbered IP for debtors; 
3 Notifying necessary information about the secured transaction and the status of the 
collateral for all third parties in a cost-effective way; 
4 Promoting innovation by keeping the incentive for IP exploitation, especially for IP 
licensing; 
5 Maximizing the total social surplus, by minimizing transaction cost and taking into 
account all the direct and indirect parties’ benefits and costs.  
The most relevant issue here is that, in some cases, not all these functions can be 
achieved at the same time. How to achieve a balance while conflicts occur is exactly 
what this thesis tries to explore.  
In the legal framework for secured transactions, functions are implemented through 
concrete functional mechanisms. Sometimes a function requires the cooperation of 
several functional mechanisms to achieve. Knopf (2002) gives a good summary of the 
connection of the functional mechanisms:  
“personal property security legislation enables lenders to secure loans in a 
variety of ways by means of security agreements that create security 
interests which attach to identifiable personal property and are perfected in a 
such a manner that priorities can be established and jurisdiction can be 
clarified for purposes of enforcement.”289  
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The following parts of this chapter will look into the three key functional mechanisms, 
creation, perfection (with publicity and priority) and enforcement,290 and identify 
some main issues where IP law and secured transaction law may cause potential 
conflicts when establishing a unitary legal regime for IP collateralization. This thesis 
is not intended to discuss all conflicts. We will just choose some important issues as 
examples to show how the conflicts can increase the transaction cost and legal risks. 
The examination will illustrate the difficulties in achieving an appropriate balance 
among conflicting objectives and functions. And then later we will comparatively 
examine how the laws of China, the US and the UNCITRAL’s Supplement address the 
difficulties, and evaluate the effectiveness of the different solutions, mainly from the 
perspective of risk controlling and transaction cost reduction.  
3.4 Creation 
Modern secured transaction law draws a distinction between the creation and the 
perfection of a security right. ‘Creation’ is the first stage, which establishes the in 
personam relationship between debtor and secured creditor. It is defined as the process 
by which the secured creditor and the debtor create the security interests in the 
encumbered collateral and thereby confer on the secured creditor special proprietary 
rights in the collateral, such as enforcement of the collateral, against the debtor.291 
3.4.1 Transaction Structure 
With the lead of the Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code of the United States 
(UCC-9), the modern secured transaction law stops making distinctions among 
different security devices, such as chattel mortgages and liens, but instead starts to 
adopt a functional approach, by treating all transactions playing the function of 
securing transactions under a uniform framework. The functional approach subjects all 
secured transactions to an identical regulatory framework and treats them alike under a 
common set of principles.  

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Applying this unitary approach to IP collateralization relieves parties of IP 
collateralization from the heavy burden of revaluing the advantages and disadvantages 
of various security devices. This approach ensures the comprehensiveness, consistency 
and transparency of the rules regarding IP collateralization. The transaction costs, 
including costs related to both the creation and enforcement of security rights are 
therefore reduced by this approach. 
3.4.2 Scope of IP Eligible for Collateralization 
The objective of modern secured transaction law is to expand the scope of assets 
eligible for being collateral for providing low-cost credit. The legal regime for IP 
collateralization is thus expected to enable innovators to make full use of their IP as 
collateral for credit. Unnecessary restrictions limit the debtor’s borrowing capability. 
Unclear restrictions bring uncertainty to the transactions and leave creditors unsure 
whether the security interests would be effectively enforced upon the debtor’s default. 
The legal uncertainty would exclude economically important IP from being used to 
support debt finance.292 
3.4.2.1 Types of IP that can serve as collateral 
The first issue is about what types of IP can be used as collateral. The answer to this 
question is much more difficult than it looks at first glance. “IP” itself is a vague and 
broad legal concept, which includes a bundle of different protection regimes over 
various types of human intellectual output.293 For a long time, although with various 
attempts of many scholars and international instruments, there has been no 
internationally accepted statutory definition of IP. Even the Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (the TRIPS Agreement) in the end just chooses an 
enumerative approach to list the scope of IP, instead of giving a clear abstract 
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292 See H Fleisig, M Safavian, and N de la Pena, Reforming Collateral Laws to Increase Access to Finance 
(Washington, DC: World Bank, 2006) at 23-24. 
293 See Lipton (2002) “Intellectual Property in the Information Age and Secured Finance Practice”, supra 
note 154 at 367 (summarizing and dividing the different forms of IP into four categories: “(1) basic forms of 
IP whose legal incidents are generally well established, e.g., patents, registered trademarks, copyright and 
possibly also registered industrial designs; (2) more unusual sui generis forms of IP, such as plant breeder's 
rights, circuit layout rights, databases, etc., in jurisdictions in which they exist as independent statutory rights; 
(3) forms of intellectual “quasi” property that tend to be protected for the most part by the judiciary rather 
than by legislation, such as trade secrets in some jurisdictions, as well as unregistered trade marks and trade 
names; and; (4) some newly evolving areas of IP, for example, developing law as to the appropriate IP 
protection for things like computer software, internet domain names, e-commerce business methods, etc.”).  
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definition.294 This enumerative approach creates problems when the scope of IP is 
progressively expanding as a result of the developments in both science and 
technology. Meanwhile, there are different statutory schemes for each kind of IP in 
each jurisdiction and divergences in the level and scope of legal protection among 
jurisdictions. This fact raises further questions as to what rights can be categorized as 
IP, what rights are comprised in each type of IP, or what rights in which types of IP are 
valuable and may be used as collateral. The case-by-case analysis and assistance from 
specialized IP lawyers and accountants might help clarify these questions but also 
greatly increase the transaction costs.  
In the case without clear answers to these questions, in practice, only the three 
fundamental forms of IP, i.e. copyright, patents and registered trademarks, are favored 
by the banks and other financial institutions, largely due to the fact that the relevant 
laws concerning them in different jurisdictions enjoy a high level of harmonization 
around the world. The rights comprised in the three kinds of IP and their characters are 
determined and regulated in most jurisdictions by laws that comply largely with 
international treaties, which are now generally and uniformly administered by the 
WIPO and by the World Trade Organization (WTO). However, lenders have been 
specifically advised not to take security interests over the other types of IP, with the 
consideration of the associated high transaction costs, legal risks and practical 
difficulties.295  
Nevertheless, even for these well-standardized types of IP, there are still plenty of 
uncertainties as to whether they are eligible for collateralization. We can hereby take 
trademarks as an example. From the law and economic perspective, the trademark 
system is established to help the public identify the source of goods and services 
covered by the trademark. 296  So, in many countries, a trademark cannot be 
disassociated from the related business or goodwill attached to it. However, upon the 
debtor’s default, the foreclosure sale would impose the sale of the encumbered 
trademarks. If the trademarks cannot be assigned independently, the creditor would 
have to take the related goodwill and business altogether as collateral; otherwise the 
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294 The TRIPS Agreement lists the scope of IP in Part 2 (Standards Concerning the Availability, Scope and 
Use of Intellectual Property Rights), including copyright and related rights, trademarks, geographic 
indications, industrial designs, patents, layout-designs (Topographies) of integrated circuits, protection of 
undisclosed information.  
295 See Bromfield and Runeckles (2006) “Taking Security over Intellectual Property: A Practical Overview,” 
supra note 156. 
296 See Bently and Sherman (2004) “Intellectual Property Law, ” supra note 39 at 699-702.  
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security interests on the trademark itself would be simply meaningless for the creditor. 
In other words, if a trademark cannot be assigned independently, its value of being 
collateral would be very limited. So, determining if an IP is capable of being used as 
collateral requires a comprehensive analysis of relevant rules in IP law. 
The legal uncertainty as to what types of IP are eligible for collateralization imposes a 
heavy burden in terms of time and financial costs on the transactions. Transaction 
costs rise when much time and effort must be devoted to determine whether the law 
permits taking a security interest in a particular type of IP and what specific category 
of rights have been exactly included. This would seriously impede the efficiency of 
realizing the monetary value inherent in IP assets, especially the newly emerging ones. 
For this reason, an efficient legal regime for IP collateralization is firstly expected to 
have a clear and broad scope regarding what types of IP are eligible for 
collateralization.  
3.4.2.2 Treatment of rights under IP license agreements 
As explained in Section 3.3.2.2, licensing has been one of the main ways of IP 
exploitation and also the main source for providing the economic incentives for 
innovation. When a licensor or licensee wants to use its monetary interests under the 
license agreement as collateral, there is a problem of whether its interests can be the 
subjects of security interests.  
A. Licensor’s right to royalty payment 
In the case a licensor (as the debtor in this setting) wants to use its “right to royalty 
payment” as collateral, the main legal problem is how the law should treat such a right 
(as Case 2 in Section 3.3.2.2). Should it be treated as a kind of IP rights, the proceeds 
of IP, or a separated kind of collateral such as “receivable”, i.e., a right to payment of 
monetary obligations? Secured transactions law and IP laws may give different 
treatments because of their different policy considerations.  
The modern secured transaction laws, such as the United Nations Convention on the 
Assignment of Receivables in International Trade, usually give exceptional rules to 
eliminate some statutory and contractual restrictions on the assignability of rights in 
receivables, in order to facilitate the finance of receivables. The main argument is that, 
an obligor of receivables usually discharges its obligation by simply making the 
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payment. As the change of receivers is unlikely to increase any cost or risk of 
performance to the obligor, there is also no legitimate interest of enforcing restrictions 
on assignment of rights in receivables.297 Allowing free assignability can save the 
lender from the heavy burden of examining every relevant contract to determine the 
assignability of the receivables concerned and the cost of renegotiation.298 
However, applying these exemptions to royalty payments arising from IP license may 
cause conflicts with some fundamental IP law considerations. For example, copyright 
laws usually limit the private autonomy to freely stipulate the compensation for a 
transfer of rights or prevent the assignment of equitable remuneration, in order to 
ensure that the rights of authors and performers to payment would not be contractually 
undermined by the parties with greater bargaining powers, such as large publishers and 
film producers.299 So, the law on IP collateralization should give a clear solution or 
explanation on how to solve the divergence on policy considerations. 
B. Licensee’s interests in IP license 
Similarly, a licensee/debtor may also want to use its interests in the authorization to 
exploitation under an IP license, maybe the most important value source of all its 
assets, as collateral (as Case 3 in Section 3.3.2.2). However, it would raise the 
licensor’s concerns. The licensor may worry about the potential detrimental effects of 
assigning the license to another party in the case of the licensee/debtor’s default. For 
this reason, usually there is an anti-assignment clause in the original license agreement, 
which requires the licensor’s consent for the assignment of the license for the purpose 
of security interests. 
The anti-assignment or anti-attachment clause can have ambiguous effects. On the one 
hand, the anti-assignment clause allows the licensors to keep better control over their 
IP, by giving them the final power to consent to or refuse the licensee’s use of an IP 
license as collateral. However, when the enforcement of security interests in the 
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297 See Richard A. Epstein, “Why Restrain Alienation?,” Columbia Law Review 85, no. 5 (1985): 970–990 at 
972. 
298 Eliminating some statutory and contractual restrictions on the assignability can also protect parties 
holding a weaker position in negotiations of transactions from undue commitments, especially where a large 
debtor intends to contractually limit a small creditor’s ability to use its receivables as collateral. See Brennan 
(2009), “International Intellectual Property Financing: An Overview,” supra note 261 at 31.  
299 See Reto M. Hilty and Alexander Peukert, “Equitable Remuneration in Copyright Law: The Amended 
German Copyright Act as a Trap for the Entertainment Industry in the U.S.,” Cardozo Arts & Entertainment 
Law Journal 22, no. 1 (2004): 401–50. 
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licensee is totally conditional upon the IP holder-licensor’s decision, which is 
uncertain and might be inefficient, the lenders generally would not like to accept the 
“licensee’s rights in the license” as collateral. In this case, a licensee’s capability of 
leveraging the economic value of his rights under a license will be highly restricted or 
even practically impossible.  
While IP laws are in favor of enforcing the anti-assignment for keeping the licensor’s 
control over the license, the secured transaction regime tends to restrict its 
enforceability for helping licensees get better access to credit. So, there is also a choice 
between the different preferences on the enforceability of the anti-assignment clause 
(see further analysis in Chapter 5).  
3.4.2.3 Future IP 
The modern secured transaction law has evolved to permit all property, whether 
presently existing (“present collateral”) or to be acquired in the future (“after acquired 
collateral”), to serve as collateral for a loan. On the one hand, encompassing the 
possibility of security on “after-acquired” property permits a debtor to use the future 
output as collateral to get funding to satisfy the current need for working capital 
input.300 It accelerates the finance circle. On the other hand, it is also compatible with 
the practical needs of creating “floating security interests”, a kind of non-specific 
security interest created over the changing assets of the borrower/debtor, which floats 
until the occurrence of some prescribed events which convert into it into being fixed 
and attached to specific assets. From the commercial and financial perspective, it is 
obviously impractical to request a new registration whenever there is a change in the 
assets, which happens very frequently in the ordinary course of business.301 However, 
applying this rule to IP raises some controversies, especially about whether the scope 
of collateral should be expanded to the some rights in future IP, such as copyrights of 
future works, or the rights to the application for patents or trademarks. 
The benefits of allowing the use of future IP as collateral are obvious, taking into 
account the fast evolution in the related industries. Many IP-intensive industries keep 
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300  See further explanation of the adverse effects of the limitation on creating security interest in 
after-acquired collateral or after-created debt at Chapter 3 (The Economic Consequences of Obsolete 
Systems for Secured Transactions) in Fleisig et al. (2006) Reforming Collateral Laws to Increase Access to 
Finance, supra note 292 at 29. 
301 See Christina Lui, “Navigating through the Legal Minefield of State and Federal Filing for Perfecting 
Security Interests in Intellectual Property,” Santa Clara Law Review 51 (2011): 705–742. 
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progressing all the time. For instance, in the film industry, a film may consist of 
hundreds or more of discretely copyrightable components, which are subject to 
changes before the film is fully finished. In the software industry, works like computer 
programs are updated constantly even after being launched on the market. Similarly, 
innovators also always keep improving their technologies covered by patents in order 
to keep their technological superiority and to make sure that their patents are not 
surpassed by new technologies invented by competitors. With the improving progress, 
many creations or inventions can develop new derivative works or updated versions. 
The derivative works and revisions can turn into new independent IP assets and can 
greatly expand or diminish the value of original IP assets. So, from the perspective of a 
creditor, making sure that security interests also cover future improvements is crucial 
for maintaining the value of the encumbered IP. Allowing the creation of security 
interests in future updated works enables the creditors to create security interests in all 
of these different versions throughout the whole improvement process at once. It can 
give the creditors better protection to ensure their priority status and collateral value, 
and save them plenty of time and cost on keeping monitoring the debtor’s activity 
closely, and on repeatedly creating and perfecting security interests in each new 
version or item.302 
Intuitively, people may have practical concerns about the high financial risk. As IP is a 
kind of rights upon the creator’s products of cognitive processes, future IP may merely 
be based on some “ideas” about later results of human intellect. And the grant of 
patents and trademarks has to pass through certain examinations, which is subject to 
plenty of uncertainties, from not only the innovator’s R&D activities but also the 
competition from the market. In other words, the transactions based on future IP 
merely rely on some expectations concerning the innovative potential of the debtor. In 
the case of the debtor’s default, a secured creditor may get nothing from the 
encumbered “future IP”. However, this is a matter for financial experts to consider for 
collateral valuation and risk management, not a valid reason for laws to impose 
statutory restrictions to strictly prevent practitioners from using future IP as collateral.  
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302 See Lorin E Brennan, “Financing Intellectual Property under Revised Article 9: National and International 
Conflicts (Electronic Version),” Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal (Comm/Ent) 23 
(2001): 313–456 at 374 (noting that “Speaking from experience, for cinematographic works France requires 
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More problems come from the practical difficulties of making the use of future IP as 
collateral possible. The difficulties are mainly caused by the fact that IP laws are 
fundamentally unfriendly to the concept of “after acquired” rights. From the 
perspective of IP law, the reluctance exists for two main reasons. 
The first reason is from the IP law’s own consideration. For instance, in the legal 
regime for patents, t exclusive protection is intentionally designed with limited breadth, 
in order to encourage competitors to put efforts into making improvements and to 
restrict the patent holders’ capability of setting up barriers to entry (Section 2.1.1.2). A 
great improvement on the patented technology is entitled to get a new patent. Patent 
law is therefore reluctant to provide patent owners with rights to future patents, since 
the future patents may be granted to another party if the improvement turns out to be 
done by another party other than the patent holder in the end.  
The second reason is about the practical difficulty in registration for perfection at the 
later stage in order to make the security interests to be effective as against third parties. 
IP is a kind of intangible asset. The physical possession or occupation of IP is 
impossible and meaningless. For this reason, many IP systems are based on 
registration. Every registration has to be made to ensure a defendable right in the court. 
An IP that is not created yet is also not eligible for registration because they do not 
have a legitimate “identity” to be recorded beforehand in the property-indexed IP 
registration system. And IP registries usually require specific description and do not 
permit a blanket registration, without which a creation of security interests in future IP 
is practically impossible (more detailed examination in the following Session 3.5.1).  
So, whether to allow the use of future IP as collateral or not requires deeper 
exploration of its benefits and problems. If there were indeed a need to make it is 
possible, many changes in IP law would be necessary.  
3.4.3 Description of Collateral in Security Agreement 
The modern secured transaction law respects the autonomy of contract and keeps the 
process of creating secured transactions simple, comprehensible, expeditious, and 
inexpensive. It therefore sets only minimum requirements on the creation of a security 
right. All the additional steps for the secured creditor to acquire the superior rights as 
to the collateral in order to get the in rem rights against third parties are left to the 
further process of “perfecting” the security interests.  
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Typically, the creation of a valid non-possessory security interest requires the 
completion of a written agreement between the debtor and the secured creditor (i.e., 
the security agreement). The modern secured transaction law starts to adopt a general 
description approach, which only requires the description of collateral in whatever 
way the secured party and borrower deem appropriate. The general description is for 
making it possible or cheaper to create “floating security interests” over inventory and 
accounts receivable, and to include “after-acquired collateral”.303  
However, IP laws commonly require much more specific identification of the IP to be 
encumbered, such as the identifier in IP-registries (especially for trademarks and 
patents), the specific category of rights included, the territorial scope of application 
and the duration of security right.304 As explained below in Section 3.5.1, this specific 
description requirement comes from the “public goods” nature of IP and is consistent 
with the commercial practice of IP exploitation. An IP is a kind of intangible asset 
often comprising a bundle of rights with different values and risks. For example, a 
patent holder is vested with a set of exclusive rights to prevent others from 
commercially making, using, selling, importing, or distributing its patented invention 
without permission; and a copyright owner has the right to exclude others from 
reproducing, adapting, publically distributing, displaying or performing the 
copyrighted work without authorization. All these exclusive rights can be individually 
assigned to others as giving the authorization to a specific usage. Then these rights 
could be simultaneously enjoyed and exercised by an indefinite number of right 
holders by various contractual arrangements in different territories. So, specific 
description is important in identifying the exact scope of encumbered and 
unencumbered IP rights and the safety of transactions involving IP for all parties.305  
However, the requirement for specific identification of each IP to be encumbered can 
raise the costs of creating a security interest to some prohibitive levels. First, the IP 
practice determines that it would be difficult to precisely identify each IP involved in 
the secured transaction. The fact is that most IP-based transactions involve a large 
number of IP. A copyrighted work is capable of being divided into segments, each 
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303 See Fleisig et al. (2006) Reforming Collateral Laws to Increase Access to Finance, supra note 292 at 
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304 See Tosato (2009) “The UNCITRAL Annex on Security Rights in IP: A Work in Progress”, infra note 
591.  
305 See Liu Chongli (ࡈጷ⨶), “The Enlightment of the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Secured 
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capable of separate ownership. For instance, even a singular film may already contain 
thousands of copyrighted assets. Not only the film itself but the elements in it, e.g., 
songs, photos, drawings, architecture or even software are all protected as “individual” 
copyrights. Similarly, Gambardella et al, (2011) show that it has been a common 
practice for firms to “create value by raising the number of patents or inventions that 
they produce”, while “which particular patent or invention is most valuable is harder 
to predict.”306 From another perspective, , if a creditor wanted to control the risks 
brought by the uncertainty in value of patents, the best way is to be secured by a large 
number of patents. Against this background, it might be too costly to describe (and 
later register) each copyright within all those film assets or each patent in the whole 
patent portfolio one by one.  
Second, in many secured transactions where IP is used as collateral, especially in 
venture loans, the loans are typically backed by a blanket lien which covers all the 
assets of the firm in the case of default. The requirement on specific identification 
would make it very troublesome for a venture loan provider to create and register its 
security interest in all IP of the debtor. 
Third, as mentioned above in Section 3.4.2.3, a specific description of each IP would 
be also cumbersome for both the creation and registration of security rights in future 
IP, which is difficult to be specifically described beforehand. For instance, it is 
impossible to include the registration number of the future patent or trademark in the 
security agreement, if the law does so require. 
Fourth, requiring specific identification can also increase the transaction risk, by 
making loans harder to monitor. The secured creditor would have to tackle all the 
exploitations, assignments or the states of each encumbered IP to ensure the validity 
and priority of the security interests against all competing claims. 
Given these problems caused by commercial practice, the law for IP collateralization 
has to find a solution to satisfy the need for an appropriate identification of the 
encumbered IP without largely increasing the transaction cost or obstructing 
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transactions.  
3.4.4 Pre-default Rights and Obligations of Debtors and Secured 
Creditors 
The creation of security interests in IP would lead to an allocation of pre-default rights 
and obligations as to the exploitation and preservation of collateral between the debtor 
and the secured creditor. While the debtor’s capability of keeping a productive 
exploitation of the encumbered collateral in the ordinary course of business determines 
the cost of the secured transaction on the debtor, 307  the responsibility for the 
preservation of the value of collateral determines the liquidation value that the secured 
creditor can get at the foreclosure sale. 
For the traditional transactions secured by tangible movables, especially in the case of 
possession pledge, collaterals are generally transferred to and under the physical 
control of the secured creditors. The secured creditors are therefore obliged to properly 
keep and maintain the encumbered collateral during the lending period, and to return 
the collateral to the debtor upon the fulfillment of the principal obligations or the 
extinguishing of the security interests. As the value of most ordinary tangible assets is 
based on their physical existence and a continuous exploitation of movables may 
accelerate the physical deteriorations, the creditor’s maintenance duties are mainly 
focused on restricting the exploitation of the encumbered collateral to avoid physical 
depreciation or any payment of relevant maintenance charges.  
However, the intangible nature of IP as well as the different value sources and ways of 
exploitation of IP would result in a significantly different allocation of rights and 
obligations. 
A. No transfer of physical possession 
Firstly, the intangible nature of IP makes the physical possession of the encumbered IP 
impractical and meaningless for the secured creditor. For this reason, IP 
collateralization is not established on the actual transfer of the physical possession of 
the encumbered IP from the debtor to the secured creditor. The encumbered IP is still 
kept under the control of the debtor. Therefore, the responsibility of taking reasonable 
steps to maintain the value of encumbered IP will be imposed on the debtors. 
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B. Maintenance duties 
The maintenance duties in IP collateralization are also significantly different. As the 
value of IP is based on the holder’s statutory monopoly status and accumulated 
through exploitation, so the debtors’ maintenance duties are mainly about safeguarding 
the continuous existence of legal protection and keeping effective exploitation. 
As the continuous legal protection over the registered trademarks and patents is 
established on registration and annual renewal, the debtors are obliged to pay the 
annual maintenance fee in time. In jurisdictions where the “consecutive exploitation” 
has been imposed as a mandatory requirement for keeping the validity of a registered 
trademark,308 the debtors are also obliged to continuously implement the encumbered 
trademark in order to keep it from being revoked.309 
As discussed in Section 2.1.1.2 and 2.3.2.2 B, the value of IP is determined by the IP 
holder’s capability of exploiting its statutory monopoly status and market changes. The 
value may suffer serious loss with the passage of time; so in contrast with the case 
with ordinary tangible assets, the debtors should actively exploit the encumbered IP. 
Keeping exploitation is not a right entitled to the debtor, but also an obligation that the 
debtor has to undertake to keep the liquidation value of the encumbered IP. The 
restrictions on the exploitation of encumbered IP will be kept at a minimal level to 
reduce the debtor’s cost of encumbering IP, and to ensure the creditor’s repayment 
upon the default.  
Meanwhile, as the value of an IP is susceptible to infringements and impediments 
caused by competitors (such as, pirating copyrighted works, imitating patented 
products and infringing trademarks), the debtor should be responsible for taking active 
action against these infringements of the encumbered IP, with the objective of 
maintaining the liquidation value of collaterals.  
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C. Safeguard mechanisms 
While IP assets are so sensitive to market changes and vulnerable to infringements, 
any delay in adopting appropriate action to protect and preserve the value of the 
encumbered IP may result in a severe depreciation of the liquidation value. The 
depreciation can reduce the creditor’s collection of repayment upon the debtor’s 
default. As a result, the secured creditors may also need some safeguard mechanisms 
to intervene if the debtor fails in fulfilling their maintenance obligations or conducts 
misuse, in order to preserve the liquidation value of the encumbered IP.  
Taking all these differences into account, the law for IP collateralization should make 
an appropriate allocation of the pre-default rights and obligations on the exploitation 
and preservation of the encumbered IP. 
3.5 Perfection, Publicity and Priority 
An integrated perfection and publicity system with a comprehensive set of priority 
rules is one of the central and defining features of an efficient legal regime for secured 
transactions.310 A security interest, by definition, is simply a legal arrangement that 
gives the secured creditor full priority in the underlying collateral over the claims of 
all third parties, including inferior secured creditors, subsequent assignees of the 
debtor, and other unsecured creditors.311 In a world where information is not without 
cost, after the creation process has established an in personam relationship between 
the debtor and the secured creditor, “perfection” is set as an additional perquisite for 
publicizing information and for establishing the in rem relationship between the 
secured creditor and the rest of the world with respect to the encumbered collateral. 
The in rem effect gives the security interest the effectiveness and priority against third 
parties and competing interests. The failure to do it will render the security ineffective 
against the third parties and may make the creditor “unsecured”. Modern systems 
integrate the competing claims against the collateral into a single unified first-to-file 
perfection, publicity and priority system. 
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3.5.1 Registration Schemes for Perfection and Publicity 
The economic rationale underlying the establishment of priority order based on the 
perfection process is to encourage secured creditors to publicize information about 
their existing encumbrances on a given debtor’s collateral.312 For intangible assets, 
perfection is usually done by registration in a designed registry. The same registry 
usually does publicity and offers a search service for third parties as well. The records 
kept by the registry not only help the parties avoid fraudulent conveyances or transfer, 
but also reduce the information cost for other parties (e.g. the other creditors of the 
debtor, prospective buyers and other third parties) to find out the existing 
encumbrances over the collateral. Having knowledge about the existing encumbrances 
over collateral and the priority order of other competing interests would allow 
potential subsequent creditors to accurately access their risks, and then to adjust the 
lending terms accordingly.  
To reduce the unnecessary transaction costs, uncertainties, and delay caused by the 
multiplicity of registries on perfection, publication and search, modern secured 
transaction laws have the following typical characteristics: 
- the submission of a simple financing statement with very limited information, just 
including the debtor, the credit, and the underlying collateral asset, is considered to 
be sufficient to put third parties on notice of the existing security interest on a 
given debtor’s collateral313 ( “notice-based” filing); 
- assigning priority by the time of filing in the designated registry (“first-to-file 
priority rule”);  
- the filings and searching are indexed against the debtor (“debtor-indexed”); 
- a general and centralized/well-linked secured transaction registry/filing archive for 
all kinds of secured transaction and all assets;  
- allowing a blanket registration for a whole business collateralization (“general 
description”);  
- providing a comprehensive set of priority rules covering all secured transactions, 
mainly dealing with the conflicts between multiple secured or unsecured creditors;  
- permitting an automatic continuation of security interests in any identifiable 
proceeds of the disposition of encumbered collateral. 
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312 See Steven L. Harris and Charles W. Jr. Mooney, “A Property-Based Theory of Security Interests: Taking 
Debtors’ Choices Seriously,” Virginia Law Review 80 (1994): 2021–2072 at 2053-2066 (explaining the 
reasons to require perfection and to establish the public notice system). 
313 Once the official filing is available for checking by the public at the registry, a third person is “presumed” 
to have received information about the security interest or is reasonably expected to know about it. 
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However, both questionnaires of the International Association for the Protection of 
Intellectual Property (AIPPI) in 2006314 and of the WIPO in 2009315 show that in 
respondent States where IP-specific registries do exist the security interests in IP are 
also generally required to be registered with them as well. The majority of respondent 
States even require the security interests in IP to become effective against third parties 
only after the registrations in IP-specific registries.316  
Registered IP such as patents and trademarks, usually have a deep root with 
registration of ownership and interests therein.317 A specialized IP registration system 
usually has its own rules and plays a “right conferring” role, which is significantly 
different from the “notification-only” role found in the general security interests 
registry. For example, IP registrations usually require:  
- the submission of underlying security agreements or other documents which prove 
the validity of the IP to be encumbered (“documentation-based” filing);  
- the filings and searching are indexed against the collateral (“property-indexed”);  
- a specific description of the IP to be encumbered, which makes it is impossible to 
register security interests in a future IP (“asset-specific”);  
- certain scrutiny of the documents provided to ensure the content and validity of 
underlying IP;  
- improved versions, updates or derivatives of works may constitute new IP, instead 
of being treated as proceeds. 
The economic rationale underlying such a specialized property or ownership-based 
system comes from the “public goods” nature of IP and the special way of IP 
exploitation. Since these rights are not tangibly perceivable or economically 

314 See Duran, “Question 190, Guidelines for National and Regional Group Reports.” 
315 According to the response to Question 4 (Can security interests in IP be recorded on a register in your 
country, whether an IP-specific register or other register), among the 66 respondent States, 45 accept the 
registration of security interests in IP in an IP-specific registry, 20 accept in other registry and 9 provide no 
registry. See WIPO, “WIPO Questionnaire on Security Interests in Intellectual Property.” 
316 See Brennan (2001) “Financing Intellectual Property under Revised Article 9: National and International 
Conflicts (Electronic Version),” supra note 302 at 370-376 (summarizing the findings in the various 
international review reports and divides the effects of registration in IP-specific registers into three classes: (1) 
the registration in IP-specific registers is required to make the security assignment to be valid between the 
parties; (2) the registration in IP-specific registers is required to make the security assignment to be effective 
against third parties who take in good faith and without notice; (3) in some countries, security interests in IP 
have to be registered in the general public registers.) 
317 See Brennan (2001) “Financing Intellectual Property under Revised Article 9: National and International 
Conflicts (Electronic Version),” supra note 302 at 373 and 375 (showing that almost every country requires a 
filing for a patent security interest). This requirement is also formalized in Article 14 (registration of security 
interest) in the Patent Law Treaty issued by the WIPO. 
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rival/exclusive in nature, the property-indexed system is created for defining the scope 
of rights, keeping track of the transfers of ownership of IP, and notifying any potential 
exploiters of IP (assignee, transferee, licensee, etc.) about the current statement of the 
IP. IP registries usually also ask for a specific description of the scope of the rights. 
And IP licensing, as the main way of IP exploitation, requires a clear record of the 
“chain of title” to ensure that the innovators can keep control over the use of licensees 
and keep track over remote sub-licensees. In essence, IP is exploited more like real 
property (or immovable property in the concept of civil law).318 IP registries therefore 
usually ask for a clear record of change of title, licenses, and any changes of rights 
over IP. As a result, using the encumbered IP as the index of filing and searching 
matches commercial practice.  
So there is a problem of dealing with the relationship between the two different 
registry systems. For unregistered IP, such as copyright and trade secrets, the absence 
of a specialized registry may avoid many possible conflicts in the coordination of rules, 
but may also have to deal with gaps if a registration at the general security interests 
registry is not allowed.319 For registered IP like patents and trademarks, there is a 
problem of dealing with multiple registries, one is the notice-based general registry 
system and the other one is the documentation-based IP-specific registry system. 
The existence of multiple registries leads to several problems for IP collateralization. 
First, it brings additional legal costs of navigating among different registries to find 
out where and how to properly give notice of the security interests. Second, it causes 
confusion or conflicts about the priority order of multiple registrations at different 
registries. It may result in dual registrations and bring uncertainty to the third-party 
effectiveness and the priority order of security interests (as discussed below in Section 
4.3.3.1 about American law). Third, the title-based schemes of IP registers may focus 
on documenting the conferral of rights and the transfers of ownership of IP but cannot 
effectively reflect and accommodate security interest in IP, which is only an 
encumbrance on IP. The property-indexed IP registration system makes it impossible 
to have a whole business collateralization, create floating security interests, or use 
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318 See Brennan (2001) “Financing Intellectual Property under Revised Article 9: National and International 
Conflicts (Electronic Version),” supra note 302 at 317, 
319 It is noted that unregistered copyright has already been effectively employed as collateral in various 
jurisdictions. Many jurisdictions also provide specific registry for the voluntary registration of transactions or 
interests regarding copyright. See also Brennan (2001) “Financing Intellectual Property under Revised Article 
9: National and International Conflicts (Electronic Version),” supra note 302 at 373 (showing that almost half 
of the reviewed States require a filing for a copyright security interest).  
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future (after-acquired) assets as collateral, which are crucial benefits of the modern 
secured transaction legal regime and very important as to the endless progression and 
improvement feature of works protected by IP (see in discussion on the creation of 
security interests in the future IP in Section 3.4.2.3). Given these problems caused by 
legal disparities, how to solve these problems is one of the most serious legal barriers 
that the legal regime for IP collateralization has to face.  
3.5.2 Priority 
The essence of security interests is that the secured creditor should be vested with the 
“priority” to receive the preferential payments from the proceeds of disposition of the 
encumbered collateral in preference to competing claimants, as being paid off the 
secured debt. The “competing claimants” refers to all parties who also have interests in 
the same encumbered collateral, including another secured creditor with a security 
interest in the same collateral, an outright assignee, licensee, judgement creditor of the 
encumbered collateral, and an insolvency representative in the insolvency of the 
grantor/debtor. With the priority against competing claimants, the secured creditor is 
guaranteed to receive adequate repayment in the event of the debtor’s default (or at 
least have some recovery, so the overall lending risk is lower).320 The position of a 
secured creditor in the queue of all competing claims directly determines how much 
the secured creditor can recover upon the debtor’s default. The priority rule is 
therefore required to provide a “fair and just ordering” of “competing claims against 
the secured assets”.321  
It is worth noting that, most IP experts might be more familiar with another concept of 
“right of priority”, given under the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial 
Property (Paris Convention) for applicants seeking protection over their invention, 
utility model, mark or industrial design in several countries.322 With the “right of 
priority”, on the basis of a regular first application filed in one of the Contracting 
States of the Paris Convention, the applicant may, within a certain period of time (12 
months for patents and utility models; 6 months for industrial designs and marks), 
apply for protection in any of the other Contracting States. These subsequent 
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320 See Alan Schwartz, “Security Interests and Bankruptcy Priorities: A Review of Current Theories,” The 
Journal of Legal Studies 10, no. 1 (1981): 1–37. 
321 See Williams et al. (2010) “Secured Finance Law in China and Hong Kong”, supra note 264 at 13. 
322 Article 4, Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (1979). 
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applications will be regarded as if they had been filed on the same day as the first 
application and hence have priority over applications filed by others during the said 
period of time for the same invention, utility model, mark or industrial design. The 
“right of priority” given under the Paris Convention is for determining the effective 
date of filing and gives the applicants a 6-12 months grace period in making 
applications in several countries. It is totally different from the “priority” we discussed 
in this dissertation, which refers to the priority of the secured creditor against 
competing claimants in receiving payments from the proceeds of disposition of the 
encumbered collateral”. This is an example of what was discussed in Section 2.3.2.1 C 
that – a successful IP collateralization requires cooperation between experts in the field 
of secured financing and IP law and depends upon ‘cultural exchange’ and 
‘bilingualism’.  
Usually, the priority order among the conflicting security interests is easy to determine 
with the “first-to-file” rule. However, as stated previously in Section 3.3.2.2, the main 
way of IP exploitation, i.e., IP licensing, brings more third parties (especially the prior 
or subsequent licensor or licensee of the grantor) involved. How to balance the 
interests of the secured creditors and the third parties is crucial.  
Prioritizing the interests of the secured creditors and giving insufficient protection to 
the interests of the additional third parties may undermine the market incentive for IP 
licensing. By contrast, giving strong protection to the third parties also undermines the 
creditor’s incentive to provide loans. Both ways can reduce the total social welfare 
created from exploiting the monetary value in its IP rights. So, efficient priority rules 
for IP collateralization need not only to be clear and certain, but also have a proper 
balance of the interests of all parties directly or indirectly involved. However, usually 
neither IP laws nor the general secured transaction laws have clear priority rules for 
dealing with the additional conflicts with the IP licensors and licensees. 
Taking into account the discussion in Section 3.3.2.2, at least there should be clear 
rules for the priority order of competing claims in the following scenarios, 
- If there is a dual-registration system, the priority between the security 
interests registered at the IP-specific registry and that at the general security 
interests registry; 
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- In the case where an IP owner (as the borrower/debtor) creates security 
interests in its IP itself, the priority order among the secured creditor’s 
security interests, the IP owner/debtor’s royalty income received from the 
pre-existing and future licensees, and the pre-existing and future licensee’s 
interests; 
- In the case where an IP licensee (as the borrower/debtor) creates security 
interests in the interests in the authorization to exploitation under a license 
agreement, the priority order among the secured creditor’s security interests, 
the licensor’s interests, and the assignee’s interests. 
3.6 Enforcement 
Enforcement arises when the debtor defaults on the repayment of the debt or the 
performance of contractual obligations. Security interest is a kind of “backup 
mechanism” upon the debtor’s default. It is the capability of extracting the salvage 
value from the collateral through a disposition of the encumbered collateral that helps 
lower the creditor’s lending risk. So the rules of enforcement are mainly about 
providing predictable and certain remedies that a secured creditor is entitled to 
exercise in respect of the collateral upon the debtor’s default.  
The effectiveness and efficiency of the enforcement process directly determine if the 
backup plan works or not and, in turn, determine the creditors’ ex ante incentive to 
provide loans at the first place. Meanwhile, enforcement remedies must be tailored to 
ensure the most effective and efficient enforcement while ensuring appropriate 
protection of the rights of the debtor and third parties.  
As IP laws typically do not provide specific enforcement remedies for IP 
collateralization, legal conflicts do not arise for the enforcement in IP collateralization. 
Usually, it is the rules in the general law of secured transactions for all kinds of 
movables and rights that apply to IP collateralization with some adjustments. 
Nevertheless, the characteristics of IP may give rise to the needs for some extra 
protection in the enforcement for IP collateralization, at least in the following two 
cases.  
First, as mentioned above in Section 2.3.2.2 B, the value of a specific IP is very 
time-sensitive and vulnerable to changes in the market. A delay in enforcement may 
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result in severe depreciation of the encumbered IP. The depreciation can reduce the 
creditor’s collection of repayment and increase the debtor’s remaining payment 
obligation. As a result, enforcing the security interests in time is important to protect 
the interests of both the creditor and the debtor. Remedies are needed to allow the 
creditor to exercise its security interests in a timely manner and some remedies that 
enable the debtor to take action when the creditor delays in exercising its security 
interests.  
Second, the creditor and the assignee may have the incentive to collude in the 
disposition of the collateral in order to take advantage of the debtor. They may reach a 
low foreclosure price and leave the debtor with remaining payment obligations. 
Collusion can be easy especially in the case of IP collateralization, because of the lack 
of market price for a specific IP arising from the uniqueness of each IP. The debtor 
may not even be able to prove the collusion by showing the foreclosure price is 
unfairly below the market price. As a result, there should be some remedies for the 
debtor against collusion between the creditor and the assignee in the enforcement. 
Third, the enforcement remedies should take into account the fact that the value of IP 
comes from not only assignment but also license and exploitation. In most cases, the 
applications by the IP holder or by the competent licensees are the main value source 
of IP. Sometimes debtors may just have a temporary cash shortage but this might be 
recoverable or even profitable, because they may still be able to get royalty income 
from further license or exploitation of the underlying IP. In this case, a compulsory 
assignment of the underlying IP upon the debtor’s default may completely ruin the 
debtors’ business. So, the enforcement remedies should provide some flexibility in 
allowing the debtor to negotiate with the creditor, in order to avoid forcing debtors that 
are in temporary cash shortage into bankruptcy. And licensees should be provided with 
some remedies for claiming or protecting their interests as well. 
3.7 Summary of the Effectiveness Criteria 
From the above discussion, with the consideration of the special characteristics of IP, 
the following effectiveness criteria as to the legal framework for IP collateralization 
are established.  
When it comes to the creation of security interests, the most important issue is to see if 
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the legal rules for IP collateralization are flexible and clear enough to enable 
innovators to make full use of their IP as collateral in a simple and inexpensive way. 
The law is expected to  
- unify rules for different kinds of IP in order to reduce legal uncertainty; 
- set only minimal requirements on creation in order to reduce the transaction 
cost; 
- give broad but clear guidance on the scope of IP eligible for collateralization 
in order to ensure legal certainty; 
- provide the maximum autonomy to parties in order to allow them to control 
and reduce transaction risks via free negotiation; 
- make an appropriate allocation of the pre-default rights and obligations on 
the exploitation and preservation of the encumbered IP. 
In order to provide creditors with a simple, streamlined, comprehensible, expeditious, 
and inexpensive method for the perfection, publicity and priority of security interests 
in IP, the law is expected to:  
- set clear guidance about where and how to properly give notice of the 
security interests; and specify, if with multiple registry schemes, the priority 
of registrations at different registries; 
- make it possible to have a whole business collateralization, create floating 
security interests, or use future (after-acquired) assets as collateral, in the 
case of  IP collateralization. 
- give clear priority rules on competing interests, including also those of the 
additional third parties specifically for IP collateralization, such as the 
pre-existing and subsequent licensors and licensees.  
In order to ensure an effective and efficient enforcement process to safeguard the 
creditor’s interests on the debtor’s default and make appropriate protection of the 
rights of the debtor and third parties, the rules for enforcement are expected to  
- provide the creditor with certain, expeditious and inexpensive remedies; 
- allow and also ensure that, the creditor exercises its security interests in a 
timely manner; 
- provide remedies for the debtor against collusion between the creditor and 
the assignee in the enforcement 
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- provide some remedies for the licensees to claim or protect their interests 
The conflicts pointed out in this chapter and the criteria established here establish the 
basis for the comparative analysis in the following Chapter 4. We will comparatively 
examine how the laws of China, the US and the UNCITRAL’s Supplement address the 
problems we have identified above and evaluate the effectiveness of the different 
solutions, mainly from the perspective of risk controlling and transaction cost 
reduction.  
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Chapter 4 Comparative Study on the General Legal 
Framework for IP Collateralization 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter adopts the effectiveness criteria established in Chapter 3 to make a 
comparative law and economics assessment of the secured transaction legal 
frameworks on IP collateralization in China, the US and the UNCITRAL’s Supplement. 
The comparison aims at answering the following research questions: 
Ǧ Do the secured transaction legal frameworks on IP collateralization in China, the 
US and the UNCITRAL function efficiently? 
Ǧ What changes are needed for improving the efficiency of the current secured 
transaction legal framework for IP collateralization, especially for China? 
There are a number of reasons for making the comparison between China, the US and 
the UNCITRAL’s Supplement.  
Chinese law is chosen for three main reasons. First, China has been one of the 
fastest-developing economies in the world for over two decades and recently has 
begun to put increasing efforts on enhancing IP protection and on stimulating R&D 
investments. Both the importance of the economy and the abundant needs for R&D 
investment justify a detailed review of its laws on IP collateralization. However, no 
comprehensive review of the secured transaction legal framework for IP 
collateralization in China has been undertaken. Second, although the legal efforts in 
recent years have removed some legal obstacles for IP collateralization in China, they 
constitute a timid patchwork that is incapable of overcoming many inveterate 
problems or meeting the current financial demands of both IP right-holders and fund 
providers. One of the main objectives of this comparative study is to help identify the 
problems and to explore certain guidance for future improvements in the Chinese rules 
regarding IP collateralization. Third, despite the greater influence of common law 
systems in recent years, China’s legal system still largely follows the continental 
civilian model. Some problems identified in the Chinese law on IP collateralization 
may also affect other civil law jurisdictions.  
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US law is chosen for two main reasons. First, while Article 9 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code of the United States (UCC-9) heavily influences the modern 
secured transaction system all over the world. American IP laws are also well known 
for their high level of IP protection. So the conflicts between secured transaction law 
and IP law occurring in the US legal regime are more obvious and representative. 
Second, US law is a typical representative of the common law system. It can be used 
as an opposite counterpart to compare with the civil law model represented by Chinese 
law. The discussion and examination of the US rules therefore are mainly for making 
comparisons and formulating proposals for Chinese rules.  
The UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions: Supplement on Security 
Rights in Intellectual Property (the Supplement) is the first main international 
document addressing the legal issues on IP collateralization. It reflects some of the 
recent achievements in the secured transaction law sector and provides plenty of basic 
principles for modernizing laws for IP collateralization. It is also for the first time that 
the international community has collectively undertaken efforts on this issue. Having a 
closer examination of the efforts made by the UNCITRAL can help us have an 
enhanced understanding of the difficulty in, and underling principles of, coordinating 
the secured transaction laws and IP laws. However, the possible effects of the 
Supplement on IP collateralization in a national context are uncertain and have never 
been examined. In this case, critically comparing the Supplement with the current rules 
in China and the US can help us to draw a clearer picture of the effects of the 
recommendations in the Supplement in a national context. We can also learn from this 
comparison to see if the Supplement can give direct and clear guidance for the 
improvement of Chinese rules on IP collateralization.  
The chapter is divided into 6 sections. Following the analytic framework and 
effectiveness criteria established in Chapter 3, the next three sections (Section 4.2, 4.3 
and 4.4) show how the conflicts between IP laws and secured transactions are targeted, 
respectively, in China, the US, and the UNICITRAL’s Supplement. Then Section 4.5, 
by employing the general efficiency criteria established in Chapter 3, provides a 
comparative examination on the efficiency of the rules. This examination may provide 
China with certain guidance for future improvements on the rules regarding IP 
collateralization. It is unrealistic for (and also not the purpose of) this dissertation to 
discuss all specific legal issues in IP collateralization. The comparative analysis aims 
to present the main structural legal obstacles and the conceptual framework design. 
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Some brief general suggestions for the reform of the legal framework for IP 
collateralization in China are proposed in Section 4.6. 
4.2 China 
4.2.1 Background: Historical Development of IP Collateralization in 
China 
The historial law and economic scholar Mackaay (2000) argues that the economic 
evaluation of a specific legal issue or rule cannot be done without looking into the 
setting of the whole legal framework and then its historical development.323 Looking 
into the historical development can help us better understand how current rules and 
institutions evolved and facilitate our further analysis into specific rules.324  
In general, the development of Chinese laws and policies on IP collateralization can be 
divided into three main phases. 
4.2.1.1 The First Phase: 1995-2006 
The first phase starts from the first legislative acceptance of IP collateralization in 
China. Only in 1995325 was IP collateralization for the first time has been explicitly 
accepted in Chinese law under the Security Law (Dan Bao Fa).326 IP was featured as a 
kind of “property rights” and the security interests had to be employed in the way of a 
“pledge”. So, IP collateralization was governed under the section for the “pledge of 
rights”.327 This legislative model has a strong civil law tradition. A similar approach is 
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323 See Mackaay (2000), “History of Law and Economics,” supra note 16, at 83-86. 
324 See Ugo A. Mattei, Luisa Antoniolli, and Andrea Rossato, “Comparative Law and Economics Law,”  
supra note 28 at 505.  
325 As early as 1986, Art. 89 of the Chinese General Principles of the Civil Law has determined that security 
interests in China could be created in the ways of personal security or real security. See Article 89, General 
Principles of the Civil Law of PRC (ѝॾӪ≁ޡ઼ഭ≁⌅䙊ࡉ), promulgated on April 12, 1986 and came 
into force on January 1, 1987, amended on August 27, 2009 (L.). Nevertheless, there was no specific 
reference to IP collateralization at that time. 
326 Security Law of PRC (ѝॾӪ≁ޡ઼ഭᣵ؍⌅), adopted by NPC on June 30, 1995 and came into force 
on October 1, 1995 (L.).  
327 Section II Pledge of Rights, Chapter IV Pledge, Security law. This legislative model has a strong civil law 
tradition.  
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adopted in other typical civil law countries such as Germany and Japan as well.328  
The Security Law includes three provisions, which specifically address IP 
collateralization on the scope of rights eligible for pledge, the creation of pledge in IP 
and the effectiveness of the pledge.329 However, only the three basic types of IP, 
namely, trademark, patent and copyright were explicitly mentioned. 330  The 
registration of the written security agreement with the “corresponding competent 
authority” was set as a pre-condition for making the security agreement itself effective 
between the parties and also for making the security interests in IP become effective 
against third parties.331 Based on the underlying rationale of civil law that security 
interests are a kind of real rights (wu quan) imposed on the ownership of the collateral, 
security interests in IP should therefore be registered with the same title-registries of IP 
for keeping the integrity of the title records. Under the decentralized administrative 
system of IP in China,332 the China Trademark Office (CTMO),333 the former Patent 
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328 Germany follows the traditions of Roman law and Germanic law; the provisions concerning the pledge of 
rights are incorporated in the German Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch). The German Civil Code 
generally accepts that all property rights which are independently assignable and vested with monetary value, 
including IP, shall be able to be subject to the “pledge of rights” (Section 1273-1296). Specific issues 
regarding the creation of security interests in IP and the method for achieving third-party effectiveness of the 
security interests in IP are governed under rules of relevant IP laws. Bearing traits of strong influences from 
German law, the Japanese Civil Code follows a similar legislative model as well. It accepts that IP features as 
intangible property rights and therefore applies the rules for a “pledge of rights” to IP collateralization 
(Article 362-368). However, the provisions in the Japanese Civil Code focus more on the pledge of created 
claims and none specifically refer to IP. In this case, specific provisions concerning IP collateralization are 
mainly scattered in IP laws, such as the Japanese Patent Act (Article 95 and 96), the Japanese Trademark Act 
(Article 34), the Japanese Copyright Act (Article 66), and the Japanese Design Act (Article 35). 
329 Art. 75 [The Rights Eligible for Pledge] The following rights can be pledged: […] (3) property rights 
in exclusive rights to use trademarks, patent rights and copyrights that are assignable according to laws. 
   Art. 79 [The Creation of Pledge Rights in IP] In the case where property rights in exclusive rights to 
use trademarks, patent rights and copyrights that are assignable according to laws are pledged, the pledgor 
and pledgee shall enter into a written pledge contract and register the pledge contract with the corresponding 
competent authority. The written pledge contract shall enter into effect as from the date of registration.  
   Art. 80 [The Effectiveness of Pledge Rights in IP] After a right described in Art. 79 is pledged, the 
pledgor cannot further assign or license the encumbered IP, except for with consent from the pledgee. The 
subsequent proceeds gained by the pledgor, including assignment fee, license fee, shall be used to pay off the 
principal obligation in advance, or be held in escrow with a third party appointed by the pledgee. 
330 Article 75 (3), Security Law, ibid. 
331 Article 79, Security Law, ibid. 
332 See Daniel J. Gervais, “The TRIPS Agreement and the Changing Landscape of International Intellectual 
Property,” in Intellectual Property and TRIPS Compliance in China: Chinese and European Perspectives, ed. 
Paul Torremans, Hailing Shan, and Johan Erauw (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2007), 65–84. 
333 See China Trademark Office (CTMO, ѝഭ୶ḷተ) is under the direct supervision of the State 
Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC, ഭᇦᐕ୶ᙫተ) and is responsible for the registration 
and administration of trademarks. See further information of CTMO at: 
http://sbj.saic.gov.cn/english/orgranization/introduction.asp. 
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Office,334 and the National Copyright Administration (NCAC)335 were designated as 
the “corresponding competent authorities” to implement legislative rules for IP 
collateralization and to administer registration-related affairs for each specific category 
of IP. Aside from the three specific provisions for IP, other issues regarding IP 
collateralization such as the scope of secured obligations, the requirements on the 
pledge contract, the pre-default rights and obligations of parties, the priority rules and 
the enforcement of pledge were governed by the provisions applicable mutatis 
mutandis to the “pledge of tangible movables”.336  
Within the next two years, for further explanation of the registration requirements and 
schemes for IP collateralization, the three “corresponding competent authorities” 
individually promulgated three departmental regulations (bumen guizhang).337 
In sum, at this phase, Chinese rules regarding IP collateralization were incorporated in 
the Security Law of 1995, in its judicial interpretation, as well as the three 
implementing departmental regulations.338 The three departmental regulations were 

334 By then, the Patent Office (у࡙ተ) was the responsible administrative department for the registration 
and administration of patents. As a consequence of the reshuffle of the State Council in 1998, the Patent 
Office later became a part of the State Intellectual Property Office (SIPO, ѝഭ⸕䇶ӗᵳተ). SIPO acts 
directly under the control of the State Council at the vice ministry level and is in overall charge of relevant 
IP works and specific administration of patents. 
335 The National Copyright Administration (NCAC, ഭᇦ⡸ᵳተ) falls within the supervision of the State 
Administration for Press and Publication (ഭᇦࠪ⡸ᙫተ) and is the responsible body for organizing and 
coordinating the protection of copyrights. See further information of NCAC at: 
http://www.ncac.gov.cn/cms/html/205/1800/List-1.html. 
336 Art. 81, Security Law (prescribing “Aside from provisions in this section (Pledge of rights), pledge of 
rights is also governed by the provisions in Section I (Pledge of movables) of this Chapter.” 
337 Within the hierarchy of law in China, the rules promulgated by the ministries and commissions under the 
State Council are “departmental regulations (bumen guizhang)”. See Daniel C. K. Chow, The Legal System of 
the People’s Republic of China in a Nutshell (St. Paul MN: West Group Publishing, 2009) at 118. The three 
departmental regulations are: for copyrights, the Measures for the Registration of Copyrights Pledge 
Contracts(㪇֌ᵳ䍘ᣬਸ਼ⲫ䇠࣎⌅), promulgated by the No.1 Order of NCAC on September 23, 1996 
and came into force on September 23, 1996 (D.R.) Repealed, see infra note 410; for patents,  Interim 
Measures for the Registration of Patent Rights Pledge Contracts (у࡙ᵳ䍘ᣬਸ਼ⲫ䇠㇑⨶Ჲ㹼࣎⌅), 
promulgated by the No.8 Order of China Patent Office on September 19, 1996 and came into force on 
October 1, 1996 (D.R.) Repealed, see infra note 409; for trademarks, Registration Procedures for the 
Registration of Pledge of Exclusive Rights to Use Trademarks, (୶ḷу⭘ᵳ䍘ᣬⲫ䇠〻ᒿ), promulgated by 
the No.127 Order of SAIC of 1997 on May 6, 1997 and came into force on May 6, 1997. (D.R.) Repealed, 
see infra note 408. 
338 Judicial Interpretation of SPC on Some Issues Regarding the Application of Security Law (ᴰ儈Ӫ≁⌅
䲒ޣҾ䘲⭘ǉѝॾӪ≁ޡ઼ഭᣵ؍⌅Ǌ㤕ᒢ䰞仈Ⲵ䀓䟺) adopted on September 29, 2000 and came into 
force on December 13, 2000 (J.I.). 
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the most important legal resources that directly govern the practice of IP 
collateralization in China at that time.339 
Despite the legislative acceptance and specific implementation rules, during the period 
from 1995 to 2006, very few IP-based loans were successfully concluded in practice. 
Taking patent collateralization as an example, by the end of 2006, among the more 
than 1.73 million patents granted domestically,340 only 323 patent pledge contracts 
were registered with the State Intellectual Property Office (SIPO).341 Among these 
323 transactions, insurance companies were the main source for enterprises to obtain 
funds but most of their loans were quite small.342 By contrast, banks offered relatively 
larger loans but meanwhile generally required other tangible assets as additional 
collateral when contracting IP collateralizations. 343  In the majority of these 
transactions, patents constituted merely a part (up to 40%) of the whole collateral 
package.344 In other words, IP exerted merely the role as a “credit enhancer” or a “tool 
of risk diversion” in these transactions. The caution of the financial institutions 
reflected in these transactions might help in avoiding credit bubbles, but at a 
disproportionate expense of wasting the great wealth inherent in IP.  
In sum, at the first phase, it was extremely difficult for SMEs to get loans by IP 
collateralization.345 
4.2.1.2 The Second Phase: 2007-2009  
Faced with the relative reluctance of financial institutions in accepting IP 
collateralization, many legal changes and policy documents were made by the Central 
Government to improve the efficiency and attractiveness of IP collateralization from 

339 The three regulated were considered as having positive impacts on the exercise of administrative 
functions and on the protection of legitimate rights and interests of parties in IP collateralization Exposure 
Draft of the Measures for the Registration of a Pledge of Patent Rights, available at: 
http://big5.sipo.gov.cn/www/sipo2008/tfs/dtxx/jndt/201005/t20100519_519092.html.   
340 Data reference to SIPO, China Intellectual Property Yearbook 2006 (ѝഭ⸕䇶ӗᵳᒤ䢤 2006) (Beijing: 
Knowledge Press (⸕䇶ࠪ⡸⽮), 2007) at 499. 
341 Data reference to Lu Zhiying(঒ᘇ㤡), “Analysis of the State of Patent Pledge Financing (у࡙䍘ᣬ㶽
䍴⧠⣦࠶᷀),” Invention & Patent (ѝഭਁ᰾оу࡙) 6 (2007): 45 at 46. 
342 Ibid. 
343 Ibid. 
344 Ibid and see also Bu Yuanshi ed., Chinese Business Law (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2010) at 348. 
345 See Xu Dong (ᗀḻ), “A Study on the Development of Intellectual Property Pledge Loan Home and 
Abroad (ѝཆ⸕䇶ӗᵳ䍘ᣬ䍧Ⅾਁኅ⣦ߥ⹄ウ),” Electronic Intellectual Property (⭥ᆀ⸕䇶ӗᵳ) 8 
(2009): 51 at 52. 
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the end of 2006. During this period from 2006 to 2009, the practice of IP 
collateralization was experiencing a rapid growth with the stimulus provided by 
several guidelines and economic policies of both central and local governments. 
During this period, the main legal changes were brought about by the enactment of the 
Property Law (Wu Quan Fa; or translated as “Real Rights Law” in some other 
literature) in March 2007. 346  The Property Law was developed with technical 
assistance and detailed recommendations on modernizing the secured transactions law 
from the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and the Word Bank347 It was 
considered as “perhaps the single most significant development in the Chinese civil 
law since the founding of the PRC”.348  
For security interests in moveable assets, the Property Law has made remarkable 
improvements, at least in the following matters:349 first, it expanded the scope of 
movable collateral to movable property of all kinds, tangible and intangible, present 
and future, by eliminating the enumeration of each specific type of movable assets 
eligible for collateralization; second, it simplified the formality requirements on the 
creation of security interests and improved the publicity of registration, by allowing a 
notice-based registration, eliminating the need to register the security agreement and 
creating a public online-accessible electronic registry of security interests; third, it 
encouraged the creation of multiple security interests upon the same collateral and 
built a more transparent priority scheme, by incorporating more sophisticated priority 
rules; fourth, it allowed lenders to have contractual arrangements on default events.  

346 Property Law of PRC (ѝॾӪ≁ޡ઼ഭ⢙ᵳ⌅), promulgated on March 16, 2007 and came into force 
on October 1, 2007 (L.).  
347 See Research Bureau of the People's Bank of China, (ѝഭӪ≁䬦㹼⹄ウተ), Foreign Investment, 
Advisory Services of the World Bank Group (ц⭼䬦㹼䳶ഒཆഭᣅ䍴૘䈒ᴽ࣑ተ), and China Project 
Development Facility of the International Finance Corporation (ഭ䱵䠁㶽ޜਨѝഭ亩ⴞᔰਁѝᗳ), Secured 
Transactions Reform and Credit Market Development in China (ѝഭࣘӗᣵ؍⢙ᵳоؑ䍧ᐲ൪ਁኅ) 
(Beijing: China CITTIC Press (ѝؑࠪ⡸⽮), 2006).  
348 See Wang Liming (⦻࡙᰾), “Property Law Is the Cornerstone of the Rule of Law in China (ǉ⢙ᵳ⌅Ǌ
ᱟྐᇊ⌅⋫བྷ৖Ⲵส⸣),” Democracy and Legal System (≁ѫо⌅ࡦ) 5 (2007): 1 at 1. 
349 See Investment Advisory Services of the World Bank Group (2010), Secured Transactions Systems and 
Collateral Registries, supra note 266 at 104; Song Xiaoming (ᆻᲃ᰾) (the presiding judge of Court 2 of 
SPC), “Several Important Issues Regarding the Implementation of the Real Security Rights Section of the 
Property Law (⢙ᵳ⌅ᣵ؍⢙ᵳ㕆ᇎᯭѝⲴࠐњ䟽㾱䰞仈)”, speech at the International Symposium on 
Real Security Rights in Property Law (⢙ᵳ⌅ᣵ؍⢙ᵳഭ䱵⹄䇘Պ ), April 29, 2008 (Judicial 
Interpretation). 
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For matters regarding IP collateralization, the Property Law, however, did not make 
much structural reform. IP collateralization was still governed under the section for the 
“pledge of rights”.350 The Property Law included two provisions specifically referring 
to IP collateralization.351 The two rules further clarified some ambiguities existing in 
the Security Law in two main ways: firstly, it extended the subjects of pledge from the 
three basic types of IP to all kinds of IP (but it limited the “trademark” that can be 
pledged to the “registered trademark” only);352 secondly, it clarified that a registration 
is the prerequisite for creating a “pledge right in IP” (against third parties), not for 
“putting the written pledge contract into effect” (against the debtor).353 Other than 
these minor changes, the Property Law, just the same as the Security Law, dealt with 
the absence of detailed provisions by allowing the analogical application of provisions 
regarding the “pledge of movables” with necessary changes.354 For this reason, the 
aforementioned substantial improvements as to the pledge of tangible movables also 
provided clearer priority rules, greater party autonomy on pre-default obligations and 
rights setting to contracting parties, as well as more enforcement remedies for IP 
collateralization.  
However, the problem is that, before 2009, in the absence of corresponding 
amendments in the three departmental regulations regarding the registration of IP 
collateralization, the substantive changes in the Property Law remained on the books 
but were barely implemented in the practice of IP collateralization.  
Although the legal development was left far behind, the Chinese governments at 
various levels initiated plenty of active measures to facilitate and promote the 
development of IP collateralization. From the beginning of 2006, the two most 
important national guiding policy documents, the Outline of National Medium- and 
Long-Term Development Plan on Science and Technology (2006-2020)355 and the 

350 Section II [Pledge of Rights], Chapter XVII [Pledge], Part Four [Real Security Rights], Property Law. 
351 Article 223(5) and Article 227, Property Law 
352 See further discussion in Section 4.2.2.2 A. 
353 See further discussion in Section 4.2.2.1. 
354 Article 229, Property Law (stipulating that ”beside the rules under this section, the pledge of rights is also 
governed under the rules in Section 1 for the pledge of movables”).  
355 Paragraph 5, Section 8, Outline of National Medium- and Long-Term Development Plan on Science and 
Technology (2006-2020) (ഭᇦѝ䮯ᵏ、ᢰਁኅ㿴ࡂ㓢㾱: 2006-2020), promulgated by State Council on 
February 9, 2006, available at: http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2006-02/09/content_183787.htm (hereafter 
“Development Plan 2006-2020”) (setting as one of its primary policies to incentivize the policy banks and 
commercial institutions to provide preferential credit aids for establishing and improving a sound credit 
system and necessary supporting financial schemes for IP financing, by utilizing government funds). 
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Outline of the National Intellectual Property Strategy356 have identified promoting the 
commercial and industrial exploitation of IP as the central Government’s concern in 
the IP sector, with the objective of solving the difficulties of high-tech SMEs in 
financing. Later, the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC), as the 
competent administrative department for leading the promotion of IP collateralization 
in practice,357 also emphasized IP collateralization as a significant way of resolving 
the current financing problems for SMEs in some important policy documents.358 
While these guiding economic stimulus policies have helped IP collateralization gain 
some public notice, they were still too general and therefore could not be directly 
applied in practice. To push forward the implementation, in September 2006, the 
CBRC and the Central Bank of China (CBC) took the lead to convene the National 
Intellectual Property Pledge Finance Seminar in Xiangtan (Hunan province). More 
than 180 specialists from both financing and IP sectors, including scholars and 
professionals from the World Bank, the International Finance Corporation, branches of 
the People’s Bank of China (PBC), the SIPO and its provincial branches, some other 
commercial banks, guarantee institutions and valuation institutions, were presented at 
this seminar and actively discussed solutions to expand financing channels for IP 
collateralization.359 This seminar was labeled as the starting point of the prosperity of 

356 Clause 12, Outline of the National Intellectual Property Strategy˄ ⸕䇶ӗᵳᡈ⮕㓢㾱 ,˅ promulgated by 
the State Council on June 5, 2008, available at: 
http://www.gov.cn/english/2008-06/21/content_1023471.htm (hereafter “IP Strategy”) (stipulating that the 
Central Government would actively deploy financial and economic policies to strongly encourage and 
support the participation of various market entities in the development of financial exploitation of IP and to 
lead enterprises to use IP collateralization to realize the market value of their IP). 
357 According to the unified deployment of the Chinese central government, the China Banking Regulatory 
Commission (CBRC) is the competent administrative department to draft and implement more detailed 
directory documents for further implementing the general principles regarding promoting financial 
innovations in the guiding policy documents. The CBRC is therefore the competent administrative 
department for promoting IP collateralization. 
358 Article 10, Guiding Opinions of China Banking Regulatory Commission for Commercial Banks to 
Improve and Strengthen Financial Services to High-Tech Enterprises (ѝഭ䬦㹼ъⴁⶓ㇑⨶ငઈՊޣҾ୶
ъ䬦㹼᭩ழ઼࣐ᕪሩ儈ᯠᢰᵟԱъ䠁㶽ᴽ࣑Ⲵᤷሬ᜿㿱), CBRC No. 94 [2006] (explicitly encouraging 
commercial banks to explore and develop various forms of financial service in order to grant preferential 
credits to high-tech enterprises, especially by experimenting with the pledge of IP on the high-tech 
enterprises that own independent IP and have passed the evaluation of state authority); Article 14, Guiding 
Opinions on the Banks’ Granting of Credits to Small Enterprises (ѝഭ䬦㹼ъⴁⶓ㇑⨶ငઈՊޣҾঠਁ
ǉ䬦㹼ᔰኅሿԱъᦸؑᐕ֌ᤷሬ᜿㿱ǊⲴ䙊⸕), CBRC No. 53 [2007] (reemphasizing that IP assets should 
be included in the scope of eligible assets for collateralization in order to relax the loan criteria for small-size 
enterprises). 
359 See SIPO, “Holding of National Intellectual Property Pledge Finance Seminar (ޘഭ⸕䇶ӗᵳ䍘ᣬ㶽䍴
ᐕ ֌ ⹄ 䇘 Պ ਜ ᔰ ),” SIPO Homepage, September 28, 2006, available at 
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/sipo2008/yw/2006/200804/t20080401_352186.html. 
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IP collateralization in China. Subsequent to the seminar, IP collateralization has 
suddenly gained strong momentum from the market. In September of the same year, 
the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) issued its first patent pledged 
loan in Shanghai.360  
The opportunities attracted plenty of specialized market entities such as valuation 
institutions, insurance companies, law firms and guarantee institutions to participate in 
IP collateralization. Some of them tried to work together to build some sustainable 
long-term cooperation business modes. For example, in October 2006, the Beijing 
Branch of the Bank of Communications, the Jingwei Law Office of Beijing, the 
Liancheng Assets Appraisal Co., Ltd and the Beijing Zihexin Insurance Ltd. formally 
signed a four-party agreement to build a united service platform named Zhanyetong to 
carry out a routine finance service concerning IP collateralization.361 The cooperation 
among various specialized market entities allowed each of them bring in its specialty 
and reduce or share the overall risk altogether. The cooperation helped in easing the 
financial institutions’ skepticism about IP collateralization. The four-party cooperation 
received good market responses. By the end of August 2008, the Bank of 
Communications had offered 37 enterprises 44 IP-based loans amounting to RMB 
402.75 million, and all of these loans were paid off in due course.362 
In the wake of these efforts, IP collateralization witnessed its growing appearance 
among local financial institutions in China. Taking the pledge of patents as an example, 
in the year 2007, the number of registrations of patent-pledged contracts rose up to 
324, which was more than the total amount in the previous decade.363  
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360 See Huang Ting (哴Ⴇ), “The First Pledge of Patent in Shanghai (к⎧俆⧠у࡙䍘ᣬ䍧Ⅾ),”available at, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/stock/t/20060919/0514933642.shtml. 
361 Only SMEs with total assets of no more than RMB 40 million or annual sales revenue less than RMB 30 
million, or SMEs with credit exposures less than RMB 10 million are qualified to apply for loans from this 
four-party platform. See more information at the website of Bank of Communications Promotion: 
http://www.bankcomm.com/jh/cn/newRecommend/zyt.html; see also Yang Jinxin (ᶘӅ䪛), “Patent Pledge 
Loans Resolve Enterprises out of Finance Dilemma (у࡙䍘ᣬ䍧Ⅾ⹤䀓Աъ㶽䍴䳮仈),” China Securities 
Journal (ѝഭ䇱ࡨᣕ), August 9, 2009, http://www.bankcomm.com/jh/cn/newRecommend/zyt.html. 
362 See Yangzi (ࡈ䱣ᆀ) Liu, “Governmental Interest Subsidies Facilitate Enterprises in Zhongguancun Go 
through Financial by Using Intellectual Property (᭯ᓌ䍤᚟ࣙѝޣᶁԱъԕ⸕䇶ӗᵳ⑑䳮ޣ),” China 
Intellectual Property News (ѝഭ⸕䇶ӗᵳᣕ), January 1, 2009, page 3. 
363 Data reference to Lu (2007) at 45-47. 
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4.2.1.3 The Third Phase: 2009 to the Present 
As a matter of fact, the most important result of the Xiangtan Seminar in September 
2006 is that the necessity of using government funds to facilitate IP collateralization 
has been noticed. A centralized policy pilot scheme was consequently launched for 
further implementing the general economic stimulus polices and for accumulating 
experiences of different government funding models. For now three groups with 16 
pilot regions in total have been chosen for experimenting with different policies, with 
different main objectives and emphasis. 
In December 2008, the first group of six pilot regions was selected for achieving nine 
main objectives (such as, using mechanisms like interest subsidies and intermediary 
services to reduce the cost of IP collateralization for SMEs, establishing professional 
financing service platforms, and promoting cooperation between valuation institutions 
and banks) within the 2-year duration of the experiment.364 In each pilot region, the 
local municipal SIPO was chosen as the competent organization for directing and 
monitoring the policy experimentation. The central government, especially the CBRC 
and the SIPO, would provide certain preferential credits or professional support for 
these local policy experiments but would not impose or even propose any specific 
suggestions. After taking their local conditions into consideration, local governments 
were encouraged to freely try various innovative models for cooperation to utilize 
government funds, accompanied by preferential policies, to spur IP collateralization. 
During the pilot period, basically all local governments of the pilot regions have 
promulgated local regulations to provide more specific rules for their local 
experiments. A work mechanism named “government policy guidance, enterprises 
participation, market operation” was established. These pilot efforts have achieved 
fruitful results.365 
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364 The six pilot regions are: the Haidian District of Beijing, Changchun, Nanchang, Xiangtan, the Nanhan 
District of Foshan and the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, See SIPO, “China Nailed Down the First 
Group of Pilot Organizations for Probing IP Pledge Financing (ᡁഭ⺞ᇊ俆ᢩ⸕䇶ӗᵳ䍘ᣬ㶽䍴䈅⛩অ
ս ),” SIPO Homepage, December 12, 2008, available at 
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/sipo2008/zlgls/scgl/zcpg/zyrzsd/200910/t20091028_478992.html. 
365 For example, in Xiangtan, during the short 2-year period of experiment from the start of the pilot project 
in December 2008 to the end of December of 2010, the whole city had offered pure IP-based loans with the 
amount of more than RMB 58.25 million to ten SMEs; and and loans with IP as additional collateral with 
the amount of RMB 204.5 million. See SIPO, “Xiangtan of Hunan Province Has Passed Through the 
Examination of SIPO on Pilot Works in IP Pledge Financing (⒆ই⒈▝䙊䗷ޘഭ⸕䇶ӗᵳ䍘ᣬ㶽䍴䈅⛩
ᐕ ֌ 傼 ᭦ ),” SIPO Homepage, February 28, 2011, available at 
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In September 2009, when the first pilot group was still at the trial, another six cities 
were chosen for the second pilot group.366 While the central government did not 
change its position of giving local government full competences on experimenting 
new policies, it re-emphasized that the pilot regions should based on the development 
level of local SMEs and the actual needs for IP collateralization, find more innovative 
workable mechanisms and explore financial models, gradually establish scientific and 
reasonable risk-sharing mechanisms, take efforts to solve the financial difficulties for 
SMEs, and promote the effective integration of technological innovations and 
financial innovations.367 The SIPO promised to not only provide pilot regions with 
great support regarding policy guidance, strategic research, staff training and problem 
solving; but also organize conferences for information and experience sharing.368 The 
main change in the second stage experimentation is the geographic spread. Compared 
to those regions in the first group, the six regions chosen in the second group were 
relatively better developed and with more obvious regional advantages in both 
high-tech and finance development. All the six new pilot regions have gathered a large 
number of innovative high-tech SMEs, formed well-founded IP protection systems, 
and established sophisticated finance and market mechanisms. The SMEs in these 
regions also have greater enthusiasm for IP collateralization.  
Later, in July 2010, the third group of pilot regions was selected. This time only four 
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http://www.sipo.gov.cn/sipo2008/dtxx/gn/2011/201102/t20110228_582253.html. This prosperity was not 
limited to Xiangtan but actually dispersed nationwide. Within the national scope, to the end of September 
2010, 24 commercial banks and 16 guarantee agencies had already registered a total of around 2000 
patent-based loans with SIPO, involving an amount of up to RMB 25 billion. See SIPO, “China Has 
Achieved a Remarkable Result in IP Pledge Financing with the Amount of 25 Billion (у࡙ᵳ䍘ᣬ㶽䍴ᐕ
֌ᡀ᭸ᱮ㪇ޘഭ㶽䍴 䘁 250 ӯݳ ,” SIPO Homepage, September 30, 2010, available at: 
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/sipo2008/yw/2010/201009/t20100926_539318.html. Among these transactions, 
RMB 7.46 billion were concluded within 2009 alone, see Planning and Development Department of SIPO 
(ഭᇦ⸕䇶ӗᵳተ㿴ࡂਁኅਨ), “Patent Statistics Bulletin (у࡙㔏䇑ㆰᣕ) No.12 of 2010 (88),” May 20, 
2010, available at http://www.sipo.gov.cn/sipo2008/ghfzs/zltjjb/201005/P020100524341390757138.pdf. 
366 The six regions included in the second pilot group are: Chengdu, Guangzhou, Dongguan, Yichang, Wuxi 
and Wenzhou. See SIPO, “SIPO Launched A New Round of IP Pledge Financing Pilots (ഭᇦ⸕䇶ӗᵳተ
੟ࣘᯠа䖞⸕䇶ӗᵳ䍘ᣬ㶽䍴䈅⛩ ),” SIPO Homepage, September 18, 2009, available at: 
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/sipo2008/yw/2009/200909/t20090916_475619.html. 
367 Ibid. 
368 Ibid. Three years after the initiation of the official policy experiment pilot project, in June 2011, the 
SIPO convened a special seminar for sharing the experience collected in the trials among its branches at the 
local level, representatives of financial institutions with IP collateralization business and academic scholars. 
See SIPO, “The Seminar on Intellectual Property Investment and Financing Service Is Held in Beijing (⸕䇶
ӗᵳᣅ㶽䍴ᴽ࣑у仈⹄؞⨝൘ӜѮ࣎ ),” SIPO Homepage, May 18, 2011, available at: 
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/ztzl/ndcs/zgzlz/5thpatentweek/pw005zyrz/201111/t20111107_628778.html. 
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regions were chosen.369 After having taken into account the experience from previous 
policy trials, “strengthening the cooperation among various regulatory departments in 
promoting IP collateralization” was emphasized as the key issue in the instruction 
document for the third stage of the pilot scheme.370 Accordingly, in August 2010, six 
administrative departments of the State Council, including the Ministry of Finance, the 
Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT), the CBRC, the SIPO, the 
SAIC and the NCAC, jointly released a departmental regulation, i.e., the Notice on 
Strengthening the Intellectual Property Pledge Finance and Evaluation Management 
to Support the Development of Small-and-Medium-sized Enterprises.371 In this notice, 
the central government required all relevant departments at various levels to 
collectively improve the supporting policies and management mechanisms to enhance 
the management of IP valuation and to accelerate the establishment of a concerted 
mechanism for IP collateralization, with the objective of guiding and facilitating 
financial institutions to explore business opportunities in relevant fields. With the 
general guidance from the central government, plenty of methodes, such as third-party 
loan guarantees, government subsidies and specialized lending institutions, have 
formed part of the experiment in pilot regions for helping local financial institutions to 
offset the risk of employing IP collateralization.372  
After having taken into account the problems found and the experience accumulated in 
these pilot schemes, three years after the promulgation of the Property Law of 2007 
the three competent departments finally released updated departmental regulations to 

369 The four regions included in the third pilot group are: Pudong New District of Shanghai, Tianjin, 
Zhenjiang and Wuhan. See SIPO, “The List of Third Group of Pilot Has Been Determined (⸕䇶ӗᵳ䍘ᣬ
㶽 䍴 䈅 ⛩ ㅜ й ᢩ ਽ অ ⺞ ᇊ ),” SIPO Homepage, July 7, 2010, available at: 
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/sipo2008/yw/2010/201007/t20100713_525179.html. 
370 Ibid. 
371 Notice on Strengthening the Intellectual Property Pledge Finance and Evaluation Management to 
Support the Development of Small-and-Medium-sized Enterprises (ޣҾ࣐ᕪ⸕䇶ӗᵳ䍘ᣬ㶽䍴о䇴ՠ㇑
⨶᭟ᤱѝሿԱъਁኅⲴ䙊⸕), Ministry of Finance No.1999 [2010], by Ministry of Finance, MIIT, CBRC, 
SIPO, SAIC and NCAC, on 20 August, 2010. 
372 In a loan guarantee scheme, the banks’ risks in IP collateralization are underwritten by the third-parties. 
While some third-party guarantees are directly funded by the government, some are given by specialized 
guarantee institutions which are supported by government funds. In some loan subsidies scheme, subsidies 
are given to specialized banks or financial institutions directly, or are given in the way of default 
compensation. See more detailed discussion in Lin Min(᷇᭿), “Comparative Analysis on the Modes 
Utilized by Chinese Government Funds in Promoting the IP Collateralization (᭯ᓌ䍴䠁᧘䘋⸕䇶ӗᵳ䍘ᣬ
㶽䍴Ⲵ⁑ᔿ∄䖳᧒᷀),” Cadernos de Ciência Jurídica 14 (2010): 193; Li Xiyi (ᵾᐼѹ) and Jiang Xiu (㪻
⨷), “The Mode to Develop Intellectual Property as Security for Loans by Government (᭯ᓌ᭟ᤱлⲴ⸕䇶
ӗᵳ䍘ᣬ䍧Ⅾ⁑ᔿ৺ަ⢩ᖱ࠶᷀),” Science Technology and Law (、ᢰо⌅ᖻ) 5 (2009): 8. 
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keep consistent with the legal changes and the evolved practice. 373  The three 
departmental regulations largely simplified the registration process, by greatly 
reducing the respective requirements for the security agreement, as well as the scope 
and the time of registry scrutiny.374 
In the wake of this wave of amendments in departmental implementing regulations, 
fifteen years after IP collateralization had been incorporated into the general secured 
transaction laws, some changes were finally introduced to IP laws at the beginning of 
2010. Both the two recently revised legal documents, the revised Copyright Law375 
and the Detailed Rules for the Implementation of the Patent Law376 added specific 
provisions for IP collateralization, stipulating “where the copyright (or patent) is 
pledged, the pledgor and the pledgee shall handle the registration of pledge at the 
copyright (or patent) department of the State Council.”377 These changes in IP law 
show that IP collateralization has been explicitly acknowledged as a routine way of IP 
exploitation in China.  
In 2013, the CBRC, with assistance from the SIPO, released a departmental regulation 
specifically for providing more clear guidance and regulation over the commercial 
banks in their operation of IP collateralization, i.e., Guiding Opinions for Commercial 
Banks on Operating IP collateralization.378 In 2015, the SIPO issued the Opinions on 
Further Promoting the Financial Services to Intellectual Property379 for giving more 
specific policy guidance over IP collateralization, mainly on improving the IP 

373 The new departmental regulations are: Regulation on the Procedures for the Registration of Pledge Rights 
in Exclusive Rights to Use Registered Trademarks (⌘޼୶ḷу⭘ᵳ䍘ᵳⲫ䇠〻ᒿ㿴ᇊ), infra note 408; 
Measures for the Registration of Pledge of Patent Rights (у࡙ᵳ䍘ᣬⲫ䇠࣎⌅), infra note 409; Measures 
for the Registration of Pledge Rights of Copyright (㪇֌ᵳ䍘ᵳⲫ䇠࣎⌅), infra note 410. 
374 See detailed discussion in Section 4.2.2-4.2.4. 
375 Copyright Law of the PRC (ѝॾӪ≁ޡ઼ഭ㪇֌ᵳ⌅), originally adopted on September 7, 1990 and 
amended twice, respectively, on October 27, 2001 and February 26, 2010 (L.). 
376 Regulation for the Implementation of the Patent Law of the PRC (ѝॾӪ≁ޡ઼ഭу࡙⌅ᇎᯭᶑֻ), 
originally adopted on December 21, 1992, and amended twice, respectively, on December 28, 2002 and 
January 9, 2010) (A.R.). 
377 Article 26, Copyright Law of 2010; Article 14, Regulation for the Implementation of the Copyright Law 
of 2010. 
378 Guiding Opinions for Commercial Banks on Operating IP collateralization (ޣҾ୶ъ䬦㹼⸕䇶ӗᵳ䍘
ᣬ䍧Ⅾъ࣑Ⲵᤷሬ᜿㿱), CBRC No.6 [2013]. This document is directly addressed to all the SIPO, 
Adminartation for Industry and Commerce (AIC), Copyright Administration at the provincial level, all policy 
banks, state-owned commercial banks, joint-equity commercial banks, financial assets management 
companies, postal saving banks, all rural credit cooperatives at the provincial level, and all trust companies, 
financial companies of enterprise group, financial leasing companies directly regulated under the CBRC. 
379 Opinions on Further Promoting the Financial Services to Intellectual Property (ޣҾ䘋а↕᧘ࣘ⸕䇶ӗ
ᵳ䠁㶽ᴽ࣑ᐕ֌Ⲵ᜿㿱), SIPO No. 21 [2015]. 
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valuation mechanisms, risk-management in IP collateralization and the disposition of 
IP. Just recently, in August 2016, the SIPO initiated a new demonstration scheme and 
a new pilot scheme on patent collateralization and patent insurance in 72 selected 
regions spread over the whole country.380 All these developments mentioned above 
show that the Chinese Government is making great efforts to encourage both financial 
institutions and IP owners to exploit actively the financial value inherent in IP.  
4.2.1.4 The status quo 
A. Enhanced IP protection 
For a long time and only until recently, China has been accused as the pirate who was 
only preaching IP, copying and manufacturing counterfeit products. However, this 
situation has improved a lot recently. In recent years, China tries to achieve economy 
transformation by discouraging labor-intensive industries and by promoting capital or 
technology-intensive industries. Now China has become a leader in innovation and no 
longer a follower.381 In the Global Innovation Index (GII) prepared by Cornell 
University, the INSEAD and the WIPO, China became a “top 25” innovative economy 
for the first time in 2015, mainly for the fact that “the country has a particularly high 
number of R&D-intensive firms among the top global corporate R&D spenders”.382 It 
is also the first middle-income country having achieved this.  
With their stronger performance in the international market, Chinese firms have started 
to take patent management as a crucial part of their business strategy. They started to 
take advantage of the international IP protection system to protect their interests. Just 
taking patents as an example, China has experienced the highest growth rate among 

380 The list of “patent collateralization demonstration regions” includes 11 regions such as Guangzhou, 
Chengdu and Wuxi; the list of “patent insurance demonstration regions” includes 9 regions such as Nanjing, 
Jinan, Shenzhen; the list of “patent collateralization pilot regions” includes 40 regions such as Qingdao, 
Shenyang, Changchun; the list of “patent insurance pilot regions” includes 12 regions such as Yantai, 
Anyang, Foshan. See more information at SIPO, “The Pilot And Demonstration Scheme on Patent 
Collateralization And Patent Insurance Has Been Initiated (у࡙ᵳ䍘ᣬ㶽䍴઼у࡙؍䲙䈅⛩⽪㤳ᐕ֌੟
ࣘ ),” SIPO Homepage, August 26, 2016, available at 
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/zscqgz/2016/201608/t20160826_1288248.html. 
381  “China Emerges as World Patent Leader,” Thomson Reuters, 2014, available at 
http://thomsonreuters.com/en/articles/2014/china-emerges-as-world-patent-leader.html. 
382 See The Global Innovation Index 2016, by Cornell University, the INSEAD and the WIPO,  available at: 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/wipo_pub_gii_2016.pdf. 
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the top 10 PCT383 filing countries since 2010.384 In 2015, China was the fourth largest 
PCT filer, with 31,031 filled applications.385 Among middle-income countries, the 
applications were far ahead of its immediate followers, i.e., India with 1,423, Turkey 
with 1,016 and Brazil with 547.386 
Meanwhile, at the domestic level, as IP applications keep increasing with the steady 
economic growth,387 the enforcement of IP protection in China has been greatly 
enhanced as well. In 2013, 55,000 IP cases were concluded and more than 59,000 
arrests were made; a total of 173 billion RMB worth of goods were seized by 
authorities.388 For now, all main Chinese websites for streaming or downloading 
music or movies are with proper authorization from the original copyright holders. To 
further the improvements, the State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film 
and Television (SAPPRFT) has recently released a statement aiming to improve 
standard operations in track registration, copyright authentication and paid use of 
music products before 2020.  
With the increasing awareness of using IP to defend technology and innovation against 
both domestic and foreign competitors, there has been a corresponding increase in 
patent litigations. Accordingly, three specialized IP courts were introduced in Beijing, 
Shanghai and Guangzhou in 2014 to fulfill the increasing demand for IP-related 
litigations. As of 20 August 2015, within just one year, the three IP courts have already 
accepted 10,795 IP cases and concluded 4,160 IP cases in total.389 With such positive 
results, some IP courts might be established in other regions in 2017. These 
improvements in the enforcement of IP protection provide investors with greater 
confidence on doing business in China. The 2016 China Business Environment Member 

383 When pursuing patent rights outside their home jurisdictions, patent applicants can choose between two 
filing routes. One is the Paris route, which has existed since 1883 and enables an applicant who has filed an 
application in one office of a Paris Convention signatory to file subsequent applications referring to the same 
priority date directly in the offices of other signatories, subject to certain conditions. The other one is the PCT 
route, which has been created by the Patent Cooperation Treaty since 1978 and allows applicants to seek patent 
protection simultaneously in a large number of offices by filing a single “international” PCT application”. 
384 WIPO, Patent Cooperation Treaty Yearly Review 2016 - The International Patent System, 2016, 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/wipo_pub_901_2016.pdf at 27. 
385 Ibid, at 26. 
386 Ibid, at 27. 
387 See the China’s Statistical Country Profiles on IP applications and economic growth at the homepage of 
the WIPO at http://www.wipo.int/ipstats/en/statistics/country_profile/profile.jsp?code=CN. 
388 The data is from the web summary of “The Truth About Intellectual Property Protection in China,” 
available at http://internshipschina.com/truth-intellectual-property-protection-china/.  
389  The data is from the homepage of China Court, available at 
http://www.chinacourt.org/article/detail/2015/09/id/1703517.shtml.  
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Survey by the US-China Business Council (USCBC) shows that, among the most 
concerned matters for the USCBC members doing business in China, IP enforcement 
has slipped overall from 2nd place in 2014, to 4th place in 2015, and then to 8th place in 
2016.390 
With the economic change and the need for stronger IP protection, China started the 
fourth comprehensive revision to the Patent Law. In April 2015, the SIPO posted the 
amendments to the Patent Law for public comment.391 The amendments are intended 
to make it easier for patent owners to prosecute infringement cases and to take the IP 
protection beyond the current international standards and to a higher level.392 In 
addition, more emphasis will be put on patent commercialization. The amendments are 
considered to reflect a mindset that believes “a patent's value lies in its 
commercialization and utilization, rather than protection,” and "commercialization is 
key for our country to move from a large patent producer to a strong innovation 
country.”393 
The enhanced IP protection in China allows IP owners to obtain more economic profits 
from IP. In other words, in the case of being used as collateral, IP is worth more to 
both the debtor and the creditor. Consequently, the collateralizing value of IP is also 
increased. 
B. Remarkable growth of IP collateralization 
With the support from all aforementioned policies, legal changes and governmental 
funds, the development of IP collateralization in China keeps a good momentum of 
growth. The data from the SIPO shows that, from 2008, when the first group of six 
pilot regions was selected for trialing out new stimulus polices, to 2012, the number of 
registered transactions secured by patents and the total number of patents used as 

390  See the USCBC 2016 China Business Environment Member Survey, available at 
https://www.uschina.org/reports/uscbc-2016-member-company-survey.  
391 See the Draft of Amendments to Patent Law for Public Comment at the homepage of the SIPO, 
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/tz/gz/201504/t20150401_1095939.html.  
392 See the drafters’ explanations on the purpose of the comprehensive revision to the Patent Law in SIPO, 
“[Legislation Q&A] The Fourth Comprehensive Revision of the Patent Law (Ǐ・⌅䰞ㆄǐу࡙⌅ㅜഋ⅑ޘ
䶒 ؞ ᭩ ),” Homepage of SIPO, 2015, 
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/ztzl/ywzt/zlfjqssxzdscxg/xylzlfxg/201504/t20150424_1107544.html. 
393  See Wang Xin, “New Draft Patent Law Released,” China Daily, April 22, 2015, available at 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2015-04/22/content_20502602.htm. 
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collateral has kept a high level of growth for 5 continuous years.394 
 
Graph 4.1 Number of patents used as collateral versus transactions secured by patents 
From 2008 to 2012, the average annual growth rate of the total number of registered 
transactions secured by patents is 77.63%, while for the total number of patents being 
used as collateral it is 98.71% and for the total transaction value it is 78.8%. In total, 
2073 transactions backed by 7326 patents with a total value of RMB 38.57 billion  
(approximately US$5.6 billion) have been successfully concluded.395 The growth 
trend continued in the following years with an even more remarkably increasing rate. 
In 2013 alone, the total amount of loans secured by patents reached RMB 25.4 billion 
(approximately US$3.7 billion), while for 2014 it was RMB 48.9 billion 

394  The data is collected and analyzed by the SIPO, available at 
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/ztzl/ywzt/zlzydjyxkba/xxcl/201401/t20140125_901043.html. 
395 The data is from the report on the homepage of SIPO, see SIPO, “In 2012 the Total Amount of Funds 
Backed by Patent Collateralization Has Reached RMB 10 Billion For the First Time (2012ᒤޘഭ⸕䇶ӗᵳ
䍘 ᣬ 㶽 䍴 䠁 仍 俆 ⹤ Ⲯ ӯ ),” SIPO Homepage, January 22, 2013, available at 
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/zscqgz/2012/201310/t20131023_841144.html. For more specific data for 2009, see 
the Planning and Development Department of SIPO (ഭᇦ⸕䇶ӗᵳተ㿴ࡂਁኅਨ), “Patent Statistics 
Bulletin ( у ࡙ 㔏 䇑 ㆰ ᣕ ) No.12 of 2010 (88),” May 20, 2010, available at 
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/sipo2008/ghfzs/zltjjb/201005/P020100524341390757138.pdf; for specific data for 
2010, see Planning and Development Department of SIPO (ഭᇦ⸕䇶ӗᵳተ㿴ࡂਁኅਨ), “Patent Statistics 
Bulletin ( у ࡙ 㔏 䇑 ㆰ ᣕ ) No.9 of 2011 (108)” (2011), 
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/tjxx/zltjjb/201509/P020150911515200284498.pdf. After 2010, the SIPO stops 
issuing specific report on pledge of patents. 
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(approximately US$7.1 billion) and for 2015 it was RMB 56 billion (approximately 
US$8.1 billion).396 The SIPO and the State Council set aspirational but also feasible 
goals that, by 2020, IP collateralization should become more routine and in a larger 
scale, the annual amount of loans secured by patents should reach RMB 100 billion 
(approximately US$14.5 billion) and for all loans secured by IP should reach RMB 
180 billion (approximately US$26 billion).397 
In 2015 alone, a total loan amount of RMB 56 billion (approximately US$8.1 billion) 
secured by patents have been given to more than 2000 firms.398 The SIPO ran a 
sample survey over 20 funded firms at the end of the year. The survey shows that in 
2015 the 20 firms together had achieved additional sales of RMB 3.77 billion  
(approximately US$540 million), and additional profit of RMB 320 million 
(approximately US$46.2 million).399 The additional sales and profit indicate the 
tremendous economic value created by IP collateralization.  
C. Geographically unbalanced utilization of IP collateralization 
The SIPO reveals the top 10 provinces in the total amount of loans secured by patents 
and the top 10 provinces in the number of projects funded by using patents as 
collateral for the year of 2015.400 When we locate all the provinces in the maps below, 
we can see a significant geographic imbalance. While most IP collateralizations 
happen along the eastern coast, much fewer cases happen in Central or Western China.  

396 The data about 2013 and 2014 is collected from news report, available at: http://www.hfiplaw.cn/?p=2652 
(2015-03-09); the data about 2015 is collected from news report, available at: 
http://www.nipso.cn/onews.asp?id=30163 (2016-01-19). 
397 The SIPO sets goals in the Opinions on Further Promoting the Financial Services to Intellectual Property 
that, supra note 379 that the annual amount of loans secured by patents shall reach RMB 100 billion and IP 
collateralization shall become more routine and scale-up. The State Council sets goals in the Action Plan on 
Further Implementation of National Intellectual Property Strategy (2014-2020), State Council No.64 [2014], 
that the annual amount of loans secured by IP shall reach RMB 68.75 billion in 2013, RMB 75 billion in 
2015 and RMB 180 billion in 2020. 
398 The data is collected at the website of the SIPO, see SIPO, “The Total Amount of Loans Secured by 
Patents in 2015 Exceeded 56 Billion Yuan (2015ᒤу࡙ᵳ䍘ᣬ㶽䍴䠁仍ケ⹤ 560ӯݳ),” 2016-01-28, 
available at http://www.sipo.gov.cn/zscqgz/2016/201601/t20160128_1234421.html. 
399 Ibid. 
400 See the data in SIPO (2016),“The Total Amount of Loans Secured by Patents in 2015 Exceeded 56 
Billion Yuan (2015ᒤу࡙ᵳ䍘ᣬ㶽䍴䠁仍ケ⹤ 560ӯݳ),” supra note 398. 
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Graph 4.2 Top 10 provinces in the total amount of loans secured by patents in 2015 
 
Graph 4.3 Top 10 provinces in the number of projects funded with loans secured by patents in 2015 
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D. Under-utilization of IP collateralization 
Notwithstanding the spectacular growth in recent years, the practice of IP 
collateralization in China is still below expectation. Even with the supporting policies 
from the government, the banks still put risk-control the first and focus on the 
repayment capacity of IP mainly. 401  Almost all the banks that accept IP 
collateralization for SMEs keep their line of credit (LOC, i.e., the maximum loan 
balance that the lender permits the borrower to access or maintain) at a very low level. 
For example, in a bank’s internal Practice Guidance for IP collateralization, it 
explicates that the maximum LOC for innovation patents is 30% of the valuation, 
while 15% for utility mode patents, 30% for copyrights, 30% for “famous trademarks 
recognized by the SAIC” and 20% for other registered trademarks; and the pledge 
term shall be no more than 1 year in the usual case.402 The low LOC greatly increase 
the cost of IP collateralization for borrowers.403 
A survey was done by the SIPO in 2015 on the factors impeding individuals from 
profiting from technological creations. While 46.5% of the respondent firms reply “it 
takes too long from getting patents from the technologic outputs to actually producing 
the patented products can be sold in the market”, 45.3% of the respondent firms reply 
that the “lack of effective funding channels to support the financial needs for the 
follow-up production” is still the main factor “obstructing enterprises from making 
profits from technological innovations”.404 The data in 2012 shows that, only 3438 out 
of the total 3508561 patents in force, a percentage of less than 0.1%, have been used 
as collateral. 405  Such a low percentage shows a clear under-utilization of IP 
collateralization and implies a serious waste of economic value in IP.  

401  See Zhou Yi, “We Promote Market–Driven IP Pledge Financing Mode”–An Interview with Liu 
Zhengang, Director of the Beijing IP Office,” China Intellectual Property Magazine, May 5, 2010, available 
at http://www.chinaipmagazine.com/en/journal-show.asp?id=568 (explaining that, in most cases, the IP 
holders are reluctant to use their IP for loans due to concerns about costs of IP collateralization, and financial 
institutions are not willing to accept IP as collateral because of concerns about risks related to IP 
collateralization). 
402 Note: for confidentiality reasons, the author is prohibited from directly revealing the inner information 
source.  
403 Reading together with the Section 2.4.1.1. 
404 SIPO, ഭᇦ⸕䇶ӗᵳተ㿴ࡂਁኅਨˈഭᇦ⸕䇶ӗᵳተ⸕䇶ӗᵳਁኅ⹄ウѝᗳ, Survey Report on 
Chinese Patent Data of 2015 (2015 ᒤ ѝ ഭ у ࡙ 䈳 ḕ ᮠ ᦞ ᣕ ੺ ˅ , 2016, 
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/tjxx/yjcg/201607/P020160701584633098492.pdf at 16. 
405 The total number of valid patents in 2012 is from the SIPO’s annual patent report of 2012, available at 
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/tjxx/jianbao/year2012/c/c1.html. 
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E. Summary of the national policies and legal documents on IP collateralization 
Many other factors might be accounted as the causes for the limited success in the 
practical operation of IP collateralization as well, such as, the immaturity of the 
markets for IP transactions, the absence of effective and reliable IP valuation criteria, 
the lack of experts in related sectors and the weakness in laws and regulations 
regarding related issues.406 Among these possible obstacles, we take the last one, i.e., 
the problems in law, as the subject of our further examination below. 
All the currently effective legal documents and national policies on IP collateralization 
in China can be summarized as follows, 
  

406 See Li Siqi (哾ഋཷ), “On the Barriers of Pawning Finance of Intellectual Property Right and the 
Corresponding Solutions (⸕䇶ӗᵳ䍘ᣬ㶽䍴Ⲵ䳌⺽৺ަݻᴽ),” Retical Exploration (⨶䇪᧒㍒) 4 (2008): 
139; Yanchao (ᶘᔦ䎵) Yang, No Title (Beijing: Law Press China (⌅ᖻࠪ⡸⽮), 2008) at 120-122. 
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Year Name of document Status Applicable rules 
1995 Security Law407 Law Article 75, 79 and 
80, and the Section 
for “pledge of 
movables” 
2007 Property Law Law Article 223(5), 
Article 227, and the 
Section for “pledge 
of movables” 
2010 Copyright Law (2010 revision) Law Article 26 
2010 Detailed Rules for the Implementation of 
the Patent Law (2010 revision) 
Departmental 
Regulation, by the SIPO 
Article 14 
2009 Regulation on the Procedures for the 
Registration of Pledge Rights in 
Exclusive Rights to Use Registered 
Trademarks408  
Departmental 
Regulation, by the SAIC 
Entire regulation 
2010 Measures for the Registration of Pledge 
of Patent Rights409 
Departmental 
Regulation, by the SIPO 
Entire regulation 
2011 Measures for the Registration of Pledge 
Rights of Copyrights410 
Departmental 
Regulation, by the 
NCAC 
Entire regulation 
2006 Outline of National Medium- and 
Long-Term Development Plan on Science 
and Technology (2006-2020) 
National guiding policy, 
by the State Council 
Paragraph 5 of 
Section 8 
2008 Outline of the National Intellectual 
Property Strategy 
National guiding policy, 
by the State Council 
Clause 12 
2006 Guiding Opinions of the China Banking 
Regulatory Commission for Commercial 
Banks to Improve and Strengthen Financial 
Services to High-Tech Enterprises  
Implementation policy, 
by the CBRC 
Article 10 
2007 Guiding Opinions on the Banks’ Granting 
of Credits to Small Enterprises  
Implementation policy, 
by the CBRC 
Article 14 
2010 Notice on Strengthening the Intellectual 
Property Pledge Finance and Evaluation 
Management to Support the Development 
of Small-and Medium-sized Enterprises 
Implementation policy, 
by the Ministry of 
Finance, the MIIT, the 
CBRC, the SIPO, the 
SAIC and the NCAC 
Entire regulation 
2013 Guiding Opinions for Commercial 
Banks on Operating IP collateralization 
Implementation policy, 
by the CBRC 
Entire regulation 
2015 Opinions on Further Promoting the 
Financial Services to Intellectual Property 
Implementation policy, 
by the SIPO 
Entire regulation 

407 Note: as the Property Law of 2007 did not wholly replace or abolish the Security Law of 1995, both of 
them are in force now and the provisions in the Property Law prevail in the case of conflicts, see Article 178, 
Property Law. 
408 Regulation on the Procedures for the Registration of Pledge Rights in Exclusive Rights to Use 
Registered Trademarks (⌘޼୶ḷу⭘ᵳ䍘ᵳⲫ䇠〻ᒿ㿴ᇊ), promulgated by the No.182 SAIC Order of 
2009 on January 1, 2009 and came into force on December 1, 2009 (D.R.). 
409 Measures for the Registration of Pledge of Patent Rights (у࡙ᵳ䍘ᣬⲫ䇠࣎⌅), promulgated by the 
No. 56 of SIPO Order on August 26, 2010 and came into force on October 1, 2010 (D.R.). 
410 Measures for the Registration of Pledge Rights of Copyright (㪇֌ᵳ䍘ᵳⲫ䇠࣎⌅), promulgated by 
the No. 8 of NCAC Order of 2010 on November 25, 2010 and came into force on January 1, 2011 (D.R.). 
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It can be seen from the summary that, at the legislative level, China has not yet set up 
an independent and unified system of rules for IP collateralization. Currently, the rules 
regarding IP collateralization in China are scattered among various laws, mainly the 
Property Law of 2007, and the three implementing departmental administrative 
regulations governing the registration of pledge in patents, trademarks and copyrights. 
The CBRC’s Guiding Opinions for Commercial Banks on Operating IP 
collateralization (hereafter “CBRC’s Guiding Opinion”) is a policy guidance 
document, not a mandatory legislative document. However, in Chinese practice, it 
directly guides and regulates the operation of banks and does determine the practical 
operation as well. Therefore, we will also refer to it when it is relevant in our 
following analysis.  
4.2.2 Creation 
4.2.2.1 Transaction structure 
Currently, Chinese law allows various security devices, including guarantee (bao 
zheng), charge (Di ya), pledge (zhi ya), lien (liu zhi), mortgage (rang yu dan bao), 
deposit (ding jin) and retention of title (suo you quan bao liu). Among these security 
devices, “pledge” is expressly stipulated as the only security device that can be used to 
create security interests in IP.411 In comparison with the previous Security Law of 1995, 
subjecting all secured transactions in movables to the same security device is also one 
of the most important improvements in the Property Law of 2007. The collateral can 
be provided by the debtor or a third party, so the pledgor can be different from the 
debtor. In the following discussion, we mainly discuss the situation where the pledgor 
is also the debtor.  
The current Chinese rules indeed make a distinction between the creation and the 
perfection of security interests in IP. With a careful comparison of the text of the 
Security Law of 1995 with that of the Property Law of 2007, we can find that the 

411 In Chinese law, “pledge” is essentially a possession-based security device for tangible movables. The 
pledgor/debtor transfers the possession of his movables to the pledgee/creditor as a security for debt. If the 
pledgor/debtor defaults, the pledgee/creditor is entitled to enjoy priority in having his claims satisfied with 
the proceeds of auction or sale of the pledged collateral. See Art. 208 of the Property Law; formerly Art. 63 
of the Security Law. In the current Chinese Property Law, all kinds of movable assets, tangible and 
intangible, present and future, are governed under a unitary security device the “pledge” and the same rules 
apply, except for limited exceptions. Art. 223 (5) of the Property Law expressly stipulated that “pledge” is 
the only security device for creating security interests in IP. 
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subject to registration in the designated public registry has changed from the “pledge 
contract” to the “pledge right”.  
Year Legal document Content 
1995 Security Law Art. 79 […]: The written pledge contract shall enter into effect as 
from the date of registration. 
2007 Property Law Art. 227 (1): A pledge right [in IP] shall be created upon the 
registration with the competent authority.  
As the Property Law changes the expression from “a pledge contract enters into effect” 
to “a pledge right is created”, it has clarified that the registration is only a pre-requisite 
for creating the pledge right, which has the in rem effect against all the third parties 
(the third-party effectiveness - perfection purpose), not a statutory requirement for 
making the pledge contracts effective between the parties anymore.412 This change of 
the subject to registration is also reflected at the names of the administrative 
departmental regulations.413  
Therefore, in the current law, a formal written pledge contract is sufficient to establish 
the in personam relationship and make the security interest effective between the 
parties (creation purpose).  
4.2.2.2 Scope of IP eligible for collateralization 
A. General requirements: property rights in legally assignable IP 
For the scope of IP eligible for being collateral, Art. 223 (5) of the Property Law 

412 At the first glance, someone may think, under the Property Law, registration is still imposed as a 
prerequisite for the creation of security rights (effective between parties). However, such an initial impression 
is caused by the divergence in terminologies. In accordance with the traditional “real rights” (wu quan) theory 
in Chinese law, a pledge right is a real right with in rem effect against all third parties and permits the 
secured creditor to be paid out in preference to competing claimants  (this is the same as making the security 
interest effective against third parties). A pledge contract itself establishes a contractual in personam 
relationship between the parties only (this is the same as making the security interest effective between the 
parties). 
413 For copyright, the Measures for the Registration of Copyrights Pledge Contracts of 1996 is changed into 
the Measures for the Registration of Pledge Rights of Copyright of 2011; for patents, the Interim Measures 
for the Registration of Patent Rights Pledge Contracts of 1996 is changed into Measures for the Registration 
of Pledge of Patent Rights of 2010.  
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removes the ambiguity in Art. 75 (3) of the Security Law,414 by stipulating as follows, 
Art. 223 [The Scope of Rights Eligible for Pledge] 
The following rights of which an obligor or a third party has the right to 
disposition can be pledged: 
 […] 
 (5) Property rights in the exclusive rights to use registered trademarks,415 patent 
rights and copyrights and other intellectual property that are assignable according 
to laws. 
Except for restricting “trademarks” to “registered trademarks”, the Property Law 
actually sets only minimal requirements on the eligibility of collateral, namely, 
property rights in (all kinds of) IP that are legally assignable.416 It seems that this 
flexible approach can cover IP to the maximum extent and avoid conflicting with IP 
laws. Whether a specific property right in an IP can be encumbered as collateral or not 
will be determined by a combined reading with relevant IP laws to check if such a 
right is independently assignable.  
However, in practice, the lack of coordination among rules makes the determination of 
the scope of IP eligible for collateralization in China much more complicated. We 
hereby use the following three examples to demonstrate the complexity: whether the 

414 With regard to the scope of IP eligible for collateralization, Art. 75 (3) of the Security Law only 
mentioned the three basic types of IP, i.e., trademark, patent and copyright. For a long time scholars were 
unable to reach a consensus on whether other unmentioned types of IP could be encumbered as collateral in 
the legal regime of China. Some scholars argued that other types of IP may be permitted to be encumbered 
by reference to “other rights that may be pledged” under Art. 75(4) of the Security Law. The great majority 
of scholars and practitioners, however, tended to favor the opposite position. It is well exemplified by the 
fact that these un-mentioned types of IP had rarely been encumbered as collateral in secured transactions in 
practice. See Lv Yu'e (੅⦹ၕ) “Investigation on Legal Issues of Trademark Collateral (᧒䇘୶ḷᵳ䍘ᣬѻ
⴨ޣ⌅ᖻ䰞仈),” in Intellectual Property Rights Strategy and Practice - Third Series (⸕䇶ӗᵳᡈ⮕оᇎ࣑
-ㅜ 3䗁), ed. Yu Zehui (Ҿ⌭䖹) (Beijing: Law Press-China ѝഭ⌅ᖻࠪ⡸⽮, 2008), at 70. 
415 In Chinese law, a trademark holder is vested with “exclusive right to use a trademark” (Shang biao zhuan 
yong quan). This exclusive right enables the holder to mark the sign “registered trademark” on its goods and 
related commercial activities, and to exclude others from using a mark that is likely to cause consumer 
confusions (Article 9 (2), Trademark Law of 2001; and Article 3, Implementing Regulation of Trademark 
Law). The “exclusive right to use a trademark” is considered as being narrower in scope than the terms of 
“trademark right” or “exclusive right” used in international treaties or laws in other jurisdictions. See Zheng 
Chengsi (䜁ᡀᙍ), Intellectual Property Law: Several Research Focuses at the Beginning of the New Century 
(⸕䇶ӗᵳ⌅:ᯠц㓚ࡍⲴ㤕ᒢ⹄ウ䟽⛩) (Beijing: Law Press (⌅ᖻࠪ⡸⽮), 2004) at 19. 
416 Some scholars argue that there are three preconditions for IP being used as collateral: (1) being property 
rights; (2) being legally assignable and (3) can be registered with the competent authority. See, e.g., Wang 
Chun (⦻᱕), “Several Issues on Pledge on Trademark Rights (୶ḷᵳ䍘ᣬ㤕ᒢ䰞仈),” China Trademark 
(ѝॾ୶ḷ) 2 (2006): 55 at 55. This argument actually confuses the preconditions of creation of the security 
rights with its practical possibility. The lack of corresponding registry is a problem for the practical 
implementation but not a legislative precondition for the creation of security interests. 
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moral rights in copyrights are eligible for collateralization, the treatment of rights 
under IP license agreements; and the use of future IP as collateral.  
a. Moral rights in copyrights 
First, as the IP laws are very different from the traditional property law, some legal 
experts who are specialized in IP law but not so familiar with property law, or the 
other way around, may not be able to be sure about the assignability of a specific IP 
right.  
We hereby use the discussion on whether the moral rights in copyrights are eligible for 
collateralization to demonstrate the complexity. Some leading experts in IP law argue 
that “moral rights are not chai chan quan and thus cannot be used as collateral.”417 
And a scholar in secured transaction laws agrees with this argument. 418  Their 
argument is based on the following two provisions. 
Legal document Content 
Copyright Law Art. 10: An original creator is entitled with both moral rights (ren shen quan) 
and economic rights (chai chan quan). 
Property Law Art. 223 (5): Property rights (chai chan quan) in […] copyrights […] may be 
pledged. 
The argument is actually caused by the confusion of two legal concepts, namely, 
“moral rights” with “personal rights”. Despite both terms being closely associated with 
the protected person’s reputation and thus overlapping to some extent in scope, they 
are terms of different sub-fields of law and hence not identical. 
 “Moral rights” (from the French droit moral) is a term used in the IP laws, as 
opposed to the term of “economic rights” (Chai chan quan in Chinese). Standing in the 
tradition inherited from the French dualistic model, the Chinese Copyright Law 
distinguishes moral rights (including the rights to publication, authorship, alteration 
and integrity) from economic rights (including the rights to reproduction, distribution, 
lease, exhibition, performance, projection, broadcasting, information network 

417 See Wu Handong(੤≹ь) et al., Study on the Legal Regimes of Copyright in Several Western Countries 
(㾯ᯩ䈨ഭ㪇֌ᵳࡦᓖ⹄ウ) (Beijing: China University of Political Science and Law, 1998) at 218; 
418 See Fei Anling (䍩ᆹ⧢) Fei, Comparative Security Law: Take Security Laws in Germany, France, 
Switzerland, Italy and China as Study Objects (∄䖳ᣵ؍⌅-ԕᗧഭǃ⌅ഭǃ⪎༛ǃ᜿བྷ࡙ǃ㤡ഭ઼ѝഭᣵ
؍⌅Ѫ⹄ウሩ䊑) (Beijing: China University of Political Science and Law, 2004) at 408. 
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dissemination, production, adaptation, translation, compilation and other related 
rights).419 The moral rights are given to an author for keeping the author’s relationship 
with its work and enabling the author to protect his personal and reputational value 
upon the work.420 While moral rights in most cases are inalienable, some moral rights, 
like the right to publication (in works like computer software, diagrams of project 
design, drawings of product design and maps) can be waived or be assigned by the 
author in exchange for monetary payment in certain cases.421 Those assignable moral 
rights can be used as collateral. 
By contrast, “personal rights” is a term used in the general property law, as opposed to 
the term of “property rights” (chai chan quan in Chinese). It refers to rights that a 
person has over its own body or reputation, which are absolutely inalienable from the 
protected person.422 Of course, a personal right cannot be used as collateral.  
Their relationships and difference can be shown as follows: 
IP law Moral rights 
(some are assignable) 
Economic rights (chai chan quan) 
 
Property law Personal rights 
(non-assignable) 
Property rights (chai chan quan) 
However, as both the term “economic rights” in IP law and the term “property rights” 
in the general property law are expressed as “chai chan quan” in Chinese, legal 
experts specialized in one legal field only may not be able to appreciate the distinction. 

419 The economic rights in a copyrighted work are explicitly assignable (by license or assignment) in part or 
as a whole. See Article 10, Copyright Law of 2010. 
420 Article 6 bis, Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works; Article 5, World 
Performers and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT). 
421 The current Chinese Copyright Law just prescribes that the economic rights of a copyright are permitted 
to be authorized or be wholly or partly assigned by the copyright holder to others, without specifying 
whether these moral rights are assignable or not. It is generally agreed that moral rights in most works are 
inalienable. The limitation on the assignability of moral rights mainly aims at protecting the authors’ 
reputations and avoiding the disruption of social orders. However, as to works like computer software and 
graphic works (such as diagrams of project design, drawings of product design, maps and sketches as well as 
works of their model), the focus of copyright protection is on their commercial utility. For these works, the 
assignment of moral rights would not adversely affect the public interest and therefore are allowed in China 
in certain cases, See Article 8, Regulation on the Protection of Computer Software; Article 16(2), Copyright 
Law of 2010. Some scholars also argue that the right to publication in all kinds of works are assignable and 
therefore can be used as collateral. See Che Hui (䖖䖹) and Li Min (ᵾ᭿), On New Issues in the Legal 
Regime of Secured Transactions (ᣵ؍⌅ᖻࡦᓖᯠ䰞仈⹄ウ) (Beijing: Law Press China (⌅ᖻࠪ⡸⽮), 
2005) at 184. 
422 See Sam Ricketson and Jane Ginsburg, International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights: The Berne 
Convention and Beyond (Volumn 1), 2nd Editio (Oxford University Press, 2006) at para 10.01. 
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When they mistakenly equate “economic rights” in IP law with the “property rights” in 
property law, they may equate their counterparts, namely, the moral rights and 
personal rights. The misconception can lead to a jump to the flawed conclusion that 
“moral rights are not property rights and thus cannot be used as collateral”. 
This misconception shows that a combined reading of IP law and secured transaction 
law (or the general property law) is much more complicated than it looks and can give 
rise to lots of legal uncertainty.  
b. Trademarks 
Second, sometimes IP laws impose additional requirements for the assignment. In 
China, registered trademarks can be dissociated from the related business or goodwill 
attached to it and therefore can be used as collateral. However, any assignment of 
registered trademark must be approved by the Trademark Office.423 When assigning a 
registered trademark, the assignor (also the registered owner of the trademark) shall 
also assign the similar trademarks that he owns on the identical category of commodity, 
or the identical or similar trademarks on the similar category of commodity, in order to 
avoid of causing confusions to the public; otherwise, the Trademark Office can refuse 
to approve the assignment.424 The departmental regulation for the registration of 
pledge in trademark and CBRC’s Guiding Opinion also stipulate that, when providing 
loans backed by trademarks, the banks shall require the pledgor to pledge the identical 
or similar trademarks in identical or similar products or services as well.425  
B. Treatment of rights under IP license agreements 
The Chinese Property Law does not make any distinction between different types of IP, 
types of debtors, as well as forms of interest. It seems that all rights of IP holders or 
rights under the IP licenses can be used as collateral. Nevertheless, the conflicts among 
rules from different documents easily destroy such a harmonious picture. 
a. Licensor’s right to royalty payment 
In Chinese law, after an IP has been pledged, the pledgor/debtor, who is also the IP 

423 Article 42, Trademark Law (2013). 
424 Article 42, Trademark Law (2013). 
425 Article 3, Trademark Pledge Regulation of 2009; Article 23, Guiding Opinions for Commercial Banks on 
Operating IP collateralization, supra note 378. 
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holder, cannot assign or license the pledged IP, unless with express consent from the 
pledgee/secured creditor.426 In the case with the pledgee/secured creditor’s consent, 
the royalties arising from assigning or licensing the pledged IP (post-royalties) are 
treated as proceeds and therefore are automatically covered by the pledge and should 
be used to fulfill the principal obligation in advance or be held in escrow with a 
competent authority.427 The post-royalties cannot be used as independent collateral.  
By contrast, in the case where an IP holder/licensor wants to use its right to royalty 
payment (pre-royalties) as collateral, the pre-royalties shall be considered as account 
receivables,428 a category of rights different from IP.429 In this case, the rules for the 
pledge of account receivables instead of those for the pledge of IP should apply. The 
security interests in pre-royalties should be registered with a separated specific registry 
for account receivables, not an IP-specific registry. The right to collect receivables is 
perfected by registration with the Credit Reference Center (a national information 
system established by the People’s Bank).430 It is allowed to create multiple pledges 
on receivables with the priority order established by the time of registration.431 
b. Licensee’s interests in license 
In the Guiding Opinions for Commercial Banks on Operating IP collateralization, the 
CBRC specifically instructs the commercial banks that “in the case where licensees 
create a pledge, the consent from the original IP holder or the licensor is required.”432 
This instruction implies that the CBRC, as the state administrative department of the 
banks, does allow banks to accept licensee’s use of interests in license as collateral. 
However, all of the three departmental registration regulations require that the pledgor 

426 Article 227 (2), Property Law. 
427 Article 80, Security Law; Article 227 (2), Property Law. See Wang (2006) at 56. 
428 The right to collect receivables is newly added in the Property Law as intangible property which can be 
pledged. See Article 223 (6) and 228, Property Law; Article 4(1), Measures for the Registration of Pledge of 
Receivables (ᓄ᭦䍖Ⅾ䍘ᣬⲫ䇠࣎⌅), promulgated by PBC No. 4 Order [2007] on September 30, 2007 and 
came into force on October 1, 2007 (D.R.).  
429 Article 223 of the Property Law (Scope of Rights Eligible for Pledge), IP is governed under 223 (5) and 
receivables are governed under 223(6). See also Bu (2010) at 349. 
430 Article 2, Measures for the Registration of Pledge of Receivables. The registry for the registration of 
pledge of receivables is the Credit Reference Center of the People’s Bank of China (ѝഭӪ≁䬦㹼ᖱؑѝ
ᗳ).  
431 Article 5, Measures for the Registration of Pledge of Receivables. 
432 Article 8, Guiding Opinions for Commercial Banks on Operating IP collateralization, supra note 378. 
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in registration should be the “recorded title-holder” of the IP to be pledged.433 As a 
licensee cannot be the “recorded title-holder” of an IP in the Chinese law, this 
registration requirement makes it impossible for a licensee to have a security interests 
with third-party effectiveness in its interests in the authorization to exploitation, even 
with express consent from the licensor.434 
This prohibition might come from the dogmatic distinctions between the rights in legal 
theory. In Chinese IP laws, “rights in IP” refers only to rights enjoyed by IP owners, 
excluding the licensee’s interests in the authorization to exploit IP owned by another 
party.435 In this case, a licensee’s interests in the authorization to exploit someone 
else’s IP is deemed as a kind of contractual claim created by the license agreement 
between the licensor and the licensee. Similarly, other contractual rights enjoyed by 
parties under license agreements are not considered as rights in IP either. Meanwhile, 
in current Chinese law whether a contractual claim can be used as collateral for credit 
or not is still unclear.436  
In summary, although the licensee’s use of an IP license as collateral is allowed under 
the Real Rights Law and by the CBRC, it cannot be done in practice because of the 
registration rules. In this end, it is practically impossible for IP right holders rather 
than the IP owners to use their rights in IP to get finance.  
C. Future IP  
Similarly, the current Chinese Property Law accepts the use of future assets as 
collateral.437 The CBRC also encourages commercial banks to do so. In the Guiding 

433 Article 8, Regulation on the Procedures for the Registration of Pledge Rights in Exclusive Rights to Use 
Registered Trademarks of 2009; Article 12 (1), Measures for the Registration of Pledge of Patent Rights of 
2010; Article 12, Measures for the Registration of Pledge of Copyright of 2011. 
434 In theory, if the creditor does not want to register its security interest for the third-party effectiveness, 
there is a legal obstacle to just create security interest in a licensee’s right to exploitation, which is effective 
between the parties only. But this creation is meaningless for the purpose of security interests. 
435 See Zhong Qing (䫏䶂), On Pledge of Rights (ᵳ࡙䍘ᵳ⹄ウ) (Beijing: Law Press China (ेӜ:⌅ᖻࠪ
⡸⽮), 2004) at 259.  
436 Some Chinese scholars argue that a general contractual claim can be used as collateral, see e.g. Che and 
Li (2005), On New Issues in the Legal Regime of Secured Transactions (ᣵ؍⌅ᖻࡦᓖᯠ䰞仈⹄ウ), supra 
note 421 at 193-204. 
437 However, some scholars do still think the pledge cannot be created over future or after-acquired property, 
see, for example, Hu Kaizhong (㜑ᔰᘐ), Studies on Pledge over Rights (ᵳ࡙䍘ᵳࡦᓖ⹄ウ) (Beijing: 
Chinese University of Politics and Law Press (ѝഭ᭯⌅བྷᆖࠪ⡸⽮), 2004) at 152 (arguing that the pledge 
cannot be created over future or after-acquired property because the nature and extent of future property has 
not been determined). This thesis does not agree with this opinion. Despite the fact that there is no clear 
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Opinions for Commercial Banks on Operating IP collateralization, it stipulates that 
“in the pledge of patents, the commercial banks can require the pledgor to promise to 
pledge the future improved patents as well; […] in the pledge of copyrights, the 
commercial banks can require the pledgor to pledge the existing or future copyrights 
in the revisions or derivative works as well”. 438  However, the departmental 
registration regulations put a different level of restrictions for different kinds of IP 
which obstruct the practical applications. 
For copyrights, as neither the Copyright Law nor the departmental registration 
regulation has imposed any impediment, the pledge of copyright in future works has 
been exercised in practice. For example, in May 2008, the Bank of Beijing offered the 
Beijing Time Co. Ltd a RMB 10 million loan for the production and distribution of the 
movie “Painted Skin”, with taking the future copyrights of the movie “Painted Skin” 
(Hua Pi) as collateral.439 Some other transactions backed by future copyrights were 
paid off in due time as well.440 
However, for patents and trademarks, despite there being no explicit prohibition in 
Patent Law or Trademark Law, the departmental registration regulations impose 
requirements on a specific reference with the registration number of each patent or 
trademark to be pledge.441 Such requirements make it impossible to have a security 
interest with third-party effectiveness in future patents or trademarks (see detailed 
discussion in Section 4.2.2.3). Therefore, even a bank, by following the guidance from 
the CBRC, requires the pledgor to make a promise of pledging the future patents over 

provision in the Security Law or the Property Law regarding security interests in future assets, the explicit 
permissions for two kinds of secured transactions involving future assets or rights, namely, the floating 
charge in movable property (Article 181 Floating Charge) and the pledge of receivables (Article 223 Subject 
to Pledge of Rights) can be considered as a kind of implied acceptance of use of future assets for credits. See 
also Joshua T. Klein, “Recent Legal Changes That Affect Secured Financing in the People’s Republic of 
China,” American Bankruptcy Institute Journal 27, no. 10 (2008): 38 at 39. 
438 Article 23, Guiding Opinions for Commercial Banks on Operating IP collateralization, supra note 378. 
439 “The Cultural Creation Loans of Beijing Bank Have No Bad Debts, Painted Skin Paid Back 100 Million 
on Time˄ेӜ䬦㹼᮷ॆࡋ᜿䍧Ⅾ⋑ᴹൿ䍖 ǉ⭫ⳞǊ亪࡙䘈䍧 1000зݳ ,˅” Beijing Commerce ˄ेӜ
୶ ᣕ ˅ , October 16, 2011, available at 
http://www.cmc.gov.cn/cms/a/xinwenzhongxin/chanyexinwen/2011/1016/3685.html.  
440 For example, in 2007, one of the largest private entertainment groups in China, the Huayi Brothers Media 
Corporation, used the future copyrights in TV shows as collateral to get loans from Beiing Bank (Chaoyang 
Branch) for the money to produce 10-14 shows. All transactions paid off in due time. See Weiwei(䎥ՏՏ) 
Zhao, “The Cultural Banks Should Solve the Dilemna for Copyright Pledge (᮷ॆ䬦㹼䴰䀓⡸ᵳ䍘ᣬѻ
ഠ),”Beijing Daily (ेӜᰕᣕ), May 14, 2014, http://bjrb.bjd.com.cn/html/2014-05/14/content_178825.htm. 
441 Article 3 and 5(4), Trademark Pledge Regulation of 2009; Article 9 (4), Patent Pledge Regulation of 
2010. 
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improved innovations, such a promise is effective only between the parties and cannot 
be used against any third parties. To protect its own interests, the bank has to make 
another new pledge registration immediately after the improved innovations are 
granted with patents. In the case where the bank fails to do so, if the pledgor breaches 
its promise and pledges the new patents for another loan, the bank cannot claim its 
interests in the new patents directly against the new secured creditor. In practice, there 
are only cases about the creation of pledge rights in future copyrights.442 
For the right to a patent application, although Patent Law expressly acknowledges its 
assignability,443 the departmental registration regulation explicitly excludes it from 
being used for pledge. Both the 1997 and the 2010 regulations on the registration of 
pledge in patents uniformly stipulate that “for a patent application that has not been 
granted with a patent right, the SIPO shall disapprove the registration of pledge”.444 
An explanatory document promulgated by SIPO, entitled How to Make the 
Registration of Patent Pledge Contracts, explains that “[e]ven though the right to a 
patent application is the precondition for acquiring a patent and assignable under the 
current law, the obvious lack of certainty in law makes it unable to be a property right 
with legal validity.”445 Some scholar explained that the “obvious lack of certainty in 
law” here refers to the high risks associated with the disapproval of the application.446 
As a result, in the end, only future copyrights can and have been used as collateral in 
China. 
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442 See the cases in supra note 439 and 440. 
443 According to Article 13 of the Chinese Patent Law of 2008, during the period of application - after the 
publication of patent application and before the grant of a patent - the applicant is already entitled to give 
license and require the entity or individual who wants to exploit the invention to pay an appropriate fee. The 
right to apply for a patent is of intrinsically economic value and explicitly allows to be assigned to others by 
virtue of law (Article 10, Patent Law of 2008). As a result, according to the Property Law, the right to patent 
application is supposed to be eligible for collateralization.  
444 Article 12 (3), Measures for the Registration of Pledge of Patent Rights of 2010. 
445 Article 3, Forth Section,  How to Make the Registration of Patent Pledge Contracts (ྲօ࣎⨶у࡙ᵳ
䍘ᣬਸ਼ⲫ䇠), promulgated by the Patent Market Bureau of Patent Work Management Department at 
National Patent Office of SIPO, May 9, 2006, available at: 
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/sipo2008/xtgls/bszn/200901/t20090106_437152.html (stipulating that “[T]he 
subjects to a pledge (of patent) shall be assignable property rights deriving from granted patents. […] Even 
though the right to a patent application is the precondition of acquiring a patent and assignable under the 
current law, the obvious lack of certainty in law makes it cannot be a property right with legal validity. The 
right to application therefore cannot be utilized as collateral to secure debts”). 
446 See Che and Li (2005), On New Issues in the Legal Regime of Secured Transactions (ᣵ؍⌅ᖻࡦᓖᯠ䰞
仈⹄ウ), supra note 421 at 181. 
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4.2.2.3 Specific description of encumbered IP in security agreements 
The Property Law has just imposed minimum requirements on the formality and 
content of the security agreement. In respect of the formality, the pledge contract is 
only required to be in writing, as either a pledge clause in the principal contract or an 
independent pledge contract.447 In respect of the content, there is no mandatory 
requirement on the clauses. Parties of a security agreement are free to decide what to 
be included in the pledge contract. The law only provides some non-mandatory rules 
to suggest that parties should specify information about the encumbered collateral for 
reducing legal uncertainty.448 
As these non-mandatory rules remind parties about important matters, they allow 
parties to negotiate terms on their needs and leave room for a general description of 
the IP to be encumbered, which makes the creation of “an all-asset security right” or 
“floating pledge”, or the creation of security interests over after-acquired assets 
feasible.449 Accordingly, the three departmental regulations have also reduced the 
statutory requirements on clauses in pledge contracts.450 
However, while the departmental regulation for copyrights retains these flexible 
clauses in the Property Law as non-mandatory,451 the departmental regulations for 
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447 Article 210 (1), Property Law. This is a general rule for the pledge of movables, which is also apply to the 
pledge of rights, including IP. Article 229, Property Law. 
448 Art. 210 of the Property Law provides:  
“A pledge contract generally includes the following clauses: 
(1) the type and amount of the obligation to be secured; 
(2) the time limit for the debtor to fulfill obligation; 
(3) the name, quantity, quality, condition of the pledged assets; 
(4) the scope secured by the pledge;” 
449 See Klein (2008) “Recent Legal Changes That Affect Secured Financing in the People’s Republic of 
China,” supra note 437 at 39. Note, regarding the secured scope of a pledge, the allowance for a general 
description of the obligation to be secured also makes it possible to secure future obligations up to a 
maximum amount, see Article 203-206, 229 and 222, Property Law. Unless otherwise stipulated in the 
pledge contract, a pledge covers the principal claim and its contractual or statutory interests, agreed default 
fines, damage claims, collateral-maintenance fees, and pledge-enforcement costs, see Article 21, Security 
Law; Article 173, Property Law. Regarding the default fine, see Article 114-116 Contract Law.  
450 Some previously compulsory clauses are no longer mandatory any more but subjects to the autonomy of 
parties concerned, such as, reasons and purposes of the pledge, the evaluation report provided by the 
trademarks evaluation organization appointed by the SAIC, see Article 5, Trademark Pledge Regulation of 
1997; the method of payment, the agreement on keeping the validity of the encumbered patent during the 
pledge duration and the liabilities of the grantor where a patent dispute is raised, see Article 7, Patent Pledge 
Regulation of 1996.  
451 The regulation for copyright retains these clauses in the Property Law as non-mandatory. Article 7 (4) of 
the Copyright Pledge Regulation of 2011 only provides that “A copyright pledge contract generally contains: 
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trademarks452 and patents transform them into mandatory rules asking for a specific 
description. For example, the regulation for patents requires the pledge contract to 
include: “the total quantity of the patents to be pledged; a specific description of each 
underlying patent, including at least: the name, the registration number, the date of 
application, the date of authorization proclamation.453 Failure to comply with any of 
these requirements makes the registration of the pledge impossible.  
The mandatory rules on specific description of IP to be pledged prevent parties from 
creating an all-asset pledge through merely describing the collateral as “all IP of the 
debtor” in the security agreement, or creating pledge rights in “future patents or 
trademarks”. That is also why in practice there are only cases about the creation of 
pledge rights in future copyrights.454 
4.2.2.4 Pre-default rights and obligations of debtors and secured creditors 
While the Property Law leaves most issues regarding the allocation of pre-default 
rights and obligations to the parties to decide freely in their security agreement, it also 
provides several mandatory rules and defaulted non-mandatory rules.  
A. Mandatory rules 
The mandatory rules mainly aim at helping secured creditor to protect their legitimate 
interests.  
a. Maintenance obligation and monitory right 
The Property Law generally grants pledgees/secured creditors the rights to monitor the 
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[…] (4) The content and protection term of the pledged copyright.” So, a general description of copyrights to 
be pledged is still allowed. That is why the creation of security interests in future copyrights is feasible in 
practice, see supra note 439 and 440. 
452 The regulation for trademarks expressly requires that the pledge contract should explicitly state the 
registration number of each trademark to be pledged. Article 5(4) of the Trademark Pledge Regulation of 
2009 just recommends that a pledge contract generally includes a detailed list with reference to the 
registration number, type and protection term of each encumbered trademark. This recommendation is not 
mandatory. However, Article 3 requires the parties to specify the register-number of each trademark to be 
pledged in the Application Form for Pledge Registration. And Article 4 (5) even requires the parties to 
provide a photocopy of the Registration Certificate for each trademark to be pledged.  
453 Article 9 (4), Patent Pledge Regulation of 2010. These matters are also specifically required by the 
Practical Notes on the Registration of Pledge of Patent Rights (у࡙ᵳ䍘ᣬⲫ䇠᡻㔝࣎⨶ᇎ࣑享⸕), issued 
by the SIPO, available at 
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/ztzl/ywzt/zlzydjyxkba/bszn/201507/t20150728_1151491.html.  
454 See the cases in supra note 439 and 440. 
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value maintenance of collaterals and to protect its own legitimate interests. 
Accordingly, when the encumbered IP is likely to suffer severe depreciation which can 
adversely affect the pledgee/secured creditor’s interests, the pledgee/secured creditor is 
entitled to take many actions, including demanding a deposit of the pledged IP, making 
an earlier discharge of the obligation with return of the property, asking for additional 
collaterals to cover the potential depreciation of the pledged IP, or, with the refusal of 
the pledgor/debtor, taking legal action to realize and secure the current value of the 
pledged IP by way of auction or private sale.455 In order to ensure that the secured 
creditors in patent-based transactions know the current statement of the pledged 
patents and can take active actions against depreciation in a timely manner, the 
specific departmental regulations even impose some obligations on the public 
authorities. The SIPO is required to instantly inform the pledgees in two cases: if the 
patentee or debtor fails to pay the annual fee for a pledged patent in time; or the 
pledged patent is annulled or terminated during the term of pledge.456 
b. No re-pledge 
However, some contractual freedoms given by the Property Law have been turned into 
mandatory prohibition in the registry practice. 
For example, the Property Law does not prohibit a pledgee from re-pledging the 
pledged collateral and leaves the matter for parties to decide in their pledge contracts. 
Article 217 of Property Law provides that, “if the pledgee re-pledges the collateral 
during the pledge term without the consent from the pledgor, such a re-pledge is 
invalid and the pledgee shall be liable for any loss, destruction or damage to the 
collateral arising from the sub-pledge.” Therefore, in the case with consent from the 
pledgor, a re-pledge by the pledgee should be feasible.457  
However, all the three registration regulations require that the pledgor in registration 
should be the “recorded title-holder” of the pledged IP.458 As a pledgee is not 
considered as the “recorded title-holder” of the pledged IP in Chinese law, this 
registration requirement makes it impossible for the pledgee/secured creditor to be the 

455 Article 215, 216 and 219, Property Law. 
456 Article 19 and 20, Patent Pledge Regulation of 2010. 
457 Article 217, Property Law.  
458 Article 12(1), Patent Pledge Regulation of 2010; Article 8(1), Trademark Pledge Regulation of 2009; 
Article 12(1), Copyright Pledge Regulation of 2011. 
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“pledgor of the re-pledge”, even with express consent from the debtor (who is the 
“pledgor of the first pledge” and also the recorded title-holder of the pledged IP). In 
the end, the creation of re-pledge is actually prohibited for all kinds of IP. 
c. No multiple pledges  
Similarly, while there is no explicit prohibition on the creation of multiple pledges on 
the same IP in the Property Law,459 it is strictly prohibited in the registry practice for 
patent-based transactions. The regulation for the registration of pledge of patents of 
2010 expressly stipulates that one of the pre-condition for the approval of registration 
is that there is no pre-existing and on-going pledge upon the patent to be pledged.460 It 
is not clear whether the creation of multiple pledges in trademarks or copyrights is 
allowed or not, because there is no such a prohibition in the registry regulations for 
pledge in trademarks and copyrights, nor any cases.  
B. Non-mandatory Rules 
Chinese law also incorporated some non-mandatory rules to facilitate the conclusion 
of transactions by increasing the efficiency and reducing transaction costs without 
interfering with the parties’ autonomy. These non-mandatory rules are set as default 
rules, which would apply when the security agreements are silent with regard to the 
relevant issues. They can be otherwise apportioned between the debtor and the secured 
creditor in the pledge contract.  
Some non-mandatory rules mainly aim at helping parties to reduce the policing cost. 
For example, the Property Law stipulates that a pledgor/debtor retains the right to 
exploit the pledged IP by himself but is not allowed to further assign or license the 
encumbered IP to others without the consent from the pledgee/secured creditor.461 In 
this way, the pledgee/creditor would always be informed if changes occurred to the 
pledged IP. However, this also means that the pledgor/debtor’s decision of making 
further assignment or license would be always conditional upon the creditor’s consent. 
In addition, the regulation for patents provides one more non-mandatory rule, which 

459 While the Property Law explicitly allows the creation of multiple mortgages (diya) on the same 
immovable (Article 199, Property Law), there is no such explicit allowance for the creation of multiple 
pledges on the same movables or intangible property. But there is no prohibition either.  
460 Article 12 (11), Patent Pledge Regulation of 2010. See the text in infra note 473. 
461 Article 227 (2), Property Law. 
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states that, without the consent of the secured creditor, the pledged patent may not be 
revoked or limited before the secured claims have been satisfied.462 This approach, on 
the one hand, allows the pledgee/secured creditor to police the current statement of the 
pledged patent through limiting the pledgor/debtor’s right to waive its patent. On the 
other hand, it avoids the danger of wasting expenses for the maintenance of worthless 
IP, by permitting to waive worthless IP with the consent of the pledgee/secured 
creditor.  
Furthermore, considering the possibility that some changes may happen to the validity 
and right-holder of the encumbered, the regulation for patents reminds parties to 
negotiate over issues about the “the payment of the annual fee of the encumbered 
patent during the pledge term; the assignments and the licenses for the exploitation of 
the patent right during the pledge term; the measures to be taken when the patent right 
is declared invalid or the ownership of the patent right changes; the delivery of 
correlative technical materials when the right of pledge is realized” and to explicitly 
write them into the pledge contract if necessary.463 464 
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462 Article 15 of the Patent Regulation of 2010 provides:“ During the pledge term of a patent, the SIPO shall 
disapprove the waiver of the patent right if the pledgor fails to provide evidentiary materials on the pledgee’s 
consent to his waiver of the right.” There is no such a non-mandatory rule like this for trademarks or 
copyrights. 
463 See Article 10, Patent Regulation of 2010.  
464 In practice, the banks are required by the CBRC’s Guiding Opinions for Commercial Banks on Operating 
IP collateralization (supra note 378) to include all these terms in the pledge contracts:  
Article 20 Commercial banks should sign a written pledge contract with the pledgor, clearly stating the 
name, content, protection term, ownership status (and relevant proof) of the IP to be pledged; the scope of 
pledge, the arrangement about pledge registration, the obligations of the pledgor, the enforcement 
mechanisms; as well the matters occurring during the pledge term, such as transfer and licensing of the 
pledged IP, as well as how to handle the revocation and invalidation of the pledged IP. 
Article 21 The pledge contract should specify the pledgor’s obligations on maintaining the integrity of 
pledged IP rights, including matters like providing the documents like the certificates of the pledged IP 
and ensuring that the information provided is genuine, accurate, complete and valid; shall require the 
pledgor to earnestly safeguard the validity of the pledged IP and prohibit the pledgor from waiving the 
pledged IP without consent from the plegee’s consent; shall require the pledgor to actively protect the 
pledged IP from the infringements from other parties, and to use the required compensation from 
infringements to pay back the secured debts first.  
Article 22 The pledge contract shall also specify the pledgor’s obligations on maintaining the validity of 
the pledge rights of the pledgee, including matters like no assignment or license of the pledged to other 
parties without the pledgee’s consent; the payment from assignment or license of the pledged IP shall be 
used to pay back the secured debt first; instantly informing the pledgee and taking actions when events 
that can have a substantially impact on the validity and economic value of the pledged IP occur; timely 
and sufficiently exploit the pledged patent when there is a possibility of being compulsorily licensed; 
shall stipulate that the license fee should be used to pay pack the secured debts in advance or be held in 
escrow when the pledged patent is compulsorily licensed.” 
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4.2.3 Perfection, Publicity and Priority  
For an IP, the Property Law stipulates that the pledge right, as a kind of “real rights” 
(wu quan) with third-party effectiveness, becomes effective with a proper registration 
in the corresponding IP-specific registry. 465  The approval of a registration is 
conditional upon a substantive scrutiny of comprehensive documents. 
4.2.3.1 IP-specific registry system 
Based on the civil law underlying rationale that the creation and enforcement of a 
security interest would affect the exercise and disposition of the ownership of the 
encumbered collateral, security interests are usually registered in the same 
title-registry as the collateral for keeping the integrity of the title records. Although the 
fragmentation in the registry system of China has been the subject of complaint for a 
long time,466 the Property Law did not consolidate these registries into a single unitary 
system. For now, there are more than fifteen movable collateral registries in China but 
without a general security registry.  
Similarly, there are multiple registries for IP. The security interests in each type of IP 
have to be perfected by registration at its corresponding title-based registry, 
respectively, the SIPO for patents, the CTMO for trademarks, and the NCAC for 
copyrights.467 As the Property Law remains vague, detailed rules for the registration 
of security rights are given under the departmental regulations promulgated by the 
three registries.  
This specialized approach may make it easier for the specialized competent authority 
to administer registry affairs or to give specific rules better suited to satisfy the 
specific requirements of each type of IP. However, it also gives many problems.  
First, the multiple registries give rise to high legal uncertainty and transaction costs. If 
one pledgor wants to use different kinds of IP as collateral, it has to make multiple 
registrations at different registries. Accordingly, other parties have to search at all 

465 Art. 227 (1), Property Law. 
466 Over the past thirty years since the beginning of the 1980s, China has developed multiple decentralized 
collateral registry systems specialized for specific types of assets, such as real estates, ships, airplanes, 
machinery, equipment, inventory and receivables. See Investment Advisory Services of the World Bank 
Group (2010), Secured Transactions Systems and Collateral Registries, supra note 266 at 105 
467 See Gervais (2007) “The TRIPS Agreement and the Changing Landscape of International Intellectual 
Property,” supra note 332. 
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registries to find out all encumbrances in the pledgor’s assets. As discussed above in 
Section 4.2.2.2 B, when an IP licensor wants to use its right to royalty payment 
(pre-royalties) as collateral, the registration has to be done with a different registry for 
“account receivables” subject to different regulations.  
Second, the lack of a general registry or general rules, makes it is impossible to using 
some IP as collateral in practice. Although Article 223 (5) of the Property Law clearly 
stipulates that “property rights in […] other intellectual property” can be pledged as 
well, other kinds of IP are rarely used as collateral in practice. For other types of IP 
with specialized title registry, such as new plant varieties, the difficulty is the absence 
of specific regulations guiding the registration of security interests thereof. For 
unregistered IP such as trade secrets, the problem is that there is nowhere to register 
the security interests. No cases have been found for the use of IP other than the three 
basic types as collateral in Chinese practice.  
4.2.3.2 A document-based registration with substantive scrutiny  
While the Property Law made major progress on simplifying the registry system, by 
allowing a notice registration and by eliminating the requirement of registering the 
security agreement,468 these departmental regulations for registering security interests 
in IP have not fully followed this legislative improvement.  
First, although the three departmental regulations have greatly simplified the 
registration process, they still require the submission of numerous documents, 
including at least the following,  
- the registration application form,  
- pledge contract (must indicate the names and addresses of all direct parties; the type 
and amount of the obligation to be secured; the time limit for the debtor to fulfill 
obligation, a specific description of each underlying IP, the scope secured by the 
pledge),  
- identity documents of the pledgor and the pledgee, and authorization letter (if 
applicable), 
- valuation report (if applicable), 
- and even the principal debt contract itself should be submitted for registration as 

468 See Investment Advisory Services of the World Bank Group (2010), Secured Transactions Systems and 
Collateral Registries, supra note 266 at 104. 
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well.469 
- the regulation for the pledge of copyrights even requires a submission of all the 
pre-existing license contracts.470  
- the regulation for the pledge of trademarks even requires a submission of photocopy 
of the registration certificate of each trademark to be pledged.471 
Second, only the registrations passing a comprehensive scrutiny of all the submitted 
documents can be approved.472 We hereby take the pledge of patents as an example to 
demonstrate the broad scope of scrutiny of the registry.  
Article 12, Measures for the Registration of Pledge of Patent Rights (October 1, 2010) 
[…] If any of the following cases is found with the scrutiny, the SIPO shall make the 
decision of “disapproving registration” and issue the “Notice Letter for Disapproving the 
Registration of Pledge of Patents”.  
(1) the pledgor is inconsistent with the “recorded title-holder” of the patent at the registry; 
(2) the patent has been terminated or has been declared to be void; 
(3) the patent application has not been granted with a patent yet; 
(4) the patent is delinquent on the annual fee payment; 
(5) the patent has been initiated with an invalidation proceeding; 
(6) the procedure for the pledge of patent is suspended, because there is an ownership 
dispute over the patent, or the People’s Court has ruled protective measures against the 
patent.  
(7) the maturity of the debt is beyond the validity period of the patent; 
(8) the pledge contract agrees that the ownership of the patent would be transferred to the 
pledgee if the debt is not discharged at its maturity; 
(9) the pledge contract does not comply with Article 9 of these Measures; 
(10) the pledge of a joint patent has not obtained the consent of all joint owners.  
(11) the patent has been applied for pledge registration and is still during the term of pledge; 
(12) any other situations that may cause disapproval of registration. 
We can see from the long list that the scrutiny not only concerns the form of the 
underlying documentations but also their substance, which covers a broad range of 
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469 Article 4, Trademark Pledge Regulation of 2009; Article 7, Patent Pledge Regulation of 2010; Article 6, 
Copyright Pledge Regulation of 2011.Although in the case regarding patents, the principal contract is not a 
compulsory document anymore, some information regarding the principal contract, such as name of principal 
contract, the creditor and the debtor, as well as the duration of principal obligation and the cause of pledge, 
are still required to be filled in the “application form for registration of the pledge right”. The application 
form for the registration shall be uniformly printed and provided by the SIPO, The application form available 
at: http://www.sipo.gov.cn/sipo2008/bgxz/zlqzybg/201010/P020101011588076254354.doc. 
470 Article 6(6), Copyright Pledge Regulation of 2010. 
471 Article 4 (5), Trademark Pledge Regulation of 2009 (requiring the parties to provide the photocopy of the 
Registration Certificate of each of each trademark to be pledged). 
472 Article 6 and 8, Trademark Pledge Regulation of 2009; Article 12, Patent Pledge regulation of 2010; 
Article 9 and 12, Copyright Pledge Regulation of 2011. 
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issues, including the validity of the underlying IP, the clauses of the security 
agreement, the pledgor’s rights to the underlying IP, and the pre-existing pledges.473  
Thirdly, as a consequence of the substantive scrutiny over so many factors, the 
registrations proceed very slowly. Although the departmental regulations set clear 
deadlines requiring that the scrutiny to be finished within 5 days for trademarks,474 7 
days for patents,475  and 10 days for copyrights,476  there are substantive delays 
between the application for registration and the actual registration. The delay can 
cause serious problems to the priority order. For patents or copyrights, a pledge 
becomes effective as of the approval of application for registration.477 Then even a 
diligent creditor that makes registration exactly on may still find out that its pledge 
cannot be effective against some subsequent creditors or assignees because its earlier 
registration application may be approved later than a subsequent registration 
application. The problem is slightly different in the case with trademarks, for which a 
pledge becomes effective upon the approval of registration but is retrospective to the 
day of application.478 Then a creditor cannot be completely sure about its priority 
order even after a completely diligent and accurate search at the CTMO, because some 
pledges or assignments may have happened before its search but have not yet been 
approved by the time of the search.  
4.2.3.3 Priority rules  
Upon the registration of the pledge in IP at the designated IP-specific registry, the 
secured creditor is granted the priority in receiving the repayment from the disposition 
of the pledged IP upon the debtor’s default, against all subsequent third parties. The 
sole criterion for determining the priority order is the time of registration; the 
knowledge of competing claimants is irrelevant. The Property Law allows a secured 
creditor to waive or subordinate his priority claim in the case without being against the 
legitimate interest of other third parties.479 There is hardly any discussion in literature 
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473 Article 8, Trademark Pledge Regulation of 2009; Article 12, Patent Pledge regulation of 2010; Article 12, 
Copyright Pledge Regulation of 2011.  
474 Article 6, Trademark Pledge Regulation of 2009. 
475 Article 11, Trademark Pledge Regulation of 2009. 
476 Article 9, Copyright Pledge Regulation of 2011. 
477 Article 12, Patent Pledge Regulation of 2010; Article 9, Copyright Pledge Regulation of 2011. 
478 Article 6 (1), Trademark Pledge Regulation of 2009. 
479 Article 218, Property Law (providing: “A pledgee may waive the right of pledge. In case an obligor 
establishes the right of pledge with its own properties, and the pledgee waives the right of pledge, other 
security providers will be exempted from the security liability within the scope for which the pledgee has lost 
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regarding the priority rules among security interests in China, maybe because of the 
strict prohibitions on many matters.  
A. Conflicting security interests 
As discussed above in Section 4.2.2.4.A, the Chinese rules have expressly prohibited 
the pledgees/secured creditors from the creation of re-pledge in all kinds of IP. And the 
creation of multiple pledges in the same encumbered patent is also prohibited (not 
clear for trademarks and copyrights). With these prohibitions, there is basically no 
need to discuss the priority order among multiple security interests on the same 
encumbered patent; this is a situation which does not arise in the current IP 
collateralization practice at all. Even if it was presumed that the creation of multiple 
pledges on the same trademark or copyright was allowed, the registration time would 
be the only criterion for determining the priority order among these multiple pledges.  
B. Pre-existing license vs. security interests 
Under the current Chinese law, only an IP owner can create security interests in its 
own IP. When an IP owner can create security interests in its own IP as collateral, the 
pre-existing license in the pledged IP, given before the creation of the pledge, is not 
affected by the pledge.480  
As a licensee cannot use its right to exploitation as collateral, there is no need to 
discuss the potential conflicts between the interests of the licensor and that of the 
secured creditor. 
C. Security interests vs. subsequent assignees/licenses 
In Chinese law, there is no need to discuss the continuation of pledge in IP after an 
assignment, license, or other disposition. Once a pledge right has been created on an IP, 
any further assignment or license of the pledged IP is only possible with the consent of 
the pledgee/secured creditor. The proceeds which the pledgor/debtor obtains from the 
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the right to seek preferred payments, unless any of other security providers promises to provide the security 
all the same.”) 
480 There is no provision in the Property Law which specifically addresses this issue for IP collateralization. 
However, the rules for the mortgage (diya) of immovable stipulate that the lease relationship established 
before the mortgage contract is not affected by the mortgage; the lease relationship established after the 
mortgage contract is subject to the mortgage. See Article 190, Property Law. By analogy, it seems that 
pre-existing license relationships will not be affected by the later pledge either.  
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consented assignment or license should be used to pay off the pledgee’s claims in 
advance or be deposited or be held in escrow with a competent third party assigned by 
the secured creditor.481 Since the further assignment or license has got the consent 
from the pledgee/secured creditor and the proceeds have been paid off the 
pledgee/secured creditor, the subsequent assignee or licensee has the encumbered IP 
free from pre-existing security interests. As a result, the priority order between the 
secured creditor and subsequent assignees or licensees is irrelevant in China. 
There is no “ordinary course of business” exception in Chinese law for IP 
collateralization. 
4.2.4 Enforcement  
Currently, the three departmental regulations deal mainly with the registration for 
perfection but remain silent on the issue of enforcement remedies. Without specific 
reference to IP collateralization, the general procedural norms under the Property Law 
regarding the enforcement of pledge in all kinds of tangible assets apply mutatis 
mutandis to the enforcement of security interests in IP. 
Where the debtor performs his obligation or pays the secured debt at or prior to 
maturity, the pledgee/creditor should deregister the pledge.482 Upon the debtor’s 
default at the due date or the occurrence of a contractually stipulated circumstance 
(realization events), the enforcement of a pledge in an IP will be triggered. When the 
contractually stipulated realization events occur, the enforcement can be exercised 
prior to the due date. The pledgee/creditor is entitled with the priority in being repaid 
with the proceeds from the enforcement.483 
With the application of general procedural norms for tangible movables, the security 
interests in IP can only be enforced by one of the three available remedies:484 
- (a) to acquire the pledged IP at market price and then offset the purchase price 
against the secured claim (conversion), or  
- (b) to seek payments through judicial proceedings by requesting the court to auction 
the pledged IP (judicial sale), or  
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481 Article 227 (2), Property Law; Article 80, Security Law; Article 16 (2), Patent Pledge Regulation of 
2010. 
482 Article 219, Property Law. 
483 Article 208, Property Law; Article 63, Security Law. 
484 Article 219, Property Law. 
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- (c) to seek payments received from a private sale or auction of the pledged IP 
(extrajudicial sale).  
The pledgee can only be paid back from the proceeds of the above three remedies. 
Chinese law does not allow a “strict foreclosure”, where the debtor’s right to redeem 
the secured property is extinguished by the court order and the creditor is leǕt as the 
absolute owner of the property. The parties are not allowed to agree on letting the 
pledgee/creditor have direct retention of the ownership of the collateral for the 
satisfaction of the secured obligation. Any stipulation in the contract indicating that 
ownership of the pledged patent would be transferred to the pledgee upon the debtor’s 
default is void.485 The IP-specific registry for perfecting the pledge even scrutinizes 
the pledge contact. If there is any strict foreclosure clause or similar stipulation in the 
pledge contract, the registry will disapprove the registration of the pledge.486  
The three remedies are available in parallel. The proceeds obtained from any of the 
three enforcement remedies should be used to pay off the principal obligation or debt; 
any proceeds exceeding the secured debt should be paid back to the pledgor; where the 
proceeds are insufficient to cover the whole secured debt, the deficit remains payable 
by the debtor.487 The creditor is entitled to sue the debtor for any deficiency. 
Market prices should be used as reference in conversion or private sale of the pledged 
IP.488 Chinese law does not set any specific procedure providing the debtors with 
market price protection against the collusion between the creditor and the assignee in 
conversion or private sale.489 Nevertheless, if the creditor and the debtor cannot reach 
an agreement on the disposition value of the pledged IP, the creditor should have 
recourse to the court for a judicial auction. Although the judicial auction procedure is 
generally perceived as slow and expensive, directly applying for a court order for 
judicial auction is still faster than a lawsuit which is a full civil action involving a 
prolonged and complex procedure.490 It is therefore believed that the lack of market 
price protection should not cause significant problems in practice.491 

485 Article 211, Property Law. 
486 Article 12(8), Regulation for the Pledge of Patents of 2010. 
487 Article 221, Property Law. 
488 Article 219, Property Law. 
489 See Williams et al. (2010) “Secured Finance Law in China and Hong Kong”, supra note 264, at 369. 
490 Ibid, at 390.  
491 Ibid, at 369. 
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The Property Law includes a new provision to provide the debtors with an extra 
protection when the creditor does not enforce its rights of pledge in a timely manner 
when the debt fails due. The pledgor can request the pledgee to enforce the pledge at 
its maturity; if the pledgee does not enforce the pledge in a timely manner, the pledgor 
can have recourse to court for a judicial sale or auction of the pledged IP. And the 
pledgee should compensate for the depreciation of the pledged IP arising from the 
pledgee’s delay in enforcing the pledge. 492  This extra protection is crucial for 
protecting the debtor against the loss caused by the pledgee’s delay in enforcing the 
pledge, especially when the value of IP is very time-sensitive to market changes. 
4.3 US 
4.3.1 General Introduction and Preemption of Federal Law 
The legal issues involving IP collateralization in the US are even more complicated, 
because the US statutory schemes for IP and secured transaction laws are also at two 
different levels in its federalism system: 
- a title system for the IP under the IP laws which is exercised at the federal level,493 
mainly including the Copyright Act (17 U.S.C.), the Patent Act (35 U.S.C.), and the 
Lanham Act (15 U.S.C.)494; and 
- an encumbrance system for secured transactions in “personal property”495 under 
Article 9 of Uniform Commercial Codes (UCC-9), which is individually 
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492 Article 220, Property Law. 
493 The U.S. Constitution specifically empowers the federal government (i.e., U.S. Congress) with the 
exclusive authority in respect of patents and copyrights, for promoting the progress of science and useful arts, 
under its Copyright and Patent Clause. See U.S. Constitution. Art. 1, Sec. 8 Cl.8 empowers the U.S. Congress: 
“To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors 
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” This clause is usually referred to as the 
“Copyright and Patent Clause”, which constitutes the legitimate basis for the Copyright Act and the Patent 
Act. Though without specific references, the U.S. Constitution, Art. 1, Sec. 8 Cl.3 also provides federal 
jurisdiction to protect the inter-state use of trademarks under its Commerce Clause, while leaving the in-state 
use of trademarks to individual state jurisdiction. So, IP laws are mainly at the federal level, including the 
Copyright Act, the Patent Act, and The Lanham Act. 
494 It is noteworthy that trademark protection in the US is a state common law right, which is only “enhanced” 
and “protected” by federal registration. The federal law does not create separate exclusive property in the 
trademark in the same sense that it does for patents and copyrights. See William J. Murphy, “Proposal for a 
Centralized and Integrated Registry for Security Interests in Intellectual Property,” IDEA 41, no. 3&4 (2002): 
297–604 at 310-311.  
495 In the common law concepts of the US law, “personal property” contrasts with real property (land and 
interests created over it, such as leases and easements). 
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implemented at the state level. IP likes patent, trademark, and copyright are all 
qualified under the catchall category of collateral - “general intangibles” under the 
UCC-9.496 
The literature about IP collateralization in the US therefore mainly criticizes about 
how the interface between federal and state legislation, and how it brings more legal 
uncertainty and increases the difficulty of concluding transactions.497 This two-level 
system creates lots of functional problems such as which of the two systems would 
apply, especially where conflicts and deficiency exist. The UCC-9 has included a 
general rule of “preemption of federal law” as a solution for the case where an 
inconsistency or gap between UCC-9 rules and federal law exists.498 The rule restricts 
the application scope of the UCC-9 to the extent without preemption from the federal 
law.  
The fact is that even though the federal laws do partly govern the security interests in 
all three types of IP, the substantive federal IP laws are “primarily concerned with 
defining the nature and scope of the owner’s or exclusive rights in the intellectual 
property and with setting out the limits on and procedures for enforcing those rights. 
[…] Each makes some provision for recording, priority and derivative interests 
(including security interests), but none deals directly with the creation or priority of 
security interest”.499 So, no complete federal preemption exists in this area. It is still 
the UCC-9 that provides the main rules for the creation, perfection, priority and 
enforcement of security interests in IP, unless preempted by federal laws. However, 
most of the UCC-9 rules just generally apply to all personal property, without 
explicitly addressing IP. There are still some gaps which cannot be filled. In the end, 
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496 See further discussion below at Section 4.3.2.2 A. 
497 For example, see Lorin E Brennan, “Financing Intellectual Property Under Federal Law: A National 
Imperative (Electronic Version),” Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal (Comm/Ent) no. 
23 (2002): 195–312 (discusses how effective financing of copyrights, patents and trademarks under federal 
law should operate in harmony with the state secured transaction laws); Murphy (2002), “Proposal for a 
Centralized and Integrated Registry for Security Interests in Intellectual Property”, supra note 494 (focuses 
on the problems in the registration for perfection, and gives very specific proposals to the USPTO on creating 
a centralized or integrated registry for security interests in IP and offers a technological solution for the 
implementation of that registry); Xuan-Thao Nguyen, “Commercial Law Collides with Cyberspace: The 
Trouble with Perfection - Insecurity Interests in the New Corporate Asset,” Washington and Lee Law Review 
59, no. 1 (2002): 37–82 (discussing the problems of perfecting security interests in domain names). 
498 UCC § 9-109(c)(1) (109 [SCOPE] (c) [Extent to which article does not apply] “This article does not apply 
to the extent that: (1) a statute, regulation, or treaty of the United States preempts this article”). 
499 Murphy (2002), “Proposal for a Centralized and Integrated Registry for Security Interests in Intellectual 
Property”, supra note 494 at 327-328.  
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the lack of clarity in the federal laws and the inconsistent case law regarding the 
“preemption of federal law” give rise to a lot of controversy and legal uncertainties, 
especially about the filing requirements for perfection.  
As explained in Section 4.1, the US law is chosen as a comparative counterpart 
because of the conflicts between secured transaction law and IP law occurring in the 
US legal regime are more intensive. Although it seems that this dual-level system 
problem does not exist for China at all, it in essence reflects amplified conflicts 
between secured transaction law and IP law. The main purpose of this thesis is for 
generating proposal for Chinese rules, so the discussion on the US rules will be more 
descriptive rather than a critical analysis. The discussion does go too deeply into 
specific legal issues or case studies.  
4.3.2 Creation 
The UCC-9 makes a distinction between the creation of security rights, when the 
security interest is “attached” to the collateral and becomes enforceable against the 
debtor;500 and the third-party effectiveness of security rights, when the security 
interest is “perfected” and becomes enforceable against the debtor. 
4.3.2.1 Transaction structure 
US law clearly distinguishes the “grant of security interests” from an “assignment”. 
While an “assignment” is the transfer of all of the IP owner’s title, rights and interests 
to the IP; the “grant of security interests” under UCC-9 is a lesser transfer as the 
borrower still keeps its title and retains certain rights and interests in the encumbered 
collateral.501  
In the past, many debtors were required to “absolutely” assign the encumbered patents 
to the creditors firstly, in order to try to fit within the language of section 261 of the 
Patent Act and to make a recordation in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office 
(USPTO). Then the debtors could get a license back from the creditors (which have 
become the registered owners) in order to keep exploiting the encumbered patents. 
This approach makes it difficult for the debtor to show its ownership for bringing 
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500 UCC § 9-203. 
501 For patents, see In re Transp. Design & Tech., Inc., 48 B.R. 635 (S.D. Cal. 1985); for trademarks, see 
Li’l Red Barn, Inc. v. Red Barn Sys., Inc., 322 F. Supp. 98 (N.D. Ind. 1970). 
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infringement actions, and also imposes on the creditor too many burdens regarding 
maintaining and protecting the encumbered IP.502 The problem of this transaction 
structure is more severe in the case of trademarks. Under the Lanham Act, an effective 
assignment of a trademark requires an assignment of its accompanying goodwill, 
including all aspects of the business to which the trademark pertains, such as trade 
secrets, supplier and customer lists, copyrights, and patents.503 An absolute title 
assignment for the purpose of security interest only, without being accompanied by a 
transfer of the related goodwill of the assignor (i.e., the debtor)’s business, may risk 
invalidating the trademark and totally destroy its value.504 As a result, in recent years, 
this “assignment” structure has become much less common in practice.505  
In order to keep the security interests effective, maintain the integrity and validity of 
the encumbered IP, and to avoid imposing maintenance burdens on the creditor, the 
best strategy is to structure the security instrument as a UCC-9 “security interest”, 
which is the contingent right to an asset (tangible or intangible) created by a security 
agreement to secure payment or performance of an obligation.506 Upon the borrower’s 
default, the security interest allows the creditor to take or transfer ownership of the 
encumbered IP. It is important to avoid the use of assignment language in the security 
agreement.507  
The UCC-9’s unitary “security interest” approach leads the modernization of secured 
transaction law all over the world, by leaving aside the pre-existing doctrine and 
practice about various security devices and uniformly treating all the transactions 
playing the function of securing transactions under the same rules.508  
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502 See Jeff Makovicka and Chris Bikus, “Security Interests in IP - Part 1: Tangible Problems in an 
Intangible World,” Nebraska Banker March (2012): 20–23 at 21.  
503 15 U.S.C § 1060. 
504 Any assignment of a trademark without its accompanying goodwill is a “naked assignment” or an 
“assignment in gross”, which can lead to an invalidity of the trademark. See Clorox Co. v. Chemical Bank, 
40 U.S.P.Q2d 1098 (TTAB 1996) (in which a debtor's registered trademark was invalidated because the 
intent-to-use application from which it issued was assigned outright to a bank under the terms of a 
collateralized loan agreement). 
505 Makovicka & Bikus (2012). “Security Interests in IP - Part 1: Tangible Problems in an Intangible World,” 
supra note 502 at 21.  
506 Murphy (2002), “Proposal for a Centralized and Integrated Registry for Security Interests in Intellectual 
Property”, supra note 494 at 313. 
507 Makovicka & Bikus (2012). “Security Interests in IP - Part 1: Tangible Problems in an Intangible World,” 
supra note 502 at 21. 
508 UCC § 9-109(a) (1) (stipulating UCC-9 applies to “a transaction, regardless of its form, that creates a 
security interest in personal property or fixtures by contract”) & cmt. 2. (stipulating “When a security interest 
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4.3.2.2 Scope of IP eligible for collateralization  
A. General requirements 
UCC-9 adopts a broad term to describe the transactions covered. IP are qualified as 
“general intangibles”, a catch-all category of collateral which include all residual 
forms of personal property that are not otherwise included in the other defined types of 
collateral. 509  The Official Comment uses the term “intellectual property” as an 
example of a “general intangible”, by just referring to “various categories of 
intellectual property”.510 It does not explicitly recite any specific form of IP. It is 
believed that this way is intentionally “designed to accommodate both existing and 
future forms of IP.”511  
B. The treatment of rights under IP license agreements 
a. Licensor’s right to royalty payment 
All derivative rights to payment under the terms of an assignment or license of IP 
(such as the right of a licensor to receive royalties payable under a IP license) are 
categorized as “accounts” 512 , not “general intangible” 513  nor “payment 
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is created, this Article applies regardless of the form of the transaction or the name the parties have given to 
it.”) See Harry C. Sigman, “Twenty Questions about Filing under Revised Article 9: The Rules of the Game 
under New Part 5,” Chicago-Kent Law Review 74, no. 3 (1999): 861–892 at 861 (stating that the Revised 
UCC-9 is intended to “place virtually all filings in a single, statewide office, facilitate electronic filing, foster 
nationwide utilization of well-designed user-friendly uniform paper forms, and make new document filing 
more efficient, transparent, and uniform.”) Note: Sigman was a member of the Drafting Committee to revise 
Article 9.  
509 UCC § 9-102(a)(42) gives a definition of “general intangible”, which means any personal property, 
including things in action, other than accounts, chattel paper, commercial tort claims, deposit accounts, 
documents, goods, instruments, investment property, letter-of-credit rights, letters of credit, money, and oil, 
gas, or other minerals before extraction. The term includes payment intangibles and software.”  
510 While the UCC-9 does not specifically recite patents, trademarks, and copyrights, the Official Comment 
uses the term “intellectual property” as an example of a “general intangible”. See Official Comment 5d to 
UCC § 9-102 (“General intangible is the residual category of personal property, including things in action, that 
is not included in the other defined types of collateral. Examples are various categories of intellectual property 
and the right to payment of a loan of funds that is not evidenced by chattel paper or an instrument. As used in 
the definition of general intangible, things in action include rights that arise under a license of intellectual 
property, including the right to exploit the intellectual property without liability for infringement.”). 
511 See Murphy (2002), “Proposal for a Centralized and Integrated Registry for Security Interests in 
Intellectual Property”, supra note 494 at 316.  
512 UCC § 9-102(a)(2) (2010). 
513 UCC § 9-102(a)(42) (2010) (providing any right to payment that is an “account” is excluded from the 
definition of a “general intangible”). 
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intangible”514.515 Accounts are classified as a separate form of collateral capable of 
separate ownership. They are also regulated under UCC-9 but may be subject to some 
special rules on specific occasions. 
b. Licensee’s interests in license 
Under the UCC-9, a licensee’s interests “that arise under a license of intellectual 
property, including the right to exploit the intellectual property without liability for 
infringement” are also explicitly included in the definition of “general intangible”.516 
The licensee’s interests under an IP license can be used as collateral and should be 
subject to the same rules as the various categories of IP (see more discussion in Chapter 
5). 
C. Infringement claims 
Infringement claims can be categorized as “commercial tort claims” and be original 
collateral under the UCC-9.517 However, they have to be subject to many special rules. 
For example, while a general description with reasonable identification is sufficient 
for the creation of security interests in most personal property, a specific description is 
required for the creation of security interests in a commercial tort claim, in which case 
a description only by type is insufficient to enable identification.518 Similarly, while 
a security agreement may create a security interest in after-acquired collateral, a 
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514 UCC § 9-102(a)(61) (2010) (providing “payment intangible” is a subcategory of “general intangible”). As 
“accounts” are excluded from the delimitation of a “general intangible”, they cannot be “payment intangible” 
either. 
515 See Murphy (2002), “Proposal for a Centralized and Integrated Registry for Security Interests in 
Intellectual Property”, supra note 494 at 317-319; Jeff Makovicka, “Security Interests in IP - Part 2: 
Collateralizing & Creating Security Interests in IP,” Nebraska Banker May/June (2012): 20–23 at 20. 
516 See Official Comment 5d to UCC § 9-102 (providing - As used in the definition of “general intangible”, 
“things in action” includes rights that arise under a license of intellectual property, including the right to exploit 
the intellectual property without liability for infringement.”). 
517 UCC § 9-102(a)(13) defines “commercial tort claims” as all business-related tort claims that do not 
involve personal injury or death. As the UCC-9 generally does not apply to an assignment of “tort claims”, 
UCC § 9-109(d)(12) gives an exception to “commercial tort claims”. However, UCC § 9-102(a)(2) 
emphasizes that commercial tort claims are not categorized as “accounts”. See also Murphy (2002), 
“Proposal for a Centralized and Integrated Registry for Security Interests in Intellectual Property”, supra note 
494 at 319-320.  
518 UCC § 9-108(a) (the general rule is that a general description is sufficient for reasonable identification), 
UCC § 9-108(b)(3) (a description only by type is generally sufficient); UCC § 9-108(e)(1)(“a description 
only by type is an insufficient description for a commercial tort claim”). See also UCC § 9-108 cmt. 2. 
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security interest cannot be attached to a commercial tort claim under an after-acquired 
property clause.519 
D. Future IP 
The UCC-9 allows the creation of security interests in the after-acquired assets, in 
which case the attachment occurs when the debtor acquires the rights in the 
after-acquired collateral.520 So, there is no problem of creating security interests in 
future IP. For example, in the case of patents, creditors could also obtain a grant of a 
security interest in all inventions, issued patents, and patent applications which the 
debtor owns, in whatever rights the debtor may have had or may in the future have 
against third persons that use or infringe the rights it owns, and in whatever 
transferable rights the debtor may have to use corresponding rights owned by others. A 
simple description like “including all now existing and hereafter acquired or created IP, 
as well as everything associated with the IP” is sufficient to cover the future IP.  
However, as discussed below in Section 4.3.3 about perfection, security interests in 
many types of IP, especially patents, registered copyrights, federal trademarks, also 
need registration with the federal USPTO or Copyright Office, in order to be effective 
against subsequent creditors and assignees. The registration can only be done to 
registered IP and must be with specific reference to the encumbered IP. In this case, a 
registration of security interests in future IP for perfection would be difficult and even 
impossible in practice.  
In order to ensure that its security interest continues to be perfected in such 
after-acquired IP, the creditor may have to monitor the debtor’s activity closely and 
continuously make separate new federal registrations for new items of IP. In practice, 
the creditor may find some protection by requiring in the security agreement periodic 
(for example, monthly or quarterly) reporting and registration of after-acquired IP 
interests.521 For example, in the case of unregistered copyright, the creditor can 
include in the security agreement a requirement that the debtor has to inform the 
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519 UCC § 9-204(a) (creation of security interests in after-acquired collateral), UCC § 9-204(b)(2) (a security 
interest does not attach under a term constituting an after-acquired property clause to a commercial tort 
claim). See also Murphy (2002), “Proposal for a Centralized and Integrated Registry for Security Interests in 
Intellectual Property”, supra note 494 at 319-320. 
520 UCC § 9-204(a) (creation of security interests in after-acquired collateral), 
521 Makovicka (2012) “Security Interests in IP - Part 2: Collateralizing & Creating Security Interests in IP,” 
supra note 515 at 23. 
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lender as soon as an unregistered copyright becomes registered (see detailed 
discussion below at the section of perfection).522 
4.3.2.3 General description of encumbered IP in security agreements  
With a strong tradition of following the principle of party autonomy, just for the purpose 
of making the security interest effective between parties, there is minimal requirement 
in US law on the format or content of the security agreement creating security interests 
in IP. The security agreement is only required to be able to “reasonably identify what is 
described”.523 A description by category, by type (with exceptions524), by quantity, in 
the way of computational or allocational formula or procedure; or by any other method 
as long as the identity of the collateral is objectively determinable, is considered as 
being sufficient for “reasonable identification”.525 So, if the parties aim at claiming all 
general intangibles (including all IP assets), a collateral description as simple as “all 
general intangibles” is sufficient.526 This approach can greatly reduce transactional 
costs by simplifying the process. It has been criticized that the use of the term “general 
intangibles” will put IP holder/debtors at a disadvantage, because they may not fully 
realize the precise scope of the IP to be encumbered and later realize that the coverage is 
much broader than they thought.527 While the UCC-9 sets minimal requirements on 
general description only, the parties are always free to (and actually should) make more 
specific-listing description to ensure the legal certainty of the transaction. 
Although the legal rules are extremely simple, the practice is much more complicated. 
Trademarks may be taken as an example. Upon default, the secured lender may sell the 
collateral only if it “(a) owns the trademark, and (b) transfers the goodwill associated 
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522 Ibid. 
523 UCC § 9-108(a). 
524 E.g., for commercial tort claims, a description only by type is insufficient to enable identification, see 
UCC § 9-108(e)(1). 
525 UCC § 9-108(b). 
526 However, an even more general description of collateral as “all the debtor’s assets” or “all the debtor’s 
personal property” or using words of similar import does not reasonably identify the collateral. See UCC § 
9-108(c). However, at the later stage for the further purpose of perfecting the created security interests against 
third parties, a financing statement covering all assets or all personal property is sufficient in the indication of 
collateral for filing. See UCC § 9-504 (2). 
527 Xuan-Thao Nguyen, “Collateralizing Intellectual Property,” Georgia Law Review 42, no. 1 (2007): 1–45 
at 42 (specifying that "the broad definition has the negative side-effect of not giving the debtor, the creditor, 
and others sufficient notice of the reach of the security interest in these types of intellectual property assets."). 
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with the trademark along with the trademark itself.”528 For this reason, it is advised to 
avoid the use of assignment language in the security agreement,529 and to include two 
important provisions in any security agreement covering trademarks, “First, the 
agreement should include an irrevocable power of attorney allowing the lender to 
execute an assignment on behalf of the borrower upon default. Second, if the collateral 
description mentions trademarks in general or a specific trademark, the description 
should include “all goodwill associated therewith” or “all general intangibles”.530 
4.3.2.4 Pre-default rights and obligations of debtors and secured creditors 
As there is no legal rule specifically for IP collateralization, all the allocation of 
pre-default rights and obligations between the debtors and the secured creditors are left 
to the autonomy of the parties. No mandatory rules or non-mandatory 
recommendations have been given in the laws. 
4.3.3 Perfection, Publicity and Priority 
For the further purpose of perfecting the security interests created against third parties, 
like subsequent creditors and assignees, a financing statement must be duly filed.531 
The main issue here is there are two registration schemes available concurrently at two 
different levels. The IP laws for the three main types of IP provide a federal-level title 
recordation-filing scheme for ownership and assignment. Meanwhile, the UCC-9 also 
provides a state-level filing scheme for registering general security interests, which 
may apply as well. The main issue here is whether the federal-level filing preempts the 
state-level UCC-9 filing or not. 532  The answer determines at which level the 
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528 See Makovicka (2012) “Security Interests in IP - Part 2: Collateralizing & Creating Security Interests in 
IP,” supra note 515 at 22. 
529 See Makovicka & Bikus (2012). “Security Interests in IP - Part 1: Tangible Problems in an Intangible 
World,” supra note 502 at 21. 
530 Ibid (specifying “Goodwill is classified as a kind of “general intangible” under the UCC-9, if the 
collateral description includes “all general intangibles”, a specific reference to the goodwill associated with 
the trademark(s) is not necessary.”) 
531 UCC § 9-310(a). 
532 UCC § 9-311(a)(1) [Perfection of Security Interests in Property Subject to Certain Statutes, Regulations, 
and Treaties] (a) [Security interest subject to other law.] “Except as otherwise provided in subsection (d), the 
filing of a financing statement is not necessary or effective to perfect a security interest in property subject to: 
(1) a statute, regulation, or treaty of the United States whose requirements for a security interest's obtaining 
priority over the rights of a lien creditor with respect to the property preempt Section 9-310(a).”) For 
example, in US law, it has long been accepted that “the recording of patents in the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office is a “constructive notice” to the world of their existence.” In re Cybernetic Service, Inc., 
252 F.3d 1039, 44 U.C.C Rep. Serv. 2d 639 (9th Cir. 2001) (The US Court has confirmed that “Congress 
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registration for perfection should be done. The lack of clarity about the interface 
between the two registration regimes and the lack of uniformity and consistency in the 
relevant federal IP laws make the rules for perfection of security interests vary for 
different types of IP, and bring lots of legal uncertainties regarding the priority order 
among parties with conflicting interests. 
4.3.3.1 Dual-registration system 
A. Patent 
For security interests in patents, there are two registration schemes available. The 
federal Patent Act requires a federal recordation in the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO) to make an “assignment, grant, or conveyance of a patent 
or application for patent” valid, as against a bona fide “subsequent purchaser or 
mortgagee”.533 Case law has established that the grant of security interests in a patent 
is a lesser transfer than an “assignment” governed under the Patent Act, so there is no 
federal preemption.534 A state-level UCC filing should be necessary for perfecting 
security interests in patents against the subsequent creditors; and a filling only with the 
USPTO would be fatal for a creditor.535  
However, the UCC filing omits the bona fide purchaser. As a subsequent purchaser 
has no obligation to search the UCC filing to find out the existing security interests in 
the patents to be purchased, a UCC registration alone does not constitute a 
constructive notice. If a search in the USPTO reveals no existence of previously 
created security interests in the patents to be purchased, the subsequent purchaser can 
claim for being bona fide and hence having an ownership with a priority over the 
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intended for parties to record their ownership interests in a patent so as to provide constructive notice to 
subsequent holders of an ownership interest.”). 
533 35 U.S.C. § 261 (governing ownership and assignment of patents and provides a federal-filing scheme for 
protecting patent rights – “An interest that constitutes an assignment, grant or conveyance shall be void as 
against any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee for a valuable consideration, without notice, unless it is 
recorded in the Patent and Trademark Office within three months from its date or prior to the date of such 
subsequent purchase or mortgage”). 
534 Courts have reasoned that the grant of security interests in a patent is a lesser transfer than an 
“assignment”, and therefore does not fall within the “assignment, grant, or conveyance” under 35 U.S.C. § 
261. As the Patent Act has not directly referred to the registration of a security interest/mortgage, it does not 
preempt the UCC-9 regarding the perfection of security interests in patents. The UCC-9, therefore, would 
apply in this regard. See In re Cybernetic Services, Inc., 252 F.3d 1039 (9th Cir. 2001). 
535 See In re Tower Tech, Inc., 67 Fed. Appx. 521 (10th Cir. 2003) (a filling only with the USPTO cannot 
make the security interests in patents valid as against subsequent creditors). 
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security interests.536 Therefore, in order to keep the priority over the bona fide 
subsequent purchasers of the encumbered patents, a prudent creditor is also advised to 
have a federal-level registration with the USPTO, which is for disclosing the existence 
of his security interests in the encumbered collateral.537  
In summary, for ensuring the maximum protection for the creditor, the current 
customary practice is to have a dual registration of the security interests at both the 
state-level UCC, for perfecting the security interests as against subsequent creditors, 
and the federal-level USPTO, for protecting against subsequent purchasers of the 
encumbered patents.  
B. Trademarks 
In US law, there are three classes of trademarks: (a) common law unregistered 
trademarks, (b) stately registered trademarks for the use of trademark within the state 
only, and (c) federally registered trademarks for inter-state use. For the first two types 
of trademarks, which arise under state law, perfection is accomplished by a state-level 
UCC filing as well. With respect to a federally registered trademark, legal rules and 
case law are almost the same as those for patents.  
For the federally registered trademarks, the case law has also established that the 
Lanham Act does not preempt the UCC-9 either, because security interests in 
trademarks are not considered as assignments.538 A state-level UCC filing is therefore 
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536 Rhone-Poulence Agro, S.A. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 284 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (the creditor 
cannot use a UCC registration to claim that the subsequent purchaser has actual knowledge about the 
pre-existing security interests; a bona fide subsequent purchaser with a duly recorded assignment at the 
USPTO would defeat a secured creditor that has not filed in the USPTO). So, a UCC filing alone cannot 
protect creditors against subsequent purchasers of the encumbered patents. 
537 The creditor can record the whole security agreement or, alternatively, an abbreviated agreement, 
which restates the grant of the security interests, identifies the patent in compliance with USPTO recording 
requirements, and cross-references the security agreement. See Moldo v. Matsco (In re Cybernetic Servs., 
Inc.), 252 F. 3d 1039 (9th Cir. 2001). With this federal USPTO filing, purchasers of patents are likely to 
acquire actual notice of the short form patent security agreement through a USPTO search even if the filing 
still does not constitute constructive notice. Makovicka & Bikus (2012). “Security Interests in IP - Part 1: 
Tangible Problems in an Intangible World,” supra note 502 at 21. 
538 In the US, the federally registered trademarks are governed under the Lanham Act (15 U.S.C). Section 
1060 of the Lanham Act stipulates that assignments must be registered federally in order to preserve 
"distinctiveness", and provides a federal filing scheme for registering assignments of federally registered 
trademarks. Similar to the Patent Act, the clause does not specifically refer to security interests. See 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1060. The relevant case law has also established that security interests in trademarks are not considered as 
assignments. See Roman Cleanser Co. v. National Acceptance Co., 43 B.R. 940 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (ruling 
that a security interest in a trademark is not equivalent to an assignment; the federal assignment recordal 
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necessary for perfecting security interests against subsequent creditors. In the same 
way as with patents, without a USPTO registration, a bona fide subsequent purchaser 
of the encumbered trademark may defeat the creditor’s priority.539 So, similar to the 
case of patents, for perfecting security interests in federally registered trademarks, a 
dual-registration with both the state-level UCC and the federal-level USPTO is 
advised to a prudent creditor.  
C. Copyrights 
The case law involving perfecting security interests in copyright has been the most 
controversial. Although the current US Copyright law has precluded the requirement 
of registration as a condition for the subsistence of copyright after the US finally 
changed law to be a state member of the Berne Convention in 1989,540 compared to 
many other jurisdictions, the US keeps a deeply rooted tradition of registering 
copyrights. As copyrights may be federally registered or unregistered, the rules for 
perfecting security interests are also different.  
For registered copyrights, the federal Copyright Act has clearly preempted the state 
UCC-9. In contrast with the cases of patents and federally registered trademarks 
discussed above, the Copyright Act, by its terms, has already specifically referred to 
governing security interests (mortgage) in registered copyrights.541 The leading cases 
have also confirmed that a federal filing with the Copyright Office is the exclusive 
method of perfecting security interests in registered copyrights, as against both 
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provisions did not trigger the UCC preemption); In re Chattanooga Choo-Choo Co., 98 B.R. 792 (E.D. Tenn. 
1989) (a service mark is a UCC general intangible requiring the filing of a financing statement); In re 
Trimarchi v. Together Dev. Corp., 255 B.R. 606 (D. Mass. 2000) (the creditor’s security interest was 
unperfected and voidable in bankruptcy because the secured creditor filed the financing statement with the 
USPTO rather than with the secretary of state.) 
539 See 15 U.S.C. § 1060 (an assignment of federally registered trademarks should be void against any 
subsequent purchaser for valuable consideration without notice, unless the prescribed information reporting 
the assignment is recorded in the USPTO). 
540 According to the Berne Convention, copyright rights arise automatically upon creation and cannot be 
dependent upon formalities such as registration. In the current US copyright law, copyrights exist 
automatically upon creation of the work whether or not registered with the Copyright Office. 
541 Section 205 of the Copyright Act provides a federal filing scheme for the registration of ownership and 
for the recordation of “any transfer of copyright ownership”. See 17 U.S.C. § 205. Meanwhile, its Section 
101 defines “transfer of copyright ownership” as “an assignment, mortgage, exclusive license, or any other 
conveyance, alienation, or hypothecation of a copyright or of any of the exclusive rights comprised in a 
copyright”. See 17 U.S.C. § 101. There is a federal-level filing scheme provided for the perfection of security 
interests in registered copyrights. 
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subsequent creditors and subsequent purchasers. 542  A UCC-9 filing is neither 
necessary nor adequate to perfect a security interest in a registered copyright. 
For unregistered copyrights, the rules are not so straightforward. As the federal 
Copyright Office’s filing scheme is only available for registered copyrights, the issue 
relevant here is if a UCC-9 filing would be sufficient for perfecting a security interest 
in an unregistered copyright. With the absence of clear rules in both the Copyright Act 
and the UCC-9, case law is also unsettled. While some cases have held that all 
copyrights must be registered with the Copyright Office in order to perfect a security 
interest in them,543 some cases have held that a state-level filing with the UCC might 
be adequate for perfecting a security interest in an unregistered copyright.544 Without 
consistent case law, in order to reduce the legal uncertainty, a prudent commercial 
creditor is highly advised to take the first approach – always registering with the 
Copyright Office.545  
However, the federal Copyright Office’s filing scheme is not possible for unregistered 
copyrights. For this reason, a creditor should always register the copyright to be 
encumbered firstly, and then perfect the registered copyright with the Copyright Office. 
The problem is that, in some cases, it may not be practicable to register the copyright 
first. For example, in the software industry, software is likely to be revised frequently. 
Keeping registering copyrights for all the versions of software is just impractical. In 
such a case, a lender may choose to file the unregistered copyright as general 
intangible under the UCC-9 firstly and then keep monitoring whether the unregistered 
copyright becomes registered afterwards. The monitoring can be done by means of 
including appropriate covenants and warranties in the copyright security agreement, 
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542 In re World Auxiliary Power Co., 303 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2002) (the Copyright Act’s use of the word 
“mortgage” as one definition of a “transfer” includes security interests under the UCC-9). Courts reject the 
proposition that federally registered copyrights are properly perfected under the UCC. In re Peregrine 
Entertainment, Ltd., 116 B.R. 194 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1990) (the bankruptcy court held that federal copyright 
laws stipulate copyright must be recorded federally in order to perfect that security interest); In re AEG 
Acquisition Corp., 127 B.R. 34 (C.D. Cal. 1991), aff’d 161 B.R. 50 (9th Cir. 1993) (federal filing is the 
exclusive method of perfection for federally registered copyrights).  
543 E.g., AEG Acquisition Corp., 127 B.R. 34 (it was held that copyrights must be registered with the 
Copyright Office in order to perfect a security interest in them. Thus, according to this decision, it would 
seem there can be no perfected security interest in an unregistered copyright); In re Avalon Software, Inc., 
209 B.R. 517 (Bank. D. Ariz. 1997). 
544 E.g., World Auxiliary Power, 303 F.3d at 1128; Aerocon Engineering Inc. v. Silicon Valley Bank 244 
B.R. 149 (Bank. N.D. Cal. 1999). 
545 See Makovicka (2012) “Security Interests in IP - Part 2: Collateralizing & Creating Security Interests in 
IP,” supra note 515 at 23. 
 ͳͻ͵
such as requiring the debtor to promptly notify the creditor as soon as the debtor 
registers the previously unregistered copyrights. With the notification, the lender 
would take appropriate action immediately to perfect the security interests in the 
copyright subsequently registered with the Copyright office.546 
The same problem also exists for the dual-registration of security interests in future 
patent and federal trademarks. As the registration of security assignment in the 
USPTO is possible only for registered patent and federal trademarks, the creditors 
must make the same contractual arrangement in the security agreement, register the 
security interest first at the UCC and take active monitoring in order to make the 
federal USPTO filing as soon as the future patent and federal trademarks get registered 
(See also the Section 4.3.2.2 D on future IP).  
In the case of state-level UCC registration, there is another complicated issue about in 
which state to register. A deeper discussion into this issue requires a comprehensive 
exploration into the choice of laws and is beyond the scope of our comparative study. 
In sum, the rules for perfecting security interests vary for different types of IP.547 The 
absence of uniform rules for all kinds of IP, and the dual-registration system for 
patents and federal trademarks, have been criticized for giving rise to a great deal of 
legal uncertainty, being time-consuming and cost-inefficient. In practice, many 
security agreements may simply include all of the debtor’s IP, registered or 
unregistered, existing or future, as collateral. The creditors should be very careful to 
ensure that their security interests are properly perfected. As early as the 1980s, there 
were plenty of efforts at building a more integrated and rationalized security interests 
recordation system at the federal level, in order to bring greater certainty into the 
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546 Ibid, at 23. 
547 For perfecting a security interest in a registered copyright, a single federal registration of the security 
interest in the Copyright Office is sufficient. For perfecting a security interest in an unregistered copyright, 
although a state-level UCC registration might be adequate for perfection, the best practice may be to register 
the unregistered copyright when it is possible and immediately register the security interests with the 
Copyright Office. For patents and federally registered trademarks, the best practice is always to take a 
dual-registration with both the federal-level USPTO and the state-level UCC. For stately registered 
trademarks and common law unregistered trademarks, perfection may only be accomplished by a state-level 
UCC filing.  
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recording of security interests in the federal IP. 548  However, not many actual 
improvements have been done.  
4.3.3.2 A Notice-based registration system 
For a state-level UCC registration, perfection of a security interest in IP requires only 
a recordation of a financing statement, which is designed to give rudimentary public 
notice about the existence of a security interest established by the debtor and the 
secured party in the described collateral, or in the indicated “types” of collateral. The 
description requirement for the financial statement is even less stringent than that for 
the general description in the security agreement. A financing statement only needs to 
indicate the names of the debtor and the secured party and the covered collateral.549 A 
simple description of the collateral as “all assets (or all personal property) of the 
debtor, now owned or hereafter acquired” will suffice to perfect a security interest in 
any IP owned by the debtor, as long as the “general intangibles” category or some 
more precise description is used in the security agreement.550 If the parties aim at 
claiming all general intangibles (including all IP assets), a collateral description as 
simple as “all general intangibles” is sufficient. Of course, parties are always able to 
(and actually should) identify the IP collateral more specifically. The registries do not 
make any scrutiny.  
For patents and federally registered trademark, a dual-registration is highly 
recommended. A registration with the federal USPTO is also necessary to make the 
security interests effective against subsequent assignees. For registration at the 
USPTO, filing a mere “notice” is insufficient; the security agreement must be 
registered. The creditor can choose to record the whole original security agreement 
or, alternatively, an abbreviated agreement, which restates the grant of the security 
interests, specifically identifies the encumbered patents and trademarks in compliance 
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548 These problems have been the subject of a great deal of work over several years, beginning with the 
International Trademark Association at least as early as the late 1980s and, more recently, by the Joint Task 
Force of the Business Law and Intellectual Property Law Sections of the American Bar Association (the 
"Federal Intellectual Property Security Act" advances the IP community). The AIPLA supports uniformity in 
the various systems for filing security interests or ownership changes involving federal IP rights. 
549 UCC § 9-502. 
550 UCC § 9-504(2). Note: in the security agreement for the purpose of creating security interests in IP, an 
even more general description of collateral as “all the debtor’s assets” or “all the debtor’s personal property” 
or using words of similar import does not reasonably identify the collateral, see UCC § 9-108(c).  
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with USPTO recording requirements, and cross-references the security agreement.551 
The latter way can reveal less information about the security agreement to the public.  
The filing requirement of the USPTO for more specific reference to the encumbered IP 
can create problems for perfecting the security interests in future IP, which have not 
existed and may not be specifically referred to the time of filing. In order to safeguard 
its security interest continues to be perfected in future IP, the creditors should take 
additional care and steps as mentioned in Section 4.3.2.2 D. 
4.3.3.3 Priority rules 
AˊConflicting security interests 
In the US, the priority among conflicting security interests in the same collateral is 
also established by the time of filing.552  
B. Pre-existing license/assignment vs. security interests – Grace Period problem 
Following the “first-to-file rule” and the “principle of continuation of disposition”, a 
properly “perfected” security interest in a collateral only affects the transactions 
occurring afterwards. When an IP owner creates security interests in its own IP as 
collateral, the pre-existing license in the encumbered IP is not affected by the later 
security interest.  
One issue having been comprehensively discussed about the priority order between the 
pre-existing assignment and security interests is the “grace period” in IP law. For 
patents and federally registered trademarks, there is a “generous” three-month 
look-back grace period for registering “assignment, grant or conveyance” with the 
USPTO.553 The grace period allows an assignee to register his assignment within 
three months from the date of assignment and still keep the priority back to the date of 
assignment, instead of the actual registration-date. A creditor cannot be completely 
sure about its priority order even after a completely diligent and accurate search at the 
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551 See, e.g., Moldo v. Matsco (In re Cybernetic Servs., Inc.), 252 F. 3d 1039 (9th Cir. 2001). 
552 UCC § 9-322(a). 
553 As to patents, Section 261 of the Patent Act states that “an assignment, grant or conveyance shall be void 
as against any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee for a valuable consideration, without notice, unless it is 
recorded in the Patent and Trademark Office within three months from its date or prior to the date of such 
subsequent purchase or mortgage.” 35 U.S.C. § 261. Similar rules exist under the Section 1060 of the 
Lanham Act as well (15 U.S.C. §1060). 
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USPTO, because it may find that its security interests in the patents or trademarks 
cannot be used against some assignees because the assignments had happened before 
his search but just had not been recorded yet by the time of search.554 Only another 
post-closing search can reveal the existence of all the existing transactions. Although, 
in practice, creditors are advised to require representations or warranty from the debtor 
guaranteeing that no competing assignments have been granted, the legal uncertainty 
still exists and increases the transaction cost.  
When a licensee uses its interests under an IP license as collateral, the pre-existing 
license is “partially” prior to the security interests. If there is an anti-assignment or 
anti-encumbrance clause in the pre-existing IP license agreement, the US law 
invalidates such a clause to the extent that it impairs the creation or perfection (note: 
but not the enforcement) of security interests in the IP license (see further discussion in 
Chapter 5).555 
C. Secured creditors and subsequent licensees/assignees – with ordinary course 
non-exclusive licensee exception 
In the UCC-9, the general rule on the priority order among secured creditors and 
subsequent licensees and assignees is that, a properly “perfected” security interest in 
collateral continues after a sale, license, exchange, or other disposition of the collateral, 
unless the secured creditor authorized the disposition free of the security interest.556 
Same rule applies to the case of IP collateralization. A bone fide licensee takes the 
license free of “unperfected” security interests.557 
An exceptional protection is given to the “non-exclusive licensees in ordinary course 
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554 Alice Haemmerli, “Insecurity Interests: Where Intellectual Property and Commercial Law Collide,” 
Columbia Law Review 96, no. 7 (1996): 1645–1752. For example, if patent holder A assigns its patent to 
assignee B on 1st January, B can register the assignment any day before 1st April (the registration keeps the 
priority back to 1st January). On 1st February, when patent holder A is negotiating with the lender C about 
using the patent as collateral, even when the lender C diligently checks all the recordation at the USPTO, he 
cannot find any record showing that the patent has been assigned to B. Based on the check, the lender C accepts 
the patent as collateral on the 1st March. However, later, the lender C may surprisingly find out that the 
assignee B has registered the assignment on 20th February, which is later than the check day (1st February) but 
earlier than the creation of the security interests (1st March), and still within the grace-period (till 1st April). As 
the registration on 20th February actually keeps the priority back from 1st January, the lender C finds out that 
its security interests in the patent created on 1st March is “void” against the assignee B. The lender C cannot 
enforce the security interests against the assignee B at all.  
555 UCC 9-408 (a) and (d). 
556 UCC § 9-315. 
557 UCC § 9-317(d). 
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of business”,558 who can take its rights under a “non-exclusive” license free of a prior 
perfected security interest created by the licensor, even when the licensee knows of the 
existence of the security interests.559 The “non-exclusive” restriction was added in the 
last minute before the final approval of the Revised UCC-9, mainly because of the 
pressure from segments of the Copyright Bar that was against the extension to 
exclusive copyright licenses.560 The ordinary course of business exception only holds 
a non-exclusive licensee free of a security interest created by its immediate ordinary 
course licensor.561 
4.3.4 Enforcement 
In US law, with the silence in federal laws, the enforcement of security interests in all 
types of IP is governed by the UCC-9 or other applicable state laws. Upon default, a 
secured lender has a variety of non-exclusive UCC-9 mechanisms to get recovery.562 
The secured creditor may reduce a claim to judgment, foreclose, or otherwise enforce 
the claim or security interest by any available judicial or non-judicial procedure inside 
or outside the structure of the statute.563 
With the consent from the debtor, the secured creditor may exercise the legal right to 
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558 UCC § 9-321(a) (321 [License of General Intangible and Lessee of Goods in Ordinary Course of Business] 
(a) ["Licensee in ordinary course of business."]”In this section, "licensee in ordinary course of business" 
means a person that becomes a licensee of a general intangible in good faith, without knowledge that the 
license violates the rights of another person in the general intangible, and in the ordinary course from a 
person in the business of licensing general intangibles of that kind. A person becomes a licensee in the 
ordinary course if the license to the person comports with the usual or customary practices in the kind of 
business in which the licensor is engaged or with the licensor's own usual or customary practices.”) 
559 UCC § 9-321(b). 
560 See Murphy (2002) “Proposal for a Centralized and Integrated Registry for Security Interests in 
Intellectual Property”, supra note 494 at 518. 
561 Ibid, at 519 (giving examples that “If for example, the licensor grants an unauthorized exclusive license to 
use the intellectual property while such property is already subject to a perfected security interest created by 
the licensor, the exclusive licensee takes subject to the perfected security interest. If thereafter, the exclusive 
licensee grants a nonexcluive sublicense, the nonexclusive licensee could not rely on section 9-321(b) for 
protection against the security party, even if the sublicense was taken in the ordinary course. The 
nonexclusive sublicensee would not hold the sublicense free of the original perfected security interest 
because that interest was not created by its immediately ordinary course licensor.”) 
562 See UCC § 9-601(c)  
563 See UCC § 9-601(a) (providing rights of the secured party after debtor default. “After default, a secured 
party... may reduce a claim to judgment, foreclose, or otherwise enforce the claim, [or] security interest.., by 
any available judicial procedure .... ); UCC § 9-609, cmt. 3 (providing that the secured party's right to 
repossess collateral either through self-help or judicial means. The secured party has several options: (1) it 
can initiate an action for payment of the outstanding loan; (2) it can request judicial intervention to foreclose 
on the collateral; or (3) it can exercise self-help to seize the collateral so long as no breach of the peace 
occurs). 
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“strict foreclosure” and keep the IP collateral in full or partial satisfaction of the debt 
(or called “acceptance in satisfaction”).564 As the consequences of a strict foreclosure, 
the secured party acquires all of debtor's rights in collateral and the debt is discharged, 
meaning the secured creditor cannot pursue the debtor for any deficiency. If the 
secured party later sells the collateral to a third party, the debtor is not entitled to any 
surplus yielded.565 This remedy provides great flexibility and is often used in peaceful 
workouts. Otherwise, the usual method of disposition is a UCC foreclosure sale, in 
which the secured lender may sell the collateral in a public or private disposition and 
apply the proceeds to the satisfaction of the debt, through either judicial or 
non-judicial procedure.566 
A problematic issue in the foreclose sale of IP collateral is how to target the correct 
“regular market” in order to conform with the “commercially reasonable” requirement 
under the UCC 9. In the case of IP collateralization, as typically no universally 
recognized “regular market” for patents, trademarks, or copyrights exists in most cases, 
ensuring that a disposition is “commercially reasonable” presents difficulties.567 Case 
law has established that the most difficult part in the disposition process for the 
secured creditor is to locate the best market,568 to make sufficient adverting efforts in 
the best market,569 and to disclose necessary information about the encumbered IP, in 
order to find the most promising buyers and to allow the potential buyers to make 
appropriate evaluation of the encumbered IP.570 In some cases the best market for the 
encumbered IP may not even be the same as the market for the debtor’s business as a 

564 See UCC § 9-620 [Acceptance of Collateral in Full or Partial Satisfaction of Obligation]. 
565 See U.C.C. § 9-622 [Effects of acceptance of Collateral]; U.C.C. § 9-622 cmt. 2. 
566 See Jeff Makovicka and Chris Bikus, “Security Interests in IP - Part 3: Realizing on IP Collateral,” 
Nebraska Banker August (2012): 20–21 at 20. 
567 Makovicka and Bikus (2012), ibid, at 21. 
568 In In re Four Star Music Co., 2 B.R. 454 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1979) (four Star Music involved the sale of 
a copyrighted music catalog that was held not to have been carried out pursuant to commercially reasonable 
practices based upon the lender’s failure to seek specialized advice, obtain competent appraisal, and make 
attempts to reach logical purchasers). 
569 Advertising in the correct market is equally important to a commercially reasonable disposition. In the 
case of IP with a specific use within a specific industry, trade publications and the appropriate sections of 
publications in general circulation may be required. See Connex Press, Inc. v. International Airmotive, Inc., 
436 F. Supp. 51, 55 (D.D.C. 1977) (an advertisement for an airplane which appeared in the Wall Street 
Journal but not in the “Aviation” section is not advertised “in the correct market”). 
570 Such advertising should reach the relevant market and also disclose whatever information necessary to 
allow buyers in the particular trade to value the assets involved. In re Four Star Music Co., Inc., 2 B.R. at 
462– 63 (in disposing of IP rights in a music catalogue, the secured party must make significant attempts to 
reach the most logical purchasers, and the basic information, which should be made available to potential 
buyers, must be accumulated). 
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whole.571 So secured creditors are advised to enlist the debtor or other persons who 
know the debtor’s business, or similar kinds of IP as the encumbered IP, to assist in 
finding the correct market. 
With so much legal uncertainty regarding whether a foreclose sale of IP collateral 
conforms with the “commercially reasonable” requirement under the UCC 9, the 
“safest” way of having a “clean” enforcement of security interests in IP is through the 
judicial process.572  
4.4 UNCITRAL’s Supplement on IP Collateralization 
4.4.1 Background 
4.4.1.1 Other international efforts 
The international community has noticed the imperative need to articulate effective 
principles for secured transactions involving IP and has been working on promoting 
harmony between the secured transaction law and IP law for a long time. The 
fragmentation of laws pertaining to border-crossing IP collateralization is multiplied 
due to the legal diversity and pluralism in the international context. However, in line 
with their status at the national level, IP law and secured transaction law, at the 
international level, are traditionally subject to two separate regulatory administrative 
frameworks. International organizations specialized in IP laws or those specialized in 
secured transaction laws or financial laws can only make efforts within their limited 
regulatory frameworks and may not be able to fully take into account the 
developments in relevant neighboring fields. This limitation unavoidably impedes the 
international organizations from achieving significant progress. 
The efforts in international law in the IP sector are mainly conducted by the WIPO. 
Traditionally, the constitutional mandate of WIPO is promoting IP protection through 
international cooperation.573 In recent years, after having recognized the trend that IP 

571 See Wells Fargo Business Credit v. Environamics Corp., 77 Mass. App. Ct. 812, 821-22 (2010) (the 
dispute is about whether the WFBC’s methods of sale were commercially reasonable among dealers in the 
type of property that was the subject of the disposition). 
572 Makovicka and Bikus (2012), “Security Interests in IP - Part 3: Realizing on IP Collateral,” supra note 
566 at 21. 
573 Article 3 [Objectives of the Organization], the Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property 
Organization. 
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is becoming an increasing important source in secured transactions and the need to 
promote the effective financial exploitation of IP assets, the WIPO also started to fund 
research and to provide training programmes on IP financing and IP 
commercialization.574 The WIPO has incorporated IP collateralization into some 
treaties administered by it; for instance, the Patent Law Treaty harmonizes and 
streamlines formal procedures regarding patent applications and patents, and 
specifically refers to security interests. 575  However, these rules are mainly on 
procedural issues and do not refer to any substantive issues on IP collateralization.  
Among the international instruments regarding the modern secured transactions law,576 
two of them have been endorsed by a number of countries and multilateral 
organizations and are valuable for the secured financing reform. They are the World 
Bank Principles for Effective Insolvency and Creditor Rights System577 and the United 
Nations Convention on the Assignment of Receivables in International Trade578 in 
2001. The former has specific reference to IP collateralization, providing that there 
should be an “allowance of security interests in all types of movable assets […], 
including […] intellectual property and its proceeds”,579 and “special registries are 
beneficial in the case of certain kinds of assets, such as […] certain types of 
intellectual property (such as trademarks and copyrights).”580 However, these rules 
contain mainly general principles and do not touch upon any specific issues. The latter 
proposes many important principles for creating and enforcing security interests, 

574 See further information concerning these programs at: http://www.wipo.int/sme/en/. 
575 Article 14 (Regulation) of the Patent Law Treaty (PLT) (providing “(1) (Content) […] (b) The 
Regulations also provide rules concerning the formal requirements which Contracting Party shall be 
permitted to apply in respect of requests for: […] (iii) Recordation of a license or a security interest.” 
576 There are also many regional instruments, e.g. the Model Law on Secured Transactions, European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), London, 1994; the Uniform Act Organizing Securities, the 
Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa, 1 January 1998; the Law and Policy Reform 
at the Asian Development Bank – A Guide to Movables Registries 2000, Asian Development Bank, 
December 2000; the Model Inter-American Law on Secured. Transactions, Organization of American States, 
February 8, 2002. However, very few of them have incorporated specific rules concerning IP 
collateralization, e.g. the Model Law on Secured Transactions mentions IP in its Article 11, but merely states 
that there might be an additional registration for IP. Nor is there any expressed provision for IP 
collateralization in other instruments. 
577 World Bank Principles for Effective Insolvency and Creditor Rights System (Revised 2005), originally 
issued at April 2001, revised at December 2005. 
578 United Nations Convention on the Assignment of Receivables in International Trade, United Nations 
General Assembly Resolution A/RES/56/81, 31 January 2002. 
579 Part A (Legal Framework for Creditor Rights), A3 (Security (Movable Property), World Bank Principles 
for Effective Insolvency and Creditor Rights System (Revised 2005). 
580 Part A (Legal Framework for Creditor Rights), A4.3 (Registry Systems), World Bank Principles for 
Effective Insolvency and Creditor Rights System (Revised 2005). 
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however, without direct reference to IP.  
4.4.1.2 Drafting process of the Supplement 
Compared to other international efforts, the efforts of the United Nations Commission 
on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL)581 on drafting the Supplement dealing with 
security interest in intellectual property to the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on 
Secured Transactions (the Supplement) are the most important initiatives in the 
process of modernizing IP law and secured transaction law with a view of establishing 
a unitary system. It is for the first time that the international community has 
collectively undertaken efforts on the establishment of an efficient unitary legal 
framework for IP collateralization. The efforts led by UNCITRAL are supported by 
most of the other competent international organizations in related fields, such as, the 
WIPO, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The active 
participation of experts from these international organizations has increased the 
diversity of professional opinions in the process of modernization. The exchange of 
ideas from various fields is aimed to ensure that the unitary system is consistent with 
principles of both modern secured transaction laws and IP laws.  
The UNCITRAL firstly noticed the need to build a comprehensive system to 
modernize and harmonize national secured transaction laws to meet the demands of a 
global economy.582 During the drafting of the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on 
Secured Transactions (the Guide) with the goal of “alleviating the inequalities in the 
access to lower-cost credit between parties”,583 the UNCITRAL Commission started 

581 The UNCITRAL was established by the General Assembly of United Nations in 1966 with the general 
mandate of progressively harmonizing legislative reforms among Member States and unifying the laws of 
international trade, in order to reduce or remove the legal obstacles to the free flow of international trade 
among different countries and regions. While the WTO coordinates Member State’s efforts toward the 
harmonization of international trade law from the perspective of public international law, the UNCITRAL 
performs a similar role in the United Nations system for international trade law from a private law 
perspective. 
582 So the UNCITRAL started to draft the Guide, which was designed to include “a set of core principles for 
an efficient legal regime governing secured transactions” as well as detailed “model legislative provisions” 
covering almost all main issues of secured transactions law. Paragraph 357 and 458, Report of the United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law on its thirty-third session, Official Records of General 
Assembly of United Nations, Fifty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 17 (A/55/17). And for an overview of 
UNCITRAL’s efforts in the sector of secured transactions, see Spiros V. Bazinas, “UNCITRAL’s Work in 
the Field of Secured Transactions,” in Emerging Financial Markets and Secured Transactions, ed. Joseph J. 
Norton and Mads Andenas, 1998, 211–18. 
583 Paragraph 347, Guide. More specifically, the key objectives of the Guide are the following: 1. to promote 
low-cost credit by enhancing the availability of secured credit; 2. to allow debtors to use the full value 
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to realize that IP were assuming an increasingly important role in international trade as 
a value source of credit and thus should be included in the modern secured transaction 
law.584 The Commission noted that IP collateralization is generally compatible with 
the modern secured transaction law system recommended in the Guide, because the 
Guide does not mention issues relating to the existence, validity and content of the 
encumbered IP.585 However, it also noted that the distinctiveness of IP does bring a 
certain degree of incompatibility, especially on particular issues such as the creation, 
third-party effectiveness and enforcement of security interests. This divergence needed 
to be accommodated through certain adjustments. 
To avoid a possible inconsistency between the Guide and the rules in IP laws, and to 
ensure that an enacting State’s IP law would not be “inadvertently” changed as a 
consequence of the implementation of the recommendations given in the Guide,586 the 
Commission incorporated the Guide with Recommendation 4 (b) to prioritize national 
laws or international agreements concerning IP587 over the Guide in the event of an 
inconsistency.  
    Recommendation 4 (b)  
“[T]he law should not apply to: (b) intellectual property, in so far as the provisions of the law 
are inconsistent with national law or international agreements, to which the State is a party, 
relating to intellectual property.” 
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inherent in their assets to support credit; 3. to enable parties to obtain security rights in a simple and efficient 
manner; 4. to provide for equal treatment of diverse sources of credit and of diverse forms of secured 
transaction; 5. to validate non-possessory security rights in all types of asset; 6. to enhance certainty and 
transparency by providing for registration of a notice in a general security rights registry; 7. to establish clear 
and predictable priority rules; 8. to facilitate efficient enforcement of a secured creditors’ rights; 9. to allow 
parties maximum flexibility to negotiate the terms of their security agreement; 10. to balance the interests of 
persons affected by a secured transaction; 11. to harmonize secured transactions laws, including 
conflict-of-laws rules. See Paragraph 46-59, Introduction, and Recommendation 1 (Key objectives of an 
effective and efficient secured transactions law), Guide.  
584 Paragraph 81, Report of United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on the Work of Its 
Thirty-ninth Session, Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixty-first Session, Supplement No. 17, 
(A/61/17). 
585 See Section A (4), A/CN.9/WG.VI/WP.42/Add/1. 
586 See Paragraph 33, Part1, Commentary, Guide.   
587 As a matter of fact, instead of “IP law”, both the Guide and the Supplement use the expression “law 
relating to intellectual property”, which refers to “law that governs specifically security rights in IP, and not 
law that generally governs security rights in various types of asset and that may happen to govern security 
rights in IP”. For example, if a state adopted a law that applies specifically to pledges of rights in software, 
that would be a “law relating to intellectual property”. This expression is not limited solely to statutory 
enactments but includes “both statutory and non-statutory law”. It is broader than IP law but narrower than 
general contract law or property law. See Paragraph 88, Part 1, Commentary, Guide; Paragraph 17, 
Supplement. 
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By this approach, the UNCITRAL could go on preparing the Guide without keeping 
the complicated IP issues in mind. However, the UNCITRAL also realized that this 
approach also has its drawbacks. It would be inefficient and impractical to separate IP 
laws entirely from the modern secured transaction law.588 First, this simple separation 
also prevents IP collateralization benefiting from the modernized secured transaction 
law. Second, the cross-cutting nature of IP collateralization determines that the 
separation is just impossible, because the adoption of suggestions in the Guide may 
still have certain implications for the national IP laws.  
To address these drawbacks, the Commission determined that there was a need to draft 
a special annex on security interests in IP to the Guide as a supplement, i.e. the 
UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions: Supplement on Security 
Rights in Intellectual Property (the Supplement).589 The Supplement endeavors to 
enhance the availability of low-cost secured credits without interfering with 
fundamental policies of IP law.590 It discusses ways of how the commentary and 
recommendations of the Guide would apply in the case of IP collateralization, points 
out possible implications which the Guide may have for the existing IP laws of 
enacting States and, only in a very few necessary cases, incorporates some modest 
IP-specific suggestions for enacting States.  
The recommendations given in the Guide and the Supplement are non-binding rules. 
Enacting States are expected, with the consideration of the recommendations, to 
review and assess the economic efficiency of their secured transactions laws and IP 
laws, to identify inconsistencies among them, and to find out practical solutions to 
repair these inconsistencies. The final decisions on how best to domestically 
coordinate IP law with modernized secured transactions law would be made by 
enacting states themselves according to their own situations.  
Because of the competing interests and heterogeneous legal cultures among the 
participating jurisdictions, the progress in drafting the Supplement was much slower 

588 See Brennan (2009), “International Intellectual Property Financing: An Overview,” supra note 261. 
589 The document was initially called the Annex to the UNITRAL Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions 
dealing with security rights in IP, but was later changed to the Supplement to the UNCITRAL Legislative 
Guide dealing with security interest in intellectual property (the Supplement) later. See Paragraph 162, 
Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on the Work of Its Fortieth Session, 
Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixty-first Session, Supplement No. 17, A/62/17 (Part I). 
590 Para 1 (Purpose of the Supplement) and para 46-52, Supplement. 
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than was expected.591 After three years of negotiation and various drafts, the final text 
of the Supplement was eventually completed in February 2010 and approved by the 
United Nations General Assembly in December 2010.592  
In the following part, we briefly discuss the controversial topics that emerged at the 
time of the drafting of the Supplement and examine the final rules in the Supplement. 
The examination is expected to reveal how the characteristics of IP give rise to 
numerous difficulties in the coordination of the two legal regimes and to see if the 
solutions adopted in the Supplement are effective in solving the difficulties.  
4.4.2 Creation of Security Interests in IP 
4.4.2.1 Transaction structure 
In view of the objective of establishing a security right in a simple and efficient 
way,593 the Guide also makes a distinction between the creation and the third-party 
effectiveness of a security interest.594 
With the strong influence from the UCC-9 and previous achievements in the modern 
secured transactions law, one basic policy of the system recommended by the Guide is 
to adopt a “functional, integrated and comprehensive” approach, which directs the 
focus on the substance rather than the form.595 The Guide treats all transactions that 
create a right in any movable asset (including intangibles rights) meant to secure the 

591 See Andrea Tosato, “The UNCITRAL Annex on Security Rights in IP: A Work in Progress,” Journal of 
Intellectual Property Law & Practice 4, no. 10 (2009): 743–750 at 746. Facing this pending dilemma, the 
Commission decided to first adopt the Guide at the resumed fortieth session in Vienna on 14 December 2007 
(with the approval of the United Nations General Assembly on 11 December 2008). The Guide includes 
thousands of commentaries and 242 recommendations which are categorized into twelve chapters. It is the 
second text prepared by the UNCITRAL in the field of secured transaction law after the United Nations 
Convention on the Assignment of Receivables in International Trade. The Commission left the Supplement 
to further discussions under the Working Group VI. After the adoption of the Guide, the entrusted Working 
Group VI organized five sessions for discussion in cooperation with other professional organizations on 
some specific matters, such as Working Group V (Insolvency Law), WIPO and other IP institutions from the 
public and private sector as well as the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International 
Law. The various drafts can be found at: 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/working_groups/6Security_Interests.html.  
592 UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions: Supplement on Security Rights in Intellectual 
Property. Official Records of the General Assembly, Six-fifth Session, Supplement No. 17 (A/65/17), June 
29, 2007, United Nations General Assembly Resolution 65/23 of December 2010.  
593 Recommendation 1 (c), Guide; Paragraph 77, Supplement.  
594 Recommendation 30, Guide.  
595 Para 101-112, Chapter I, and Recommendation 8, Guide 
 ʹͲͷ
performance of an obligation (i.e. the fulfillment of security functions) as secured 
transactions, and uniformly covers all these transactions with an integrated notion - 
“security rights”.596 For intangible assets like IP, security rights are uniformly created 
by the execution of a proper written security agreement between the secured creditor 
and the debtor/grantor.  
4.4.2.2 Scope of IP eligible for collateralization 
Consistent with the objective of “promoting low-cost credit by enhancing the 
availability of secured credit”,597 the Guide tries to cover as many assets as possible 
so as to enable the debtors598 to fully exploit the maximum value of their assets as 
collateral.599  
The property right eligible for collateral is not limited to ownership, but can also be a 
usufruct right or a contractual right under an agreement.600 Similarly, a security 
right can be created not only in an existing asset but also in an after-acquired 
asset.601 The security rights in the collateral should be extended automatically to the 
various forms of proceeds of the collateral, such as natural fruits or revenues, even 
proceeds of proceeds, except for being explicitly excluded.602 Multiple security rights 
can be created in the same assets. Under the Guide, the sole general requirement for an 
asset to be encumbered (except for receivables) is that, under the domestic laws of 
enacting States or previous contracts, the asset is assignable for security credit 
purposes.603  

596 Recommendation 8, Guide (providing “The law should adopt a functional approach, under which it 
covers all rights in movable assets that are created by agreement and secured the payment or other 
performance of an obligation, regardless of the form of the transaction or the terminology used by the parties 
[…]”. Even though some functional exceptions and adjustments are given to specific assets and transactions 
for special needs in certain situations, they are nevertheless minimal. See Recommendation 9, Guide. 
597 Recommendation 1 (a), Guide.  
598 Under the Guide, the person who creates the security right is called as a “grantor”; the person who owes 
the obligation or debt is a “debtor”. As the security can be provided by another party, the grantor may be a 
third party other than the debtor.  
599 Recommendation 1 (b), Guide.  
600 Paragraph 13, Supplement. 
601 Recommendation 17, Guide. Because security rights can be created on future assets, the grantor need not 
have rights in the asset to be encumbered or the power to encumber it at the conclusion of the security 
agreement. In the case of future asset, the grantor can acquire that right or power at a later time. See 
Recommendation 13, Guide. 
602 Recommendation 19, Guide. 
603  Recommendation 18, Guide. The Guide provides receivables with some exemptions from some 
legislative and contractual restrictions on transferability. See Recommendation 23-25, Guide. 
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A. Encompassing IP to the maximum extent 
When it comes to the problem of how to guarantee maximum compatibility with IP 
laws at both the international and the national level, the Guide and the Supplement 
clarify their position that they do not intend to identify all assets that a state might 
consider to be IP.604 They simply define IP as, 
“copyrights, trademarks, patents, service marks, trade secrets and designs and any 
other asset considered to be IP under the domestic law of the enacting States or 
under an international agreement to which the enacting State is a party (such as, 
for example, neighboring, allied or related rights or plant varieties).”605 
And they allow enacting States to add or remove types of IP from the given list for 
keeping consistent with their domestic laws.606 In this way, the Guide and the 
Supplement try to ensure that all types of IP recognized in the domestic IP laws of 
enacting States may be encumbered as collateral for credit. They let the national 
legislators decide the characterization and assignability of different types of IP.  
B. Treatment of rights under IP license agreements 
The Supplement explains that the term “intellectual property” should be understood as 
comprising not only various exclusive rights enjoyed by IP owners607 but also all 
contractual rights enjoyed by licensors and licensees in license agreements, as long as 
these rights are assignable according to IP laws.608 As result, a security right in IP may 
be given by the owner of the IP or alternatively by the licensor or licensee of an IP 
license agreement.  
a. Licensor’s right to royalty payment 

604 Paragraph 54, Supplement. 
605 “Intellectual property”, Section B (Terminology and interpretation), Introduction, Guide; Paragraph 18, 
Supplement. 
606 Para 18, Supplement. 
607 In the Supplement, the rights enjoyed by an IP owner generally include the following rights: (1) the right 
to enjoy and exploit its IP; (2) the exclusive right to prevent others from unauthorized use of its IP, and the 
right to pursue infringers and to obtain an injunction and/or monetary compensation; (3) the right to deal 
with authorities in the various stages of the registration process (for example, the right to file an application 
for the registration of intellectual property, the right to register intellectual property or to renew registration); 
and (4) the right to authorize others to exploit its intellectual property and the right to collect royalties. See 
Paragraph 54, Supplement. 
608 See Paragraph 89-96, 106-107, Supplement. 
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In the Supplement, all “the retained rights of a licensor, such as the ownership right, 
rights associated with ownership and the rights of a licensor under a licence agreement 
(such as the right to grant further licences or obtain payment of royalties), may be used 
by the licensor as security for credit.”609 
The royalties from the license and assignment of IP can be treated as proceeds of 
IP.610 In this case, royalties would be automatically covered by security interests in 
the original IP and thus also be encumbered to secure the principal obligations, except 
when explicitly excluded.611 Meanwhile, if having been appropriately described in the 
security agreement, the licensor’s right to payment of royalties can also be treated as a 
kind of independent asset and therefore be encumbered as original collateral by 
itself.612 Under the Supplement, regardless of being covered by security interests in 
original IP or being independently financed, the licensor’s right to the payment of 
royalties is treated as a kind of “receivable”, i.e. a right to payment of monetary 
obligations.613 
During the draft process of the Supplement, there was extensive discussion about how 
to apply these exceptions given to receivables under the Guide to the case of IP. The 
Guide eliminates some statutory and contractual restrictions on transferability for 
some receivables. For statutory prohibitions, the Guide provides that the law should 
not prohibit an assignment of contractual receivables on the sole ground that the 
receivables are future receivables or receivables that are assigned in bulk or in part (or 
undivided).614 For contractual prohibitions, the Guide provides that an assignment of a 

609 Paragraph 89-97 and 188, Supplement; Paragraph 97, Supplement (providing “the other contractual rights 
might include, for example: (a) the licensor’s right to compel the licensee to advertise the licensed intellectual 
property or product with respect to which the intellectual property is used; (b) the licensor’s right to compel 
the licensee to market the licensed intellectual property only in a particular manner; and (c) the licensor’s 
right to terminate the licence agreement as a result of breach by the licensee”.) 
610 Recommendation 19, 39, 40, 100 and 168 Guide; Paragraph 91 and 190, Supplement. 
611 Recommendation 19, Guide. 
612 Paragraph 97, Supplement. 
613 “Receivable”, Section B (Terminology and interpretation), Introduction, Guide; Recommendation 24, 
Guide; Paragraph 98, Supplement. 
614 Recommendation 23 (Effectiveness of a bulk assignment of receivables and an assignment of a future 
receivable or a part of or an undivided interest in a receivable), Guide (providing: “The law should provide 
that: (a) An assignment of contractual receivables that are not specifically identified, a future receivable or a 
part of or an undivided interest in a receivable is effective as between the assignor and the assignee and as 
against the debtor of the receivable as long as, at the time of the assignment or, in the case of a future 
receivable, at the time it arises, it can be identified to the assignment to which it relate; and (b) unless 
otherwise agreed, an assignment of one or more future receivables is effective without a new act of transfer 
being required to assign each receivable.”); 
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receivable should be effective despite an anti-assignment clause.615 It was concerned 
that applying these exceptions to receivables to IP might undermine some important 
policy considerations that IP laws aim to achieve, such as preventing the assignment of 
equitable remuneration for ensuring that the rights of authors and performers to 
payment are not contractually undermined by large publishers or and film producers 
(Section 3.4.2.2) or obstruct the licensor’s capability of controlling the licensed IP, 
who can use it and the flow of royalty payments.616  
In the end, the Supplement holds its standpoint that the exceptions should be retained 
in the context of IP, by explaining that these exemptions only apply in very limited 
cases and therefore do not give rise to many conflicts in IP collateralization. First, 
these statutory prohibitions in IP laws are on the ground of protecting the rights of 
authors and performers, not on the sole ground that the receivables are future 
receivables or receivables that are assigned in bulk or in part, so these statutory 
prohibitions would not be affected by this exemption to statutory prohibitions.617 
Second, the exception to contractual limitations only applies to these anti-assignment 
clauses that prohibit the licensor from assigning the “royalty arising from the sale or 
license of intellectual property”, but does not affect these anti-assignment clauses that 
prohibit the licensee from further assigning or licensing the underlying IP.618 The 
latter kind of anti-assignment clauses would be still effective and binding; so the 
licensor’s capability of controlling the licensed IP, who can use it and the flow of 
royalty payments, is not affected at all. Third, even in the case where the exception to 
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615 Recommendation 24 (Effectiveness of an assignment of a receivable made despite an anti-assignment 
clause), Guide (providing: “The law should provide that: (a) An assignment of a receivable is effective as 
between the assignor and the assignee and as against the debtor of the receivable notwithstanding an 
agreement between the initial or any subsequent assignor and the debtor of the receivable or any subsequent 
assignee limiting in any way the assignor’s right to assign its receivables; (b) Nothing in this 
recommendation affects any obligation or liability of the assignor for breach of the agreement mentioned in 
subparagraph (a) of this recommendation, but the other party to such an agreement may not avoid the 
original contract or the assignment contract on the sole ground of that breach. A person that is not a party to 
such an agreement is not liable on the sole ground that it had knowledge of the agreement.”). 
616 See Brennan (2009), “International Intellectual Property Financing: An Overview,” supra note 261 at 32 
(providing “applying the Guide’s policy of eliminating restrictions on transferability of trade receivables to 
IP royalties could have the perverse effect of undermining the policy protections of small creditors both the 
Guide and IP laws intend to foster, just as an application of the IP rules restricting the transferability of 
royalties would have inappropriate consequences if applied to all forms of trade receivables.”). 
617 Recommendation 23 (a), Guide; Paragraph 99 and 119, Supplement. 
618 Recommendation 24 (a), Guide; Paragraph 102-103, 120, Supplement. 
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contractual limitation applies, the licensors will still be liable for damages caused by 
its breach of the anti-assignment agreement.619  
b. Licensee’s interest to exploitation 
Under the Supplement, the rights of a licensee include “the authorization given to the 
licensee to use the licensed IP in accordance with the terms of the licence agreement 
and possibly the right to enter into sub-licence agreements and the right to obtain 
payment of sub-royalties”.620 All the rights can be used as security.  
However, any contractual limitation in the license agreement as to the assignability of 
licensed rights should be respected.621 A licensee can use his rights to use or exploit 
the licensed IP as collateral,622 but only if he has the power to do so (based on the 
nemo dat principle, i.e., the grantor cannot grant to the secured creditor more rights 
than the grantor has or may acquire in future).623 If the license agreement includes an 
anti-attachment or anti-assignment clause, no enforceable security right in the license 
can be created without the consent of the licensor.624 The Supplement suggests that the 
creditors should carefully check the terms and conditions of the license agreement to 
ensure that the creditor can actually acquires the licensee’s right as satisfaction of the 
secured obligation at the time of post-default enforcement.625 We will further discuss 
the relevant problems in Chapter 5.  
C. Future IP 
One of the basic policies of the Guide is that the encumbered assets can cover future 
assets.626 Even though security rights in future assets may give rise to a certain 
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619 Recommendation 24 (b), Guide; Paragraph 105 and 120, Supplement. 
620 Paragraph 16, Supplement. 
621 Paragraph 25 and 90, Supplement. 
622 Paragraph 17 and 190, Supplement. The Supplement also gives an example of using the rights of a 
licensee as collateral. See Paragraph 41, the Supplement.  
623 Recommendation 13 and 18, Guide; Paragraph 55, 82, 86, 90 and 119, Supplement (the nemo dat (quod 
non habet) principle).  
624 Paragraph 52, Supplement. Of course, if there is no restriction on the assignability of the licensee’s rights 
in the licensee agreement (which rarely happens), it is considered that the licensee’s rights are freely 
assignable. A secured creditor can take a security right in the licensee’s rights subject to the terms and 
conditions of the license agreement. In this case, upon the licensee-debtor’s default, the secured creditor can 
directly enforce his security interests and dispose of the encumbered licensee to an assignee. See Paragraph 
107 and 250, Supplement. 
625 Paragraph 253, Supplement.  
626 Recommendation 17, Guide. 
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liquidation dilemma upon the debtor’s default, the Guide is strongly against imposing 
the statutory prohibitions on the collateralization of future assets by stipulating as 
follows: 
“[T]echnical notions of property law should not be invoked to pose obstacles to 
meeting the practical need of using future assets as security to obtain credit. In 
addition, business debtors can protect their own interests and do not need 
statutory limitations on the transferability of rights in future assets. Moreover, 
permitting future assets to be encumbered makes it possible for debtors with 
insufficient present assets to obtain assets, which is likely to enhance their 
business and benefit all credits, including unsecured creditors. To the extent that 
certain debtors may need protection against unwise encumbering of future assets, 
this should be a matter to be addressed in other law, such as consumer protection 
law.”627 
With the same position, the Supplement also believes that the high risk associated with 
future IP is a factor that should be considered by secured creditors and can be 
negotiated or avoided through other contractual arrangements, such as reducing the 
amount of secured debts or requiring additional collateral; a statutory limitation or 
prohibition would just restrict the parties from negotiating and therefore is not 
necessary. 
Moreover, the Supplement also agrees with the standpoint that allowing the creation of 
security rights in future IP would enable IP right holders to obtain funds for the 
development of new works and to achieve the maximization of commercial utility in 
IP.628 Hence it suggests that enacting States should review their IP laws so as to make 
it possible to use future IP rights as collateral, as long as the assignability of these 
future rights has not been expressly prohibited in IP laws for some reasonable IP 
policy considerations.629 
A security right is created at the time when the security right was attached to the 
collaterals.630 For a present asset, the security right would be effective as to the 
encumbered assets as soon as the entry of the security agreement. For a future asset, 
the security right would not be created until the debtor acquires rights in the 
encumbered asset or the power to encumber the asset. 
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627 Para 53, Chapter 2, Guide.  
628 Para 114, Supplement. 
629 Recommendation 17, Guide; Para 113 and 114, Supplement. 
630 See Recommendation13, Guide. 
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4.4.2.3 The preference to the general description of encumbered IP  
The Guide has explicated that the best risk control in secured transactions is to “allow 
debtors to use the full value inherent in their assets to support credit”631 and to support 
with sound secured transaction laws and insolvency laws, as well as “effective and 
efficient judicial systems and other enforcement mechanisms”632. Within this system, 
the assessment of risk associated with collaterals should be left to parties of secured 
transactions to decide. The Guide therefore sets out only minimum requirements on 
the creation of a security right and chooses to “allow parties maximum flexibility to 
negotiate the terms of their security agreement.”633 
In the formality, an agreement must be concluded in or evidenced by a written 
document signed by the parties.634 For the content, the written security agreement is 
only required to “identify the secured creditor and the grantor (debtor), and describe 
the secured obligation and the encumbered assets in a manner that reasonably allows 
their identification.”635 Enacting States are recommended to adopt the concept of “an 
all-asset security right”, so as to allow the debtor to encumber all of its assets, present 
or future ones, through a general description in a single document.636  
With regard to these possible conflicts with the possible stricter requirements of IP 
laws on specific description (Section 3.3.3), the Supplement argues that there is no 
need for imposing statutory requirements on a specific description of the encumbered 
IP, by stating as follows,  
“If the parties wish to describe the encumbered intellectual property rights in a 
specific way, they are always entitled to do so and will probably do so in most 
cases; but this should not deprive the parties of the right to describe the 
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631 Recommendation 1 (b), Guide.  
632 Paragraph 2, Introduction, Guide. 
633 Recommendation 1 (i), Guide. 
634 It is irrelevant whether the written document is a separated agreement or a clause contained in the 
principal loan agreement. Furthermore, a simple written statement which by itself or in conjunction with the 
course of conduct between the parties has the capability of indicating the intention of the parties to create a 
security right is sufficient. See Recommendation 15, Guide. 
635 Recommendation 14, Guide. Parties of a secured transaction are allowed to agree on encumbering only 
parts of a grantor’s asset or only for up to a limited amount, provided that they have specifically described 
this in their security agreement in a reasonable way. When the parties only specify the asset to be 
encumbered without further description or any contrary agreement, the asset is considered as being 
encumbered for the full value of the entirety of the grantor’s rights thereof at the time of enforcement. See 
Paragraph 50, Commentary Chapter 2, Guide. 
636 Recommendation 17, Guide. 
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encumbered intellectual property rights in a general way.”637 
The Supplement suggests that the States should consider minimizing their 
requirements on description, except where the specific description is for serving 
specific reasonable policy objectives of IP laws.638 And it suggests that enacting 
States should allow a proper description of the future IP in order to enable the creation 
of security rights in future IP.639 It tries to use this flexible approach to avoid 
inconsistencies with requirements in other laws, but also leaves enough autonomy to 
parties of secured transactions in the negotiation of their security agreements. However, 
it does not explain in which cases specific description is necessary for some 
reasonable policy objectives of IP laws at all. 
4.4.2.4 Pre-default rights and obligations of debtors and secured creditors 
When it comes to the allocation of pre-default rights and obligations as to the 
preservation and the exploitation of collaterals between the debtor and the secured 
creditor, the Guide recognizes the freedom of parties, respects the established 
practices,640 and actively encourages the debtor and secured creditor to draft the 
detailed provisions in their security agreement to fit specific practical needs.641  
It only imposes two mandatory rules concerning the pre-default rights and obligations. 
First, the party in possession of the collateral must take reasonable steps to preserve 
the collateral and its value,642 and; second, the secured creditor must return the 
encumbered asset and cancel the registered notice upon the termination of principal 
obligations or the extinguishment of security interests.643  
Apart from the mandatory limitations, the Guide enacts a greater number of 
non-mandatory rules as default rules, which would apply where the parties do not 
specify otherwise in their security agreement, to emphasize the maintenance rights and 
obligations of the secured creditor. Unless otherwise agreed, the “secured creditor” is 
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637 Paragraph 84, Supplement. 
638 Paragraph 85, Supplement. 
639 Paragraph 118, Supplement. 
640 The Guide admits that, in the case without a contrary agreement, any agreed usages and any established 
practices between the parties can be sources of determining allocation of rights and obligations between the 
parties. See Recommendation 110, Guide. 
641 Recommendation 10, Guide. 
642 Recommendation 111, Guide. 
643 Recommendation 112 and 72. Guide. 
 ʹͳ͵
entitled644  
- (a) to be reimbursed for reasonable expenses incurred for the preservation of an 
encumbered asset in its possession;  
- (b) to make reasonable use of an encumbered asset in its possession and to apply 
the revenues it generates to the payment of the secured obligation; and  
- (c) to inspect an encumbered asset in the possession of the grantor. 
The Supplement notices that the mandatory rules and non-mandatory rules in the 
Guide are based on a physical possession of the collateral. In the case of IP 
collateralization, where the encumbered IP is still kept under the control of the debtor, 
the Supplement allocates the obligation to maintain the value of the encumbered IP to 
the debtor. It explains that in an IP-based transaction it is the “grantor/debtor” who is 
obliged to deal with the authorities, to renew registrations and to pursue infringers to 
preserve the validity and value of encumbered IP.645  
Regarding the secured creditor’s concerns about the debtor’s failure in taking 
sufficient action to preserve the liquidation value of the encumbered IP, the 
Supplement admits in its final version that it is necessary to provide secured creditors 
with some alternatives to help them obtain the right to monitor the debtor’s 
exploitation and maintenance of the encumbered IP with the objective of protecting 
secured creditors’ legitimate interests.646 It therefore adds a specific recommendation 
to remind the secured creditor to secure its right to take necessary steps to protect its 
security right, i.e., “[The] law should provide that the debtor and the secured creditor 
may agree that the secured creditor is entitled to take steps to preserve the encumbered 
intellectual property.”647 
4.4.3 Perfection, Publicity and Priority 
4.4.3.1 The co-existence of the general registry and IP-specific registries  
The Guide proposes a simple, notice-based, cost-efficient and effective, centralized 
public “general registry” system as the basic mechanism for the perfection and 
publicity of security rights in intangible assets, in order to enhance certainty and 
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644 See Recommendation 113, Guide. The Guide does not enumerate every possible non-mandatory rule but 
suggests enacting that States provide flexible non-mandatory rules in their laws for their specific needs. 
645 Paragraph 223, Supplement 
646 Paragraph 224-226, Supplement.  
647 Recommendation 246, Supplement; Recommendation 116 bis, Guide. 
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transparency.648 The unitary general registry system allows an advance registration of 
later-created security interests and a consolidation of multiple registrations between 
the same debtor and secured creditor in a single registry record. It helps parties of 
secured transactions avoid the burden of making continuous registrations each time the 
debtor acquires a new asset or creates a new security right. The registration in the 
notice-based general security registry649 renders the registered security right effective 
against all third parties and consequently gives the secured creditor a priority over all 
third parties, regardless of their knowledge.650 The registry is relieved of the advance 
scrutiny or approval of the content of the registered notice.651 The Supplement tries to 
solve the problems of coordinating the different registry systems for IP after an 
enacting State builds a general registry system as recommended in the Guide.  
For unregistered IP, such as copyright and trade secrets, the introduction of the general 
registry system as proposed in the Guide would enable the financing of these IP. These 
unregistered IP can always be registered with the recommended general security 
registry to achieve the third-party effectiveness and therefore become financeable.  
For registered IP, like trademarks and patents, the question of how to design a 
workable resolution to coordinate two systems was at the heart of discussions during 
the drafting of the Supplement.652 On the one hand, some opinions considered that the 
policy rules in the Guide effectively simplified the achievement of third-party 
effectiveness of security rights, especially those in future assets, and therefore 
preferred to reform the current IP-specific registries. On the other hand, some other 
opinions believed that the IP-specific registry systems are better tailored to the 
characteristics of particular types of IP and work more coherently with other rules in 
IP laws, and consequently tended to continue the current IP practices.  
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648 Recommendation 1(f), Guide. 
649 Recommendation 76, Guide. The notice is limited to basic information concerning the security right: (a) 
the identities of the parties; (b) a description of the encumbered asset in a manner that reasonably allows its 
identification; (c) the duration of registration; and if required in the domestic laws of the enacting State, (d) 
the maximum amount for which the security right may be enforced. See Recommendation 57 and 63, Guide. 
A registrant does not need to submit the underlying security agreement or any other evidential materials for 
the registration of a notice. Recommendation 54 (b), Guide. 
650 The third-party effectiveness of a registration is achieved as from the time when the information 
contained in the notice is entered into the registry records and becomes searchable for third-party searchers. 
See Recommendation 32, 70 and 76, Guide. 
651 Recommendation 54 (d), Guide.  
652 See Tosato (2009) “The UNCITRAL Annex on Security Rights in IP: A Work in Progress”, supra note 
591 at 747.  
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In the end, the Supplement chooses a modest approach, which does not recommend a 
profound reform of the current IP-specific registries but suggests a co-existence of 
specialized IP registries and the general registry as recommended in the Guide. It 
provides that, if IP laws require registration in the specialized IP registry as the only 
way of achieving the third-party effect, these IP rules get priority.653 In this case, a 
security right cannot be made effective against third parties by way of a registration in 
the general registry. In other cases without such an “IP-registry only limitation”, the 
Supplement permits the co-existence of specialized IP registry and the general registry. 
In the dual registration schemes, parties can choose either registry to achieve the 
third-party effect (but the registrations at IP-specific registries are given a higher 
priority; see the discussion in the following section).654 To maintain a harmonious 
co-existence of both registry systems, the Supplement provides some suggestions on 
ensuring efficient and effective communication between the two registry systems, such 
as maintaining both debtor-based and asset-based indexes in all registries, and the 
forwarding of copies and implementing a simultaneously searchable common gateway 
among registries.655  
This approach encourages secured creditors to use IP-specific registries for achieving 
a maximum degree of protection, but without directly giving suggestions on reforming 
the IP registries, which is beyond the mandate of the UNCITRAL.  
4.4.3.2 Priority rule 
The Guide permits the co-existence of more than one security right on the same 
encumbered asset and centers the priority on its whole structure and designs an 
elaborate system of simple and clear priority rules. The Guide’s priority system is 
based on the “first-to-file rule”, the “principle of continuation of disposition” and the 
“principle of subordination”.656 In order to ensure the coordination between these two 
registry systems and to preserve the reliability of registrations under IP registries, the 
Supplement set clear priority rules. 
A. Conflicting security interests 
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653 Recommendations 34 (a) (iii) and 38 (a), Guide; Paragraph 126, Supplement. 
654 Paragraph 128, Supplement. 
655 Paragraph 139, Supplement. 
656 A secured creditor or a competing claimant can subordinate its priority unilaterally or by agreement, as 
long as not affecting the legitimate interests of other third parties Recommendation 94, Guide. 
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If various security rights are registered with the same registry, the priority order is 
determined by rules of the registry concerned. For the general registry recommended 
in the Guide, the “first-to-file rule” is adopted, i.e., the priority order is generally 
established on the basis of the time of registration, regardless of competing claimants’ 
knowledge.657  
When there is a co-existence of two registry schemes, in the case of multiple security 
rights registered with different registries in the same IP, priority is given to the security 
right registered with IP-specific registries, irrespective of the time of registration.658 It 
is clear that in this priority system the most appropriate way for a secured creditor to 
achieve a maximum protection of its priority status is to register the security rights 
with an IP-specific registry. For multiple security rights registered at the same 
IP-specific registry, the priority is determined by the “first-to-file rule”.659 
B. Pre-existing licensee/licensor v. security interests 
The Guide follows the nemo dat principle, which requires that the grantor cannot grant 
to the secured creditor more rights than the grantor has or may acquire in future.660 
Accordingly, the Supplement explains the priority orders in several complicated cases. 
For the case where a grantor is the IP owner who creates security interests in its IP 
itself and had previously granted an exclusive license to a third party (as in Section 
3.3.2.2 B and problems discussed in Section 3.5.2), the Supplement explains that, 
“upon default, the secured creditor would be unable to grant another licence covering 
the same use within the same geographical and time limits of the licence”, as the 
grantor itself had no such right to do so.661 So, the pre-existing licensee would not be 
affected by the subsequent security interests. 
For the case where a IP owner grants a security interest in its rights (to royalties) as a 
licensor against the licensee, and the licensee also grants a security interest in its rights 
(to sub-royalties) as a sub-licensor against the sub-licensee (similar as in Section 
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657 Recommendation 76(a) and 93, Guide; Paragraph 175-178, Supplement. 
658 Recommendation 77 (a), Guide. Paragraph 138, 181, Supplement. 
659 Recommendation 77 (b), Guide. Paragraph 181, Supplement. 
660 See explanation on the nemo dat principle in supra note 623 and its companying text. 
661 Paragraph 237, Supplement (“the secured creditor may be able to grant another licence outside the 
geographical or time limits of the exclusive licence previously granted by the grantor.”) 
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3.3.2.2 C and problems discussed in Section 3.5.2),662 the Supplement explains that 
there is no problem of priority order between the two security interests, since they 
actually encumber different assets. While for the first case the collateral is the 
licensor’s right to royalties owed by the licensee; for the latter case the collateral is the 
licensee’s right to sub-royalties owed by the sub-licensee.663 And for the cases where 
the first licensor worries that the security rights in the licensee’s rights to sub-royalties 
may have an impact on its capability to collect royalties from the licensee, the 
Supplement suggests that the first licensor should use contract terms to protect its 
interests, such as prohibiting the licensee from granting a security right in its right to 
the sub-royalties.664 With the nemo dat principle, these contractual restrictions are 
unconditionally enforceable under the Supplement.  
For the case where an IP licensee uses its interests in an IP license as collateral, the 
Supplement prioritizes the IP licensor’s control in the license agreement. If the license 
agreement includes an anti-attachment clause or an anti-assignment clause, no 
enforceable security right in the license can be created without the consent of the 
licensor (see further discussion in Chapter 5).665 
C. Security interests vs. subsequent assignees/licenses  
With the “principle of continuation of disposition”, the rights of a subsequent assignee 
or licensee of an encumbered asset (and any person that subsequently acquires rights 
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662 As in Section 3.3.2.2 B and problems discussed in Section 3.5.2. 
663 Paragraph 213, Supplement.  
664 Paragraph 216, Supplement (providing “for example, the licensor can protect its rights by: (a) ensuring 
that its secured creditor registers first a notice of its security right in the general security rights registry; (b) 
ensuring that its secured creditor registers first a document or notice in the relevant intellectual property 
registry; (c) requiring the secured creditor of the licensee to enter into a subordination agreement with the 
licensor’s secured creditor before granting a licence; (d) prohibiting the licensee from granting a security right 
in its right to the payment of sub-royalties; (e) terminating the licence in cases where the licensee created a 
security right in its sub-royalties in breach of such a prohibition; or (f) prior to the licensee as sub-licensor 
granting a security right in its right to the payment of sub-royalties to its secured creditor, granting a security 
right in its right to payment of a percentage of the sub-royalties and agreeing that any sub-licensee pay its 
sub-royalties directly to an account of the licensor. The Guide does not interfere with any agreements of this 
kind between licensor and licensee, if they are effective under law relating to intellectual property and contract 
law. In addition, the licensor could insist that the licensee grant to the licensor a security right in its right to the 
payment of sub-royalties and take as a secured creditor the steps just mentioned”). 
665 Paragraph 52, the Supplement. See Para 107 and 250, the Supplement (providing “Of course, if there is no 
restriction on the assignability of the licensee’s rights in the licensee agreement (which rarely happens), it is 
considered that the licensee’s rights are freely assignable. A secured creditor can take a security right in the 
licensee’s rights subject to the terms and conditions of the license agreement. In this case, upon the 
licensee-debtor’s default, the secured creditor can directly enforce his security interests and dispose the 
encumbered licensee to an assignee.”). 
 ʹͳͺ
in the encumbered asset from this assignee or licensee) are generally subject to the 
pre-existing (and properly perfected) security rights created on the asset,666 except for 
where such a transaction happens with authorization from the secured creditor667 or is 
subject to an “ordinary course of the assignor’s business”.668  
However, if a security interest is required to be perfected at the IP-specific registry, 
then a subsequent assignee or licensee of the encumbered asset takes the asset free of 
the pre-existing security interest registered at the general security rights registry only, 
since such a security interest does not have third-party effectiveness;669 and any 
person that subsequently acquires rights in the encumbered asset from that assignee or 
licensee also acquires its rights free of that pre-existing security interest.670 
D. Ordinary course of business exception 
The Guide gives an “ordinary course of business exception” to the “first-to-file rule” 
and the “principle of continuation of disposition”. According to the exception, in the 
ordinary course of the debtor’s business, a good faith buyer or non-exclusive licensee 
who, without knowledge of pre-existing security rights or contractual limitations in the 
encumbered asset, would acquire the asset free of pre-existing security rights and 
contractual limitations. 671  In the Guide, this exception is given mainly for the 
commercial practice of tangible movables and for protecting “every-day, legitimate 
transactions”, because for most tangible goods, the usual expectation is that security 
rights do not continue after the sale in the ordinary course of business. 
Applying this exception to IP collateralization gives rise to intensive debates during 
the draft of the Supplement. The proponents argue that the incorporation of the 
exception into the case of IP also matches the expectation in commercial practice of 
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666 For the discussion on subsequent assignees, see Recommendation 31, 69-82, Guide; Paragraph 175, 
181-183, Supplement; for the discussion on subsequent licensees, see Paragraph 188-190, Supplement. 
667 Recommendation 80(a), Guide; Paragraph 184, Supplement. 
668 Recommendation 81(a), Guide; Paragraph 184, Supplement. 
669 For the discussion on subsequent assignees, see Recommendation 78, Guide; Paragraph 181-183, 
Supplement; for the discussion on subsequent licensees, see Paragraph 188-190, Supplement.  
670 Recommendation 31 and 82, Guide; Paragraph 181-183, Supplement. 
671 Recommendation 81 (c), Guide (providing “The rights of a non-exclusive licensee of an intangible asset 
licensed in the ordinary course of the licensor's business are not affected by a security right in the asset, 
provided that, at the time of the conclusion of the licence agreement, the licensee does not have knowledge 
that the licence violates the rights of the secured creditor under the security agreement.”) 
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IP. 672  For example, “the incorporation would ensure that off-the-shelf software 
purchasers would not lose their end-user licenses in the event of the execution of a 
security over the copyright associated with that particular computer program.”673 By 
contrast, the opponents mainly argue that the “ordinary course of business exception” 
is a very foreign and ambiguous concept to IP laws and may cause lots of 
uncertainties.674  
After intensive debates during the draft, the “ordinary course of business exception” is 
retained in the Supplement. The commentary of the Supplement explains that this 
exception protects good faith purchasers and non-exclusive licensees in the ordinary 
course of business from the enforcement of pre-existing security rights in the 
encumbered IP and also saves them from the significant burden of searching the 
pre-existing security rights created on the underlying IP.675 On the other hand, the 
exception is limited to certain “non-exclusive licenses” in “everyday, legitimate 
transactions” only and the good faith buyer or licensee should have no knowledge of 
pre-existing security rights.676 So the exception does not adversely affect the secured 
creditor’s interests, because in the case of default the secured creditor is still entitled to 
collect the royalties from these licenses as the repayment of the principal obligation.677 
The Supplement encourages the secured creditors to include some terms in the security 
agreement in order to ensure its capability of collecting these royalties.678 It is 
believed that such a limited exception will not have any substantial impact on the 
substance of IP laws. 
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672 See Tosato (2009) “The UNCITRAL Annex on Security Rights in IP: A Work in Progress”, supra note 
591 at 748. 
673 Ibid at 748. 
674 Ibid at 748 (providing the opponents’ main dissenting arguments are as follows: “First, the ordinary 
course of business exception is foreign to many jurisdictions and consequently difficult to implement. Second, 
this concept ‘has no precedent in intellectual property law’ that only recognizes exclusive and non-exclusive 
licences, without distinguishing whether they are granted in the ordinary course of business. Third, the Guide 
provides no definition of an ordinary course of business, nor of its fundamental elements; therefore, while 
this concept may be relatively clear in the concept of tangible good, its application remains unclear for IP 
rights. Furthermore, it was affirmed that this exception would not be desirable even if it were successfully 
introduced, as lenders would be discouraged from taking IP rights as collateral due to the faculty for right 
owners to grant licences free from the security. Lastly, it was observed that policies directed at protecting 
specific transactions, such as off-the-shelf software purchases, should be realized by other means, rather than 
by introducing categories that might potentially destabilize the whole IP legal regime.”). 
675 Paragraph 195-200, Supplement. 
676 Recommendation 81 (c), Guide; Para 198 and 205-212, Supplement. 
677 Paragraph 198, Supplement. 
678 Paragraph 197, Supplement. 
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4.4.4 Enforcement 
The Guide establishes the enforcement remedies based on the assumption that “the 
enforcement remedies must be tailored to ensure the most effective and efficient 
enforcement while ensuring appropriate protection of the rights of the grantor and the 
third parties”.679 It provides a secured creditor with several post-default enforcement 
remedies, including (a) taking possession of the encumbered asset; (b) acquiring the 
encumbered asset; (c) selling, leasing, licensing or otherwise disposing of the 
encumbered asset on behalf of the debtor. 680  These enforcement remedies are 
cumulative681 and may be exercised through judicial proceedings or by extrajudicial 
enforcement of the secured creditor.682 The security right is extinct after the full 
satisfaction of the secure obligation683 and any surplus arising from the enforcement 
would be returned to the debtor.684 
For the case where the grantor is a licensee, which uses its rights under the license 
agreement (mainly the right to exploitation) as collateral (Section 3.3.2.2 D and 
discussion in Section 4.4.3.2), the secured creditor can enforce the security interest and 
dispose of the collateral to an assignee, only if there is no anti-assignment or 
anti-attachment clause in the license agreement or the licensor consents to the 
enforcement.685 
The Supplement noted that, as states typically do not provide specific enforcement 
remedies for IP collateralization, applying these enforcement remedies to IP 
collateralization does not give rise to many problems. Therefore, the Supplement 
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679 Paragraph 223, Supplement. 
680 Recommendation 141 (a) and (b), Guide. 
681 Recommendation 143, Guide (providing “The law should provide that the exercise of one post-default 
right does not prevent the exercise of another right, except to the extent that the exercise of one right has made 
the exercise of another right impossible”). 
682 Recommendation 142, Guide. The extrajudicial enforcement is possible only where the debtor has 
consented in the security agreement or where, after default, the secured creditor has sent an advance 
notification to the debtor and all relevant parties with interests in the collaterals and received no expressed 
objection from the parties noted (Recommendation 147-151 and 156-158, Guide). The notice need not be 
given if the encumbered asset is perishable, may decline in value speedily or is of a kind sold on a recognized 
market (Recommendation 149, Guide). An assignee or licensee that acquires the grantor’s right in the 
encumbered collateral via an extrajudicial enforcement takes the asset free of the security rights of the 
enforcing secured creditor and any other lower-ranking secured creditor, but still subject to higher-ranking 
security rights of the enforcing secured creditor (Recommendation 161-163, Guide). 
683 Recommendation 140, Guide. 
684 Recommendation 152, Guide. 
685 Paragraph 250, Supplement. 
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clarifies the rules in some cases but gives no specific recommendation on the 
enforcement for IP collateralization.  
4.5 Comparison 
Reading the general criteria set in Chapter 3, we hereby have a comparative 
examination on whether the legal rules in China, the US, and the UNCITRAL 
Supplement have properly addressed the contradictions between IP law and secured 
transaction law as to IP collateralization. We will evaluate the effectiveness of the 
different approach, mainly from the perspectives of risk controlling and transaction 
cost reduction. The comparison is expected to help us identify the problem in Chinese 
law and to see if Chinese law can learn from other jurisdictions in order to solve the 
problems. 
4.5.1 Creation 
It has been established in Chapter 3 that, with respect to the creation of security 
interests in IP, the most important issue is to see if the legal rules for IP 
collateralization are flexible and clear enough to enable innovators to make full use of 
their IP as collateral in a simple and inexpensive way. The law is expected to  
- (1) unify rules for different kinds of IP in order reduce legal uncertainty; 
- (2) set only minimal requirements on creation in order to reduce the transaction 
cost; 
- (3) give broad but clear guidance on the scope of IP eligible for collateralization in 
order to ensure legal certainty; 
- (4) provide the maximum autonomy to parties in order to allow parties to control 
and reduce transaction risks via free negotiation; 
- (5) make an appropriate allocation of the pre-default rights and obligations on the 
exploitation and preservation of the encumbered IP. 
We then comparatively examine if the legal rules in China, the US, and the 
UNCITRAL Supplement are effective and efficient as to the creation.  
4.5.1.1 Transaction structure 
All of China, the US, and the UNCITRAL’s Supplement have differentiated between 
creation and perfection of security interests in IP and set few requirement on the 
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creation. All the three legal regimes choose to subject all IP collateralization 
transactions to the same secured transaction legal framework. Both the UCC-9 and the 
UNCITRAL’s Supplement have adopted the “functional and integrated” approach. They 
replace the various pre-existing security devices with a functional concept “security 
interests/rights”, and subject all transactions that play the role of security to the same 
legal structure. Although Chinese law has not replaced all the security devices with the 
concept of “security interests” or a similar concept yet and still keeps various security 
devices, “pledge” is set as the only way of using IP as collateral. This unitary approach 
in secured transaction law is expected to largely reduce legal uncertainty and to save 
the transaction cost of comparing different security devices.  
However, at the domestic level, neither China nor the US has set uniform rules for 
patent, copyright and trademarks. In both China and the US, many specific issues on 
IP collateralization are not subject to the unitary secured transaction law only, but 
more to other uncoordinated IP-specific laws. The IP laws in China merely stipulate 
that IP collateralization is a way of exploitation of IP but provides no specific 
provision regarding the work of IP collateralization. There are only two provisions in 
the Property Law specifically addressing the issues of IP collateralization. In most 
cases, it is the rules for the pledge of tangible movables that apply to IP 
collateralization by analogy. Therefore, the most specific rules that are directly 
relevant to IP collateralization are scattered in the three departmental regulations 
respectively for trademarks, patents and copyrights. 686  The examination above 
showed that among the three departmental regulations there are significant disparities 
on many core issues, such as the requirements for the description of encumbered IP in 
the security contract (Section 4.2.2.3), the creation of security interest in future IP 
(Section 4.2.2.2 C), the prohibition on the creation of multiple pledges (Section 4.2.2.4 
A), and the documents needed for registration (for the perfection purpose, Section 
4.2.3.2). Similarly, in the US, patents, copyrights and inter-state registered trademarks 
are also subject to separate federal laws, which do not provide the same level of 
exemptions to the UCC-9, so the perfection rules turn out to be very different for 
trademarks, patents and copyrights (Section 4.3.3.1). Without coordination with and 
among IP laws, the rules for specific issues in the end still vary for different types of 
IP.  
The disparities among IP laws mainly come from the fact that patent, copyright and 
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686 See more details in Section 4.2.1.4. E. 
 ʹʹ͵
trademark are traditionally subject to separated legal regimes. Although the IP system 
has a core idea, i.e., providing incentives to innovation, the economic rationales 
underlying each type of IP are quite different.687 Providing separated legal regimes 
has its advantages in building different statutory schemes to provide more appropriate 
rules for each type of IP. However, it is obvious that these disparities noticed above are 
not the intended results for better fitting the different characteristics of each type of IP, 
but are rather a consequence of the absence of a unitary approach following the 
uniform principles set in the secured transaction law. 
For other types of IP rather than patent, copyright and trademark, laws in the US and 
in China have adopted different approaches. In the US, for the other types of IP, like 
unregistered trademark, in-state registered trademark, no federal law exemption exists. 
Therefore, the modernized UCC-9 would apply. Although the dual registration system 
in the US has been criticized for increasing transaction cost, it also has some 
advantages for those types of IP without federal registry regimes, which can still be 
used as collateral, by being perfected at the UCC-9 general registry for all assets. 
However, in China, the Property Law remains vague in many core issues such as the 
registry process, priority order and enforcement remedies. And no general registry for 
all assets exists. In the end, without separated implementing regulations or special 
registries for these IP, IP collateralization is basically not feasible for them in practice; 
just as happened in reality. 
4.5.1.2 Scope of IP eligible for collateralization 
The UNCITRAL’s Guide and Supplement, the UCC-9 of the US and the Property Law 
of China have imposed only minimal requirements on the eligibility of collateral, 
namely, being assignable according to corresponding IP laws (note: Chinese Property 
Law restricts “trademarks” to “registered trademarks” only). These general secured 
transaction laws leave it for IP laws to decide the content and the assignability of a 
specific IP right. This flexible approach is expected to be able to avoid conflicts with 
IP laws and encompass various IP to the maximum extent. The drawbacks of this 
approach may be not so obvious when reading the Supplement or the secured 
transaction laws alone. When it comes to specific issues, the drawbacks become 
apparent due to the fragmentation between secured transaction laws and IP laws.  
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A. Terminology ambiguity 
First, the divergence in the terminologies in the general secured transaction law and IP 
laws can give rise to uncertainty as to the assignability of a specific IP right. The 
confusion between “moral rights” and “personal rights” discussed in Section 4.2.2.2 A 
is a good example to show the divergences in terminology and the diversity in legal 
traditions of property laws and IP laws can create problems for determining the scope 
of IP rights eligible for collateralization. This need for clarification demonstrates that 
simply leaving all the matters on assignability of a specific IP for the IP laws and IP 
specialists to decide might not be the best way to solve the divergences.688 
Determining whether a specific IP right is assignable or not for the purpose of secured 
transaction requires a good communication between IP specialists and finance 
specialists. Giving certain clear explanations of some essential and easily confusing 
terms in legal documents would be of great help in clarifying some of the ambiguity 
caused by the divergence in terminologies and in bridging the gaps in the 
communication between experts in different legal subfields. However, the Supplement 
does not help much in this regard.689 It is without doubt that the avoidance of 
discussing specific issues or giving explanation regarding “the nature and legal 
attributes” of terms in IP laws made it is easier for the UNCITRAL to reach consensus 
on the Supplement, albeit at the cost of missing an important opportunity to decrease 
the ongoing fragmentation between different laws.  
B. The Treatment of rights under IP license agreements 
One of the core objectives of the Supplement is to subject all IP rights to the same set 
of rules. According to the Supplement, the term of IP should also include all 
contractual rights enjoyed by licensors and licensees in license agreements, including 
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688 See also in Nguyen (2007), “Collateralizing Intellectual Property,” supra note 527 at 45 (providing “As 
the modern economy has increasingly moved towards using intangible property as a most valuable corporate 
asset, however, Article 9 must be adapted for the interests of involved parties and all others who benefit from 
the creation and dissemination of intellectual property rights. This can be accomplished by including in 
Article 9 definitions of specific forms of intellectual property, such as copyrights, patents, trademarks, and 
trade secrets.”  
689 In this regard, the Supplement is expected to provide some useful guidance on explaining terminologies. 
Such explanations do not need to consider the specific conditions of every country. A simple reference to 
some commonly accepted IP international treaties would be enough and helpful. However, except for the 
fourteen terms mentioned in Section C of the Introduction, the remaining part of the Supplement does not 
give any explanation regarding “the nature and legal attributes” of terms in IP law, See Paragraph 62, 
Supplement.  
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the licensor’s right to collect royalties, the licensee/sub-licensor’s right to collect 
sub-royalties, the licensee’s right to exploit the underlying IP in accordance with the 
terms of the license agreement. The Supplement subjects all of them to the same set of 
rules, except for some special rules for receivables (Section 4.4.2.2 B). US law adopts 
a similar approach (Section 4.3.2.2 B). 
At the first glance, Chinese law may appear to have adopted the same approach. The 
Chinese Property Law does not make any distinction between different types of IP, 
types of debtors, as well as forms of interests. It seems as though all rights of IP 
holders or rights of parties under license agreements or related contractual rights are 
uniformly treated. Nevertheless, the strict separation model adopted in IP laws can 
easily destroy such a harmonious picture, by artificially dividing closely related rights 
into separate categories. Then the decentralized asset-specific registries and diversity 
in registry practice subject the closely related rights to different treatments (Section 
4.2.2.2 B). The post-royalties are treated as proceeds and therefore automatically 
covered by the security interests in the original IP. By contrast, the pre-royalties can be 
used as independent collateral but must be registered with a separate specific registry 
for account receivables only and subject to a totally different set of rules for the pledge 
of account receivables. Furthermore, a licensee’s right to exploitation under the 
license agreement is deemed as a kind of contractual claim created by the license 
agreement, and cannot be used as collateral at all.  
The dogmatic separation places a premium requirement on specialized knowledge of 
complicated categories of rights in IP and knowledge of their counterpart-categories in 
secured transaction laws. These requirements impose a lot of additional legal 
uncertainties and costs in the process of the determination of the applicable rules, 
especially for those transactions covering a range of different rights in various types of 
IP. They complicate the utilization of the monetary value in IP and also bring 
difficulties for subsequent inquirers to find out all the pre-established security interests 
in an IP. 
The survey done by the SIPO in 2014 shows that in China smaller enterprises are more 
likely to issue patent licenses, i.e., 11.6% of micro-sized enterprises give patent license 
while only 7.3% of large-sized enterprises give patent license.690 Although this survey 
does not explicitly reveal the reason, it is easy to understand that this licensing 
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690 See SIPO et al. (2016) "Survey Report on Chinese Patent Data of 2015", supra note 404 at 14. 
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preference may come from the fact that smaller enterprises usually do not have all the 
capabilities and resources to accomplish the whole process from the research and 
innovation, to the production and to the distribution of products alone. Licensing out 
their patents allows them to authorize the innovations to more capable parties for the 
following-up innovation or production and meanwhile to recover their investment in 
innovation from the licensing fee. This survey result also shows that the market 
entities which are the worst affected by the legal uncertainties from these dogmatic 
distinctions would be these micro-or-small-sized enterprises, which happen to the 
parties that need bank loans the most. 
4.5.1.3 Collateral description in the security agreement and the use of 
future IP as collateral 
Based on the consideration that leaving parties the broad freedom of contract is the 
most efficient way of facilitating the secured credit, all of the UNCITRAL’s 
Supplement, the UCC-9 and the Property Law of China, keeps the statutory 
requirements for formality and content of security agreements to the minimum extent. 
With the general description, the parties are given the maximum flexibility in making 
their own negotiation on risk or cost control. The parties are always free to (and 
actually should) make more specific-listing description to ensure the legal certainty of 
the transaction. The allowance for general description makes the creation of security 
rights in “future assets” and the creation of “all-asset security interests” possible; these 
are two core policies which a modern secured transaction law is expected to achieve.  
For the US, the problems about using future IP as collateral come from the registration 
requirements for the perfection purpose (Section 4.3.2.2 D and 4.3.3.1). There is no 
problem to “create” security interest in future IP or all-asset security interests over IP, 
because the applicable law on this issue is the UCC-9, which allows very general 
description in the security agreement. Nevertheless, with the dual-registration system, 
the security interests in patents and federal trademarks have to be registered at the 
federal USPTO in order to be effective against subsequent assignees. The security 
interests in copyright have to be registered at the federal Copyright Office in order to 
be effective against subsequent assignees and creditors. And the registrations can only 
be done to registered IP. Therefore, if a creditor wants to have a security interest with 
third-party effectiveness in all IP of the debtor, the creditor has to specifically refer to 
each IP. If any future IP is included, the creditor will have to make a registration at the 
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general UCC-9 registry first and then keep closely monitoring the debtor’s activity and 
continuously make separate new federal security interest registration as soon as the 
unregistered IP becomes registered (Section 4.3.2.2 D). These arrangements require a 
lot of continuous efforts in monitoring and making timely registrations. Any 
negligence can make the security interest ineffective against a certain third party and 
put the creditor’s interest at risk. All these factors give rise to high transaction cost and 
great legal uncertainty.  
For China, there are more obstacles. First, whereas the creditors in the US at least can 
make a registration at the general UCC-9 registry to perfect the security interest in 
future patents and federal trademarks against subsequent creditors (not against 
subsequent assignees), the absence of a general security interest registry in China 
makes the registration at the IP-specific registries the only way for perfecting security 
interest in IP (against all parties). So, when the IP-specific registry schemes make it 
impossible to perfect the security interest in a future IP, there is no other alternative.  
Second, although the Chinese Property Law has not imposed any mandatory 
requirement, just has some non-mandatory suggestions, on the clauses of pledge 
contract, the specific departmental implementing regulations for patents and 
trademarks turn these suggestions on specific description into mandatory rules. The 
mandatory rules on specific description make the creation of security interests over all 
assets or the creation of security interests over future patents and trademarks are not 
practically feasible in China.  
Third, there is a statutory prohibition on the creation of security interests in the right to 
patent application. The corresponding explanatory document takes the “obvious lack 
of certainty in law” as a justifiable argument for claiming that the right to patent 
application cannot be “a property right with legal validity”, as the reason for the 
prohibition (see Section 4.2.2.2 C). However, as the right to a patent application is a 
legally recognized right by the Chinese Patent Law and is expressly assignable against 
remuneration,691 it is sufficient to conclude that the law has recognized the legal 
validity of the right to a patent application being a property right. There is no reason to 
doubt its validity and exclude it from being used as collateral.  
Some Chinese scholars explain that the “obvious lack of certainty in law” here refers 
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691 Article 10, Patent Law of 2008. 
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to the high risks associated with the disapproval of the application.692 However, risk 
itself is neither a plausible argument for denying the legal validity nor a reason for the 
strict statutory prohibition. As a matter of fact, the employment of any asset as 
collateral is always associated with certain risks. Even for granted patents, the risk of 
invalidation may not be lower than the risk of a disapproval of patent application, 
especially nowadays where the patent invalidation has already become a common 
defense strategy used by defendants in IP-related proceedings.693  
Even though the risks associated with the collateral are significant factors that should 
be carefully considered under the secured transaction laws, it does not necessarily 
mean that the law should narrow down the scope of eligible collateral to those assets 
without risks or with risks at an extremely low level. If that were the case, very few 
assets would be eligible. The subprime crisis in 2008 has proven that even real estates, 
which was generally considered as the most suitable collateral, is also associated with 
quite high risks. The risk of collateral is an essential factor that should be carefully 
considered by parties of secured transactions.  
Simply excluding assets with some risks from being used as collateral is not necessary 
and against the essence of modern secured transaction laws. From the law and 
economics perspective, respecting the freedom of contract doctrine would allow 
parties of secured transactions freely to negotiate over and choose ways to balance 
interests and risks, such as to reduce the amount of secured debts or to require 
additional collateral. A sophisticated legal regime is established for reducing the 
transaction cost of negotiation and for providing a backup plan. This approach is more 
effective and efficient than simply limiting the scope of the collateral, which would 
interfere with the negotiation and strictly exclude the possibility of some assets being 
used as collateral. It shows that current Chinese rules tend to use an oversimplified and 
crude way to ensure safety even at the expense of efficiency. 
There are two things worth mentioning. First, the CBRC, as the competent department 
regulating banks in China, explicitly instructs the commercial banks to create security 
interests in the future patents and copyrights as collateral, in order to ensure the 
liquidation value and to reduce transaction risks.694 It is the departmental regulations 
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692 See Che and Li (2005), On New Issues in the Legal Regime of Secured Transactions (ᣵ؍⌅ᖻࡦᓖᯠ䰞
仈⹄ウ), supra note 421 at 181. 
693 See Lipton (2010) “Security Interests in Intellectual Property”, supra note 145 at 300;  
694 Article 23, Guiding Opinions for Commercial Banks on Operating IP collateralization, supra note 378. 
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that prevent banks from doing so. Prohibiting the use of future IP as collateral actually 
prevents the creditor from taking effective risk-control. 
Second, as the departmental regulation for the registration of security interests in 
copyright has not required specific description, the creation and perfection of security 
interests in future copyright is feasible and has been practiced with many successful 
cases (Section 4.2.2.2 C). The successful experience proves that, in the case without 
unnecessary restrictions, Chinese market participants do have the capacity of making 
proper contractual arrangements to control the relevant risks. The Chinese regulators’ 
underestimation of the risk-control capabilities of the market participants obstructs the 
practice.  
As result, it is argued here that Chinese laws should follow the suggestions in the 
Supplement to provide some special provisions to allow a proper description of IP in 
future works and all kinds of IP in the security agreement, as long as such description 
allows the reasonable identification of the underlying collateral; and should remove 
the prohibition on the pledge of the right to patent application. 
4.5.1.4 Pre-default rights and obligations of debtors and secured creditors 
With regard to the pre-default rights and obligations, US law does not give any 
specific clauses. All the terms are left for parties to negotiate. According to the 
difference that the encumbered IP is still kept under the control of the debtor during 
the term, the Supplement allocates the obligation of maintaining the value of the 
encumbered IP to the grantor/debtor and requires that the grantor/debtor must take 
reasonable steps to preserve the collateral and its value, including dealing with the 
authorities, renewing registrations and pursuing infringers to preserve the validity and 
value of encumbered IP.695 With the notice of the necessity for secured creditors to 
effectively monitor the debtor’s exploitation and maintenance of the encumbered IP, 
the Supplement adds a specific recommendation to remind the secured creditors to 
include a term that allows them to take steps to preserve the encumbered intellectual 
property.696 For other matters like the creation of re-pledge or multiple pledges, the 
Supplement sets only non-mandatory default rules.  
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See also the discussion on the obvious benefits of allowing the use of future IP as collateral in Section 
3.4.2.3. 
695 Recommendation 111, Guide; Paragraph 223, Supplement. 
696 Recommendation 246, Supplement; Recommendation 116 bis, Guide. 
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Compared with the Supplement, although the Chinese Property Law leaves most 
issues regarding allocation of pre-default rights and obligations to the security 
agreement, it imposes more mandatory rules and stricter non-mandatory rules than the 
Supplement.  
A. Mandatory rules 
For the mandatory rules for which the parties cannot contract around by prior 
agreement, the Chinese Property Law imposes the obligation of maintenance to the 
pledgor/debtor, and also directly grants to the secured creditor the right to monitor. It 
even requires the registries to keep the secured creditor updated with the current 
statement of the pledged IP to ensure that the secured creditor can take active action 
against depreciation in a timely manner (see Section 4.2.2.4 A-a). As a result, the 
additional recommendation given under the Supplement actually becomes mandatory 
in China. The additional mandatory rules grant the secured creditors more rights and 
stronger protection without interfering with the freedom of contract. They are 
therefore beneficial. 
Nevertheless, the strict prohibitions on the creation of multiple pledges and re-pledge 
(see Section 4.2.2.4 A-b&c) are obstructive. With the fight from the law and 
economics movement, the academics have reached a “surprising consensus” that 
mandatory rules are “justifiable” in two cases only: first, the society wants to protect 
parties within the contract, from the perspective of paternalism; second, society wants 
to protect the parties outside the contract, from the perspective of controlling 
externalities.697 Mandatory rules are justified “only if unregulated contracting would 
be socially deleterious because parties internal or external to the contract cannot 
adequately protect themselves.”698  
We do not see any plausible justification here for the strict prohibition in the Chinese 
law. It is obvious that these prohibitions are for ensuring the certainty of secured 
transactions. The modern secured transaction law has developed socially efficient 
ways to encourage the full exploitation of the inherent value of the encumbered assets 
and at the same time protect the interests of parties, by relying on a combination of 
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697 Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner, “Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default 
Rules,” The Yale Law Journal 99, no. 1 (1989): 87–130 at 88. 
698 Ibid, at 88. 
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statutory rules and freedom of contract. It permits the creation of re-pledge or 
multi-pledges in the same encumbered collateral, and then supplements parties with a 
transparent publicity system and sophisticated priority rules to determine the priority 
order among competing claims. By contrast, the Chinese law adopts an oversimplified 
approach to exclude the possibility of negotiation. It seriously undermines the parties’ 
autonomy on balancing interests and controlling risks based on their own 
consideration of relevant risks and costs. Some monetary value in IP is just lost. It is 
therefore suggested here that these prohibitions on multiple pledge and sub-pledge 
should be eased to keep the mandatory rules to the minimum. 
B. Non-mandatory default rules 
As a matter of fact, in many cases the Chinese legislators’ concern on the certainty of 
transactions can also be addressed by prescribing non-mandatory default rules without 
interfering with the parties’ autonomy because they can be modified by the prior 
agreement of the parties. Default rules play the roles of reminding parties of important 
issues during the drafting process and filling gap for incomplete contracts where the 
parties “cannot negotiate terms specifically to cover all contingencies”.699 They save 
the transaction costs on negotiation and compliance.  
For default rules, we can see that the Chinese law and the Supplement choose different 
settings, which would lead to different “nudging effects”. According to the “nudging 
theory”, as making an explicit choice or switching choices take time, attention and 
cost, people tend to have an “anchoring” bias to stay with the default rules.700 Default 
rules can determine what would happen if people choose to do nothing. While the 
expression in Chinese rules is “unless otherwise agreed, […] is prohibited from doing 
[…]”,701 the expression in the Supplement is “unless otherwise agreed, […] is entitled 

699 Randy E. Barnett, “The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent,” Virginia Law Review 
78 (1992): 821–911 at 822. See also Douglas G. Baird and Thomas H. Jackson, “Fraudulent Conveyance 
Law and Its Proper Domain,” Vanderbilt Law Review 38 (1985): 829–855 at 835-836 (specifically arguing 
that the default rules governing the debtor-creditor relationship “should provide all the parties with the type 
of contract that they would have agreed to if they had had the time and money to bargain over all aspects of 
their deal.” and should represent “one kind of control that creditors generally would want to impose and that 
debtors generally would agree to accept”). 
700 Cass R. Sunstein, “Deciding by Default,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 162, no. 1 (2013): 1–
58. 
701 E.g., Article 227 (2), Property Law; Article 15 of the Patent Regulation of 2010 (providing “During the 
pledge term of a patent, the SIPO shall disapprove the waiver of the patent right if the pledgor fails to 
provide evidentiary materials on the pledgee’s consent to his waiver of the right.”) 
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to […]”.702  
We will now take the rules on the further assignment and license of the encumbered IP 
as an example. The Chinese default rule is that, “after the property rights in IP are 
pledged, the pledgor cannot further assign or license the encumbered IP, except with 
the express consent from the secured creditor.”703 The Chinese default rule requires an 
expressed consent for further assignment/license, so no further assignment/license if 
people choose to do nothing. This default rule shows the Chinese law’s tendency to 
restrict continuous exploitation. This default rule determines that the grantor/debtor 
should always negotiate for the creditor’s consent to each further assignment or license. 
This approach has its advantage that the creditor would be always be informed about 
changes which have occurred to the pledged IP.  
By contrast, the Supplement includes a default rule that a further assignment or license 
is feasible except for being expressly prohibited, and reminds the secured creditors 
that they have the right to control the debtor’s exploitation of the encumbered IP by 
writing such prohibition into the security agreement.704  This approach still can 
effectively protect the creditors’ interests but saves the negotiation cost for the cases 
where the creditors do not want to impose prohibitions on the exploitation. This 
default rule reflects the Supplement’s tendency to encourage the continuous 
exploitation of collaterals. 
While under Chinese law a further assignment and the license by the grantor/debtor 
can be possible only with the expressed consent of the creditor, the Guide provides a 
different treatment of the assignment and the license depending on whether it is made 
with or without the debtor’s consent. While the authorized assignments and licenses 
are free from the pre-existing security rights, the unauthorized ones are valid for a 
bona fide third party but still subject to pre-existing security rights, which would be 

702 E.g., Recommendation 133 of the Guide (providing “unless otherwise agreed, the secured creditor is 
entitled: (a) to be reimbursed for reasonable expenses incurred for the preservation of an encumbered asset in 
its possession; (b) to make reasonable use of an encumbered asset in its possession and to apply the revenues 
it generates to the payment of the secured obligation; and (c) to inspect an encumbered asset in the 
possession of the grantor.”) 
703 Article 227 (2), Property Law of China (providing “After the property rights in intellectual property are 
pledged, the pledger cannot further assign or license the encumbered IP, except with consent from the 
secured creditor.” 
704 Paragraph 222, Supplement (providing “An owner/creditor and its secured creditor may agree between 
themselves that: […] the owner/grantor may not grant licences (in particular exclusive licenses) without the 
consent of the secured creditor.”) 
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automatically extended to royalties from the unauthorized assignments or licenses.705 
Even in the unconsented cases, upon the debtor’s default, the secured creditor can 
always request an enforcement of the pre-existing security right, which still covers the 
encumbered IP and is automatically extended to royalties from the unauthorized 
assignments or licenses. And the secured creditor’s right to require the grantor/debtor 
to take all responsibility for the breach of contractual limitation is not prejudged. 
Therefore, the legitimate interests of a secured creditor can still be effectively 
protected.  
As explained in Section 3.4.4, keeping efficient exploitation of the encumbered IP 
during the pledge period is crucial for preserving the liquidation value and beneficial 
to both the creditor and the debtor. The secured creditor may not intentionally block 
further assignment or license, but they may hold-up for some private benefits or may 
be reluctant to give authorization because they are not familiar with IP or their 
risk-aversion. Their hold-up and risk aversion can affect the grantor/debtor’s decision 
(see further discussion on a similar case in Chapter 5 to see how a third party’s 
incentive to hold-up and risk-aversion can restrict the debtor’s decision making and 
have an impact on the total social welfare). Under the current Chinese law, if the 
secured creditor refuses to consent, then the debtor cannot make further assignment 
and license at all. The grantor has no way to protect its interests from the secured 
creditors’ hold-up on giving consents to further assignments and licenses, especially in 
the case where the grantor will rely on its royalty income to pay off the secured 
obligation. By contrast, under the Supplement, the possibility of making further 
assignments or licenses despite contractual limitations gives the grantor/debtor a 
greater autonomy on making exploitation decisions in line with its own business 
considerations, without worrying about being held-up or blocked by the creditor. 
Through this approach, as the secured creditor’s interests can be protected to the 
maximum, the debtor may still achieve the full exploitation of its encumbered IP. 
This divergence in setting up default rules clearly reflects the Supplement’s tendency 
to encourage the continuous exploitation of collaterals, and the Chinese law’s tendency 
to restrict the exploitation.  

705 Recommendation 81, Guide. 
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4.5.2 Perfection, Publicity and Priority 
According to the criteria established in Chapter 3, in order to provide creditors with a 
simple, streamlined, comprehensible, expeditious, and inexpensive method for the 
perfection, publicity and priority of security interests in IP, the law is expected to:  
- (1) set clear guidance about where and how to properly give notice of the 
security interests; and specify, if with multiple registry schemes, the priority 
of registrations at different registries; 
- (2) make it is possible to have a whole business collateralization, create 
floating security interests, or use future (after-acquired) assets as collateral, 
in the case of IP collateralization. 
- (3) give clear priority rules on competing interests, including also those of 
the additional third parties specifically for IP collateralization, such as the 
pre-existing and subsequent licensors and licensees.  
4.5.2.1 Registration schemes 
In both of the US and China, security interests in IP are perfected mainly with 
IP-specific registries. The Supplement agrees that this specialized approach has its 
advantages. It is more suitable for satisfying the specific requirements of each type of 
IP and this makes it easier for the specialized competent authority to administer 
registry affairs. So, the Supplement does not suggest a profound reform of the current 
IP-specific registries and allows the co-existence of specialized IP registries and the 
general registry suggested by the Guide. To guarantee a harmonious co-existence of 
both registry systems, it provides priority to the registrations at the IP-specific 
registries and gives some suggestions on ensuring the efficient and effective 
communication between the two registry systems (Section 4.4.3.1). 
For the US, there has been a long-lasting debate about the dual-registration system for 
security interests in IP. The co-existence of a federal-level IP specific registry and a 
state-level UCC-9 general security interest registry for all kinds of assets result in a 
dual-registration problem, especially for patents and federally registered trademarks 
(Section 4.3.3.1). While the UCC-9 registry only asks for notice-registration, the 
federal IP specific registry requires more documents and more specific description. 
The specific description requirements in the federal IP-specific registries creates 
problems for perfecting the security interests in all-asset or in future IP (Section 
 ʹ͵ͷ
4.3.2.2 D and 4.3.3.2).  
Opponents claim that the dual-registration system gives rise to cost duplicity and great 
legal uncertainties in the effectiveness and the priority order, which can make the 
transactions time-consuming and cost-inefficient. They therefore argue for centralizing 
the registration to the federal IP-specific registries.706 
On the other hand, some proponents argue that the dual-registration has two main 
advantages. First, it allows the other types of IP without specific federal registry to be 
perfected at the state-level UCC-9 registry. For these types of IP, without federal IP 
law exemptions, all the benefits of the modernized UCC-9 rules can be applied 
without worrying about any conflicts with IP laws. Second, while the specific 
description requirements in the federal IP-specific registries make it impossible to 
create security interests in all-asset or in future IP, an additional state-level UCC-9 
registration and a cross-reference may solve the problem. With the help of electronic 
registration, a fast cross-reference would make a simultaneous dual-registration easily 
done. In this case, the transaction cost and legal uncertainty can be largely reduced and 
the benefits of both registry systems can be achieved at the same time. Then the US 
rules would be actually quite consistent with the recommendations given in the 
Supplement.  
As a result, we can see that, in the US, the co-existence of two registration schemes is 
not the problem. The main uncertainties mainly come from the unclear preemption 
rule and the lack of specific reference to the security interests in IP in the federal IP 
laws. With clearer preemption rule and a well-designed electronic registration with 
cross-reference, the dual-registration system can display its advantages (those argued 
by the proponents) without bringing uncertainties.  
In China, there exists no dual-registration problem. For patents, copyrights and 
trademarks, security interests can be perfected only in IP-specific registries. And there 
are specific departmental administrative regulations for registries regarding trademarks, 
patents and copyrights. These specific rules have the advantage of being clear and 
straightforward. However, the absence of uniform rules or principles guiding the 
works of these decentralized IP registries results in numerous inconsistencies among 
these registry systems and consequently increases the uncertainties in law (Section 

706 See discussion on the efforts in supra note 548. 
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4.2.3). Furthermore, the absence of a general security interest for all assets makes the 
perfection of security interests in the other types of IP rather than trademarks, patents 
and copyrights just not feasible in practice (Section 4.2.3.1). 
It is therefore suggested here that a group of rules with uniform underlying principles 
should be introduced to either the Property Law or the IP laws to guide the 
administrative operations in specialized IP registry systems. And establishing a general 
security interests registry for all assets can make the perfection of security interests in 
other types of IP possible as well.  
4.5.2.2 Registration requirements 
In a simple notice-based registry system recommended under the Guide and adopted in 
the US under the UCC-9 or in IP-specific registries, a registration does not go through 
any scrutiny over the information provided and becomes effective as of the moment 
the information in the notice become searchable for third parties (note: the IP-specific 
registries require more specific description but do not conduct any scrutiny).707 By 
contrast, in China, the cumbersome and prohibitive registration process for perfecting 
security interests IP imposes too many statutory requirements on the information and 
documents to be submitted, and conducts a substantive scrutiny of the submitted 
documents and information.  
It is easy to understand that the document-based registry with substantive scrutiny 
adopted in China aims to ensure the accuracy of the registration records, for protecting 
debtors from unauthorized registrations or other potential abuses and for allowing all 
third parties to rely on the records to assume the existence of the security rights in the 
encumbered collateral. However, these purposes can be achieved with the much less 
cumbersome notice-based registry recommended by the Guide and the Supplement as 
well.708 
First, the mere registration of a notice is also sufficient for notifying the public about 
the existence of the security rights in the collateral, which is the exact purpose of the 

707 Recommendation 32 and 70, Guide. 
708 See comparison between the notice-based registration and the document-based registration can also be 
found at: Asian Development Bank, Law and Policy Reform at the Asian Development Bank – A Guide to 
Movables Registries 2000 (December 2000), paragraph 75-82, available at: 
http://www.adb.org/documents/reports/movables_registries/default.asp. See also Fleisig et al. (2006) 
Reforming Collateral Laws to Increase Access to Finance, supra note 292 at 39. 
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registry system for perfection. In China, in order to avoid exposing the economic 
situations of pledgors and pledgees, the final records available for public enquiry are 
actually limited to the names of pledgor and pledge, basic information of the collateral, 
registration date of pledge and duration of pledge only,709 exactly the same as the 
information required under the notice-based registry recommended by the Supplement. 
Therefore, most of the information and documents required under the Chinese laws do 
not help in notifying the public at all, but they impose an onerous burden on both 
registrants and specific registries for providing, archiving and scrutinizing the 
necessary documents, and slow down the whole registry process. The costs in terms of 
time and money incurred to the registrants on the preparation of these documents, and 
those incurred to registrars on administration and the examination of these documents, 
will eventually be imposed upon the parties of the secured transaction, and in 
particular upon the debtors in most cases because of credit rationing. All these costs 
can be largely reduced under the notice-based registry system. Meanwhile, the 
abundance of information and documents submitted also make the electronic entry and 
retrieval of records extremely complicated and time-consuming. The SAIC admitted 
that the quantity of the documents for review “present[s] a major hurdle for it to adopt 
computerized online registration.”710 By contrast, the information required in a notice 
registration is limited and usually with a standard format, which makes the 
establishment of a multilingual or electronic registration system much easier and more 
convenient. 
Second, the debtors’ concerns about unauthorized or fraudulent registrations or other 
abuses and the other concerns about incorrect information in the notice can be relieved 
by the accompanying correction rules under the Guide as well. For example, the Guide 
provides precise rules for protecting the reliance of third parties on information in the 
notice,711 entitles debtors to compel cancellations or amendments of registrations 
through simply judicial or administrative proceedings, 712  and allows imposing 
administrative penalties on unauthorized registrants or for fraudulent conveyances to 

709 Article 14, Patent Pledge Regulation of 2010; Article 21-23, Copyright Pledge Regulation of 2011. 
710 See Su Linhan, “Security Interests under China’s New Property Law,” China Secured Finance Bulletin 1 
(2008) at 7. 
711 Recommendation 58-60; 66-67, Guide.  
712 Recommendation 72 (b), Guide. 
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an appropriate extent, with the consideration about the relevant risk and administering 
cost.713 
In sum, we can see that the additional burdens imposed by the cumbersome 
document-based registry do not bring any additional benefits that the notice-based 
registry cannot give. These unnecessary burdens virtually obstruct the debtor’s ability 
to get access to credit through IP collateralization. As a result, it is proposed here that 
it would be better to learn from the Guide to adopt the simple notice-based registration 
system and to introduce the accompanying correction rules for protecting debtors from 
fraudulent conveyances.  
4.5.2.3 Priority 
Although it seems that the problem of the “three-month look back grace period” in the 
US law (Section 4.3.3.3 B) does not concern China at all, the serious administrative 
delay caused by the strict scrutiny of the abundant documents and information during 
the registry process in fact can also lead to substantive delay between the application 
date and the actual registration date, which can consequently result in the same (maybe 
even worse) uncertainties to the priority order among conflicting claims (Section 
4.2.3.2). 
Compared to the complicated priority rules in the US (Section 4.3.3.3) and in the 
Supplement (Section 4.4.3.2), the priority rules in China are extremely simple. There is 
no need to discuss the priority order among various pledges in the same IP, because 
re-pledge (of all IP) and muti-pledge (of patents) are explicitly prohibited. Similarly, 
there is no need to discuss the priority order between security interests and subsequent 
further licenses or assignments, because the latter are possible only with consent from 
the secured creditor and there is no “ordinary course of business” exception in Chinese 
law for IP collateralization at all.  
The clear priority order among conflicting claims in the current Chinese law for IP 
collateralization is not the intentional results of systematically designed priority rules 
but a consequence deriving from the prohibitive restrictions on the exploitation of 
encumbered IP. The approach adversely affects the ability of the debtor to fully exploit 
the monetary value of the encumbered IP. It obstructs the debtor’s capability of 

713 Recommendation 55 (c) and 72 (b), Guide. 
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generating revenues to pay back the principal claim and also the secured creditor’s 
realization of security interests upon default.  
This problem cannot be solved by changes in priority rules only. All the relevant rules 
shall be changed to remove all these prohibitive restrictions on the creation and 
perfection of security interests, to give parties a greater autonomy on allocating the 
obligations and rights and arranging further exploitation of the pledged IP, and then to 
provide clear priority rules for parties and judicial authorities to determine the priority 
order in the enforcement of security interests in IP. In this case, the recommendations 
in the Guide and Supplement are helpful.  
4.5.3 Enforcement 
In order to ensure an effective and efficient enforcement process to safeguard the 
creditor’s interests on the debtor’s default and make appropriate protection of the 
rights of the debtor and third parties, the rules for enforcement are expected to  
- provide the creditor with certain, expeditious and inexpensive remedies; 
- allow and also ensure that the creditor can exercise its security interests in a 
timely manner; 
- provide remedies for the debtor against collusion between the creditor and 
the assignee in the enforcement; 
- provide some remedies for the licensees to claim or protect their interests 
Regarding the enforcement, the Supplement does not provide any specific 
recommendation for IP collateralization and US case law has established some rules 
about “locating the best market” to make “commercially reasonable” disposition of the 
encumbered IP (Section 4.3.4). Chinese law has no special rules for IP collateralization 
either, but by a simple mutatis mutandis application of the general rules pertaining to 
tangible assets in the Property Law to the enforcement of security interests in IP.  
The substantive Chinese rules governing the rights of the creditor to exercise the 
enforcement remedies are generally clear. The security interests in IP can only be 
enforced by one of the three remedies: conversion, (public or private) auction and sale. 
There is no other alternative for debtors to receive a proportional liquidation value. 
Chinese law gives some protection to the debtor/pledgee. Although without specific 
procedure rule providing the debtors with a market price protection like that in the US 
 ʹͶͲ
counterpart, the Property Law allows the debtor to request a judicial action if the 
debtor does not agree with the disposition value of the pledged IP. This remedy 
provides a more or less equivalent protection for the debtor against collusion between 
the creditor and the assignee in the enforcement (Section 4.2.4). It also gives the 
debtor/pledgor the right to request the pledgee to promptly enforce the pledge at its 
maturity or to request compensation for any damage caused by delayed enforcement. 
However, no rule in Chinese law addresses the remedies for licensees to claim or 
protect their interests.  
In summary, the enforcement and remedy provisions in Chinese law for IP 
collateralization seem rudimentary and lack sophistication. The Chinese law should 
therefore aim at providing parties with more flexible alternatives and take into account 
more interests. However, in this regards, neither the Supplement nor the US law have 
clear rules for China to learn from.  
Although a detailed discussion of the enforcement process is beyond the scope of our 
analysis, it is worth emphasizing that a well-designed specific enforcement mechanism 
is perhaps much less important than an effective enforcement process with clarity, 
predictability, and execution. A slow, expensive and corrupted enforcement process 
can take all the benefits of secured transactions away and discourage creditors from 
engaging in IP collateralization from the first place. However, the factors determining 
the efficiency of an enforcement process cannot be simply improved by the changes in 
the substantive legal rules.  
4.6 Summary of Findings 
The findings from the comparative analysis above can be summarized as follows, 
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From the comparative analysis on the strengths and weaknesses of the general legal 
frameworks in relation to the criteria of creation, perfection (publicity and priority) 
and enforcement of security interests in IP, we find that all the three legal frameworks 
have some particular aspects could be improved from the perspectives of risk 
controlling and transaction cost reduction. 
4.6.1 Problems in US Law 
For US law, the comparative analysis reveals that the main problems are still about 
the lack of specific rules and the dual-registration system. In general, the parties are 
left with great autonomy in controlling and balancing risks through negotiation and 
the law does not impose prohibitions over active exploitation of encumbered IP. 
However, because of the absence of any document specifically addressing IP 
collateralization, parties have to go through all relevant legal documents and cases to 
figure out the applying rules and have to adopt lots of remedies to ensure sufficient 
protection against the uncertainties. All these efforts to reduce the substantial legal 
uncertainties result in high transaction cost.  
However, while most literature focuses on criticizing the co-existence of two 
registration schemes in the US, our analysis shows that the real problems under the 
dual-registration system are the unclear exemption rule and the lack of cross-reference 
between the registries. The current general security interest registry established under 
the UCC-9 at the state level can actually act as a good supplementary scheme to 
facilitate the creation of security interests in all IP of the debtor and in future IP, 
without the need for making compound reform of the IP-specific registries and 
practice. So, our analysis does not support the proposal of centralizing the registration 
to the federal IP-specific registries. With a clearer preemption rule and a 
well-designed electronic registration with cross-referencing, the current 
dual-registration system could display its advantage without bringing uncertainties.  
4.6.2 Problems in Chinese Law 
For China, the comparative study helps us identify several main problems.  
4.6.2.1 Lack of coordination among rules 
First and foremost, great legal uncertainties come from the fact that the current legal 
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regime regarding IP collateralization is a chaotic patchwork of uncoordinated 
fragmented documents and rules with plenty of contradictions and gaps.  
Most of the specific rules directly on IP collateralization are scattered in the three 
departmental regulations for trademarks, patents and copyrights. The absence of 
unitary guidance from Property Law or IP laws results in significant disparities on 
many core issues, such as the requirements on the description of encumbered IP, the 
documents needed for registration, the use of future IP as collateral, and the creation 
of multiple pledge. These disparities are results of the absence of unitary guidance and 
the lack of coordination, not for catering to different economics rationales. 
Meanwhile, when the Property Law remains vague in many core issues such as the 
registry process, priority order and enforcement remedies, it is not feasible to use the 
other types of IP rather than trademarks, patents and copyrights as collateral in 
practice. The absence of a general security interests registry makes it impossible (or 
expensive) to create all-asset security interests over IP.  
The lack of coordination among the rules for different kinds of IP, the ambiguity in 
the terminology, the lack of precise rules on assignment, and the dogmatic separation 
among rights in IP call for further clarifications from IP law and unitary guidance 
from the Property Law. IP collateralizations involving all kinds of IP would be treated 
alike under a common set of principles, with accommodation of specific needs for 
each kind of IP.  
As a result, in order to reduce the transaction cost brought by legal uncertainties, the 
first structural reform on the general legal framework in China should be reducing the 
fragmentation and making rules more compatible and coherent with each other.  
4.6.2.2 Paternalistic bias 
Second, the Chinese general legal framework for IP collateralization controls the risk 
by paternalistic regulation rather than through supplementary supports. From the law 
and economics perspective, respecting the autonomy of parties and the freedom of 
contract would allow parties of secured transactions freely to negotiate over their 
transactions and choose ways to balance interests and risks, such as to reduce the 
amount of secured debts or to require additional collaterals. With the successful 
experience which has proven that the best way of promoting the development of 
secured transactions is to give contracting parties the maximum flexibility in 
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structuring their transactions, the Guide has explained that the best risk control in 
secured transactions is to “allow debtors to use the full value inherent in their assets to 
support credit”,714 to give parties the “maximum flexibility to negotiate the terms of 
their security agreement,”715 and to support with sound secured transaction laws and 
insolvency laws, as well as “effective and efficient judicial systems and other 
enforcement mechanisms”.716 So, the Guide and the Supplement (and also the UCC-9 
of the US) set out only minimum requirements on the creation of security rights, 
support the creation of multiple pledges and re-pledge on the same encumbered assets, 
and encourage parties to make proper arrangements on the subsequent exploitation of 
the encumbered IP. In addition, to reduce the possible risks of fraud or hidden 
information for all parties including relevant third parties, they provide sophisticated 
priority rules and enforcement remedies to protect the legitimate interests of all 
parties and the public welfare in the case where something goes wrong. 
Nevertheless, the general legal framework in China chooses the exact opposite 
approach. In general, the Chinese rules on the creation, perfection (including publicity 
and priority) and enforcement are very simple, quite clear and straightforward. It 
seems to have kept the legal uncertainty at a low level. In fact, the prohibitive Chinese 
rules limit the scope of IP eligible for collateralization to ownership only, require 
specific description of encumbered IP, prohibit the use of the right to patent 
application as collateral, build a burdensome document-based registry system with 
substantial scrutiny, restrict the subsequent exploitation of encumbered IP during the 
loan term, and prevent the parties from negotiating over matters like multi-pledge or 
re-pledge. 
All these prohibitive “risk-control” mechanisms only make IP collateralization 
become more expensive and time-consuming, and obstruct the parties from fully 
exploiting the monetary value in their IP, but do not better serve their objectives of 
ensuring the certainty of transaction and the prevention of frauds. For example, we 
have shown that the burdensome document-based registry system does not achieve a 
better informing function than the notice-based registry system and the latter can also 
effectively prevent fraudulent conveyances or incorrect information through providing 
accompanying correction mechanisms and imposing administrative penalties. 

714 Recommendation 1 (b), Guide.  
715 Recommendation 1 (i), Guide. 
716 Paragraph 2, Introduction, Guide. 
 ʹͶ͸
These prohibitions also show that “law-making [in China] has a strong paternalistic 
bias due to the fundamental mistrust of the risk management capabilities of 
transacting parties.”717 For example, the legal prohibitions on the creation of security 
interests in future patents and trademarks or in the rights to patent application are 
imposed to protect parties from legal uncertainty. However, the successful experience 
of using future copyright as collateral to fund projects has proven that, when there is 
no prohibition on the creation of security interests in future copyright, the Chinese 
market participants do have the capacity of making proper contractual arrangements 
to control the relevant risks. It is the paternalistic bias and mistrust that restricts the 
market participants from practicing. The whole legal system for IP collateralization is 
overly troublesome and prohibitive. The fact that, faced with such a great market 
demand for credit, less than 0.1% of the total valid patents have been used as 
collateral in 2012 clearly demonstrates an obvious under-employment of patents as 
collateral.  
In other words, Chinese rules prefer an easy regulatory approach even at the expense 
of wasting the value inherent in IP. To change the status quo, there is an urgent need to 
extend the scope of IP eligible for collateralization beyond ownership only, to remove 
these legal prohibitions on the creation of security interests in future IP, to provide 
parties with greater autonomy in negotiating contract terms, to allow parties to make 
appropriate identifiable description of the IP to be encumbered and negotiate over 
matters like multi-pledge or re-pledge, to make it possible to use future IP as 
collateral, to encourage parties to make proper arrangements on subsequent 
exploitation of encumbered IP during the loan term, and to largely simplify the 
registry scheme.  
4.6.2.3 Insufficient protection 
Third, the current Chinese rules cannot provide creditors with sufficient protection 
upon the debtor’s default at all. Because of the troublesome prohibitions, the priority 
rules in Chinese law for IP collateralization are extremely simple. As a matter of fact, 
there are two main approaches to control the risks regarding IP collateralization, i.e., 
pre-control or post-control. 

717 See Linhan Su, “Secured Transactions Law Reform in China: Can a Commercial Law Serve the Needs 
of the Market?,” China Secured Finance Bulletin 1 (2008) at 10. 
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Clearly, the Guide and the Supplement (and also the UCC-9 of the US) have chosen 
the post-control mechanism. They do not interfere with the parties’ autonomy but 
establish a group of sophisticated rules for the priority order and enforcement 
remedies, to ensure that security interests can function effectively as a kind of 
“backup mechanism” upon the debtor’s default. Sophisticated priority rules and 
enforcement remedies lower the secured creditor’s lending risk by enhancing the 
secured creditor’s capability of extracting the salvage value from the collateral 
through a disposition of the encumbered collateral, and also achieve a proper balance 
with the other competing claimers’ interests.  
By contrast, Chinese law has chosen the pre-control mechanism, by imposing 
prohibitive restrictions and remaining vague on the priority order and enforcement 
remedies. The Property Law just applies these provisions for tangible movables 
mutatis mutandis to the case of IP collateralization. This approach does take into 
account the peculiar characteristics of IP and therefore cannot effectively protect the 
creditors’ interests when liquidation occurs or signs of trouble show up. After 
removing all these obstructive prohibitions, Chinese law calls for the introduction of 
more sophisticated priority rules and enforcement remedies.  
4.6.2.4 Need for a structural reform 
The large number of economic stimuli policies issued in recent years reflect that the 
Central Government of China has realized the necessity of stimulating IP 
collateralization for solving funding problems for SMEs, especially those high-tech 
ones for their needs for R&D investments. The legal changes since 2006 also show 
that the central legislative body of China, at the conceptual level, has noticed the 
importance of an effective and efficient legal framework for IP collateralization.  
However, all these problems revealed above suggest that the current legal framework 
governing IP collateralization is still unfit for meeting the actual economic demands 
in practice. Although these legal efforts have removed some minor legal obstacles for 
IP collateralization in China, they constitute a timid patchwork that is incapable of 
overcoming many deep-seated problems or meeting the current financial demands of 
both IP right holders and fund providers.  
Our comparative analysis reveals that the current deficiencies cannot be easily fixed 
by way of small modifications. A structural reform of the current general legal 
framework governing IP collateralization has to be done to establish more unitary 
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guidance rules for reducing legal uncertainty, and to transform the current prohibitive 
pre-control system into a more sophisticated post-control system. Nevertheless, the 
tendency of path dependence and the fear to a dramatic department from the 
long-standing legal tradition might be the biggest obstacle to such a structural reform. 
4.6.3 Problems in the UNCITRAL’s Efforts 
Meanwhile, this comparative study also allows us to examine the possible effects of 
the Supplement on IP collateralization in a national context. The World Bank once 
praised that the Supplement because it “offers a generally acceptable intellectual basis 
for the solution of a number of intricate legal problems in different legal system.718 
The Supplement does make certain adjustments to accommodate the divergence 
between IP law and secured transaction law, for example, adopting a flexible 
definition of “intellectual property” to encompass various types of IP and abundant 
rights in IP to a maximum extent, allocates the maintenance obligation to the debtors 
to encourage the exploitation of encumbered IP, reminds secured creditors of the 
needs to protect their rights to maintain the encumbered IP without imposing 
restrictions, prioritizes the registrations in the IP-specific registries to those in the 
general security registry, to mention but a few. These efforts take into account the 
characteristics of IP and provide clear directions on making domestic adjustments to 
build an efficient legal regime for secured transactions and equally to ensure the 
effective protection and exercise of IP. This is just what the Supplement is expected to 
achieve.719  
However, throughout the text of the Supplement, it is more common to see 
commentaries merely clarifying further the provisions contained in the Guide in the 
context of IP, without giving any specific suggestions on how to reconcile these rules 
with IP laws by simply saying “(the issue) is a matter of law relating to intellectual 

718 Draft Supplement to the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions dealing with security 
rights in intellectual property - Compilation of comments by Governments and international organizations, 
A/CN.9/701, UNCITRAL, 2 June 2010, at 3, available at: 
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/V10/541/00/PDF/V1054100.pdf?OpenElement (the World 
Bank praises the contribution of the Supplement that ““The (draft) Supplement recognizes that each 
jurisdiction may have specific rules governing intellectual property and seeks to accommodate these 
regimes in addressing the issue of security interests; the (draft) Supplement thus offers a generally 
acceptable intellectual basis for the solution of a number of intricate legal problems in different legal 
system”). 
719 Paragraph 1 (Objective), Supplement. 
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property”720, and “this matter would be left to law relating to intellectual property”.721 
Recommendation 4 (b), entitled “Limitations on Scope”, is designed to draw a clear 
boundary to limit the scope of application of the Guide and the Supplement to the 
cases without inconsistency with rules regulating IP, in order to guarantee the 
coherence between the laws on secured transactions and those on IP. The limitation on 
the authority competence forces the Supplement to keep using Recommendation 4 (b) 
as the shield to avoid having a deeper discussion of IP laws.  
Our comparative study shows that the general security laws in China and the US, 
namely, the Property Law and the UCC-9, are actually quite consistent with the 
recommendations given in the Guide in almost all aspects. However, most of the 
problems identified above in China actually come from the IP-specific rules. 
Therefore, some changes have to be made in these IP-specific rules as well. However, 
the existence of Recommendation 4 (b) makes it basically impossible for the 
Supplement to have an in-depth discussion on core issues or to propose any 
substantive suggestions to the adjustments in IP laws.  
As a result, it may conclude that the Supplement indeed reflects some of the recent 
achievements in the secured transaction law sector and provides plenty of basic 
principles for modernizing laws for IP collateralization. However, the Supplement’s 
approach of simply prioritizing rules governing IP does not help much in reconciling 
the general secured transactions law with IP laws, even in specific jurisdictions that 
actually adopt the recommendations thereof. 
A comparative study on the efforts of the Supplement helps us identify the problems 
in current Chinese law, but it cannot give many recommendations that can be directly 
used to make the legal changes, because these changes have to be done in IP laws. 
Simply prioritizing IP rules is not a solution for sure. In the end, we need much deeper 
analysis of IP laws and of specific issues, and examine how the different economic 
reasoning under IP and other assets can give rise to conflicts. The next Chapter is an 
example about what the law and economics analysis can contribute in this regard.  
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720 For example, Paragraph 88, 93, 96, 123, 159, 189, 199, Supplement. 
721 For example, Paragraph 24, 174, 176, Supplement. 
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Chapter 5 Enforceability of Restrictive Clauses in IP 
Licenses in Secured Transactions  
5.1 Introduction 
The objective of modern secured transaction law is to expand the scope of assets 
eligible for being collateral for providing low-cost credit.722 From the perspective of 
secured transaction law, any asset that has monetary value and is assignable can be 
encumbered as collateral.723 In the current international intellectual property (IP) 
finance practice, IP licenses have been used as collateral for getting external debt 
finance in order to support some investments. 
As discussed in Section 3.3.2.2, as IP licensing has become the main way of IP 
exploitation, in a licensing relationship, both the licensor and the licensee have some 
rights with monetary value under the license agreement (the specific rights depend 
more on the contents of license agreements).  
Nowadays, IP licensing has become a main way of IP exploitation, especially in the 
software industry. Based on a license agreement, an IP rights owner (as the licensor) 
grants the other party (as the licensee) the permission to (exclusively or 
non-exclusively) exploit the innovation underlying the IP protection in exchange for 
an agreed payment. The other party’s exploitation otherwise would be an 
infringement of the patent in the case without the license. For different types of IP, 
license agreements can be in the form of copyright license agreement, technology 
license agreement, trademark license and franchise agreement. A license can also be 
in the form of a contractual license or a non-contractual license (as in the case of a 
statutory or a compulsory license), an exclusive or a non-exclusive license. The 
agreed payment can be in the form of fixed fee or royalties, or a down payment plus a 
running royalty.724 In a licensing relationship, both the licensor and the licensee have 
some rights with monetary value under the license agreement (the specific rights 
depend more on the contents of license agreements.). 
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722  See, e.g., N. Orkun Akseli, International Secured Transactions Law: Facilitation of Credit and 
International Conventions and Instruments (New York: Routledge, 2011) at 55–73. 
723 See more detailed discussion in Section 2.3.1 A. 
724 See Nalin Kulatilaka and Lihui Lin, “Impact of Licensing on Investment and Financing of Technology 
Development,” Management Science 52, no. 12 (2006): 1824 – 1837 (showing that firms’ investment and 
licensing strategies depend critically on the firms' financial constraints and the expected market conditions). 
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For an IP owner/licensor, giving a license can retain the ownership and control over 
IP, and meanwhile broaden the reach of IP into different and more markets and bring 
an additional source of revenue. In addition, IP licenses also provide IP 
owners/licensors with a way to maintain market power via cross licensing or help 
attract external finance to mitigate financial constraints. 725  Under normal 
circumstances, the licensor has many contractual rights, such as the right to compel 
the licensee to advertise or use the licensed IP or related products in line with the 
terms in the license agreement and the right to terminate the license agreement upon 
the licensee’s breach. The main monetary interest the licensor has in a license is the 
right to collect the agreed payment. Licensing is one of the main ways that create 
rewards for innovation. 
For a licensee, the license grants him the authorization to manufacture, sell, import, 
export, distribute or market various goods or services in accordance with the terms of 
the license. Without the license, these exploitations may be prevented. For instance, a 
cell phone manufacturer may not be able to produce or sell phones without the license 
to use a certain patented telecommunication technology. Getting a license helps the 
licensee to save the R&D costs in developing the protected innovation itself or 
engineering workaround. The permission to use or exploit IP may also help the 
licensee to obtain some competitive advantage over its competitors.726 The main 
monetary value of a license to the licensee comes from the authorization to use or 
exploit the underlying innovation protected by IP without being worried about being 
sued by the IP holder (the licensor). According to the International Accounting 
Standards (IAS), licensing (or royalty) agreements are clarified as intangible “assets” 
in the balance sheet, regardless of whether they are transferable or separable from the 
entity or from other rights and obligations.727  
While it has been a common practice for licensors to use their “rights to payment of 
royalties” (usually characterized as “receivables”) as collateral, the potential of 
allowing licensees to use IP licenses as collateral also gains some attention.728 
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725 See Kulatilaka and Lin (2006) (pointing out that some firms may adopt a licensing strategy to discourage 
competitors' development efforts and appropriate value via licensing revenues) 
726 See more detailed discussion in the social benefits of IP licensing in Section 3.3.2.2 A.  
727 International Accounting Standards [38.12], supra note 201. 
728 See, e.g., Dietmar Harhoff, “The Role of Patents and Licenses in Securing External Finance for 
Innovation,” in Handbook of Research on Innovation and and Entrepreneurship (Elgar Original Reference), 
ed. David B. Audretsch et al. (Edward Elgar, 2011), Peter Picht, “Collateralizing IP Licenses: Present 
Deficiencies And Proposals For Reform,” AIPLA Quarterly Journal 41, no. 3 (2013): 423–465 at 426.  
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From the licensee’s perspective, allowing the use of their IP licenses (or its interests in 
IP licenses), which may be the most important value source of all its assets, as 
collateral would enable licensees to leverage their future income from the licenses for 
satisfying the current cash needs for their operation and growth investment.  
From the lenders’ perspective, they predict the borrower’s repayment basing it on the 
debtor’s capability of generating the cash flow to service the debt and the liquidation 
value of the collateral at the foreclosure sale (the signaling effect discussed in Section 
2.4.1.1 and 2.4.2.1). On the one hand, the license fee is determined by the licensee’s 
capability in generating a steady stream of revenue from getting the license. So, it is 
directly correlated with the licensee/debtor’s capability of generating the cash flow to 
service the debt. On the other hand, the fact that the licensee asks for the license can 
prove the practical applicability of the underlying innovation. The practical 
applicability predicts the demand from other firms competing in the same market, 
which helps the lender to assess the liquidation value of the license. 
As we have discussed in Section 2.4.1.2 and 2.4.2.2, the mainstream law and 
economics literature in secured transaction has established that some efficiency of the 
secured transactions are from the disciplinary role of collateral in controlling the 
post-lending moral hazard problem. For many high-tech companies, an IP license 
frequently represents an intrinsic component of the “going concern value of the whole 
company”. For instance, if a cell phone manufacturer cannot be able to produce or sell 
phones without the license to use a certain patented telecommunication technology, 
then the net value of the manufacturer may just worth the “liquidation value of the 
manufacturing plant and raw materials”. For the lender, the higher percentage is the IP 
license worth as to the total going concern value of the licensee-debtor, the greater the 
disciplinary role that the encumbered license can play.729 The lender would then be 
more willing to accept the license as collateral. The disciplinary role of IP license can 
alleviate the credit-rationing problem and help more welfare-enhancing projects to be 
financed.  
However, in the current Chinese law, a licensee is strictly prohibited from using his IP 
license as collateral (Section 5.3.1). The strict statutory prohibition prevents the 
licensees from leveraging the monetary rights in their licenses and consequently 
forgoes many welfare-enhancing projects. Chinese law therefore should learn from 
other jurisdictions to design proper rules for allowing a licensee to use its rights under 

729 See Lacker (1991) “Why Is There Debt?”, supra note 254; Tirole (2006) "The Theory of Corporate 
Finance", supra note 256, And more detailed discussion in Section 2.4.2.2. 
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an IP license as collateral.  
Nevertheless, in these jurisdictions where the licensee’s use of an IP license as 
collateral is allowed, some terms in the license agreement that prohibit or restrict the 
(security) assignment of the license can obstruct a licensee from obtaining a security 
interest in its license. These terms sometimes are called anti-assignment clauses or 
anti-encumbrance clauses (uniformly referred to as “restrictive clauses” hereafter). A 
typical restrictive clause looks as follows, 
“the licensee should not assign, sell, mortgage, pledge, or in any manner 
transfer the license contract or any interest herein whether voluntary or 
involuntary or by operation of law without the prior written consent of the 
licensor.” 
These restrictive clauses give a licensor the final power to consent to or refuse the 
licensee’s use of IP license as collateral. The issue concerned here is that, while these 
restrictive clauses allow the licensors to keep better control over their IP, they also 
restrict the licensees’ borrowing capabilities.  
So, there is a tension between the licensee’s need for credit and the licensor’s interests 
to protect itself against the potential detrimental effects of the security interests in IP 
license. IP laws and the secured transaction regime reflect very different perspectives 
regarding this tension and hence have different preferences on the enforceability of 
these restrictive terms. While IP laws are in favor of enforcing these restrictive terms 
for keeping the licensor’s control over the license, the secured transaction regime 
tends to invalidate them for helping licensees get access to credit. Then the issues 
concerned here are: the preference of which law should prevail? Should the law give 
the licensor the power to consent or refuse the licensee’s use of license as collateral? 
If no, why; if yes, what should be the extent of the licensor’s power? The 
enforceability of these restrictive terms is the answer to this question.  
For now, there are two main approaches in the existing legislations around the world 
on the enforceability of these restrictive terms. The majority of the legislations follow 
the approach adopted by the UNCITRAL’s Supplement, which simply respects 
personal autonomy and freedom of contract, and therefore unconditionally enforces 
the contractual restrictions (Section 3.2). On the other hand, US law gives an 
exception to IP license by allowing the licensee’s creation of limited security interests 
in IP license notwithstanding contractual restrictions (Section 3.3). 
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This dissertation is not aimed at providing a practical instruction for practitioners on 
how to use licenses as collateral, but at exploring the problems in existing legal rules. 
Therefore, in the analysis, we do not trap the analysis within the logic like - “since IP 
licenses are contractual or prohibited from free assignment without the licensors’ 
consent in the current law of most jurisdictions, they cannot and should not be used as 
collateral.” We do not take all existing legal rules as given. Instead, we explore the 
deeper reasons why these contractual restrictions are included in IP licenses in the first 
place. And then we employ law and economics methodologies to examine if 
unconditional enforcement of these contractual restrictions would lead to desired social 
results, especially in the specific context of secured transactions. We make a 
comparative study on these two different approaches adopted in the UNCITRAL’s 
Supplement and in the US law, by examining their effects on negotiation, incentives, 
collateral requirements and investment decision. 
In the remaining part, Section 5.2 illustrates a road map about the contractual 
relationships among the relevant parties and describes the conflicting interests of the 
relevant parties and the different preferences of IP laws and secured transactions in 
solving the conflicts. Section 5.3 gives an overview of the different approaches in 
China, the United States and in the UNCITRAL Supplement for IP. Section 5.4 uses a 
simple formal debt finance moral hazard model to set up the analytic framework. 
Section 5.5 applies the analytic framework to examine the consequences of the two 
different approaches for different kinds of licenses (public or private) on welfare 
grounds. The examination helps us to reveal the real problem of unconditionally 
enforcing the anti-assignment clauses in the case of secured transaction, especially for 
the case of using IP licenses as collateral. In the end, the conclusion section 
summarizes all the findings and recognizes the limitations. Since the economic 
rationales underlying each type of IP are similar but not exactly the same, this chapter 
uses the generic term “IP” in a general way but the analysis is mainly focused on 
patents in order to illustrate relevant problems. 
5.2 Policy Considerations 
This section firstly illustrates a road map concerning the contractual relationships 
among the relevant parties and describes the interests of each party involved. It then 
gives a brief intuitive explanation about the factors and core principles that should be 
considered in assessing policy implementations and in giving policy implications in 
the later sections.  
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5.2.1 Road Map of the Contractual Relations 
Secured transactions with IP licenses are complex because four parties and three 
contractual relationships are involved. The complicated contractual relationships can 
be illustrated as follows, 
 
Figure 5.1 Contractual relationships among all parties involved 
A. The license relationship between the licensor and the licensee 
The initial contractual relationship is the license agreement between an IP licensor 
and a licensee (relationship 1 in Figure 5.1). According to the license agreement, the 
IP licensor grants an exclusive or nonexclusive license to the licensee in return for a 
license fee, which is usually in the form of fixed payments plus royalties. 730 
Correspondingly, the licensee pays the license fee in exchange for the rights to use the 
innovation underlying the license subject to the contractual terms in the license 
agreement. Licensing is one of the main ways that create rewards for innovation (see 
more details in Section 3.3.2.2 A). 
B. The security relationship between the licensee-debtor and the creditor 
The second contractual relationship is the security agreement between the 
licensee-debtor and the secured creditor (relationship 2 in Figure 5.1). In the security 
agreement, the licensee uses its rights under the license, mainly the right to 
(exclusive)731 exploitation, as collateral and grants the lender (as the secured creditor) 

730 See the detailed discussion on the economic reasoning of this kind of payment structure at Scotchmer 
(2004) “Innovation and Incentive”, supra note 39 at 161-196. 
731 IP licenses can be “exclusive”, where the licensor cannot make another license with the same scope, or 
“non-exclusive”, where the licensor can. Non-exclusive licenses, in many countries, are non-assignable by 
law, and, even in countries where assignment is possible, have much less monetary value. For simplicity, 
this Chapter focuses on exclusive licenses.  
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security interests in the license. The security interests allow the secured creditor to 
dispose of the encumbered license in a foreclosure sale upon the licensee-debtor’s 
default, and to get refunded from the foreclosure sale prior to other parties as the 
repayment of the debt. The security interests work as a self-disciplinary mechanism to 
control the licensee-debtor’s post-lending misbehaviors and ensure the creditor 
receive the repayment in the case of licensee-debtor’s default (See the detailed 
discussion in Section 2.4.1.2 and 2.4.2.2). 
C. The potential license relationship between the licensor and the assignee 
The first license agreement and the second security agreement are separately 
concluded between different parties but closely interdependent.  
First, the performance of each contractual relationship has a strong influence on the 
other one. On the one hand, the license agreement directly determines the 
collateralizing value of the license in the security agreement. On the other hand, the 
security agreement influences the performance of the license agreement. While the 
security agreement can bring external finance and consequently improve the 
licensee’s payment capacity, it also may totally change the license relationship in the 
case of foreclosure disposition upon the licensee-debtor’s default.  
Second, the interaction between the two direct contractual relations may give rise to a 
change of the contractual counterparty to the licensor. A foreclosure disposition of the 
encumbered license upon the licensee-debtor’s default would place the encumbered 
license in the disposition sale. The encumbered license would be assigned to an 
assignee (relationship 3.1 in Figure 5.1). In this case, in spite of the fact that there is 
no direct contractual relation between the licensor and the assignee, both parties may 
have to fulfill and accept performance according to the terms of the original license 
agreement between the licensor and the original licensee (relationship 3.2 in Figure 1). 
The licensor may have to deal with a new licensee (i.e., the assignee) without his prior 
knowledge or consent.  
5.2.2 Reasons to Include Restrictive Clauses in License Contracts 
The licensor’s main concern here is that dealing with an assignee without prior 
knowledge or consent may bring extra risks or costs for the licensor to fulfill its 
obligation under the license agreement or increase some other costs outside the 
license.  
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One main cost may come from the fact that the license may fall into the hands of the 
licensor’s prime competitor. At the auction of the foreclosure sale, the IP license 
might be assigned to the licensor’s prime competitor. The competitor might use the 
underlying technology to develop or produce his own products, which are 
substitutions or improved products to the licensor’s products and hence can erode the 
licensor’s profits. Alternatively, the competitor might suppress or shut down the 
production and sale of the licensed products as part of its business strategy to drive 
the licensor out of the market. In the above cases, the competitor would not have been 
granted the license by the licensor or, even if have been granted, would have been 
demanded a much higher license fee or with less favorable terms. The competitor may 
therefore have an opportunistic incentive to seek an existing license from a 
foreclosure sale, instead of directly contracting with the licensor for a license, which 
otherwise might be impossible or too expensive.732 In the worst case, the competitor 
may even have the incentive to arbitrage the investment funded by the secured 
transaction in order to increase the opportunity of purchasing the license from the 
foreclosure sale. The competitor’s opportunistic behavior would undermine the 
licensor’s profit from his license.  
And in some other cases, the licensor’s concerns about the licenses may fall into the 
hands of someone not qualified or deserving. As the value of IP is 
exploitation-specific, the licensors want to make sure that the IP licenses are 
effectively exploited by someone who has both the expertise and financial resources 
to provide products or service.733 Unqualified products or service may ruin the 
reputation of the licensor and consequently bring extra costs to the licensor in the way 
of damage, higher performance costs or risks.  
The licensor’s fear of losing control over the identity of the licensee without his 
knowledge or approval requires him to take some actions to protect his private 
interests. Since the licensor and the assignee are not interrelated by a direct 
contractual relationship, the licensor cannot directly control the relationship with the 
assignee. The incorporation of restrictive terms on the security interest assignment in 
the license agreement therefore becomes the licensors’ self-help solution to protect 
themselves from having to deal with someone who he has refused to deal with 

732 See Raymond T. Nimmer, “Breaking Barriers: The Relation Between Contract And Intellectual Property 
Law,” Berkeley Technology Law Journal 13 (1998): 827–889 at 857.  
733 This chapter focuses on patent, but this problem is more serious in the case of trademarks, which 
designed for identifying to the pubic the source of goods or services. Uncontrolled licensing may result in 
the misleading or even a fraud to the public. 
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directly in the first place. The anti-assignment clause, if effective, enables a licensor 
to continue to control the use of the license, the counterpart it has to deal with, and to 
keep informed with the changes of the counterpart.  
5.2.3 Enforceability of Restrictive Clauses 
However, the problem here is that, while these restrictive terms can protect licensors 
from opportunistic behavior, they also give a licensor the final power to consent to or 
refuse the licensee’s use of IP license as collateral. The enforceability of these 
contractual restrictive terms would determine the incentives of all the parties involved. 
The IP laws and the secured transaction legal regime reflect very different 
perspectives on these contractual restrictive terms and hence have different 
preferences on the enforceability. There is a basic tension between freedom of 
contract principles and concerns about restraints on alienation. 
5.2.3.1 The perspective of IP laws 
The core idea of the IP regime is to provide the incentives to create innovations, 
disclose knowledge, and put the knowledge and innovations into use. IP protection 
entitles the innovators with the legitimate right to exclude others from practicing their 
innovations. The statutory exclusivity allows the innovators to charge monopoly price 
and drag profits for covering their investments in R&D and to disclose knowledge 
without worrying about the free-rider problems. IP laws focus on facilitating 
innovators to use this legitimate exclusion to maximize the value that can be derived 
from the innovations.  
Licensing is a main way for innovators to generate profits and for putting protected 
innovations into use. In order to maximize the profits, it is in the licensor’s interest to 
find the licensee with the highest net value (the benefits minus the costs). However, 
the judgment about who is the best licensee is very subjective, depending on the 
licensee’s valuation about the profits from the license and the associated cost as to the 
licensor. IP laws therefore generally respect the freedom of contract in licensing of IP, 
by letting the parties explore the information and to sort out the bargain, and simply 
enforcing the contract terms. Licensors are allowed to freely decide to whom and to 
what extent the licensors want to grant rights of exploitation.  
For the licensors’ interests, the IP laws would favor the enforcement of these 
restrictive terms. Losing control over the identity of the licensees may bring 
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substantial costs to the licensors. The costs would undermine the licensors’ profits 
from the innovations and consequently remove the IP holders’ incentive to license or 
to innovate. A licensor therefore should have a legitimate interest in protecting 
himself against an unwanted change of his contractual partner and the other 
detrimental effects that could result from a particular secured transaction. Enforcing 
the constrictive terms would entitle the licensor to the final say on approving the 
creation of security interests in the licensee’s rights under the license.  
However, there is a growing opinion that, for encouraging the application of 
innovative technologies, the IP laws should not always support enforcing restrictive 
terms. The competitor’s opportunistic behavior would undermine the licensor’s profit 
from his license but would not necessarily be socially inefficient. In recent years, 
there have been comprehensive discussions on the adverse effects of the IP licensing 
on promoting the application of innovation.734 Licensors may make their license 
decision for private interests instead of for productive efficiency. In this case, offering 
the assignees another opportunity to avoid the patentee’s abuse of patent rights might 
be socially efficient in some cases. But this opinion is still controversial and has not 
been widely accepted. 
Furthermore, it is worth noting that, although license agreements are in general still 
considered to be contractual, they are gradually gaining some “proprietary” 
characteristics. For example, to stimulate patent licensing and to help patentees indicate 
their willingness to grant licenses, the Intellectual Property Office of the United 
Kingdom (UKIPO) encourages patent holders to have their patents endorsed with 
“licences of right” (LORs) in the register of patents, to the effect that licenses under the 
patent are to be available “as of right”.735 When a granted patent is endorsed with the 
LOR, the patent owner only needs to pay half of the usual annual renewal fees, but also 
must grant a license to anyone who wants one. The license will still be on terms agreed 
between the licensor and the licensee. However, if the license terms cannot be agreed 
between the parties, then the UKIPO will intervene and set the terms. A similar LOR 

734 See the general discussion on the adverse effects of IP system in Section 2.1.1.2. See the adverse effects 
of IP licensing in, for example, Michael L. Katz and Carl Shapiro, “On the Licensing of Innovations,” The 
RAND Journal of Economics 16, no. 4 (1985): 504–520; Simon Genevaz, “Against Immunity for Unilateral 
Refusals to Deal in Intellectual Property: Why Antitrust Law Should Not Distinguish between IP and Other 
Property Rights,” Berkeley Technology Law Journal 19, no. 2 (2004): 741–784. 
735 Section 46, UK Patent Act 1977 (as amended) [2014 version] [Patentee’s application for entry in register 
that licences are available as of right]. See more information at the website of the Intellectual Property Office 
of the United Kingdom, available at https://www.gov.uk/guidance/licensing-intellectual-property.  
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practice exists in Singapore as well.736  
Moreover, some IP-specialized practitioners established the world’s first market-based 
and fully transparent patent license exchange platform, i.e., Intellectual Property 
Exchange International, Inc. (IPXI), in 2009. The IPXI attempted to convert 
non-exclusive patent licenses into a standardized, transparent, and tradable instrument 
called the Unit License Rights Contracts (ULR contracts).737 The ULR Contracts 
transformed private licensing of technology into tradable products. They were expected 
to “enable IP holders […] to more efficiently monetize patents and other IP brought to 
the market through non-exclusive licensing, while also allowing buyers to purchase at 
market-established prices.”738 Although it eventually failed in 2015,739 these efforts in 
creating the IPXI show that some practitioners have noticed the potentials of 
commoditizing and trading IP licenses. 
5.2.3.2 The perspective of secured transaction law 
By contrast, the secured transaction law views economic activities from the 
standpoint of spurring the availability of low-cost credit in order to facilitate the 
movement of goods and services. In order to accomplish this, it seeks to allow debtors 
to easily use the full value inherent in their assets to support credit in a safe, fair, 
efficient and transparent capital market.  
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736 See more information at the website of the Intellectual Property Office of Singapore (IPOS), available at 
http://www.ipos.gov.sg/AboutIP/TypesofIPWhatisIntellectualProperty/Whatisapatent/Managingandenforcin
gyourpatent.aspx. 
737 See “Response to Intellectual Property Exchange International, INC.’s Request for Business Review 
Letter”, U.S. Department of Justice, 26-03-2013, available at 
https://www.justice.gov/atr/response-intellectual-property-exchange-international-incs-request-business-revi
ew-letter.  
738 The citation is from Ruud Peters, Executive Vice President and Chief Intellectual Property Officer of 
Philips, cited from “Intellectual Property Exchange International Welcomes Corporate and University Founding 
Members”, Eastern Standard Time, 13-12-2011, available at 
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20111213005444/en/Intellectual-Property-Exchange-International
-Welcomes-Corporate-University. See also, “Response to Intellectual Property Exchange International, 
INC.’s Request for Business Review Letter”, U.S. Department of Justice, 26-03-2013, available at 
https://www.justice.gov/atr/response-intellectual-property-exchange-international-incs-request-business-revi
ew-letter.  
739 Many factors may contribute to IPXI’s failure, such as, the lack of incentive for potential licensees 
(infringers) to get a license without litigation threats in the current litigation driven licensing system, the 
incompatibility with the cross-licensing practice, the immaturity of the price setting model, the divergence 
between the “pay-up-front” requirement of the ULR contract and the normal “pay-as-you-go” royalty based 
system, the small license portfolio and the lack of market confidence in the business model. See Jorge L. 
Contreras, “Frand Market Failure: IPXT’S Standards-Essential Patent License Exchange,” Chicago-Kent 
Journal of Intellectual Property 15, no. 2 (2016): 419–40.  
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From the perspective of secured transaction law, enforcing the restrictive terms would 
impair and limit the licensee-debtors’ ability to negotiate with the lender/creditor for 
leveraging the value in a license. It is believed that costless private negotiation can 
move the property rights to the highest-value users, which is an efficient market result; 
and laws could be structured to remove the impediments to private negotiation 
(Normative Coase Theorem).740 Free alienability of property rights is the foundation 
for costly private negotiation.741 However, the restrictive terms can impair the free 
alienability of the “licensee’s rights in the license”. They make a licensee’s creation 
and a creditor’s enforcement of security interests in the “licensee’s rights in the 
license” totally conditional on the IP holder-licensor’s decision. As a fundamental rule 
of secured transactions, a lender would be willing to provide finance, only if he can be 
convinced that he can enforce his security interests in the encumbered collateral upon 
the debtor’s default. The enforcement not only allows the secured creditor to get some 
recovery from the salvage value of encumbered collateral, but also enables the 
secured creditor to put credible threat to the debtor to remove the debtor’s 
post-lending misbehaving (see Section 2.4.2.2). When the enforcement of security 
interests in the licensee is totally conditioned on the IP holder-licensor’s decision, 
which is uncertain and might be inefficient, the lenders generally would not like to 
accept the “licensee’s rights in the license” as collateral. In this case, a licensee’s 
capability of leveraging the economic value of his rights under a license will be 
highly restricted or even practically impossible. The financial potential in the 
licensee’s right in the license would be wasted. Wealth-enhancing investment 
opportunities will be forgone because of the lack of investments. 
In this case, disrespecting the contractual restrictive clauses would encourage the 
lender’s acceptance of IP license as collateral. There is a growing view that, because 
of their inhibiting effect on secured credit, these restrictive terms should be rendered 
unenforceable by secured transactions law, not only in the context of IP licenses, but 
also in other asset contexts in which such restrictive clauses arise.742  
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740 See the “Normative Coase Theorem” in Robert B. Cooter and Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics, 6th 
Editio (Pearson, 2011) at 92. 
741 Nevertheless, in some cases with problems like externality, imperfect information, prisoner’s dilemmas, 
free riders, and high cost of administering alternative policies, some restrictions on the alienability of 
property may promote efficiency. See detailed discussion in Susan Rose-Ackerman, “Inalienability and the 
Theory of Property Rights,” Columbia Law Review 85 (1985): 931–69.  
742 See Akseli (2011) "International Secured Transactions Law: Facilitation of Credit and International 
Conventions and Instruments" supra note 722. 
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5.2.3.3 The tension between IP law and secured transaction law 
The basic tensions between IP laws and secured transaction law comes from the 
licensors’ seeking to protect themselves from enduring potential detrimental effects of 
the security interests in IP license and the lenders’ attempting to secure adequate 
collateral for their loans.  
On the one hand, enforcing these restrictive terms for the IP laws’ purpose of 
protecting licensors might allow the licensors to opportunistically withhold consent to 
a wealth-enhancing security assignment of an IP license in order to extract profits 
from the licensee-borrower’s business. Lenders would then lack incentives to provide 
credit. Some further innovative activities might be impossible because of the lack of 
credit.  
On the other hand, invalidating these restrictive terms for the secured transaction 
law’s purpose of encouraging lending might make it difficult or impossible for the 
licensor to control the detrimental effects of the secured transaction on him. The 
inability to contract around this risk can undermine the holder-licensor’s incentive to 
license and so forgo efficient license transactions. The license agreement directly 
determines the collateralizing value of the license in the security agreement. Without 
the underlying license relationship, the use of license as collateral is impossible.  
The interdependence between these contracts determine that there should be a balance 
between the secured transaction law’s objective of fostering the use of IP license as 
collateral in order to help the licensees get better access to credit, and the IP laws’ 
objective of maintaining the IP holder-licensor’s incentive to license and innovate.  
The following Section 3 will show how different approaches have been implemented 
in practice for resolving the tension. Then Section 4 will use a formal model to show 
how the interests of each of the parties affected by the transaction are addressed and 
balanced.  
5.3 Policy Implementation 
5.3.1 China  
In China, the general rule about the assignability of a contract is that the contractual 
rights can be assigned and that the anti-assignment clauses are binding. In the specific 
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case for the assignment of IP licenses, the default rule is that a licensee’s attempted 
assignment is allowed only with express consent from the licensor, unless the license 
agreement has clearly indicated otherwise.  
In current Chinese law, IP collateralization has been accepted as a financial mean of 
IP exploitation under IP laws. It has to be executed under the security device “pledge” 
(zhiquan) according to the secured transaction law.743 The Real Rights Law, which is 
the principal legal document governing secured transactions in China, has set only the 
minimum requirements on the eligibility of collateral, i.e., being property rights with 
monetary value and assignable.744 Just according to the Real Rights Law, it seems 
that the licensee’s rights in the IP license can be used as collateral, as long as there is 
express consent from the licensor.  
Similarly, in the Guiding Opinions for Commercial Banks on Operating IP 
collateralization, the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) also 
specifically instructs the commercial banks that “in the case where licensees create a 
pledge, the consent from the original IP holder or the licensor is required.”745 This 
instruction implies that the CBRC, as the state administrative department of the banks, 
does allow banks to accept licensee’s use of rights in license as collateral.  
However, the specific regulatory rules for the registration of security interests in 
patents, trademarks and copyrights explicitly stipulate that the pledgor in registration 
has to be the “recorded title-holder” of the IP to be pledged.746 As a licensee cannot 
be the “recorded title-holder” of an IP in current Chinese IP law, this registration 
requirement makes it impossible for a licensee to have a security interest with 
third-party effectiveness in its right to exploitation, even with express consent from 
the licensor. In theory, a creditor can still choose to create a security interest which is 
effective between the parties only, without making a registration.747 However, such 
an unperfected interest ineffective against third parties is just meaningless for the 
purpose of security interests. 
In summary, although the licensee’s use of its rights under an IP license as collateral is 

743 See detailed discussion in Section 4.2.2. 
744 Article 223 (5), Real Rights Law. 
745 Article 8, Guiding Opinions for Commercial Banks on Operating IP collateralization, supra note 378. 
746 See Article 12 (2), Patent Pledge regulation of 2010; Article 8, Regulation on the Registration 
Procedures for Pledge of Exclusive Rights to Use Registered Trademarks (2009); and Article 12, Measures 
for the Registration of Pledge of Copyright (2010). 
747 Note: the security interest cannot be called a pledge, because, as explained in Section 4.2.2.1, by nature, 
pledge is real right which is effective against all third parties. 
 ʹ͸ͷ
allowed under the Real Rights Law and with the banks’ acceptance, it cannot be done 
in practice because of the restrictions in the registration rules for the perfection 
purpose.  
5.3.2 UNCITRAL’s Supplement 
For now, the most important international effort on improving law for promoting IP 
collateralization is done by the United Nations Commission on International Trade 
Law (UNCITRAL), i.e., the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions: 
Supplement on Security Rights in Intellectual Property (The Supplement). 748 
Although the Supplement was designed with the objective of promoting secured credit 
with respect to IP, it absolutely prioritizes the objective of IP laws. It sets a guiding 
principle that the objective of a secured transaction law to promote credit shall be 
achieved without undermining the objectives of IP laws to “prevent unauthorized use 
of IP, to protect the value of IP and thus to encourage further innovation and 
creativity.”749  
With this guiding principle, the Supplement prioritizes the IP licensor’s control over 
the IP to the licensee’s need for credit, and chooses not to interfere with the licensor’s 
decision by simply enforcing contractual restrictive clauses. It argues, “it is important 
for the licensor to retain control over the licensed intellectual property and who can 
use it. If such control cannot be exercised, the value of the licensed intellectual 
property may be materially impaired or lost completely.” 750  The Supplement 
explicitly stipulates that the secured transaction law should not affect the licensor-IP 
holder’s ability and right to limit the assignability of its IP rights.751 Any contractual 
limitation in the license agreement as to the assignability of licensed rights should be 
respected.752  
Therefore, under the UNCITRAL’s Supplement, a licensee can use the license (or the 
interests in the granted authorization to use or exploit the licensed IP) as collateral,753 
but only if he has the power to do so (based on the nemo dat principle, i.e., the grantor 
cannot grant to the secured creditor more rights than the grantor has or may acquire in 

748 See detailed discussion in Section 4.4.1. 
749 Para 49, the Supplement. 
750 Para 107, the Supplement. 
751 Para 20 and 90, the Supplement. 
752 Paragraph 25 and 90, the Supplement. 
753 Paragraph 17, the Supplement. The Supplement also gives an example of using the rights of a licensee as 
collateral, see Pare 41, the Supplement.  
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the future).754 In the case without anti-assignment clause or with consent from the 
licensor, the licensee can use the license (or its interests in the license) as collateral; 
the secured creditor will take a security interest in the license (or the licensee’s 
interests in the license) subject to the terms and conditions of the license 
agreement.755 If the license agreement includes an anti-attachment clause or an 
anti-assignment clause, no enforceable security right in the license can be created 
without the consent of the licensor.756 
5.3.3 US  
In the US, it has been held long that contract rights are generally assignable, unless 
the terms of contract or statutes indicate otherwise.757 Nevertheless, the statutes and 
courts also show a trend towards imposing limitations on enforcing anti-assignment 
clauses in the contract.758 In the early days, statutes and courts strictly favored the 
freedom of contract and simply invalidated any attempted assignments 
notwithstanding anti-assignment clauses, and regardless of the specific words used in 
the clauses.759 As contract rights were viewed as “personal” to the contracting parties 
by then, the obligor should have had the right to deal only with the counterparty with 
whom it originally contracted.760 Gradually, statutes and courts started to limit the 
validity of anti-assignment clauses. They preferred to hold the attempted assignments 
as breaches of contract but still keep these assignments effective, unless the 
anti-assignment clause has expressly stated that the attempted assignments would be 

754 Recommendation 13 and 18, the Guide; Para 55, 82, 86, 90 and 119, the Supplement (the nemo dat 
(quod non habet) principle).  
755 Para 107, the Supplement. 
756 Paragraph 52, the Supplement. See Para 107 and 250, the Supplement (providing “Of course, if there is 
no restriction on the assignability of the licensee’s rights in the licensee agreement (which rarely happens), it 
is considered that the licensee’s rights are freely assignable. A secured creditor can take a security right in 
the licensee’s rights subject to the terms and conditions of the license agreement. In this case, upon the 
licensee-debtor’s default, the secured creditor can directly enforce his security interests and dispose the 
encumbered licensee to an assignee.”). 
757 Grover C. Grismore, “Effect of a Restriction on Assignment in a Contract,” Michigan Law Review 31, no. 
3 (1933): 299–319 at 299. 
758  Gregory Scott Crespi, “Selling Structured Settlements: The Uncertain Effect of Anti-Assignment 
Clauses,” Pepperdine Law Review 28 (2000): 787–818 at 794. 
759 Grismore (1933) “Effect of a Restriction on Assignment in a Contract,” supra note 757.  
760 Joy Anderson, “Case Note: Contracts—Looking for ‘Something’: Minnesota’s New Rule for Interpreting 
Anti-Assignment Clauses in Travertine Corp. v. Lexington-Silverwood,” William Mitchell Law Review 32, 
no. 4 (2005): 1435–1463 at 1437-1440. 
 ʹ͸͹
invalid761 or there is compelling public policy favoring invalidation of the attempted 
assignments.762 It is believed that the damage remedy is sufficient for compensating 
the obligor for damages actually suffered as a result of an assignment.763 In recent 
years, the statutes started to provide exceptional rules invalidating express 
contractual restrictions on assignment in some specific cases:764 
- The first case is about invalidating contractual restrictions on the assignability of 
interests in land. The main argument is that restraints on the alienation of property 
interests in land are generally unlawful. 
- The second case is mainly about the right to receive money due or money to 
become due.765 The main argument is that, an obligor of rights to payment 
usually discharges its obligation by simply making the payment. Paying the 
assignee instead of the original obligee (i.e., the assignor) is unlikely to increase 
any cost or risk of performance to the obligor. As the obligor would not be 
prejudiced by the assignment, there is also no legitimate interest in enforcing 
restrictions on assignment. In addition, allowing free assignability can save the 
cost of renegotiation and therefore be socially efficient.766 
- Some other cases of invalidation of anti-assignment clauses are mainly found in 
laws relating to bankruptcy767 and secured transactions.768  
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761 Article 322(2)b, the Restatement (Second) of Contract (1981) (providing “A contract term prohibiting 
assignment of rights under the contract, unless a different intention is manifested … gives the obligor a right 
to damages for breach of the terms forbidding assignment but does not render the assignment ineffective.”) 
762 For example, in Cook, Inc. v. Boston Scientific Corp., 333 F.3d 737, 742 (7th Cir.2003), Judge Ponser 
states that “whether the assignment should de valid or not should depend on examination of the circumstance 
of the contract. … An assignment violating an anti-assignment clause would be invalid if it violated public 
policy.” 
763 Rumbin v. Utica Mutual Insurance Co. 757 A.2d 526 (Conn. 2000). 
764  See Edwin E. Smith, “Article 9 in Revision: A Proposal for Permitting Security Interests in 
Nonassignable Contracts and Permits,” Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review 28 (1994): 335–350 at 338. 
765 For example, for the sale of goods and where one party to the contract has breached, U.C.C § 2-210 (2) 
allows the other party to assign his right to damages regardless of an anti-assignment clause. And the 
original U.C.C. § 9-318(4) invalidates all restrictions on the assignment of an account or on the creation of a 
security interest in a general intangible for money due or become due. 
766 Richard A. Epstein, “Why Restrain Alienation?,” Columbia Law Review 85, no. 5 (1985): 970–990 at 
972. 
767 Under federal bankruptcy law, a trustee in bankruptcy has the ability to assign an executory contract or 
lease despite an anti-assignment restriction. 
768 In the case of secured transaction, even with a clearly expressed prohibition in the security agreement, 
U.C.C § 9-401 entitles a debtor to make effective assignment of his rights in collateral (the secured lender 
may still claim for a breach of contract or a termination of contract). U.C.C § 9-406 completely invalidates 
anti-assignment clauses restricting the creation, perfection and enforcement of a security interest in an 
account or general intangible for money due or to become due. In the case of a lease of goods, U.C.C § § 
 ʹ͸ͺ
Nevertheless, except for the clear statutory exceptional rules for restricted specific 
cases, anti-assignment clauses are still routinely enforced as part of essential freedom 
of contract. The intention of the parties to the contract is presumed based on a literal 
explanation of the contractual terms. 
For the purpose of UCC-9, it has been drafted to reflect a position that the “The law 
should not impair the ability of debtors to secure as much or as little of their debts 
with as much or as little of their existing and future property as they deem 
appropriate.”769 An IP licensee’s “rights that arise under a license of intellectual 
property, including the right to exploit the intellectual property without liability for 
infringement” can be used as collateral, by being categorized as a kind of 
“non-payment general intangible”. 770  While the UCC-9 generally respects the 
contractual restrictions on security interest assignments,771 US law intervenes by 
adding a specific exceptional provision, the UCC § 9-408, in its 2001 Revision to 
allow an IP licensee to create “limited” security interests in its rights under an IP 
license notwithstanding contractual restrictions.772 
With the intention of making non-payment general intangibles more readily useable 
as collateral, the exceptional UCC 9-408 partially invalidates the contractual and 
statutory restrictions on security interest assignment of rights arising from all 
non-payment general intangibles (including a licensee’s rights in an IP license),773 
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2A-303(3) also conditionally permits the creation or enforcement of a security interest in the lessee’s 
interests under the lease agreement notwithstanding the anti-assignment clause. 
769 See Steven L. Harris and Charles W. Jr. Mooney, “A Property-Based Theory of Security Interests: 
Taking Debtors’ Choices Seriously,” Virginia Law Review 80 (1994): 2021–2072 at 2021. Note: the authors 
are reporters for the Drafting Committee to Revised U.C.C. Article 9 and were reporters for the Permanent 
Edititorial Board U.C.C Article 9 Study Committee. 
770 Where a licensee uses its rights in an IP license as collateral, the rights fall into the category of “general 
intangible” under the UCC-9. See Official Comment 5d to U.C.C § 9-102 (2010) (providing “As used in the 
definition of general intangible, things in action includes rights that arise under a license of intellectual 
property, including the right to exploit the intellectual property without liability for infringement.”). “General 
intangible” can be further subcategorized into “payment intangible” and “non-payment intangible”. U.C.C. 
§ 9-102 (a)(61) (defining “payment intangible” as “general intangible under which the account debtor’s 
principle obligation is to pay money”). Non-payment intangible refers to the rest of general intangible. So a 
licensee’s rights in an IP license are further categorized as “non-payment general intangible”. 
771 U.C.C. § 9-401 [Rights of Third Parties: Alienability of Debtor’s Rights] (providing: “(a) [Other law 
governs alienability; exceptions.] Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) and Section 9-406, 9-407, 
9-408, and 9-409, whether a debtor’s rights in collateral may be voluntarily or involuntarily transferred is 
governed by law other than this article.” 
772 Thomas E. Plank, “The Limited Security Interests in Non-Assignable Collateral under Revised Article 9,” 
American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review 9 (2001): 323–349 at 325. 
773 The contractual and statutory restrictions on security interest assignment of rights arising from “payment 
general intangible” are regulated under U.C.C. § 9-406 (2010). 
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respectively, in UCC 9-408 (a) and (c). For the contractual restrictions, the UCC 
9-408(a) stipulates: 
9-408 [Restrictions on Assignment of Promissory Notes, Health-Care-Insurance 
Receivables, and Certain General Intangibles Ineffective.] 
(a) [Term restricting assignment generally ineffective] 
Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b), a term […] in an agreement between an 
account debtor and a debtor which relates to […] a general intangible, including a 
contract, permit, license, or franchise, and which term prohibits, restricts, or requires the 
consent of […] the account debtor to, the assignment or transfer of, or creation, 
attachment, or perfection of a security interest in, the […] general intangible, is 
ineffective to the extent that the term: 
  (1) would impair the creation, attachment, or perfection of a security interest; or 
(2) provides that the assignment or transfer or the creation, attachment, or perfection of 
the security interest may give rise to a default, breach, right of recoupment, claim, 
defense, termination, right of termination, or remedy under the […] general 
intangible.” 
If there is an anti-assignment or anti-encumbrance clause in the IP license agreement 
between the licensee (as the debtor774) and the licensor (as the account debtor,775 who 
owes a duty to the debtor) constricting the licensee from using his rights in the IP 
license (as a kind of non-payment general intangible) as collateral, the UCC 9-408 (a) 
invalidates such a clause to the extent that it impairs the creation or perfection (note: 
but not the enforcement) of security interests in the IP license. A security interest 
assignment is regarded as valid even when the creditor is fully aware of the existence 
of the restrictive provisions.776 Even if the clause clearly stipulates that a security 
assignment would give rise to a default, breach, right of recoupment, claim, defense, 
termination, right of termination, or remedy, such a clause is also ineffective as to the 

774 U.C.C. § 9-102 (a) (28) (2010) (defining “debtor” as “(a) a person having an interest, other than a 
security interest or other lien, in the collateral, whether or not the person is an obligor.” )The IP licensees fall 
into the scope of “debtor”. See Murphy (2002), “Proposal for a Centralized and Integrated Registry for 
Security Interests in Intellectual Property,” supra note 494 at 465. 
775 U.C.C. § 9-102 (a) (3) (2010) (defining “account debtor” as “a person obligated on … (a) general 
intangible.”) The Official Comment 5h to U.C.C. § 9-102 (2010) uses franchise contract as an example (“For 
example, if a franchisee uses its rights under a franchise agreement (a general intangible) as collateral, then the 
franchisor is an account debtor.”) The same logic will apply to license contract as well. So, in the case where 
a licensee uses its rights under a license agreement (a general intangible) as collateral, then the IP licensor is 
an “account debtor”. See also Murphy (2002), “Proposal for a Centralized and Integrated Registry for 
Security Interests in Intellectual Property”, supra note 494 at 465. 
776 See Alexis Freeman, “Internet Domain Name Security Interests: Why Debtors Can Grant Them And 
Lenders Can Take Them in This New Type of Hybrid Property,” American Bankruptcy Institute Journal 10 
(2002): 853–889 at 886. 
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creation and perfection of security interests.777 Notwithstanding express contractual 
restrictions, the creation and perfection of security interests in the licensee’s rights are 
valid and do not constitute a default or breach under the license agreement at all. 
One of the drafters explains that the exceptional invalidation of contractual 
restrictions in UCC 9-408(a) aims to “make the value of otherwise non-assignable 
rights under a license available to licensees so that they can obtain more credit (and be 
more likely to pay their debts, including license fees).”778 It is argued that, as the 
anti-assignment clauses are designed to prevent a licensor from being adversely 
affected by the security assignment from the licensee to an unauthorized assignee; 
without enforcement, just the creation and perfection of security interests in the 
licensee’s interests under the license would not have any actual effect on the licensor. 
As the licensor would not be prejudiced by the creation and perfection only, there is 
also no legitimate interest in enforcing the restrictions on creation and perfection of 
security interests.779 
For the same reason, it is believed that the time for law to intervene should be when 
the licensor’s interests might be actually affected, i.e., the time of enforcing the 
security interest in the license. With this belief, the UCC 9-408(d) restricts the 
invalidation within a narrower scope for “non-payment intangible” than in the UCC 
9-406, which completely invalidates contractual restrictions on the assignability of 
various rights to “payment intangible”780 as to all of the creation, perfection and 
enforcement of security interests.781 Section 9-408(d) stipulates as follows: 
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777 U.C.C. § 9-408 (a) (2) (2010).  
778 See Steven O. Weise, “The Financing of Intellectual Property Under Revised Article 9,” Chicago-Kent 
Law Review 74, no. 3 (1999): 1077–1107 at 1093-1094. The Official Comments also confirm with this 
explanation. See U.C.C. § 9-408 cmt. 2 (2012) (stipulating “This section makes ineffective any attempt to 
restrict the assignment of a general intangible, […], whether the restriction appears in […] the agreement 
between an account debtor and a debtor (subsection (a)) or in a rule of law, including a statute or 
governmental rule or regulation (subsection (c)). This result allows the creation, attachment, and perfection 
of a security interest in a general intangible, such as an agreement for the nonexclusive license of software, 
[…], without giving rise to a default or breach by the assignor or from triggering a remedy of the account 
debtor […]. This enhances the ability of certain debtors to obtain credit. On the other hand, subsection (d) 
protects the other party the account debtor on a general intangible […] from adverse effects arising from the 
security interest. It leaves the account debtors or obligated persons rights and obligations unaffected in all 
material respects if a restriction rendered ineffective by subsection (a) or (c) would be effective under law 
other than Article 9.”) 
779 Ibid. 
780 A “payment intangible” is defined as a “general intangible under which the account debtor’s principle 
obligation is to pay money” (U.C.C. § 9-102 (a)(61)). 
781 The rights to payment covered under the U.C.C. § 9-406 include accounts, chattel paper, payment 
intangibles, and promissory note. An obligor of rights to payment usually discharges its obligations by 
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    9-408(d) [Limitation on Ineffectiveness under Subsections (a) and (c)] 
To the extent that a term […] in an agreement between an account debtor and a 
debtor which relates to a […] general intangible […] would be effective under law 
other than this article but is ineffective under subsection (a) or (c), the creation, 
attachment, or perfection of a security interest in the […] general intangible: 
      (1) is not enforceable against […] the account debtor; 
(2) does not impose a duty or obligation on […] the account debtor; 
(3) does not require […] the account debtor to recognize the security interest, pay 
or render performance to the secured party, or accept payment or performance 
from the secured party; 
(4) does not entitle the secured party to use or assign the debtor’s rights under the 
[…] general intangible, including any related information or materials furnished 
to the debtor in the transaction giving rise to the […] general intangible; 
(5) does not entitle the secured party to use, assign, possess, or have access to 
any trade secrets or confidential information of […] the account debtor; and 
(6) does not entitle the secured party to enforce the security interest in the […] 
general intangible.” 
UCC 9-408(d) provides that, if a prohibition or restriction clause on the assignment 
of some object is enforceable under law other than the UCC-9, then the invalidation 
of contractual restrictions under UCC 9-408(a) does not extend to the enforcement 
of security interests in that object. Where the IP licensee’s right is concerned, the 
general rule is that the express contractual prohibitions in IP licenses on the 
assignment of such right are routinely enforced. 782  So, according to the UCC 
9-408(d), the anti-assignment clause and events of default are still fully effective with 
regard to any attempted enforcement of the security interest in a IP licensee’s rights 
under an IP license. Reading UCC 9-408 (a) and (d) together, it becomes clear that, 
although a creditor can have a perfected security interest in an IP licensee’s rights 
under a license notwithstanding contractual restrictions in the license agreement 
(9-408 (a)); the creditor, without the licensor’s consent, cannot enforce the security 
interests against the licensor, nor directly assign the encumbered interests in the 
process of foreclosure (9-408 (d)).783 Therefore, although the creditor still has a valid 
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simply paying the payment. Paying the secured creditor instead of the obligee-debtor usually does not 
increase any cost or risk as to the obligor. The obligor is not prejudiced by the assignment and hence does 
not care whether the secured creditor can enforce the security interest against it or not. For this reason, there 
is no legitimate interest to enforce contractual restrictions on the assignability of various rights to “payment 
intangible”. The invalidation of invalidates contractual restrictions on the assignability of various rights to 
“payment intangible” is a principle that has been widely accepted at the international level.  
782 Brennan (2001) “Financing Intellectual Property under Revised Article 9: National and International 
Conflicts (Electronic Version),” supra note 302 at 402-404. 
783 Brennan (2001) “Financing Intellectual Property under Revised Article 9: National and International 
Conflicts (Electronic Version)”, supra note 302 at 410. 
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security interest as against a bankruptcy trustee or other secured parties of the 
licensee/debtor, the creditor cannot directly liquidate the encumbered license without 
the licensor’s consent. Any attempted enforcement of the security interest in the 
licensee’s rights can lead to a default by the licensee under the original license 
agreement. The Official Comments explain that the limitation on enforcement in 
UCC 9-408(d) “ensures that these affected persons [i.e., licensors] are not affected 
adversely thereby [i.e., by the licensee’s security assignment]. That provision 
removes any burden or adverse effects on those persons for which a rational basis 
could exist to restrict the effectiveness of an assignment or to the exercise of any 
remedies.”784  
The approach adopted in UCC 9-408 comes from the practical experience of creating 
security interests in the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) broadcast 
licenses.785 The Federal Communication Act includes an anti-assignment policy in 
order to keep the power of determining and controlling the licensee of an FCC 
broadcast license. In the early cases, the anti-assignment policy was held to prevent 
taking a security interest in an FCC license.786 In 1994, however, the FCC explicitly 
recognized that its responsibility for controlling the licensee did not extend to 
controlling the proceeds from a sale approved by the FCC.787 The later federal cases 
support the view and uphold effective security interest in the proceeds of an approved 
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784 U.C.C § 9-408, cmt 6 (Rev.1998) ; see also U.C.C § 9-408, cmt 2 (2010) “subsection (d) protects the 
other party the account debtor on a general intangible … from adverse effects arising from the security 
interest.” However, there are some opposite opinions. Brennan (2001) “Financing Intellectual Property 
under Revised Article 9: National and International Conflicts (Electronic Version),” supra note 302 at 
397-413 (arguing that 9-408 does adversely affect the licensor’s ability to collect royalties, because it makes 
the royalties otherwise payable to IP licensors who are junior to pre-existing floating liens against 
licensees).  
785 See Weise (1999) “The Financing of Intellectual Property Under Revised Article 9,” supra note 778 at 
1092-1093 (providing “Existing law generally permits the creation and perfection of security interests in 
otherwise nontransferable rights. The Drafting Committee modeled its approach on the law that applies to 
FCC licenses. Well-established law permits creation, attachment, and perfection of a security interest in the 
licensee's rights under an FCC license and the proceeds of that right, subject to the FCC's control over the 
actual enforcement of that security interest by the FCC's exercise of its power to approve or disapprove a 
transferee. The law that applies to FCC licenses permits the enforcement of the security interest in the 
proceeds, but not the enforcement of the security interest in the FCC license itself, without the consent of the 
FCC. Surely the public policy supporting the interest of the FCC in supervising who acts under an FCC 
license is no less worthy of protection than the interest of a software licensor in supervising who acts under a 
software license”); see also Timothy J. Boyce, “Collateralizing Nonassignable Contracts, Licenses, and 
Permits: Half a Loaf Is Better than No Loaf,” Business Law 52 (1996): 559–75.  
786 In re Merkley, 94 F.C.C.2d 829, 830 (1983), aff’d, 776 F.2d 365 (D.C. Cir. 1985). See Boyce (1996) 
“Collateralizing Nonassignable Contracts, Licenses, and Permits: Half a Loaf Is Better than No Loaf,” ibid 
at 563-66 (discussing evolution of FCC policy).  
787 In re Cheskey, 9 F.C.C.R. 968, 987 (1994). 
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sale of an FCC license.788 The FCC’s change in policy and relevant federal cases 
provide solid support for permitting the creation and perfection of “limited” security 
interests in a non-payment general intangible notwithstanding contractual or statutory 
restrictions under UCC 9-408.  
The proponents of UCC 9-408 claim that even a limited security interest has its value. 
A security interest in collateral automatically continues to the proceeds of the 
collateral notwithstanding any sale or other disposition of the collateral.789 Even if a 
secured creditor cannot directly enforce a security interest in the encumbered license, 
the secured lender still has a valid security interest in the proceeds arising from a 
consented post-petition assignment of the encumbered IP license in the future, against 
a bankruptcy trustee or other secured parties of the licensee.790 As one of the drafters, 
Weise (1999) states that "Once the licensee's rights have been transformed into 
money, the licensor no longer has an intellectual property interest to protect. If the 
licensee does transfer its rights (for example, with the consent of the licensor, 
pursuant to a bankruptcy court orders or otherwise), the secured party is entitled to 
enforce its security interest in the proceeds generated by a transfer of the licensee's 
rights. That does not interefere with the licensor's interest in controlling who uses the 
licensee's rights under the license."791 This approach is believed to allow creditors to 
share “half the loaf” in the value of IP licenses, which is better than no loaf at all, as 
in the case of unconditionally enforcing restrictive terms in the previous UCC-9 
rules.792 Other commentators think these limited security interests allow a debtor to 
obtain lower cost secured financing while protecting the interests of the related third 

788 See, e.g., MLQ Investors, L.P v. Pacific Quadracasting, Inc., 146 F.3d 746 (9th Cir. 1998) at 748-749 
(holding that a "creditor may obtain a security interest in the proceeds of the sale of an FCC license, and 
such an interest constitutes a 'general intangible' that may be perfected prior to the sale of the license.”; State 
St. Bank & Trust Co., 833 F. Supp. at 48-49 (stating bank has security interest in right to remuneration from 
transfer of broadcasting licenses); In re Ridgely Comm., Inc., 139 B.R. 374, 378-79 (Bankr. D. Md. 1992) 
(finding right to transfer license concerned F.C.C. and licensee but right to remuneration for transfer 
concerned only two private parties). See Plank (2001) “The Limited Security Interests in Non-Assignable 
Collateral under Revised Article 9,” supra note 772 at 347-348. 
789 See U.C.C 9-315 [Secured Party’s Rights on Disposition of Collateral and in Proceeds] (a) [Disposition 
of collateral: continuation of security interest or agricultural lien; proceeds.] 
790 See Weise (1999) “The Financing of Intellectual Property Under Revised Article 9,” supra note 778 
(stating that the reason is for allowing the secured creditor to seize the proceeds); see also Ronald J. Mann, 
“Secured Credit and Software Financing,” Cornell Law Review 85 (1999): 134–188 (discussing the creditors' 
interests in obtaining security interests in software is to preserve the claims to the firm value generated from 
software).  
791 See Weise (1999) “The Financing of Intellectual Property Under Revised Article 9,” supra note 778 at 
1096. 
792 See Boyce (1996) “Collateralizing Nonassignable Contracts, Licenses, and Permits: Half a Loaf Is Better 
than No Loaf,” supra note 785 at 559-575. 
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party as well.793 Since UCC 9-408 keeps licensors intact, the Intellectual Property 
Law Section of the American Bar Association also supports the UCC 9-408 and 
believes it “strikes an appropriate balance” among the interests of all parties 
involved.794  
Nevertheless, some other scholars argue that an unenforceable “toothless” security 
interest created under UCC 9-408 does not constitute any collateralizing value to the 
creditor, because few creditors would take a financial risk to create a security interest 
in an IP license knowing that they might not be able to directly enforce the security 
interest or dispose of the collateral.795 In the end, the enforceability of the security 
interest is purely based on the licensor’s consent. If the licensor intentionally blocks 
the transaction or keeps refusing to assign the license to anyone, then the lender just 
cannot recover anything from the disposition at all. Creating this kind of limited 
security interests is simply meaningless for the lenders in practice. The Revised UCC 
9-408 therefore has been criticized as conflicting “not only with legislative intent to 
enhance the ability of debtors to obtain credit, but also with the guiding principle of 
fostering the use of IP licenses as collateral.”796 
5.4 Model Setting 
All of these discussions and comments above start from a literal explanation of the 
contractual terms and follow with a very general and intuitive analysis. None of them 
has done a law and economics analysis on the real underlying reason for a statutory 
intervention. According to the economic paradigm of the efficiency properties of 
“freedom of contract”, it is generally believed that, in the usual cases without high 
transaction costs or serious informational asymmetry or (positive/negative) 
externalities or for some strong public policy considerations, the free negotiation 
between the contractual parties can move the property to the most-valued holder and 

793 See Plank (2001) “The Limited Security Interests in Non-Assignable Collateral under Revised Article 9,” 
supra note 772 at 323-324, and 348. 
794 See Weise (1999) “The Financing of Intellectual Property Under Revised Article 9,” supra note 778 at 
1079. 
795 See Freeman (2002) “Internet Domain Name Security Interests: Why Debtors Can Grant Them And 
Lenders Can Take Them in This New Type of Hybrid Property,” supra note 776 at 886; Picht (2013) 
“Collateralizing IP Licenses: Present Deficiencies And Proposals For Reform,” supra note 772 at 437. 
796 See Picht (2013) “Collateralizing IP Licenses: Present Deficiencies And Proposals For Reform,” supra 
note 772 at 440. 
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reach the socially efficient result. 797  So, unless there are valid market failure 
arguments to prove that the free negotiation would lead to market failure or for 
favoring some specific public policy consideration, the property law usually does not 
infringe on the parties’ freedom to contract, it just executes what the parties have 
literally agreed. For this reason, justifying a statutory intervention always needs to 
prove that there is a market failure that cannot be solved by party negotiation, or there 
are some strong public policy considerations supporting the intervention.  
In order to explain why and how the law should intervene, several questions should be 
explored first.  
- Is there any market failure caused by enforcing the anti-assignment clauses in the 
context of secured transaction, especially for IP collateralization?  
- Where does the social inefficiency come from in the first place?  
- Why cannot free negotiation lead to the socially efficient result?  
In order to answer these questions, we need to understand the essence of secured 
transactions, the role that collateral is playing in a secured transaction (see Section 
2.4), the incentive of all the parties involved and how the negotiations take place 
among all the parties.  
The following model analysis begins by describing a very simple post-lending moral 
hazard model established by Tirole (2006). From the discussion in Section 5.2.2, it is 
summarized that the main reason to include restrictive clauses such as an 
anti-assignment or anti-attachment clause in license contract is for the licensor to 
avoid the potential adverse effects of the change of assignee/licensee, who may bring 
extra costs to the licensor in the way of damage, higher performance costs or risks 
(See Section 2.2). We introduce the concept of “third-party cost” into the simple 
model of Tirole (2006) to uniformly represent these potential adverse effects, in order 
to fit into our context of IP collateralization. The modified setting can show how the 
negotiations in license agreement and security agreement occur and how the different 
legal rules can change the surplus distribution in negotiations and influence all the 
parties’ incentives of participation. Comparing the equilibriums under different rules 
can reveal if there is any market failure in the free negotiation so that we can see if 
there is need and space for the law to intervene with the contractual restrictive terms 
in license agreements. The possible limitations and implications will be discussed in 

797 See Epstein (1985) “Why Restrain Alienation?,” Columbia Law Review 85, no. 5 (1985): 970–990 at 972. 
supra note 766.  
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the end as the conclusion. 
This study may give implications for the enforceability of anti-assignment clauses in 
other cases as well, but it has no intention to claim for invalidating anti-assignment 
clauses for all purposes. We mainly want to discuss the problem of enforcing an 
anti-assignment clause in the case of secured transactions, especially for cases 
involving IP licenses.  
5.4.1 The Original Two-Party Moral Hazard Model 
The debt finance model established by Tirole (2006) is chosen because it is simple but 
is still able to capture the most basic ideas expressed in the literature about the role of 
collateral in controlling the post-lending moral hazard problem and reducing risk for 
the lender, and also easy to be expanded to comprise other factors.798 We firstly 
present the basic model of Tirole (2006) and then make some modification to fit into 
our context of IP collateralization. The basic model is presented as follows.  
Project. It is assumed that a risk-neutral entrepreneur ܧ  faces an investment 
opportunity on a project. The project needs an investment with the size of ܫ and 
yields verifiable revenue ܴ ൐ Ͳ in the case of success or Ͳ in the case of failure. If 
the borrower exerts efforts, the project yields a high probability of success ݌ு. 
Debt finance and the post-lending moral hazard problem. The entrepreneur has no 
initial cash, so it needs a loan with the size of ܫ to fund the project. Of course, in 
order to get a lower interest rate, the borrower would always promise to take high 
effort. However, there is an information asymmetry about the borrower’s efforts in the 
project after getting the loan. It is very difficult or even impossible for most lenders to 
directly observe or monitor the borrower’s efforts (the lenders can only verify the 
resulted revenue). The entrepreneur, as a borrower, is subject to a post-lending moral 
hazard problem and faces a choice between behaving (“work,” “exert effort,” “take no 
private benefit”) and misbehaving for private benefit (“consume the loan”, “shirk”, 
“shift attention to another project”). In the case of misbehaving, the borrower enjoys a 
private benefit ܤ ൐ Ͳ (“profit from consuming the loan”, “disutility of effort saved 
by shirking”, “profit from other projects”) but the project yields a lower probability of 
success ݌௅ ൌ ݌ு െ ߂݌with ߂݌ ൐ Ͳ . With ݌ுܴ െ ܫ ൐ Ͳ and ݌௅ܴ െ ܫ ൏ Ͳ , the 
lender would provide the loan only in the absence of moral hazard. 

798 Tirole (2006), The Theory of Corporate Finance, supra note 256. 
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These factors about the project, i.e., ܴ and ܫ, are determined by the characteristics of 
the project; factors like ݌ு, and ݌௅ are determined by the characteristics of the 
borrower, and the private benefit ܤ is determined by the cost of the borrower’s 
efforts and the profits of outside options. They are exogenous as to the borrower and 
the lender, and assumed to be known to both the parties at the time of making the 
lending decision. In other words, there is no ex ante information asymmetry nor 
adverse selection problem. 
The timeline is summarized in Figure 5.2 as follows, 
 
Figure 5.2 Timeline for the basic debt finance moral hazard model 
Debt finance with (fixed) collateral. Because of the ex post moral hazard problem, 
the lender needs to impose some punishment on the borrower in the case of poor 
performance. Since the borrower has no initial cash on hand and the project’s failure 
brings no income, the only possible punishment is the seizing of some existing assets 
of the borrower. The lender ܮ provides the loan only if the borrower can offer a 
contingent collateral, which the lender can seize upon the project’s failure. So the 
borrower has to offer some of its assets as collateral, which is worth ܣ to the 
borrower and would be worth ߚܣ at the foreclosure sale (with ߚ ൏ ͳ), to make a 
credible commitment on behaving as to the lender.799  
In Tirole’s original model, the borrower can encumber an arbitrary amount of 
collateral ܣ, with Ͳ ൑ ܣ ൑ ܣҧ and ܣҧ is the maximum collateral that the borrower 
can offer. For example, in the case of using ordinary tangible assets as collateral, the 
borrower can use parts of the land or some of its machines or inventory as collateral. 
With ߚ ൏ ͳ, the foreclosure sale means a transfer of the collateral from the borrower, 
the party with a higher valuation, to the lender (or an assignee), the party with a lower 

799 In the eminent works in secured transactions, such as Jeffrey M. Lacker, “Why Is There Debt?,” FRB 
Richmond Economic Review 77, no. 4 (1991): 3–19, it is usually assumed that the important condition that is 
required for a collateralized debt contract to be optimal is that the collateral should be more valuable to the 
borrower than to the lender, i.e.,ߚ ൏ ͳ. See also Jean Tirole (2006) “The Theory of Corporate Finance” 
supra note 256, at 177-180. 
 ʹ͹ͺ
valuation. The value loss in the transfer would eventually be borne by the borrower. It 
means that putting collateral is costly for the borrower. For maximizing the expected 
profit, the borrower would always like to choose the minimum amount of ܣ that is 
just large enough to make a credible commitment on behaving. 
However, in some cases, a borrower may have a fixed collateral. For example, if an IP 
licensee uses its rights under a specific license as collateral, the license has to be 
disposed of as a whole upon the project’s failure. There is no way to just dispose of a 
part of the IP license to make a profit-maximizing collateral decision. Faced with an 
investment opportunity, and with a fixed amount of collateral on hand, the borrower 
can only decide if it is going to use the whole asset as collateral to make the 
investment or not (if it is, then the borrower would lose the whole collateral in the 
disposition sale). The borrower chooses to invest only if the value of collateral ܣ is 
large enough to make a credible commitment on behaving (the borrower’s incentive 
constraint), but also at the same time cannot be too large in order to still get positive 
payoffs from the investment (the borrower’s rationality constraint). 
For better fitting into our analysis on the specific case of using the IP license as 
collateral, we hereafter assume that the collateral is fixed in our model. The 
assumption is just for making it easier to demonstrate the analysis but does not affect 
the generality of the results. The results also apply to the case of arbitrary collateral 
(for example, the borrowers may have several IP licenses or some tangible assets 
combined with a IP license), in which case the borrower can just choose to satisfy the 
minimum collateral requirement for maximizing its own payoffs, i.e., the borrower’s 
incentive constraint). 
Loan contract. With ex ante information about the values of ܣ and Ⱦܣ, and the 
probability of success if the licensee-debtor behaves or not, the borrower and the 
lender can reach a loan contract, which specifies that, in the case of success, the 
borrower pays back the lender ௟ܷௌሺܣሻ ൌ ሺͳ ൅ ݎሻܫ whereby r is the agreed interest 
rate and conditioned on ܣ, and the borrower keeps the residual revenue ௘ܷௌሺܣሻ ൌ
ܴ െ ሺͳ ൅ ݎሻܫ; in the case of failure, the secured lender enforces its security interests 
in the collateral and gets recovery from the liquidation value of the 
collateral ௟ܷிሺܣሻ ൌ Ⱦܣ and the borrower loses the collateral, i.e., ௘ܷிሺܣሻ ൌ െܣ.  
Constraints. The loan contract must be able to simultaneously satisfy the three 
following constraints.  
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(1) The lender’s zero-profit rationality constraint ሺࡾ࡯࢒ሻ . With the ex ante 
expectation of payoffs at the time when the project reveals the outcome, the 
lender sets the interest rate in the loan contract. For notational simplicity, it is 
assumed that there is no time preference (so the rate of expected return is taken to 
be Ͳ) and lenders behave competitively in the markets. The competition for loan 
contracts in the financial market drives the expected profits of financial lenders to 
Ͳ. With the borrower’s promise of behaving (݌ு ), the lender’s zero-profit 
condition requires that a risk-neutral lender will agree on an interest rate at which 
it can recoup its initial lending ܫ and make zero-profit on average, i.e.,  
௟ܷሺܣሻ ൌ ݌ுሺͳ ൅ ݎሻܫ ൅ ሺͳ െ ݌ுሻȾܣ െ ܫ ൌ Ͳ             ሺܴܥ௟ሻ  
i.e.,                 ሺͳ ൅ ݎሻܫ ൌ ூିሺଵି௣ಹሻஒ஺௣ಹ                        ሺͳǤͳሻ 
A risk-neutral borrower’s utility from the borrowing and the investment can be 
written as follows, 800 
௘ܷሺܣሻ ൌ ݌ுሾܴ െ ሺͳ ൅ ݎሻܫሿ െ ሺͳ െ ݌ுሻܣ 
(2) Borrower’s Incentive Constraint ሺࡵ࡯ࢋሻ: the lender would provide the loan only if 
the borrower ܧ is incentivized to behave, which requires that the borrower’s 
utility from behaving is higher than the expected profit from misbehaving, i.e., 
݌ுሾܴ െ ሺͳ ൅ ݎሻܫሿ ൅ ሺͳ െ ݌ுሻሺെܣሻ ൒ ݌௅ሾܴ െ ሺͳ ൅ ݎሻܫሿ ൅ ሺͳ െ ݌௅ሻሺെܣሻ ൅ ܤ 
i.e.,                 ߂݌ሾܴ െ ሺͳ ൅ ݎሻܫ ൅ ܣሿ ൒ ܤ                    (1.2) 
The condition (1.2) implies that the increase in the borrower’s utility (increased 
income plus increased probability of keeping the asset) associated with good 
behavior (the left side) exceeds the private benefit of misbehaving (the right side). 
   Substituting (1.1) into (1.2), we have 
ܣ ൒ ܣ௠௜௡ ൌ ூି௣ಹሺோି஻ ୼௣Τ ሻ௣ಹାሺଵି௣ಹሻஒ                    ሺܫܥ௘ሻ 

800 The lender’s zero-profit condition determines thatȾܣ ൌ ଵିሺଵା௥ሻ௣ಹଵି௣ಹ ܫ ൏ ܫ, i.e., Ⱦܣ െ ܫ ൏ Ͳ. This means 
that the disposition of collateral is not enough for fully repaying the lender. This also means that upon 
default there is no remaining value for the borrower to keep, so ௘ܷிሺܣሻ ൌ െܣ. 
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For a collateral ܣ ൏ ܣ௠௜௡, the borrower’s benefit associated with behaving is 
less than the private benefit of misbehaving. The borrower would choose to 
misbehave and the project would yield a low probability of success, in which 
case the lender would certainly yield a negative payoff.801 The lender would not 
provide the loan in the first place. So, condition ܫܥ௘ indicates that the collateral 
has to be valuable enough for controlling the borrower’s misbehaving. 
(3)  Borrower’s Rationality Constraint ሺࡾ࡯ࢋሻ: The borrower would like to borrow 
and participate in the investment only if it can get non-negative utility from the 
investment, i.e., 
௘ܷሺܣሻ ൌ ݌ுሾܴ െ ሺͳ ൅ ݎሻܫሿ െ ሺͳ െ ݌ுሻܣ ൒ Ͳ 
By substituting (1.1), we have 
ܣ ൑ ܣ௠௔௫ ൌ ௣ಹோିூሺଵି௣ಹሻሺଵିஒሻ                        ሺܴܥ௘ሻ 
Condition ܴܥ௘ indicates that, as using collateral is costly for the borrower, in the 
case of fixed collateral, the collateral cannot be too large in order to ensure that 
the borrower still gets positive utility from the investment, otherwise the 
borrower can be better off by simply forgoing the investment opportunity. 
The results can be shown in Figure 5.3 as follows, 

801 If the borrower misbehaves, the risk-neutral lender’s utility is negative, i.e., ௟ܷሺܣሻ ൌ ݌௅ሺͳ ൅ ݎሻܫ ൅
ሺͳ െ ݌௅ሻȾܣ െ ܫ ൌ ݌௅ ூିሺଵି௣ಹሻஒ஺௣ಹ ൅ ሺͳ െ ݌௅ሻȾܣ െ ܫ ൌ
௣ಽି௣ಹ
௣ಹ
ሺܫ െ Ⱦܣሻ . With ݌௅ െ ݌ு ൏ Ͳ  and Ⱦܣ െ ܫ ൏ Ͳ 
(the lender’s zero-profit condition), we have ௟ܷሺܣሻ ൏ Ͳ. 
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Figure 5.3 - collateral requirements in the basic debt finance moral hazard model 
In summary, the debt finance can happen only if the value of collateral ܣ falls within 
ܣ א ൣܣ௠௜௡ǡ ܣ௠௔௫൧. If the project is funded, the borrower’s utility from the borrowing 
and investment is 
௘ܷሺܣሻ ൌ ݌ுܴ െ ሺͳ െ ݌ுሻሺͳ െ Ⱦሻܣ െ ܫ ൒ Ͳ 
The results show that, despite being associated with a social deadweight cost of 
ሺͳ െ ݌ுሻሺͳ െ Ⱦሻܣ, the use of collateral is still socially beneficial, because it alleviates 
the credit-rationing problem and makes a wealth-enhancing investment occur.  
5.4.2 Introducing the Third-Party – the Licensor 
Whereas Tirole’s basic model sets up a simple analytic framework that can help us 
understand the disciplinary role of collateral in secured transaction, the basic model 
needs to be modified for fitting into the problems of the IP license secured transaction. 
Compared to the basic model, our setting adds three more features. 
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First, a third party – the original licensor – gets involved in the lending relationship as 
well. In the new setting, the collateral is not a property over which the debtor has full 
ownership, but instead a property right upon an asset of a third party (i.e., the original 
licensor in our case). The licensor’s interests would be affected by the security 
relationship between the licensee-debtor and the secured creditor (Relationship 3.2 in 
Figure 5.1).  
Second, a third-party cost is involved. From the discussion in Section 5.2.2, upon the 
IP licensee-debtor’s default, disposing of the encumbered license may bring extra 
costs in the way of damage, higher performance costs or risks to the original licensor, 
as the third party in the secured transaction. The concept of “third-party cost” 
ܥሺܥ ൒ Ͳሻ is therefore introduced to uniformly represent these potential extra costs. 
The third-party cost is a crucial factor that distinguishes IP license-backed 
transactions from the other transactions secured by common tangible assets, such as 
machines and real estates. In the latter transactions, who gets the encumbered 
collateral in the disposition sale may be relevant but not crucial to the original owner, 
so the value of the third party cost ܥ is usually small or negligible. On the contrary, 
in the case of an IP license-backed transaction, as assigning an IP license to a potential 
competitor of the original licensor may bring substantial costs to the original licensor, 
the value of ܥ can be significant. The third-party cost ܥ is also the reason that the 
original licensor wants to put the anti-assignment clause in the IP license agreement in 
the first place.  
Third, as more parties get involved, the timeline of in this new setting is also changed. 
The timeline of decisions and involvements of parties is demonstrated in Figure 5.4 as 
follows, 
 
Figure 5.4: Timeline of the IP license secured transactions 
There are three important timings in this new timeline.  
- Time 0: license agreement. Time Ͳ is the time when the licensor ܱ and the 
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licensee ܧ negotiate for getting a license, with or without restrictive clauses in the 
license agreement.  
- Time 1: loan contract. At time ͳ, the licensee ܧ needs a fund of ܫ for investing in 
a project. This is the time when the lender ܮ gets involved. All the factors about the 
project and the post-lending moral hazard problem (݌ு,ܴ, ݌௅, ܤ) are the same as in 
the basic model. In order to make a credible commitment on behaving, the licensee 
uses one of its valuable assets (or maybe the only valuable asset), i.e., the rights under 
an IP license, as collateral to secure the loan. The licensee values the license at ܣ. 
Based on the information regarding the project, the IP license and ex ante expectation 
of outcomes at time 2, the licensee and the lender can negotiate for a loan contract, 
with an agreed interest ݎ. Whether the licensee needs to get the licensor’s consent for 
creating the security interests or not depends on the license agreement and the legal 
rules.802  
- Time 2: outcome/enforcement. At time ʹ, the funded project will show the result, 
either success with a verifiable revenue of ܴ or failure with Ͳ revenue. In the case 
of success, the licensee-borrower pays back the lender with the agreed interest rate; in 
the case of failure, if the security interests in the encumbered license can be enforced, 
the license will be disposed of at the foreclosure sale for a price of ߚܣ (with Ͳ ൑
ߚ ൏ ͳ) and the deposition of the license will bring a cost of ܥሺܥ ൒ Ͳሻ to the original 
IP licensor ܱ. Whether the licensee needs to get the licensor’s consent for enforcing 
the security interests or not depends on the license agreement and the relevant legal 
rules.803 
The modified model is expected to show how the third-party cost to the original 
licensor can affect the whole transaction, and how the two different legal rules, the 
UNCITRAL rule and the UCC 9-408, can change the negotiation timing in this 

802 The licensee may face three situations. (1) If there is no restrictive clause in the license agreement, the 
licensee can freely create security interests in the license. In the case of an IP license with restrictive clauses, 
(2) if the legal rules enforce the contractual restrictions upon the creation of security interests in the license, 
then the licensor’s consent is necessary; (3) if the legal rules do not enforce the contractual restrictions upon 
the creation of security interests in the license, then the licensor’s consent is unnecessary. 
803 There may be four different situations. (1) If there is no restrictive term in the license agreement, the 
licensee can freely make the disposition. In the cases with restrictive terms in the license agreement, (2) if 
the security interest is created with the licensor’s consent, then the licensee can freely make the disposition 
as well; (3) if the legal rules allow the creation of security interests in license with the licensor’s consent 
despite restrictive terms but still enforces the restrictive terms in the case of disposition, then the 
licensee/lender still needs consent from the licensor for the disposition (˗4) if the legal rules totally invalidate 
the restrictive terms in both the cases of creation and enforcement of security interests, then there is no need 
for the licensor’s consent at all. 
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timeline and affect the negotiations and value redistribution among parties. A 
comparison on the licensee’s utilities and the collateral requirements under the two 
rules can reveal if the US legal change is beneficial.  
5.4.3 UNCITRAL Approach: Negotiations at the Time of Creation  
Under the UNCITRAL approach, the restrictive terms in a license agreement are 
unconditionally binding. If there are restrictive clauses in a license agreement, the 
licensee can create a security interest in the license only with express consent from 
the licensor. An unconsented security interest in the license is unenforceable in the 
case of failure. It means that the licensee-borrower would lose nothing for the poor 
performance, which is the same case as no collateral having been imposed, in which 
case the borrower would always be incentivized to misbehave for private benefits. So 
the lender would not provide the loan in the first place. Therefore, in this setting, the 
negotiation for the licensor’s consent happens at the time of creating security interests 
in the license, i.e., time 1 in Figure 5.4.804 With the licensor’s consent, licensee/debtor 
and the lender negotiate for the loan contract, at time 1 as well. The two negotiations 
are conditional on each other.  
Then we see below how the negotiation takes place among the parties.  
a. The negotiation between the licensee and the lender at time 1. 
Under the UNCITRAL rule, an IP licensee can create a security interest in the license 
only with express consent from the licensor. Once the security interest is created with 
the licensor’s consent, there is no need to get the licensor’s consent in the 
enforcement of the security interest any more. So, in the case of success, the lender 
gets the original lending with agreed interest, i.e., ௟ܷభ
ௌ ሺܣሻ ൌ ሺͳ ൅ ݎଵሻܫ where ݎଵ is 
the interest rate agreed in the security agreement (note: the interest rate is conditional 

804 Actually, there is another possibility that the licensee can negotiate for a license without restrictive 
clauses, by paying a higher license fee at time 0 when negotiating for the license. It is very easy to see that 
all the problems (the licensor’s risk-averse and holdup) that we find below would still exist in the negotiation. 
First, at time 0, the uncertainty about the investment opportunity is even higher, so the social deadweight 
loss in the licensor’s risk aversion is even larger. Second, at time 0, the licensor can threat the licensee about 
not giving the license and therefore has an even higher bargaining power. The licensee would get an even 
smaller proportion of the total social surplus created by its effort. So the licensee would still prefer to get a 
restrictive license first and then have a negotiation for the licensor’s consent when the investment 
opportunity actually shows up at time 1; at least the licensee would not worry about losing the license for its 
own use. 
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on the collateral ܣ, so it is more suitable to be written as ݎଵሺܣሻ; we use ݎଵ for 
demonstration simplicity); in the case of failure, the lender directly enforces the 
agreed security interest, ௟ܷభ
ி ሺܣሻ ൌ ߚܣ.   
The lender’s zero-profit rationality constraint (ࡾ࡯࢒૚): With the borrower’s promise 
of behaving (݌ு), the lender’s zero-profit condition requires that a risk-neutral lender 
will agree on an interest rate ݎଵ at which it can recoup its initial lending ܫ and make 
zero-profit on average, i.e.,  
௟ܷభሺܣሻ ൌ ݌ுሺͳ ൅ ݎଵሻܫ ൅ ሺͳ െ ݌ுሻȾܣ െ ܫ ൌ Ͳ 
  i.e.,                    ሺͳ ൅ ݎଵሻܫ ൌ ூିሺଵି௣ಹሻஒ஺௣ಹ                    (ܴܥ௟భ) 
The lending is conditional on the licensor’s consent. Therefore, the licensee has to 
negotiate with the licensor for the latter’s consent as well.  
b. The negotiation between the licensee and the licensor at time 1.  
In the negotiation for the licensor’s consent, backward induction is required. Since the 
licensee-borrower has no initial cash and the failure of the investment yields Ͳ, it can 
only negotiate with the licensor by offering to pay the licensor a price ଵܲ in the case 
of success (note: the price is conditional on the collateral, so it is more suitable to be 
written as ଵܲሺܣሻ ; we use ଵܲ  for demonstration simplicity). 805  So, we have 
ܷ௢భௌ ሺܣሻ ൌ ଵܲ. If the licensor consents to the creation of security interest in the license, 
it means that the licensor also consents to the enforcement of security interest, and 
then it has to suffer the cost brought by the disposition of the license upon the 
project’s failure, i.e., ܷ௢భி ሺܣሻ ൌ െܥ. We can see how the negotiation would take 
place among the licensor and the licensee-borrower. 
(a) If the licensor accepts the licensee’s price ଵܲሺܣሻ and consents to the creation of 
security interests in the license, the licensor’s utility can be written as follows, 

805 As it has been assumed that the licensee-borrower has no initial cash and has used its assets as collateral, 
we hereby do not discuss the possibility for the licensee/borrower to pay the licensor in advance a certain 
amount of money as deposit or compensation for failure. As the project’s failure yields Ͳ and the licensee 
has used its assets as collateral to repay the lender, the licensee cannot offer the licensor anything in the case 
of failure.  
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ܷ௢భሺܣሻ ൌ ݌ு ଵܲ െ ሺͳ െ ݌ுሻܥ െ ȟܷ௢భሺܣǡ ߝሻ               ሺʹǤͳሻ 
where ߝ is the licensor’s level of risk-aversion and ȟܷ௢భሺܣǡ ߝሻ is the licensor’s 
disutility of taking the risk, which can be understood as the difference between the 
licensor’s expected payoff and its utility from the consent. For a risk-neutral 
licensor, ߝ ൌ Ͳ  and ȟܷ௢భሺܣǡ ߝሻ ൌ Ͳ . For a risk-averse licensor, ߝ ൐ Ͳ , 
ȟܷ௢భሺܣǡ ߝሻ ൐ Ͳ  and ȟܷ௢భሺܣǡ ߝሻ  increases with the licensor’s level of 
risk-aversion ߝ.  
If the licensee/debtor gets the licensor’s consent on the creation of security 
interests in the license, in the case of success, it will keep the revenue ܴ and pay 
back the lender ሺͳ ൅ ݎଵሻܫ and pay the licensor the agreed price ଵܲ, i.e., ௘ܷభௌ ሺܣሻ ൌ
ܴ െ ሺͳ ൅ ݎଵሻܫ െ ଵܲ; in the case of failure, it will lose the collateral, i.e., ௘ܷభி ሺܣሻ ൌ
െܣ. The licensee’s utility from the lending can also be written as follows, 
௘ܷభሺܣሻ ൌ ݌ுሾܴ െ ሺͳ ൅ ݎଵሻܫ െ ଵܲሿ െ ሺͳ െ ݌ுሻܣ           ሺʹǤʹሻ 
(b) If the licensor refuses the creation of the security interests in the license, then the 
investment would not happen, in which case the licensor and the licensee both get 
nothing, i.e., ܷ௢భሺܣሻതതതതതതതതത ൌ ௘ܷభሺܣሻതതതതതതതതത ൌ Ͳ.  
The payoffs of the licensee and the licensor from the negotiation are now illustrated in 
the following table.  
Licensor’s 
decision 
Licensee’s 
decision 
Investment 
result 
Licensee’s payoff Licensor’s payoff 
Reject -- -- 0 0 
Consent Not invest -- 0 0 
Consent Invest Succeed ܴ െ ሺͳ ൅ ݎଵሻܫ െ ଵܲ ଵܲ 
Fail െܣ െܥ 
  Expected 
payoff from 
investment 
݌ுሾܴ െ ሺͳ ൅ ݎଵሻܫ െ
ଵܲሿ െ ሺͳ െ ݌ுሻܣ  
ൌ ሺͳ െ ߣଵሻȟܰ ଵܵሺܣሻ 
݌ு ଵܲ െ ሺͳ െ ݌ுሻܥ
െ ȟ ௢ܷభሺܣǡ ߝሻ
ൌ ߣଵȟܰ ଵܵሺܣሻ 
The negotiation surplus is  
ȟܰܵଵሺܣሻ ൌ ܷ௢భሺܣሻ ൅ ௘ܷభሺܣሻ െ ൫ܷ௢భሺܣሻതതതതതതതതത ൅ ௘ܷభሺܣሻതതതതതതതതത൯ 
 ʹͺ͹
Substituting (ܴܥ௟భ), ሺʹǤͳሻ and ሺʹǤʹሻ, we have 
ȟܰܵଵሺܣሻ ൌ ݌ுܴ െ ܫ െ ሺͳ െ ݌ுሻሾሺͳ െ ߚሻܣ ൅ ܥሿ െ ȟܷ௢భሺܣǡ ߝሻ      ሺʹǤ͵ሻ 
- Negotiation Condition ሺࡺ࡯૚ሻ. The negotiation is possible only with non-negative 
negotiation surplus, i.e.,  
ȟܰܵଵሺܣሻ ൌ ݌ுܴ െ ܫ െ ሺͳ െ ݌ுሻሾሺͳ െ ߚሻܣ ൅ ܥሿ െ ȟܷ௢భሺܣǡ ߝሻ ൒ Ͳ 
   i.e.,                ܣ ൑ ௣ಹோିூିሺଵି௣ಹሻ஼ି୼௎೚భሺ஺ǡఌሻሺଵି௣ಹሻሺଵିஒሻ                    ሺܰܥଵሻ 
During the negotiation for the license’s consent, a hold-up problem may happen. The 
hold-up problem is central to the theory of incomplete contracts. For example, Hart 
(1988) shows how the difficulty in writing complete contracts and the resulting need 
to renegotiate, and how the hold-up in renegotiation can lead to underinvestment.806 
Similarly here, as it is difficult to write a complete license contract about the 
licensee’s need for finance in the future, the licensee has made a prior commitment on 
getting the licensor’s consent for IP collateralization. The licensee and the licensor 
have to renegotiate for the licensor’s consent when the need for IP collateralization 
comes. Knowing that the licensee is facing an investment opportunity, the licensor 
might try to threaten not to give its consent, in order to keep a proportion of the total 
negotiation surplus (referred as “hold-up” hereafter).  
It is assumed that the licensor can keep ߣଵ of the total negotiation surplus, with 
Ͳ ൑ ߣଵ ൑ ͳ, depending on the licensor’s incentive to holdup and the licensor’s 
bargaining power at the time of negotiation. If the licensor has no incentive to holdup, 
then ߣଵ ൌ Ͳ; if the licensor wants to holdup, Ͳ ൏ ߣଵ ൑ ͳ. The higher the bargaining 
power the licensor has, the larger ߣଵ is. 
   The licensor’s utility ሺʹǤͳሻ can also be written as follows, 
ܷ௢భሺܣሻ ൌ ݌ு ଵܲሺܣሻ െ ሺͳ െ ݌ுሻܥ െ ȟܷ௢భሺܣǡ ߝሻ ൌ ߣଵȟܰܵଵሺܣሻ      ሺʹǤͶሻ               
Substituting ሺʹǤ͵ሻ, we have,  

806 See Oliver Hart and John Moore, “Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation,” Econometrica 56, no. 4 
(1988): 755–85. Although Hart and Moore (1988) argue about the possibility of hold-up can lead to 
underinvestment in relationship-specific investments and hence to inefficiency. The hold-up problem here is 
similar.  
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ଵܲ ൌ ఒభሼ௣ಹோିூିሺଵି௣ಹሻሾሺଵିஒሻ஺ା஼ሿሽାሺଵି௣ಹሻ஼ା୼௎೚భሺ஺ǡఌሻ௣ಹ            ሺʹǤͷሻ 
 The licensee/debtor’s utility from the lending ሺʹǤʹሻ can also be written as 
follows, 
௘ܷభሺܣሻ ൌ ݌ுሾܴ െ ሺͳ ൅ ݎଵሻܫ െ ଵܲሿ െ ሺͳ െ ݌ுሻܣ ൌ ሺͳ െ ߣଵሻȟܰܵଵሺܣሻ  ሺʹǤ͸ሻ 
   which is subject to the two following constraints, 
- The licensee/borrower’s incentive constraint (ࡵ࡯ࢋ૚): behaving yields a higher 
utility than misbehaving, i.e., 
݌ுሾܴ െ ሺͳ ൅ ݎଵሻܫ െ ଵܲሿ െ ሺͳ െ ݌ுሻܣ ൒ ݌௅ሾܴ െ ሺͳ ൅ ݎଵሻܫ െ ଵܲሿ െ ሺͳ െ ݌௅ሻܣ ൅ ܤ 
i.e.,                ȟ݌ሾܴ െ ሺͳ ൅ ݎଵሻܫ െ ଵܲ ൅ ܣሿ ൒ ܤ                ሺʹǤ͹ሻ 
   Substituting (ܴܥ௟భ) and (2.5), we have, 
ܣ ൒ ܣଵ௠௜௡ ൌ ሾ௣ಹோିூିሺଵି௣ಹሻ஼ሿሺఒభିଵሻା୼௎೚భሺ஺ǡఌሻା௣ಹ஻ ୼௣Τሺଵି௣ಹሻሾஒାఒభሺଵିஒሻሿା௣ಹ          (ܫܥ௘భ) 
- The licensee/borrower rationality constraint ( ࡾ࡯ࢋ૚ ): the lending brings 
non-negative profits.807 
௘ܷభሺܣሻ ൌ ሺͳ െ ߣଵሻȟܰ ଵܵሺܣሻ ൒ Ͳ 
We can see that the borrower’s rationality constraint is actually the same as the 
negotiation condition ሺܰܥଵሻ, i.e., 
      ܣ ൑ ܣଵ௠௔௫ ൌ ௣ಹோିூିሺଵି௣ಹሻ஼ି୼௎೚భሺ஺ǡఌሻሺଵି௣ಹሻሺଵିஒሻ                 (ܴܥ௘భ) 
So, for a license’s value falling within ܣ א ൣܣଵ௠௜௡ǡ ܣଵ௠௔௫൧, the licensee would like to 
use the license as collateral to fund the project and it can negotiate for the licensor’s 
consent to the creation of a security interest in the license and get the project funded. 
With ܸܰܲሺܣሻ ൌ ݌ுܴ െ ܫ െ ሺͳ െ ݌ுሻሾሺͳ െ ߚሻܣ ൅ ܥሿ, when the project is funded, 
the licensee’s utility from the borrowing and investment is  

807 The other way is to calculate ௘ܷభሺܣሻ ൌ ݌ுሾܴ െ ሺͳ ൅ ݎଵሻܫ െ ଵܲሿ െ ሺͳ െ ݌ுሻܣ ൒ Ͳ. Substituting (2.1) 
and (2.6), it would have the same result.  
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௘ܷభሺܣሻ ൌ ሺͳ െ ߣଵሻ൛݌ுܴ െ ܫ െ ሺͳ െ ݌ுሻሾሺͳ െ ߚሻܣ ൅ ܥሿ െ ȟܷ௢భሺܣǡ ߝሻൟ 
 ൌ ሺͳ െ ߣଵሻൣܸܰܲሺܣሻ െ ȟܷ௢భሺܣǡ ߝሻ൧                           ሺʹǤͺሻ 
The licensor’s utility from consenting to the licensee using the license as collateral is 
ܷ௢భሺܣሻ ൌ ͳ െ ߣଵൣܸܰܲሺܣሻ െ ȟܷ௢భሺܣǡ ߝሻ൧                ሺʹǤͻሻ 
In summary, under the UNCITRAL rule, the investment opportunity can be funded 
only when the value of the license falls within ܣ א ൣܣଵ௠௜௡ǡ ܣଵ௠௔௫൧. When the project is 
funded, the licensee’s utility from the borrowing and investment is ௘ܷభሺܣሻ ൌ
ሺͳ െ ߣଵሻൣܸܰܲሺܣሻ െ ȟܷ௢భሺܣǡ ߝሻ൧  and the licensor’s utility from consenting the 
licensee to use the license as collateral is ܷ௢భሺܣሻ ൌ ߣଵൣܸܰܲሺܣሻ െ ȟܷ௢భሺܣǡ ߝሻ൧. We 
will examine the costs and benefits of the UNCITRAL rule via a comparison with the 
US rule later in Section 5.5. 
5.4.4 American Approach: An Additional Choice for Negotiation at 
the Time of Enforcement 
Under the American approach, in the case with restrictive clauses in the license 
agreement, the licensee still can freely create security interests in his rights under a 
license without the licensor’s consent. However, for trying to protect the licensor 
against being adversely affected by the secured transaction, the security interests can 
only be enforced with the licensor’s consent. This approach is expected to help the 
licensee obtain more credit and strive for a proper balance among the interests of all 
parties involved (see discussion in Section 5.3.3). 
In essence, the American approach provides the licensee with an additional choice. At 
time 1, the licensee faces an investment opportunity and has to make a choice 
between creating a security interest with or without the licensor’s consent. 
Ǧ Choice 1: creating a security interest in the license with the licensor’s consent (at 
time 1) (as under the UNCITRAL approach). 
Ǧ Choice 2: creating a security interest in the license without the licensor’s consent 
 ʹͻͲ
(at time 2), and then negotiate for the licensor’s consent at the time of enforcing 
the security interests upon the project’s failure (at time 2). 
 
Choice 1 is the same as the UNCITRAL rule. We now examine how the parties would 
negotiate when choosing Choice 2.  
a. The negotiation takes place between the licensor and the lender at time 2.  
Choice 2 is possible only with the lender’s acceptance for an unconsented security 
interest in the IP license. When a lender would like to accept an unconsented security 
interest and to lend money to the licensee-borrower at time 1, the lender must first ex 
ante estimate its payoffs with the unconsented security interest at time 2, when the 
project reveals its result, either success or failure.  
-  In the case of the project’s success, the lender would get the payment specified in 
the lending contract, i.e., ௟ܷమ
ௌ ൌ ሺͳ ൅ ݎଶሻܫ, thereof ݎଶ is the interest rate agreed in the 
security agreement: no disposition of the license would occur. So the licensor does not 
get involved at all and gets no payoff, i.e., ܷ௢మௌ ൌ Ͳ.  
-  Upon the project’s failure, enforcing the security interests liquidates cash of ߚܣ 
and also brings a cost of െܥ to the licensor. The licensor’s consent is still needed for 
the enforcement. If a lender has accepted an unconsented security interest and has lent 
the money to the licensee, it would become the party that cares about the enforcement 
the most. If possible, the lender would like to negotiate with the licensor for the 
consent to enforcement by paying the licensor a price of ଶܲ (simplified expression 
 ʹͻͳ
for ଶܲሺܣሻ), with ܥ ൑ ଶܲ ൑ ߚܣ.808  
Then we can see how the licensor and the lender would negotiate at time 2, upon the 
default.  
(a) If the licensor accepts the licensee’s price ଶܲሺܣሻ and consents to the enforcement, 
the licensor’s utility is ܷ௢మி ሺܣሻ ൌ ଶܲ െ ܥ; the lender’s utility is ௟ܷమி ሺܣሻ ൌ ߚܣ െ ଶܲ.  
(b) If the licensor refuses the enforcement, then the licensor and the lender both get 
nothing, i.e., ܷ௢మி ሺܣሻതതതതതതതതത ൌ ௟ܷమி ሺܣሻതതതതതതതതത ൌ Ͳ.  
The payoffs of the lender and the licensor from the negotiation are now illustrated in 
the following table.  
Licensor’s decision Lender decision Licensee’s payoff Licensor’s payoff 
Reject -- 0 0 
Consent Not enforce 0 0 
Consent Enforce ߚܣ െ ଶܲ. ଶܲ െ ܥ 
The negotiation surplus is  
ȟܰܵଶሺܣሻ ൌ ൫ܷ௢మி ൅ ௟ܷమி൯ െ ൫ܷ௢మிതതതതത ൅ ௟ܷమிതതതത൯ ൌ ߚܣ െ ܥ         (3.1) 
- Negotiation Condition ሺࡺ࡯૛ሻ. The negotiation would be possible only if with 
positive negotiation surplus,809 i.e., 
ȟܰܵଶሺܣሻ ൌ ߚܣ െ ܥ ൒ Ͳ 
    i.e.,                         ߚܣ ൒ ܥ                         ሺܰܥଶሻ 
Similarly, during the negotiation, the licensor might holdup for keeping ߣଶ of the 

808 The lender would pay ଶܲ up to the disposition value of the license Ⱦ. Paying more than Ⱦ means 
that the lender would get negative payoff. The lender gets better off by simply not enforcing the security 
interest at all, in which case the lender gets zero. The licensor would not accept a price ଶܲ less than the 
third-party cost ܥ.  
809 If Ⱦ ൏ , the lender cannot make a credible threat on disposing of the collateral in the case of poor 
performance. The encumbered license cannot be disposed of. So, the licensee loses nothing in the project’s 
failure. The situation is identical to the case where the licensee has not used the license as collateral at all. As 
explained before, without collateral, the borrower would not behave at all and the lender hence would not 
provide the loan in the first place. 
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total negotiation surplus as well, thereof Ͳ ൑ ߣଶ ൑ ͳ. The licensor’s holdup also 
depends on the licensor’s incentive to holdup and the licensor’s bargaining power at 
the time of negotiation.  
The licensor’s utility can be written as  
ܷ௢మி ሺܣሻ ൌ ଶܲ െ ܥ ൌ ߣଶȟܰܵଶ ൌ ߣଶሺߚܣ െ ܥሻ             (3.2) 
i.e.,                   ଶܲ ൌ ߣଶሺߚܣ െ ܥሻ ൅ ܥ                     (3.3) 
We can see that, at this negotiation, the licensor’s risk preference does not matter 
anymore, because the licensor only gets involved in the case of enforcement, by the 
time the project has failed and the disposition would happen for sure. The licensor does 
not encounter any uncertainty or risk.  
b. The negotiation between the licensee/debtor and the lender at time 1. 
The lending decision happens at time 1. The lender has to decide if it would accept an 
unconsented security interest or not at time 1. The lender can anticipate that, in the case 
of success, it gets the original lending with agreed interest, i.e., ௟ܷమ
ௌ ሺܣሻ ൌ ሺͳ ൅ ݎଶሻܫ᧷ 
in the case of failure, it has to negotiate with the licensor for the enforcement, i.e., 
௟ܷమ
ௌ ሺܣሻ ൌ ߚܣ െ ଶܲ.  
- The lender’s rationality constraint (ࡾ࡯࢒૛). So, if a lender accepts the unconsented 
security interest, the lender would ask for an interest rate ݎଶ which satisfies its 
zero-profit rationality constraint as follows, 
௟ܷమሺܣሻ ൌ ݌ுሺͳ ൅ ݎଶሻܫ ൅ ሺͳ െ ݌ுሻሺߚܣ െ ଶܲሻ െ ܫ ൌ Ͳ 
Substituting ሺ͵Ǥ͵ሻ, we have,                     
ሺͳ ൅ ݎଶሻܫ ൌ ூିሺଵି௣ಹሻሺଵିఒమሻሺఉ஺ି஼ሻ௣ಹ                   (ܴܥ௟మ) 
With the interest rate ݎଶ, the licensee/debtor will keep the revenue ܴ and pay 
back the lender ሺͳ ൅ ݎଶሻܫ in the case of success, i.e., ௘ܷమௌ ሺܣሻ ൌ ܴ െ ሺͳ ൅ ݎଶሻܫ; 
and will lose the collateral, i.e., ௘ܷమ
ி ሺܣሻ ൌ െܣ. The licensee’s utility from the 
 ʹͻ͵
lending can be written as follows, 
ܷ௘మሺܣሻ ൌ ݌ுሾܴ െ ሺͳ ൅ ݎଶሻܫሿ െ ሺͳ െ ݌ுሻܣ               (3.4) 
which is subject to the two following constraints, 
-  The licensee/borrower’s incentive constraint (ࡵ࡯ࢋ૛),  
݌ுሾܴ െ ሺͳ ൅ ݎଶሻܫሿ െ ሺͳ െ ݌ுሻܣ ൒ ݌௅ሾܴ െ ሺͳ ൅ ݎଶሻܫሿ െ ሺͳ െ ݌௅ሻܣ ൅ ܤ 
i.e.,                ȟ݌ሾܴ െ ሺͳ ൅ ݎଶሻܫ ൅ ܣሿ ൒ ܤ                    (3.5) 
Substituting (ܴܥ௟మ), we have 
ܣ ൒ ܣଶ௠௜௡ ൌ ூି௣ಹሺோି஻ ୼௣Τ ሻାሺଵି௣ಹሻሺଵିఒమሻ஼ሺଵି௣ಹሻሺଵିఒమሻఉା௣ಹ                (ܫܥ௘మ) 
-  The licensee/borrower’s rationality constraint (ࡾ࡯ࢋ૛), 
ܷ௘మሺܣሻ ൌ ݌ுሾܴ െ ሺͳ ൅ ݎଶሻܫሿ െ ሺͳ െ ݌ுሻܣ ൒ Ͳ 
Substituting (ܴܥ௟మ), we have 
௘ܷమሺܣሻ ൌ ݌ுܴ െ ܫ ൅ ሺͳ െ ݌ுሻሾሺͳ െ ߣଶሻሺߚܣ െ ܥሻ െ ܣሿ          (3.6) 
i.e.,            ܣ ൑ ܣଶ௠௔௫ ൌ ௣ಹோିூିሺଵି௣ಹሻሺଵିఒమሻ஼ሺଵି௣ಹሻሾଵିሺଵିఒమሻఉሿ                   (ܴܥ௘మ) 
So, in the case while the disposition value of the license is larger than the third-party 
cost, ߚܣ ൒ ܥ (the negotiation condition at time 2), for a license falling within ܣ א
ൣܣଶ௠௜௡ǡ ܣଶ௠௔௫൧, a lender would like to accept a security interest in the license created 
without the licensor’s consent and then negotiate for the licensor’s consent for the 
enforcement upon the project’s failure. The secured transaction can happen.  
With ܸܰܲሺܣሻ ൌ ݌ுܴ െ ܫ െ ሺͳ െ ݌ுሻሾሺͳ െ ߚሻܣ ൅ ܥሿ, when the project is funded, 
the licensee’s utility from the borrowing and investment is  
௘ܷమሺܣሻ ൌ ݌ுܴ െ ܫ ൅ ሺͳ െ ݌ுሻሾሺͳ െ ߣଶሻሺߚܣ െ ܥሻ െ ܣሿ 
ൌ ܸܰܲሺܣሻ െ ߣଶሺͳ െ ݌ுሻሺߚܣ െ ܥሻ                      (3.7) 
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The licensor’s utility from consenting to the enforcement of security interest in the 
license is 
ܷ௢మሺܣሻ ൌ ߣଶሺͳ െ ݌ுሻሺߚܣ െ ܥሻ                   ሺ͵Ǥͺሻ 
In summary, under the UCC 9-408 rule, the investment opportunity can be funded 
only when the value of the license falls within ܣ א ൣܣଶ௠௜௡ǡ ܣଶ௠௔௫൧. When the project is 
funded, the licensee’s utility from the borrowing and investment is ௘ܷభሺܣሻ ൌ
ܸܰܲሺܣሻ െ ߣଶሺͳ െ ݌ுሻሺߚܣ െ ܥሻ  and the licensor’s utility from consenting the 
licensee to use the license as collateral is ܷ௢మሺܣሻ ൌ ߣଶሺͳ െ ݌ுሻሺߚܣ െ ܥሻ. We will 
examine the costs and benefits of the US rule via a comparison with the UNCITRAL 
rule later in Section 5.5. 
5.5 Comparison for Different Licenses 
As we discussed in Section 3.3, the approach adopted in UCC 9-408 comes from the 
successful practical experience of creating limited security interests in the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) broadcast licenses.  
Several questions have never been clearly answered. 
-  Why the legal change works well for the FCC licenses? 
-  Can the successful change also work well for the IP licenses too? 
The main differences between the FCC broadcast license and IP licenses are the 
licensors’ incentives and risk-preferences during the negotiation.  
The FCC broadcast license is a public license issued by a public authority, the FCC, 
which is a regulator with the mandate of regulating the broadcast airwaves for the 
public interest.810 A public FCC license entitles the licensee to “a governmental 
privilege to engage in certain conduct granted pursuant to the police power”.811 The 
FCC is not interested in generating profits from the licensing; so it has no incentive 
to holdup during the negotiation for consent for creating or enforcing the security 
interest in the FCC license. However, “it is concerned about who uses the limited 

810 MLQ investors, 146 F.3d at 748. 
811 Brennan (2001) “Financing Intellectual Property under Revised Article 9: National and International 
Conflicts (Electronic Version),” supra note 302 at 406. 
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broadcast frequencies.” 812  Giving a license to unqualified licensees can bring 
substantive social costs. The FCC tends to be very risk-averse in the decision for 
giving consent in order to ensure no negative utility from the consent.  
By contrast, IP license is a kind of private license issued by IP licensors. An IP license 
gives the licensee “a privilege to be free from suit for infringement of intellectual 
property rights that are granted to private parties under entirely different constitutional 
authority.”813 The IP licensing system is designed to provide monetary incentives for 
innovation, by allowing IP owners to exploit its exclusivity and monopoly status to 
generate profits. A rational IP licensor, as a private profit-maximizer, has the 
incentive to holdup during the negotiation for consent for dragging some profit from 
the negotiation surplus. An IP licensor might be risk-neutral or risk-averse.  
In the following part, we examine how the licensor’s incentive and risk-preference 
can influence the effects of legal rules. We firstly examine the effects of the legal 
changes to the case of FCC licenses. The examination can help us reveal the problem 
under the usual UNCITRAL rule and can explain why this legal change in the UCC 
9-408 works well for the FCC license. Then we examine the effects of the legal 
changes to the case of IP cases, to see if the success in the FCC license can be 
extended to the case of IP licenses as well. 
5.5.1 Public Licenses – the FCC licenses 
For public licenses like the FCC license, the licensors are public authorities like the 
FCC. These public licensors have no incentive at all to holdup for getting any profits 
from the licensee-debtor’s borrowing and investment, so they do not bargain for 
sharing any proportion of the total negotiation surplus under both rules, i.e., ߣଵǤଵ ൌ
ߣଶǤଵ ൌ Ͳ. However, they are greatly concerned about suffering the third-party cost 
from the licensee’s use of license as collateral and want to ensure a non-negative 
payoff. They tend to be very risk-averse, i.e., ȟܷ௢భǤభሺǡ ɂሻ ൐ Ͳ. We can compare the 
licensee’s utilities and the collateral requirements under the two choices to see how 
the licensee would choose and if the legal change in the UCC 9-408 is beneficial.  
5.5.1.1 UNCITRAL: Choice 1 
With ߣଵǤଵ ൌ Ͳ and ȟܷ௢భǤభሺǡ ɂሻ ൐ Ͳ, the conditions (ܴܥ௟భ ), ሺܰܥଵሻ,ሺʹǤͷሻ, ሺʹǤ͹ሻ, 

812 Ibid. 
813 Ibid. 
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(ܫܥ௘భ), (ܴܥ௘భ), ሺʹǤͺሻ and ሺʹǤͻሻ can be rewritten as follows,  
    ሺͳ ൅ ݎଵǤଵሻܫ ൌ ூିሺଵି௣ಹሻஒ஺௣ಹ                       (ܴܥ௟భǤభ) 
             ܣ ൑ ௣ಹோିூିሺଵି௣ሻ஼ି୼௎೚భǤభሺ஺ǡఌሻሺଵି௣ಹሻሺଵିஒሻ                    ሺܰܥଵǤଵሻ 
ଵܲǤଵሺܣሻ ൌ ሺଵି௣ಹሻ஼ା୼௎೚భǤభሺ஺ǡఌሻ௣ಹ                     ሺʹǤͷǤͳሻ 
          ȟ݌ ቂܴ െ ூିሺଵି௣ಹሻஒ஺௣ಹ െ
ሺଵି௣ಹሻ஼ା୼௎೚భǤభሺ஺ǡఌሻ
௣ಹ ൅ ܣቃ ൒ ܤ          ሺʹǤ͹Ǥͳሻ 
ܣ ൒ ܣଵǤଵ௠௜௡ ൌ ூି௣ಹሺோି஻ ୼௣Τ ሻାሺଵି௣ಹሻ஼ା୼௎೚భǤభሺ஺ǡఌሻሺଵି௣ಹሻஒା௣ಹ             (ܫܥ௘భǤభ) 
               ܣ ൑ ܣଵǤଵ௠௔௫ ൌ ௣ಹோିூିሺଵି௣ಹሻ஼ି୼௎೚భǤభሺ஺ǡఌሻሺଵି௣ಹሻሺଵିஒሻ                 (ܴܥ௘భǤభ) 
௘ܷభǤభሺܣሻ ൌ ݌ுܴ െ ܫ െ ሺͳ െ ݌ுሻሾሺͳ െ ߚሻܣ ൅ ܥሿ െ ȟܷ௢భǤభሺܣǡ ߝሻ 
ൌ ܸܰܲሺܣሻ െ ȟܷ௢భǤభሺܣǡ ߝሻ                             ሺʹǤͺǤͳሻ 
ܷ௢భǤభሺܣሻ ൌ Ͳ                          ሺʹǤͻǤͳሻ 
The results show that, for public licenses like the FCC license, under the UNCITRAL 
rule, the investment opportunity can be funded only when the value of the license falls 
within ܣ א ቂூି௣ಹሺோି஻ ୼௣Τ ሻାሺଵି௣ಹሻ஼ା୼௎೚భǤభሺ஺ǡఌሻሺଵି௣ಹሻஒା௣ಹ ǡ
௣ಹோିூିሺଵି௣ಹሻ஼ି୼௎೚భǤభሺ஺ǡఌሻ
ሺଵି௣ಹሻሺଵିஒሻ ቃ . The 
negotiations all happen at the time of time 1, when creating security interests in the IP 
license. The licensee can agree with the lender with an interest rate of ሺͳ ൅ ݎଵǤଵሻܫ ൌ
ூିሺଵି௣ಹሻஒ஺
௣ಹ ; and agree to pay the licensor with a price of ଵܲǤଵ
ሺܣሻ ൌ ሺଵି௣ಹሻ஼ା୼௎೚భǤభሺ஺ǡఌሻ௣ಹ  
in the case of success. When the project is funded, the licensee’s utility from the 
borrowing and investment is ௘ܷభǤభሺܣሻ ൌ ܸܰܲሺܣሻ െ ȟܷ௢భǤభሺܣǡ ߝሻ and the licensor’s 
utility from consenting to the licensee using the license as collateral is ܷ௢భǤభሺܣሻ ൌ Ͳ. 
From the social perspective, some social value of ȟܷ௢భǤభሺܣǡ ߝሻ, is wasted in the 
negotiation for the licensor’s consent.  
5.5.1.2 US Approach: additional Choice 2 
With ߣଶǤଵ ൌ Ͳ, the conditions ሺܰܥଶሻ, (3.3), (ܴܥ௟మ), ሺ͵Ǥͷሻ, (ܫܥ௘మ), (ܴܥ௘మ), ሺ͵Ǥ͹ሻ and 
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ሺ͵Ǥͺሻ can be rewritten as follows,  
                           ߚܣ ൒ ܥ                           ሺܰܥଶǤଵሻ 
                  ଶܲǤଵ ൌ ܥ                            ሺ͵Ǥ͵Ǥͳሻ 
ሺͳ ൅ ݎଶǤଵሻܫ ൌ ூିሺଵି௣ಹሻሺఉ஺ି஼ሻ௣ಹ                     (ܴܥ௟మǤభ) 
     ȟ݌ ቂܴ െ ூିሺଵି௣ಹሻሺఉ஺ି஼ሻ௣ಹ ൅ ܣቃ ൒ ܤ                  ሺ͵ǤͷǤͳሻ 
ܣ ൒ ܣଶǤଵ௠௜௡ ൌ ூି௣ಹሺோି஻ ୼௣Τ ሻାሺଵି௣ಹሻ஼ሺଵି௣ಹሻఉା௣ಹ                  (ܫܥ௘మǤభ)    
                ܣ ൑ ܣଶǤଵ௠௔௫ ൌ ௣ಹோିூିሺଵି௣ಹሻ஼ሺଵି௣ಹሻሺଵିఉሻ                     (ܴܥ௘మǤభ) 
௘ܷమǤభሺܣሻ ൌ ݌ுܴ െ ܫ ൅ ሺͳ െ ݌ுሻሾሺߚ െ ͳሻܣ െ ܥሿ ൌ ܸܰܲሺܣሻ        ሺ͵ǤͺǤͳሻ 
ܷ௢మǤభሺܣሻ ൌ Ͳ                          ሺ͵ǤͻǤͳሻ 
The results show that, for public licenses like the FCC license, only when ߚܣ ൒ ܥ, is 
the additional Choice 2 under the UCC 9-408 rule available. Then, the investment 
opportunity can be funded when the value of the license falls within ܣ א
ቂூି௣ಹሺோି஻ ୼௣Τ ሻାሺଵି௣ಹሻ஼ሺଵି௣ಹሻఉା௣ಹ ǡ
௣ಹோିூିሺଵି௣ಹሻ஼
ሺଵି௣ಹሻሺଵିఉሻ ቃ. The licensee will negotiate with the lender at 
time 1 to agree with an interest rate of ሺͳ ൅ ݎଶǤଵሻܫ ൌ ூିሺଵି௣ಹሻሺఉ஺ି஼ሻ௣ಹ . Then the creditor 
will offer to pay the licensor a price of ଶܲǤଵ ൌ ܥ at the enforcement (time 2) for the 
licensor’s consent. When the project is funded, the licensee’s utility from the 
borrowing and investment is ௘ܷమǤభሺܣሻ ൌ ܸܰܲሺܣሻ and the licensor’s utility from 
consenting to the licensee using the license as collateral is ܷ௢మǤభሺܣሻ ൌ Ͳ. From the 
social perspective, no social value is wasted in the negotiation for the licensor’s 
consent. 
5.5.1.3 Comparison between the two choices 
The comparsion of the results under the two choices can also be illustrated in Figure 
5.5 as follows, 
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Figure 5.5 Comparison for public licenses under the UNCITRAL rule and the 
UCC 9-408 rule 
A comparsion between the results under the two choices can provide several 
important implications: 
(1) The licensor’s risk-preference matters in Choice 1, but not in Choice 2.  
Under Choice 1, the licensor’s risk preference is a main determinant in the 
licensee’s utility from the investment, ௘ܷభǤభሺܣሻ, and in the requirements on the 
collateral value of the license, ܣଵǤଵ௠௜௡ and ܣଵǤଵ௠௔௫. This is because the licensor’s 
consent to the creation of security interests in the license is given prior to the 
investment. The consent implies that the licensor also agrees to bear the cost of ܥ 
in the project’s failure, which happens with a probability of ሺͳ െ ݌ுሻ with the 
licensee’s behaving. The licensor’s risk preference therefore matters in its consent 
decision. As a typical public authority that is likely to be very risk-averse, the 
licensor’s disutility of taking the risk, ȟܷ௢భǤభሺܣǡ ߝሻ, can be significant.  
By contrast, under Choice 2, the licensor’s risk preference is irrelevant. This is 
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because the licensor gets involved only at the time of enforcement, by the time the 
investment has taken place and the project has already failed. If the licensor 
consents to the enforcement of the security interest in the license, the disposition of 
the encumbered license would happen for sure. As the licensor takes no risk in the 
consent decision, the licensor’s risk preference does not matter at all.  
(2) With ௘ܷభǤభሺܣሻ ൌ ܸܰܲሺܣሻ െ ȟܷ௢భǤభሺܣǡ ߝሻ  and ௘ܷమǤభሺܣሻ ൌ ܸܰܲሺܣሻ , we have 
௘ܷభǤభሺܣሻ ൏ ௘ܷమǤభሺܣሻ, i.e., the licensee has a higher utility under Choice 2. 
The consent to the creation of security interest in the license implies that the 
licensor also agrees to bear the cost of ܥ in the project’s failure. In other words, 
the licensor is actually sharing the risk of failure with the licensee. Sharing risk 
from a risk-neutral licensee with a risk-averse licensor is associated with social 
deadweight loss, in the form of the risk-averse licensor’s disutility of taking the 
risk, ȟܷ௢భǤభሺܣǡ ߝሻ. Under Choice 1, a part of the social value created by the 
licensee’s effort, ȟܷ௢భǤభሺܣǡ ߝሻ, is wasted in the risk-sharing with the risk-averse 
licensor.  
By contrast, under Choice 2, as the licensor does not take risk, no social value 
created by the licensee’s efforts in the investment is wasted. The licensee can fully 
internalize the entire social surplus of its efforts. For the same license and 
investment project, the licensee has a higher utility under Choice 2. The difference 
is หο ௘ܷభห ൌ ȟܷ௢భǤభሺܣǡ ߝሻ. The more risk-averse the licensor is, the larger the 
difference would be. If the licensor is very risk-averse, the difference can be 
significant.  
(3)With ܣଵǤଵ௠௜௡ ൌ ூି௣ಹሺோି஻ ୼௣Τ ሻାሺଵି௣ಹሻ஼ା୼௎೚భǤభሺ஺ǡఌሻሺଵି௣ಹሻஒା௣ಹ  and ܣଶǤଵ
௠௜௡ ൌ ூି௣ಹሺோି஻ ୼௣Τ ሻାሺଵି௣ಹሻ஼ሺଵି௣ಹሻఉା௣ಹ , 
we have ܣଵǤଵ௠௜௡ ൐ ܣଶǤଵ௠௜௡, i.e., the licensee faces a lower incentive constraint 
(minimal collateral requirement) under Choice 2. 
Under Choice 2, the full internalization of all the profits increases the licensee’s 
benefit of behaving, which consequently increases the licensee’s incentive to 
behave. Therefore, less collateral is needed for the licensee to make a credible 
commitment on behaving under Choice 2. For the same license and investment 
project, if the license’s value falls within ܣ א ൣܣଶǤଵ௠௜௡ǡ ܣଵǤଵ௠௜௡൧, the license would not 
be valuable enough under Choice 1 but would become sufficent under Choice 2. 
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The expended scope is หȟܣଵ௠௜௡ห ൌ ୼௎೚భǤభሺ஺ǡఌሻሺଵି௣ಹሻఉା௣ಹ. The more risk-averse the licensor 
is, the larger the expended scope would be. In the case of a very risk-averse 
licensor, Choice 2 can greatly reduce the minimul collateral requirement. 
(3) With ܣଵǤଵ௠௔௫ ൌ ௣ಹோିூିሺଵି௣ಹሻ஼ି୼௎೚భǤభሺ஺ǡఌሻሺଵି௣ಹሻሺଵିஒሻ  and ܣଶǤଵ
௠௔௫ ൌ ௣ಹோିூିሺଵି௣ಹሻ஼ሺଵି௣ಹሻሺଵିఉሻ , we have 
ܣଵǤଵ௠௔௫ ൏ ܣଶǤଵ௠௔௫ , i.e., the licensee faces a higher rationality constraint 
(maximum collateral requirement) under Choice 2.  
As the licensee has a higher utility from the investment under Choice 2, the cost 
of using collateral is comparatively lower. For the same license and investment 
project, if the license’s value falls within ܣ א ሾܣଵǤଵ௠௔௫ǡ ܣଶǤଵ௠௔௫ሿ, the license would 
bring to the licensee negative utility under Choice 1 but would result in positive 
utility under Choice 2. The expended scope is ȁȟܣଵ௠௔௫ȁ ൌ ୼௎೚భǤభሺ஺ǡఌሻሺଵି௣ಹሻሺଵିఉሻ. The more 
risk-averse the licensor is, the larger the expended scope would be. In the case of a 
very risk-averse licensor, Choice 2 can greatly raise the maximum collateral 
requirement. 
(4) In total, for public licenses like the FCC license, the US rule strictly dominates 
the UNCITRAL rule. 
The US rule provides Choice 2 as an additional option. If both choices are 
available, Choice 2 strictly dominates Choice 1. Choice 2 not only increases the 
licensee’s utility from the investment but also expands the scope of qualified 
licenses (lowering the minimum requirement and increasing the maximum 
requirement). The licensee therefore prefers to get the licensor’s consent at the 
time of enforcement. The more risk-averse the licensor is, the more Choice 2 
would be preferred. In this case, the US rule is preferable to the UNCITRAL rule. 
Meanwhile, it is worth noting that Choice 2 is available only if the disposition 
value of the license is larger than the third-party cost, i.e., ߚܣ ൒ ܥ (negotiation 
condition at time 2). In the case of Ⱦ ൏ ܥ, a negotiation with the licensor at the 
time of enforcement is impossible, so the lender would not accept a security 
interest created without the licensor’s consent. If Choice 1 is still possible, the 
licensee would still choose Choice 1. In this case, the US rule achieves the same 
effect as the UNCITRAL rule. 
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In summary, as the licensors of public licenses have no incentive to block or holdup 
the use of license as collateral, the risk-sharing with the licensor is the real reason 
that causes the under-investment problem under the UNCITRAL rule. As public 
authorities tend to be very risk-averse, asking for their consent at the time of creating 
security interests in the licenses is associated with high social deadweight loss. The 
social loss lowers the licensee’s utility from the investment, and consequently 
increases the minimum collateral requirement and restricts the maximum collateral. 
The licensor’s risk-aversion narrows down the scope of licenses that are qualified as 
collateral and hence increases credit rationing. Some wealth-enhancing projects might 
be forgone.  
Then the US rule provides the licensee with the additional choice of getting the 
licensor’s consent at the time of enforcement (with the high priority order established 
by the time of creation). The additional choice allows the licensee to avoid the social 
deadweight loss and also the under-investment problem caused by the licensor’s 
risk-aversion. The full internalization of the entire social surplus created by its efforts 
in the investment lowers the licensee’s incentive constraint and increases its 
rationality constraint. It expands the scope of licenses that can be used as collateral (in 
the case where the disposition value of the license is larger than the third-party cost on 
the licensor). The under-investment problem under the UNCITRAL rule is solved. 
More wealth-enhancing projects therefore can be funded. The more risk-averse the 
licensor is, the more significant the advantanges of the US approach would be. This 
model explains why the legal change works well in the case of the FCC license.  
5.5.2 Private Licenses - IP Licenses 
Then we need to see if the success for the FCC license can be expanded to IP licenses. 
Unlike public licensors, the rational private licensors are utility-maximizers. As the 
anti-assignment clause makes the creation or enforcement of security interest in the 
license conditional on the licensor’s consent, a private licensor always has incentive 
to holdup for dragging some negotiation surplus during the negotiation, in order to 
maximize its own utility. However, the two rules grant the IP licensor different 
bargaining powers. We show below how the licensor’s incentive to holdup can affect 
the results.  
5.5.2.1 UNCITRAL: Choice 1 
Under the UNCITRAL rule (Choice 1), the negotiation happens prior to the 
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investment. In this pre-investment negotiation, if the licensor wants to holdup, it is 
reasonable to assume that both the licensor and the licensee-borrower have equal 
bargaining powers; so we have ߣଵǤଶ ൌ ͳ ʹΤ . The IP licensor can be risk-neutral or risk 
averse, i.e., ȟܷ௢భǤమሺǡ ɂሻ ൒ Ͳ. 
With ߣଵǤଶ ൌ ͳ ʹΤ , the conditions (ܴܥ௟భ), ሺܰܥଵሻ,ሺʹǤͷሻ, ሺʹǤ͹ሻ, (ܫܥ௘భ), (ܴܥ௘భ), ሺʹǤͺሻ 
and ሺʹǤͻሻ can be rewritten as follows, can be rewritten as follows,  
                      ሺͳ ൅ ݎଵǤଶሻܫ ൌ ூିሺଵି௣ಹሻஒ஺௣ಹ                     (ܴܥ௟భǤమ) 
                  ܣ ൑ ௣ಹோିூିሺଵି௣ಹሻ஼ି୼௎೚భǤమሺ୅ǡகሻሺଵି௣ಹሻሺଵିஒሻ                    ሺܰܥଵǤଶሻ 
ଵܲǤଶୀ
௣ಹோିூିሺଵି௣ಹሻሺଵିஒሻ஺ାሺଵି௣ಹሻ஼ା୼௎೚భǤమሺ஺ǡఌሻ
ଶ௣ಹ              
ሺʹǤͷǤʹሻ 
    ȟ݌ ቂܴ െ ூିሺଵି௣ಹሻஒ஺௣ಹ െ
௣ಹோିூିሺଵି௣ಹሻሺଵିஒሻ஺ାሺଵି௣ಹሻ஼ା୼௎೚భǤమሺ஺ǡఌሻ
ଶ௣ಹ ൅ ܣቃ ൒ ܤ  ሺʹǤ͹Ǥʹሻ 
ܣ ൒ ܣଵǤଶ௠௜௡ ൌ  ூି௣ಹሺோିଶ஻ ୼௣Τ ሻାሺଵି௣ಹሻ஼ା୼௎೚భǤమሺ஺ǡఌሻ௣ಹାሺଵି௣ಹሻஒାଵ            (ܫܥ௘భǤమ) 
        ܣ ൑ ܣଵǤଶ௠௔௫ ൌ ௣ಹோିூିሺଵି௣ಹሻ஼ି୼௎೚భǤమሺ୅ǡகሻሺଵି௣ಹሻሺଵିஒሻ                (ܴܥ௘భǤమ) 
௘ܷభǤమሺܣሻ ൌ
ͳ
ʹ ൛݌ுܴ െ ܫ െ ሺͳ െ ݌ுሻሾሺͳ െ ߚሻܣ ൅ ܥሿ െ ȟܷ௢భǤమሺܣǡ ߝሻൟ 
ൌ ଵଶ ൣܸܰܲሺܣሻ െ ȟܷ௢భǤమሺܣǡ ߝሻ൧                         ሺʹǤͺǤʹሻ 
ܷ௢భǤమሺܣሻ ൌ ଵଶ ൣܸܰܲሺܣሻ െ ȟܷ௢భǤమሺܣǡ ߝሻ൧                 ሺʹǤͻǤʹሻ 
The results show that, for private licenses like the IP license, under the UNCITRAL 
rule, the investment opportunity can be funded only when the value of the license falls 
within ܣ א ቂூି௣ಹሺோିଶ஻ ୼௣Τ ሻାሺଵି௣ಹሻ஼ା୼௎೚భǤమሺ஺ǡఌሻ௣ಹାሺଵି௣ಹሻஒାଵ ǡ
௣ಹோିூିሺଵି௣ಹሻ஼ି୼௎೚భǤమሺ୅ǡகሻ
ሺଵି௣ಹሻሺଵିஒሻ ቃ . The 
negotiations all happen at the time of time 1, when creating security interests in the IP 
license. The licensee can agree with the lender on an interest rate of ሺͳ ൅ ݎଵǤଶሻܫ ൌ
ூିሺଵି௣ಹሻஒ஺
௣ಹ ; and agree to pay the licensor a price of 
 ͵Ͳ͵
ଵܲǤଶୀ
௣ಹோିூିሺଵି௣ಹሻሺଵିஒሻ஺ାሺଵି௣ಹሻ஼ା୼௎೚భǤమሺ஺ǡఌሻ
ଶ௣ಹ  in the case of success. When the project 
is funded, the licensee’s utility from the borrowing and investment is ௘ܷభǤమሺܣሻ ൌ
ଵ
ଶ ൣܸܰܲሺܣሻ െ ȟܷ௢భǤమሺܣǡ ߝሻ൧ and the licensor’s utility from consenting to the licensee 
using the license as collateral is ܷ௢భǤమሺܣሻ ൌ ଵଶ ൣܸܰܲሺܣሻ െ ȟܷ௢భǤమሺܣǡ ߝሻ൧. From the 
social perspective, some social value of ȟܷ௢భǤమሺܣǡ ߝሻ, is wasted in the negotiation for 
the licensor’s consent.  
A simple comparison with the results found in Section 5.5.1.1 can show us, under the 
UNCITRAL rule (Choice 1), for the same license and licensor (i.e., ȟܷ௢భǤభሺܣǡ ߝሻ ൎ
ȟܷ௢భǤమሺܣǡ ߝሻ),814 how the licensor’s incentive to hold-up can affect the licensee’s 
borrowing decisions. The comparsion can also be illustrated in Figure 5.6 below, 
 
Figure 5.6 Comparison for public licenses and private licenses under the 
UNCITRAL rule 

814 Precisely, ȟܷ௢భǤభሺܣǡ ߝሻ ൐ ȟܷ௢భǤమሺܣǡ ߝሻ, since ଵܲǤଵሺܣሻ ൏ ଵܲǤଶሺܣሻ. 
 ͵ͲͶ
(1) With ௘ܷభǤభሺܣሻ ൌ ܸܰܲሺܣሻ െ ȟܷ௢భǤభሺܣǡ ߝሻ  and ௘ܷభǤమሺܣሻ ൌ ଵଶ ൣܸܰܲሺܣሻ െ
ȟܷ௢భǤమሺܣǡ ߝሻ൧, we have ௘ܷభǤభሺܣሻ ൐ ௘ܷభǤమሺܣሻ, i.e., the licensee-debtor gets a lower 
utility from the investment with the licensor’s holdup.  
If the licensor has no incentive to holdup (as like a public licensor, such as a FCC 
licensor), it would make zero-profit on average, i.e., ܷ௢భǤభሺܣሻ ൌ Ͳ. All social 
surplus created by the borrowing and investment are fully captured by the licensee, 
i.e., ௘ܷభǤభሺܣሻ ൌ ܸܰܲሺܣሻ െ ȟܷ௢భǤభሺܣǡ ߝሻ . By contrast, if the licensor has an 
incentive to holdup (as a private licensor, such as an IP licensor), then the licensee 
has to share half of the surplus with the licensor in order to get the licensor’s 
consent, i.e., ௘ܷభǤమሺܣሻ ൌ ܷ௢భǤమሺܣሻ ൌ ଵଶ ൛ܸܰܲሺܣሻ െ ȟܷ௢భǤమሺܣǡ ߝሻൟ . With  
௘ܷభǤమሺܣሻ ൎ ଵଶ ௘ܷభǤభሺܣሻ , it implies that, with the licensor’s holdup, the 
licensee-debtor can only get half of what it can get without the licensor’s holdup.  
(2) With ܣଵǤଵ௠௜௡ ൌ ூି௣ಹሺோି஻ ୼௣Τ ሻାሺଵି௣ಹሻ஼ା୼௎೚భǤభሺ஺ǡఌሻሺଵି௣ಹሻஒା௣ಹ  and ܣଵǤଶ
௠௜௡ ൌ
ூି௣ಹሺோିଶ஻ ୼௣Τ ሻାሺଵି௣ಹሻ஼ା୼௎೚భǤమሺ஺ǡఌሻ
௣ಹାሺଵି௣ಹሻஒାଵ , we have ܣଵǤଵ
௠௜௡ ൏ ܣଵǤଶ௠௜௡ , 815  i.e., a licensee 
faces a higher minimal collateral requirement in the case of a private license. 
In the case with the licensor’s holdup, in order to grasp half of the licensee’s profit 
from the borrowing and investment, the licensor would ask for a higher price in 
the case of success, ଵܲǤଶ ൐ ଵܲǤଵ. The promise of paying a higher price ଵܲǤଶ to the 
licensor in the case of success reduces the licensee’s benefits of behaving, which 
consequently lowers the licensee’s incentive to behave. Then the lender has to ask 
for more collateral for controlling the same post-lending misbehaving. The 
licensee therefore has to face a higher minimal collateral requirement for the 
creation of security interest with the licensor’s holdup. For the same license, same 
project and the same third-party cost to the licensor, if the license’s value is ܣ א
ൣܣଵǤଵ௠௜௡ǡ ܣଵǤଶ௠௜௡൧, the project can be funded without the licensor’s holdup and has to 

815 The simpler way to get the comparison result is to directly compare the left sides of conditions ሺʹǤ͹Ǥͳሻ 
and ሺʹǤ͹Ǥʹሻ. For the same collateral A, we have ሺͳ ൅ ݎଵǤଵሻܫ ൌ ሺͳ ൅ ݎଵǤଶሻܫ and ଵܲǤଵ ൏ ଵܲǤଶ. It means we 
always have ȟ݌ሾܴ െ ሺͳ ൅ ݎଵǤଵሻܫ െ ଵܲǤଵ ൅ ܣሿ ൐ ȟ݌ሾܴ െ ሺͳ ൅ ݎଵǤଶሻܫ െ ଵܲǤଶ ൅ ܣሿ . The minimum collateral 
ܣଵǤଵ௠௜௡ that satisfies the condition conditions ሺʹǤͺǤͳሻ would not be able to satisfy condition ሺʹǤ͹Ǥʹሻ, i.e., 
ȟ݌ൣܴ െ ൫ͳ ൅ ݎଵǤଵሺܣଵǤଵ௠௜௡ሻ൯ܫ െ ଵܲǤଵሺܣଵǤଵ௠௜௡ሻ ൅ ܣଵǤଵ௠௜௡൧ ൌ ܤ ൐ ȟ݌ൣܴ െ ൫ͳ ൅ ݎଵǤଶሺܣଵǤଵ௠௜௡ሻ൯ܫ െ ଵܲǤଶሺܣଵǤଵ௠௜௡ሻ ൅ ܣଵǤଵ௠௜௡൧ . 
As a result, the minimum collateral ܣଵǤଶ௠௜௡ that satisfies the condition ሺʹǤ͹Ǥʹሻ must be larger than ܣଵǤଵ௠௜௡, so 
we have ܣଵǤଵ௠௜௡ ൏ ܣଵǤଶ௠௜௡. 
 ͵Ͳͷ
be forgone with the licensor’s holdup. 
(3) With ܣଵǤଵ௠௔௫ ൌ ௣ಹோିூିሺଵି௣ಹሻ஼ି୼௎೚భǤభሺ஺ǡఌሻሺଵି௣ಹሻሺଵିஒሻ  and ܣଵǤଶ
௠௔ ൌ ௣ಹோିூିሺଵି௣ಹሻ஼ି୼௎೚భǤమሺ୅ǡகሻሺଵି௣ಹሻሺଵିஒሻ , 
we have ܣଵǤଵ௠௔௫ ൌ ܣଵǤଶ௠௔௫, i.e., the licensee faces the same maximum collateral 
requirement for both public licenses and pirvate licenses. 
With the licensor’s holdup, the licensee always gets half of the total social surplus. 
The licensee actually faces the same participation constraint in both cases.816 So 
the private licensor’s holdup does not affect the licensee’s incentive to participate 
or the maximum collateral constraint.  
In summary, under the UNCITRAL rules, all the problems for creating security 
interests in the case of public licenses do also exist for the private licenses. However, 
with the private licensor’s incentive to holdup, the licensee can keep only half of the 
entire social surplus produced by its own efforts in the investment project. Sharing 
profits with the licensor lowers the licensee’s utility from the investment, and 
consequently increases the minimum collateral requirement further. In total, the 
licensor’s holdup further narrows down the scope of qualified licenses. Under the 
UNCITRAL rules, the under-investment problem for private licenses is even more 
serious than that we found for public licenses.  
5.5.2.2 US Approach: additional Choice 2  
While the US rule can solve the problem for public licenses under the UNCITRAL 
rule, does it also work for private licenses?  
Under the additional Choice 2 offered by the US rule, the licensor’s consent is still 
needed for the enforcement of security interest in the license. The negotiation happens 
at time 2, after the investment has been undertaken. If the private licensor’s capability 
of holdup at the time of enforcement can be restricted, then all the conditions and the 
licensee’s decisions would be the same as the licensees of public licenses (Section 
5.5.1.2). The comparison can be illustrated in Figure 5.7 below (just a comparision 
between Figure 5.6 b with Figure 5.5 b). 

816  Without the licensor’s holdup, the licensee’s participation constraint is ௘ܷభǤభሺܣሻ ൌ ܸܰܲሺܣሻ െ
ȟܷ௢భǤభሺܣǡ ߝሻ ൒ Ͳ . With the licensor’s holdup, the licensee’s participation constraint is ௘ܷభǤమሺܣሻ ൌ
ଵ
ଶ ൣܸܰܲሺܣሻ െ ȟܷ௢భǤమሺܣǡ ߝሻ൧ ൒ Ͳ. In essence, the licensor has the same participation constraint in both cases. 
 ͵Ͳ͸
 
Figure 5.7 If the private licensor’s holdup can be restricted under the UCC 9-408 
If the private licensor’s capability of holdup at the time of enforcement can be 
restricted, then the UCC 9-408 can greatly increase the licensee’s utility from the 
borrowing and investment and expand the scope of licenses that can be used as 
collateral. Compared to the improvement shown in Figure 5.5, the legal change can 
alleviate the underinvestment to a larger extent (since the underinvestment problem is 
more serious for the private licenses under the UNCITRAL rule).  
However, if the licensor’s capability of hold-up cannot be restricted, then the UCC 
9-408 has just changed the licensor’s time of hold-up, from the time of creation (time 
1) to the time of enforcement (time 2). By the time of making the negotiation at time 
2, the investment has taken place. In this post-investment negotiation, as the lender 
has already lent the money at time 1, the licensor knows that the lender would always 
prefer to accept any positive payoff rather than nothing, which would occur if the 
lender refuses. The licensor hence has all the bargaining power, so we have ߣଶǤଶ ൌ ͳ.  
With the licensor holds-up at the time of enforcing the security interest in the license, 
i.e., ݅ ൌ ͳ, the conditions ሺܰܥଶሻ, (3.3), (ܴܥ௟మ), ሺ͵Ǥͷሻ, (ܫܥ௘మ), (ܴܥ௘మ), ሺ͵Ǥ͹ሻ and 
 ͵Ͳ͹
ሺ͵Ǥͺሻ can be rewritten as follows,  
                             ߚܣ ൒ ܥ                           ሺܰܥଶǤଶሻ 
                    ଶܲǤଶ ൌ ߚܣ                           ሺ͵Ǥ͵Ǥʹሻ 
                      ሺͳ ൅ ݎଶǤଶሻܫ ൌ ூ௣ಹ                        (ܴܥ௟మǤమ) 
     ȟ݌ ቂܴ െ ூ௣ಹ ൅ ܣቃ ൒ ܤ                      ሺ͵ǤͷǤʹሻ 
ܣ ൒ ܣଶǤଶ௠௜௡ ൌ ூି௣ಹሺோି஻ ୼௣Τ ሻ௣ಹ                     (ܫܥ௘మǤమ) 
   ܣ ൑ ܣଶǤଶ௠௔௫ ൌ ௣ಹோିூଵି௣ಹ                        (ܴܥ௘మǤమ) 
௘ܷమǤమሺܣሻ ൌ ݌ுܴ െ ܫ െ ሺͳ െ ݌ுሻܣ ൌ ܸܰܲሺܣሻ െ ሺͳ െ ݌ுሻሺߚܣ െ ܥሻ      ሺ͵Ǥ͹Ǥʹሻ 
ܷ௢మǤమሺܣሻ ൌ ሺͳ െ ݌ுሻሺߚܣ െ ܥሻ                  ሺ͵ǤͺǤʹሻ 
The results show that, for private licenses like the IP license, only when ߚܣ ൒ ܥ, the 
additional Choice 2 under the UCC 9-408 rule is available. Then, the investment 
opportunity can be funded when the value of the license falls within ܣ א
ቂூି௣ಹሺோି஻ ୼௣Τ ሻ௣ಹ ǡ
௣ಹோିூ
ଵି௣ಹ ቃ. The licensee will negotiate with the lender at the time 1 to 
agree with an interest rate of ሺͳ ൅ ݎଶǤଶሻܫ ൌ ூ௣ಹ. Then the creditor will offer to pay the 
licensor a price of ଶܲǤଶ ൌ ߚܣ at the enforcement (time 2) for the licensor’s consent. 
When the project is funded, the licensee’s utility from the borrowing and investment 
is ௘ܷమǤభሺሻ ൌ ܸܰܲሺܣሻ െ ሺͳ െ ݌ுሻሺߚܣ െ ܥሻ  and the licensor’s utility from 
consenting the licensee to use the license as collateral is ܷ௢మǤభሺܣሻ ൌ ሺͳ െ ݌ுሻሺߚܣ െ
ܥሻ. From the social perspective, no social value is wasted in the negotiation for the 
licensor’s consent.  
5.5.2.3 Comparison between the two choices 
Then the comparison of the results under the two choices can be illustrated in Figure 
5.8 as follows.  
 ͵Ͳͺ
 
Figure 5.8 Comparison for private licenses under the UNCITRAL rule and the 
UCC 9-408 rule 
(1) With ሺͳ ൅ ݎଵǤଶሻܫ ൌ ூିሺଵି௣ಹሻஒ஺௣ಹ  and ሺͳ ൅ ݎଶǤଶሻܫ ൌ
ூ
௣ಹ , we have 
ሺͳ ൅ ݎଵǤଶሻܫ ൏
ሺͳ ൅ ݎଶǤଶሻܫ, i.e., the license has to pay a higher interest rate to the lender in 
the case of success under Choice 2.  
The change of holdup time increases the licensor’s bargaining power from 
ɉଵǤଶ ൌ ͳ ʹΤ  to ɉଶǤଶ ൌ ͳ. The strong bargaining power allows the licensor to 
grasp all the residual value of disposing of the encumbered license, i.e., 
ܷ௢మǤమி ሺܣሻ ൌ ߚܣ െ ܥ. The licensor’s holdup leaves the lender with zero payoff at 
the enforcement (time 2), ௟ܷమǤమ
ி ሺܣሻ ൌ Ͳ. The competitive lender has to ask for a 
higher interest rate in the case of success at the time of making the lending 
decision (time 1), in order to ensure a zero profit on average.  
 ͵Ͳͻ
(2) With ௘ܷభǤమሺܣሻ ൌ ଵଶ ൛݌ுܴ െ ܫ െ ሺͳ െ ݌ுሻሾሺͳ െ ߚሻܣ ൅ ܥሿ െ ȟܷ௢భǤమሺܣǡ ߝሻൟ ൌ
ଵ
ଶ ൣܸܰܲሺܣሻ െ ȟܷ௢భǤమሺܣǡ ߝሻ൧  and ୣమǤమሺሻ ൌ ݌ுܴ െ ܫ െ ሺͳ െ ݌ுሻܣ ൌ
ܸܰܲሺܣሻ െ ሺͳ െ ݌ுሻሺߚܣ െ ܥሻ, Choice2 gives the licensee a higher utility only 
for ܣ ൑ ܣଶ෢ ൌ ௣ಹோିூାሺଵି௣ಹሻ஼ା୼௎೚మǤభሺ஺ǡఌሻሺଵି௣ಹሻሺଵାఉሻ .  
As the private licensor would still holdup at the time of enforcement (with an even 
stronger bargaining power), Choice 2 does not always give the licensee a higher 
utility any more. For ܣ א ൫ܣଶ෢ǡ ܣଶǤଶ௠௔௫൧, ௘ܷభǤమሺܣሻ ൐ ୣమǤమሺሻ; so even when Choice 
2 is possible, the licensee would still choose Choice 1 (creating a security interest 
with the licensor’s consent at time 1) for a higher utility. 
 (3) With ܣଵǤଶ௠௜௡ ൌ ூି௣ಹሺோିଶ஻ ୼௣Τ ሻାሺଵି௣ಹሻ஼ା୼௎೚భǤమሺ஺ǡఌሻ௣ಹାሺଵି௣ಹሻஒାଵ  and ܣଶǤଶ
௠௜௡ ൌ ூି௣ಹሺோି஻ ୼௣Τ ሻ௣ಹ , we 
have ܣଵǤଶ௠௜௡ ൐ ܣଶǤଶ௠௜௡ , 817  i.e., the licensee faces a lower incentice constrict 
(minimal collateral requirement) under Choice 2. 
For ܣ ൑ ܣଶ෢, Choice 2 gives the licensee greater utility.  It increases the benefit 
of the licensee from behaving, which consequently increases the licensee’s 
incentive to behave. For this reason, less collateral is needed by the lender to 
control the post-lending moral hazard problem, i.e., ܣଵǤଶ௠௜௡ ൐ ܣଶǤଶ௠௜௡. The licensee 
therefore faces a lower minimal collateral requirement for getting the loan. The 
licenses falling within ܣ א ൣܣଶǤଶ௠௜௡ǡ ܣଵǤଶ௠௜௡൧, which were not valuable enough to be 
used as collateral under Choice 1, would become sufficent under Choice 2.  
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817 Similarly, for a simpler way, we can also directly compare the left sides of conditions ሺʹǤ͹Ǥʹሻ and 
ሺ͵ǤͷǤʹሻ . For the same collateral A, we have ሺͳ ൅ ݎଵǤଶሻܫ ൅ ଵܲǤଶ െ ሺͳ ൅ ݎଶǤଶሻܫ ൌ
௣ಹோିூିሺଵି௣ಹሻሾሺଵାஒሻ஺ି஼ሿା୼௎೚మǤభሺ୅ǡகሻ
ଶ௣ಹ . With ܣ ൑ ܣଶ෢ ൌ
௣ಹோିூାሺଵି௣ಹሻ஼ା୼௎೚మǤభሺ஺ǡఌሻ
ሺଵି௣ಹሻሺଵାఉሻ  (the condition for Choice 2 
brings a higher utility to the licensee/debtor), we have ሺͳ ൅ ݎଵǤଶሻܫ ൅ ଵܲǤଶ െ ሺͳ ൅ ݎଶǤଶሻܫ ൐ Ͳ, i.e., ሺͳ ൅
ݎଵǤଶሻܫ ൅ ଵܲǤଶ ൐ ሺͳ ൅ ݎଶǤଶሻܫ . Then ȟ݌ൣܴ െ ൫ͳ ൅ ݎଵǤଶሺܣଵǤଶ௠௜௡ሻ൯ܫ െ ଵܲǤଶሺܣଵǤଶ௠௜௡ሻ ൅ ܣଵǤଶ௠௜௡൧ ൌ ܤ ൏ ȟ݌ൣܴ െ
൫ͳ ൅ ݎଶǤଶሺܣଵǤଶ௠௜௡ሻ൯ܫ ൅ ܣଵǤଶ௠௜௡൧, which means that the minimum collateral ܣଵǤଶ௠௜௡ that satisfies the conditions 
ሺʹǤ͹Ǥʹሻ would be more than enough to satisfy condition ሺ͵ǤͷǤʹሻ. So, the minimum collateral ܣଶǤଶ௠௜௡ that 
satisfies the condition ሺ͵ǤͷǤʹሻ must be smaller, i.e., ܣଵǤଶ௠௜௡ ൐ ܣଶǤଶǤ௠௜௡. 
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But with ܣଶǤଵ௠௜௡ ൌ ூି௣ಹሺோି஻ ୼௣Τ ሻାሺଵି௣ಹሻ஼ሺଵି௣ಹሻఉା௣ಹ , we can see that ܣଶǤଵ
௠௜௡ ൏ ܣଶǤଶ௠௜௡ ,818 i.e., 
the expansion of minimal collateral requirement is less than for public licenses. 
(4) In the end, the US rule improves the UNCITRAL rule to a very limited extent. 
    Only for ܣ א ൣܣଶǤଶ௠௜௡ǡ ܣଶ෢൧  and with ߚܣ ൒ ܥ  (the negotiation condition for 
Choice 2), Choice 2 is preferred. When Choice 2 is chosen, it can lower the 
minimal collateral requirement and increase the licensee’s utility (but the 
improvement is less than that for public licenses).  
    For all the other cases, if Choice 1 is available, the licensee would still choose 
Choice 1 for the same utility and subject to the same constraints as under the 
UNCITRAL rule (Section 5.5.2.1).  
In summary, in the case of private licenses, only if the licensor’s capability of holdup 
at the time of enforcement can be restricted, then the UCC 9-408 can greatly alleviate 
the under-investment problem under the UNCITRAL rule (Figure 5.7). Otherwise, the 
UCC 9-408 just changes the licensor’s time of holdup, from the time of creation of 
security interest in the IP license (prior to the investment) to the time of enforcement 
(after the investment has been made and has failed). And holdup at the time of 
enforcement actually gives the licensor a greater bargaining power. In the end, the 
advantages of the UCC 9-408 are limited (Figure 5.8). The under-investment 
problems we found under the UNCITRAL rule for private licenses (Section 5.5.2.1) 
still exist in most of the cases.  
5.5.3 Implications and Limitations 
The restrictive clauses are inserted in the license agreement with the purpose of 
protecting the licensor against the potential detrimental effects of the security interests 
in an IP license. Clearly, the US law has noticed the under-investment problem under 

818  We can directly compare the left sides of conditions (3.5.1) and ሺ͵ǤͷǤʹሻ . With ሺͳ ൅ ݎଶǤଵሻܫ ൌ
ூିሺଵି௣ಹሻሺఉ஺ି஼ሻ
௣ಹ  and 
ሺͳ ൅ ݎଶǤଶሻܫ ൌ ூ௣ಹ, for the same collateral A, we have ሺͳ ൅ ݎଶǤଵሻܫ ൏ ሺͳ ൅ ݎଶǤଶሻܫ. It means 
we always have ȟ݌ሾܴ െ ሺͳ ൅ ݎଶǤଵሻܫ ൅ ܣሿ ൐ ȟ݌ሾܴ െ ሺͳ ൅ ݎଶǤଶሻܫ ൅ ܣሿ. The minimum collateral ܣଶǤଵ௠௜௡ that 
satisfies the condition conditions ሺ͵ǤͷǤͳሻ would not be able to satisfy condition ሺ͵ǤͷǤʹሻ, i.e., ȟ݌ൣܴ െ
൫ͳ ൅ ݎଶǤଵሺܣଶǤଵ௠௜௡ሻ൯ܫ ൅ ܣଶǤଵ௠௜௡൧ ൌ ܤ ൐ ȟ݌ൣܴ െ ൫ͳ ൅ ݎଵǤଶሺܣଶǤଵ௠௜௡ሻ൯ܫ ൅ ܣଶǤଵ௠௜௡൧. As a result, the minimum collateral 
ܣଶǤଶ௠௜௡ that satisfies the condition ሺ͵ǤͷǤʹሻ must be larger, i.e., ܣଶǤଵ௠௜௡ ൏ ܣଶǤଶ௠௜௡. 
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the UNCITRAL rule and tries to alleviate the problem. It includes the UCC 9-408 to 
provide the licensee-borrower and the lender with an additional choice of getting the 
licensor’s consent only at the time of enforcement. 
The simple model analysis reveals that, in the case of public licenses like the FCC 
broadcast license, as the public licensor has no incentive to holdup, the real reason 
behind the under-investment problem under the UNCITRAL rule is the social 
deadweight loss caused by the risk-sharing with the licensor. A licensor’s consent at 
the time of creating a security interest in licenses is associated with risk. Having a 
risk-neutral IP licensee-borrower share risk with a risk-averse licensor gives rise to 
social deadweight loss, which would be eventually undertaken by the licensee/debtor 
and negatively affects the licensee/debtor’s incentive and participation constraints 
(minimum and maximum collateral requirements).  
For the public licenses, the legal change in the UCC 9-408 works well, because the 
additional choice postpones the negotiation to the time of enforcement, at which time 
the licensor does not take any risk in its decision, because by the time the default has 
happened and the disposition would certainly happen if the licensor consents. The 
change in the time of negotiation allows the licensee to avoid the social deadweight 
loss in the risk-sharing (subject to the negotiation condition, i.e., the disposition value 
is larger than the third-party cost). Avoiding the social deadweight loss enables the 
licensee to internalize the entire social surplus created by its efforts in the investment. 
The full internalization increases the licensee’s utility from the investment and 
consequently lowers the licensee’s incentive to misbehave. In the end, such a change 
lowers the collateral requirements. More licenses can be qualified to support 
welfare-enhancing investments. 
In the case of private licenses, the under-investment problem under the UNCITRAL 
rule is more serious, caused not only by the social deadweight loss in the risk-sharing 
with the licensor, but also by the private licensor’s holdup during the negotiation. 
Unconditionally enforcing the restrictive terms as under the UNCITRAL approach 
allows the licensor to holdup at the negotiation for the consent to the creation of 
security interests in licenses, in order to drag profits from the licensee. On top of 
bearing the social deadweight loss in the risk-sharing, the licensee also has to share 
the profits from the investment with the licensor. The profit-sharing further reduces 
the licensee’s utility from its efforts in the investment and consequently raises the 
minimum collateral requirement even more.  
 ͵ͳʹ
The additional choice of negotiating at the time of enforcement provided by the UCC 
9-408 can greatly alleviate the under-investment only if it is possible to impose 
restrictions on the private licensor’s ability of holdup at the time of enforcement. 
Otherwise, then compared to the UNCITRAL rule, the UCC 9-408 just changes the 
licensor’s holdup time, from the time of creation to the time of enforcement. In the 
latter time, the licensor would actually have even stronger bargaining power to holdup. 
In the end, the underinvestment problem identified under the UNCITRAL rule for 
private licenses still exists in the most cases. The UCC 9-408 can improve the 
UNCITRAL’s rule to a very limited extent.  
However, restricting the private licensor’s ability of holdup at the time of enforcement 
means that the licensor can be fully compensated with the third-party cost ܥ but 
cannot ask for any more than that. In essence, imposing this restriction is the 
equivalent of initially assigning the “property right to use licensee’s rights under the 
IP license as collateral” to the licensee and employing a semi “damage/liability rule” 
to require the licensee/lender to compensate for the third-party cost imposed on the 
licensor in the disposition sale of the encumbered license (note: the difference is that, 
under the UCC 9-408, the compensation has to happen prior to the 
enforcement/damage, not after the damage has happened as in an actual damage 
rule).819 Applying the semi damage rule basically implies that as long as the licensee 
or the lender can compensate the licensor for the third-party cost in the disposition 
sale, the licensor cannot reject at all and has to consent to the enforcement. The effect 
would be the same as forcing the licensor to give a compulsory license to the assignee 
that gets the license in the disposition sale, as long as the licensor does not suffer any 
harm. In other words, the licensor only has the right to seek monetary compensation 
for damages but no more than that. 
Imposing the semi “damage rule” to the case of IP licenses would be extremely 
difficult, because it is against the basic principle of IP laws. One of the basic 
principles of the IP laws is that IP laws generally do not intervene with the licensor’s 
decision on granting rights of use to whom and to what extent at all. IP laws do not 
prevent the licensors from exploiting their legitimate exclusivity and monopoly status 
to ask for a higher price for profits, which are designed to incentivize the licensors to 
innovate. The US comes down very hard on any country that attempts to use a 

819 Similar to “Rule 2” in Guido Calabresi and A Douglas Melamed, “Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral,” Harvard Law Review 85, no. 6 (1972): 1089–1128. See also infra 
note 825. 
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compulsory license, even for life saving generic medicines. 820  With this basic 
principle, licensors are free to ask for a higher price to get profits, instead of just 
asking for compensation to cover the cost. For this reason, no matter whether in 
theory or in practice, proposing the semi damage rule would be extremely difficult or 
impossible.  
The model analysis in this chapter has intentionally adopted some simplified 
assumptions, which may be unrealistic but not necessarily to be simplistic. These 
simplified assumptions allow our analysis to isolate a particular phenomenon and to 
focus on identifying the specific problems that we are aiming to address in each of the 
different real-world legal rules. Nevertheless, the factors that are excluded from the 
model may impose some limitations as to the application of the analysis results. 
First, this model focuses on the post-lending moral hazard problem only, without 
taking into account the pre-lending adverse selection problem (See Section 2.4). It 
takes into account the information problem as to the licensee/debtor’s efforts in the 
project after getting the loan. It is assumed that there is no information asymmetry as 
to the project and the collateral beforehand. The features of the project (probability of 
success, with or without effort, the revenue of success), the licensee’s valuation of the 
license, the disposition value of the license (the licensor’s valuation of the license) 
and the potential third-party cost for the licensor are assumed to be known (or can be 
correctly estimated) at the time of creating or enforcing the security interests in 
license. So, it is not clear how the different rules would change the parties’ incentives 
in revealing and hiding information. (Note: although it is also assumed that there is no 
transaction cost in the negotiation, it is easy to show that taking into account of 
transaction cost would make UCC 9-408 even more preferred, because, as more 
information would be available as the time passes, negotiation cost at the time of 
enforcement would be lower than at the time of creation). 
Second, this post-lending moral hazard model focuses on the licensee/debtor’s 

820 See Stiglitz (2008) “Economic Foundations of Intellectual Property Rights,” supra note 37 at 1717. 
However, since eBay v Merck Exchange, 547 U.S. 388 (2006), ended the US Federal Circuit’s practice of 
automatically granting permanent injunctions for patent infringement, it has been expected by some scholar 
that the courts might have been given more discretion to consider patent use and the public interest when 
ruling on permanent injunctions. The patentees’ (at least for non-practicing patentees) capacity of 
unreasonable holdup is reduced. It is expected that that federal courts are more likely to award “moderately 
compulsory licenses” for “non-practicing patentees”. The “approximate royalties” under the moderately 
licenses are potentially lower than that which might have been negotiated had the court issued an injunction. 
See Venkatesan (2009), “Compulsory Licensing of Nonpracticing Patentees After eBay v. MercExchange," 
supra note 45. 
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commitment on efforts only. In a post-lending relationship, a debtor may face more 
moral hazard problems, such as reacting to changed risk, newly appeared investment 
opportunities or new information. This model cannot test how the licensee would 
react to newly revealed risks or other opportunities under different legal rules. 
Third, for analytic simplicity and for focusing on the effects of legal rules on the 
negotiation, it is implicitly assumed in this model that the royalty scheme is in the 
form of a fixed fee paid all by once at the beginning; so the lending decision does not 
affect the original licensor’s capability to collect license payments, and we only need 
to consider the additional cost bought by the foreclosure disposition to the licensor. 
However, there are also some other schemes, such as royalties or down payment plus 
a running royalty, which are actually used more commonly in practice.821 Brennan 
(2001) argues that allowing a licensee freely to use its right to sub-license or right to 
exploitation as collateral may adversely affect the original licensor’s capability to 
collect royalties, because it may make the royalties payable to licensors junior to 
some security interests created by the licensee.822 This study has not examined this 
legal issue to see if this argument stands. Whether the change of royalty schemes 
would change the analysis results or not is unclear.  
Fourth, at this stage, we haven’t collected any empirical evidence to test whether the 
model accurately predicts behavior in reality. The empirical study is left for further 
study to explore.  
Taking into account all these factors and clearing out these questions requires further 
legal analysis and more sophisticated model setting. A complete answer to these 
questions is beyond the scope of the chapter and is the subject of continuing research, 
but this study provides an analytical framework to start from. This study reminds us of 
the need for more formal analysis to see how the law can affect the negotiation and 
what law and economics analysis can contribute.  
5.6 Conclusion 
This study is the first attempt to try to use the formal law and economics analysis 

821 See Nalin Kulatilaka and Lihui Lin, “Impact of Licensing on Investment and Financing of Technology 
Development,” Management Science 52, no. 12 (2006): 1824 – 1837 (showing that firms’ investment and 
licensing strategies depend critically on the firms' financial constraints and the expected market conditions). 
822 Brennan (2001) “Financing Intellectual Property under Revised Article 9: National and International 
Conflicts (Electronic Version),” supra note 302 at 397-413. 
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approach to examine the problem of enforcing contractual restrictions in the case of 
secured transaction, especially for the licensee’s use of its rights under IP license as 
collateral. It adopts a simple debt finance moral hazard model to examine the 
collateral’s disciplinary role in the secured transaction. This model provides an 
analytical framework to examine how different legal rules could change the 
negotiation time, have an impact on the different parties’ bargaining powers at the 
negotiation, and eventually on the collateral requirement and investment decision. The 
comparative analysis shows that the under-investment problem comes from sharing 
risks and profits with the licensor for the licensor’s consent. Although the UCC 9-408 
is designed to enhance the ability of licensees to obtain credit, this study reveals that it 
works well in the case of public licenses like the FCC broadcast license where the 
public licensors have no incentive to holdup, but it does not improve much in the case 
of private licenses like the IP licenses where the private licensor has an incentive to 
holdup. The UCC 9-408 just changes the IP licensor’s time of holdup. The 
under-investment problem under the UNCITRAL rule still exists in the most cases. At 
this stage, this analysis just reveals the problems caused by the licensor’s holdup 
under the UNCITRAL rule and the UCC-9 rule. However, because of the compelling 
countervailing reasons for the inability to restrict the IP licensors’ right to hold-up in 
the IP law, this chapter cannot provide a first-best solution.823 The solution might be 
proposed with further studies.  
The results found in this analysis restate one main point that the whole thesis tries to 
reach, i.e., we cannot simply copy the rules that work well for ordinary assets to the 
context of IP. The rules for IP collateralization should take into account the 
characteristics of the legal system for IP.  
In addition, this model analysis also has an interesting finding related to the eminent 
Coase Theorem, which holds that, where market transaction costs are zero and 
costless bargaining is possible (including perfect information), the law’s initial 
assignments of property rights and liability of external harms is irrelevant to 
efficiency, because voluntary negotiations and bargains between the parties will 
rectify any initial assignment and move the property rights to hands that value it the 
most in the end.824 However, our analysis shows that, this theorem may work in an 
isolated transaction between two parties. In our model with three parties (namely, the 

823 This study has not examined the other alternative legal Rules dealing with damages mentioned in infra 
note 825. The whole modeling should be accordingly changed to test the other rules. The further 
examination might be conducted in future studies. 
824 See the literature on Coase Theorem in supra note 14. 
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licensor, the licensee and the lender) and a chain of transactions, even with zero 
transaction costs (as assumed in our model setting), the initial assignments of property 
rights and liability of external harms actually do matter.  
The UNCITRAL rule is actually the equivalent of initially assigning “the property 
right to use licensee’s rights under the IP license as collateral” to the licensor and 
giving the licensor the right to impose self-injunction (injunction/property rule).825 So 
a licensor’s consent must be required for the licensee’s use of its rights under the IP 
license as collateral. We have shown that, even without transaction cost, the licensor’s 
holdup at the negotiation for consent (between the licensor and the licensee) can 
actually change the licensee’s incentive in the following borrowing decision (between 
the licensee and the lender), and consequently have an impact on the social efficient 
level. By contrast, the UCC 9-408 is actually similar (not equivalent) to initially 
allocating the “property right of using the license as collateral” to the licensee and the 
licensor is awarded with the right to require the licensee/lender to compensate for the 
cost imposed on the licensor (damages/liability rule) (note: the difference is that, 
under the UCC 9-408, the compensation has to happen prior to the 
enforcement/damage, not after the damage has happened as in an actual damage rule). 
And we also show that, this change from the injunction/property rule to the “semi” 
damages/liability rule can improve the efficiency level of the following borrowing 
decision, especially in the case of public licenses like the FCC license (for IP license, 
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825 Guido Calabresi and A Douglas Melamed, “Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View 
of the Cathedral,” Harvard Law Review 85, no. 6 (1972): 1089–1128 (expliciting 4 rules. "Rule 1 (the 
injunction/property rule)", namely, initially assigning the property right to the victim and allows the vicitim 
to issue an injunction against the injurer; and the injurer has to pay the vicitim to get the right/permission to 
damages. "Rule 2 (damages/liability rule)", namely, initially assigning the property right to the victim and 
allows the injurer to harm but the injurer has to compensate the vicitim for the damages; the injurer is given 
only with the right to be awarded damages. "Rule 3", namely, initially assigning the right to harm to the 
injurer and give the victim with no right to be awarded with damages. "Rule 4", namely, initially assigning 
the right to harm to the injurer and then the victim has to pay the injurer the compensation in order to enjoin 
the injurer from taking further damage). See further discussion on the four rules in Michael I. Krauss, 
“Property Rules vs. Liability Rules,” in Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, Volume II. Civil Law and 
Economic, ed. Boudewijn Bouckaert and Gerrit De Geest (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2000), 782–794. 
James E. Krier and Stewart J. Schwab, “Property Rules and Liability Rules: The Cathedral in Another Light,” 
New York University Law Review 70, no. 2 (1995): 440–483 (proposing a "Rule 5", namely, when it is 
difficult to obtain and process information in order to assess damages, there should be a “best-chooser 
principle”, i.e., when liability rules are used, the party who is the best chooser should be confronted with the 
decision whether or not to force a sale upon the other party). In our setting, the UNCITRAL rule is the 
equivalent of initially assigning the “the property right to use licensee’s rights under the IP license as 
collateral” to the licensor (the victim) and the licensee (the injurer) has to negotiate with and pay for the 
licensor to get the right/permission to enjoy the right to use licensee’s rights under the IP license as 
collateral.  
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this semi damages rule solution cannot be employed in reality because of the 
reluctance from the IP laws). 
In other words, we have shown that, from the social perspective, the initial 
entitlement does matter when we consider the fact that the social activities are a chain 
of different decisions. The initial entitlement can affect the ex post distribution of 
social surplus in the first transaction, which can subsequently change the negotiations 
in the following transactions and eventually have an impact on the total efficiency 
level, even when parties can costless bargain around legal rules. This study might 
shed some light for further studies to examine the validation of the Coase Theorem in 
the case with involvement of a chain of decisions among more than two parties. 
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Chapter 6 Conclusions 
6.1 Summary of the Main Findings  
When the idea of promoting the use of IP as collateral in debt finance as a solution to 
the R&D external finance problem comes into mind, the most natural concerns and 
practical difficulties are about the commercial and legal risks, and the resulting high 
transaction costs. With the overall purpose of exploring the main research question, 
i.e., “what is the preferred legal framework to optimize the use of IP as collateral in 
debt finance, in order to solve the problems in funding R&D activities and to foster 
innovation?”, this dissertation adopts a law and economics analysis into an in-depth 
examination on the impacts of these risks and transaction costs from different aspects. 
It starts from examining an unexplored question in the existing literature, i.e., why 
should we advocate IP collateralization in the first place? The literature review reveals 
that the main reasons for the difficulty of SMEs in funding their R&D activities are 
the informational asymmetries in the funding relationships, which generally exist in 
all kinds of external finance, but are amplified in the case of funding R&D 
investments by the high degree of uncertainty regarding the outputs of R&D projects 
and by the difficulty in exchanging information between innovators and external 
investors. The amplified informational asymmetries cause a serious adverse selection 
problem in the ex ante funding relationship and a moral hazard problem in the ex post 
funding relationship. The two problems together greatly increase the cost of external 
finance, especially for young high-tech SMEs. Compared with other financing 
alternatives for new high-tech SMEs, such as angel finance and venture capital, debt 
finance has the advantage of being with a much greater credit supply market, without 
ownership dilution, and more suitable for technology-intensive firms with 
medium-growth & medium-risk R&D projects, especially in the countries with deeply 
rooted bank-based financial systems. 
The other literature and efforts consider the repayment function of collateral only and 
try to find ways to make IP have the same characteristics as ordinary tangible assets. 
They are therefore mostly concerned about the difficulty in accurately evaluating IP 
and about the uncertainty in the liquidation value of IP caused by the limited 
redeployability of IP at the forced-disposition. However, our literature review reveals 
that the real difficulty in enhancing the market confidence in IP is from the wrong 
“perceived” risks. The market intervention shall be established on correct 
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understanding of the real social benefits of promoting IP collateralization. Therefore, 
this dissertation goes back to the basic economic theories of security interests and 
re-examines the roles of collateral in secured transactions. The re-examination reveals 
that the real reasons making secured transactions socially beneficial are, not the 
repayment function of collateral (which is actually costly), but the signalling role of 
collateral in solving the pre-lending adverse selection problem, and its 
self-disciplinary role in solving the post-lending moral hazard problem.  
In this regard, some characteristics of IP actually make it good collateral. First, IP is 
highly informative about the quality, potential and confidence of the borrowers, more 
costly for low-quality borrowers to provide, and can be easily observed and verified 
by the potential lenders. Therefore providing IP as collateral is sending an effective 
good-quality signal to reduce the ex ante information asymmetries and helps financial 
institutions select borrowers with better R&D projects, higher technological 
management capability as well as greater commitment to perform. Second, the 
uncertainty in the liquidation value of IP and its limited redeployability at the 
forced-disposition result in a large difference in the valuation of the encumbered IP 
between the borrower and the lender. The large valuation difference actually makes IP 
a good collateral (or more like a hostage), because it can play a substantial 
self-disciplinary role to ensure the borrower’s voluntary compliance with the terms of 
the loan contract and also removes the lender’s incentive for initiating inefficient 
liquidation. The better selection and alignment of incentives together can lower the 
overall risk of defaulting in the first place, reduce information cost and monitoring 
cost, and eventually help debtors get more advantageous terms. More 
welfare-enhancing transactions would be financed with the lower cost of debt finance. 
By looking into the advantages brought by some special characteristics of IP, instead 
of just focusing on trying to treat IP as if they are ordinary tangible assets, our 
exploration gives better explanations to some phenomena in practice, such as why 
some lenders would like to accept some IP which are only valuable for the debtors as 
collateral and why some lenders care about IP, especially the crucial IP, even more 
than other tangible assets of the debtors. It also offers new insights on the collateral 
selection criteria for IP, and provides plausible reasons to advocate and promote IP 
collateralization. 
Then, this dissertation moves on to discuss how we should design surrounding laws to 
support IP collateralization. By discussing some main conflicts in the legal rules for 
IP collateralization, it establishes a conceptual assessment framework. The assessment 
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criteria allow us to have a comprehensive and detailed comparative study of the 
general legal frameworks for IP in China, the US, and under the UNCITRAL 
Supplement. This might be the first study having a comprehensive critical discussion 
on the legal framework for IP collateralization in China.  
Apart from these detailed suggestions on specific issues for China (in Section 4.6), the 
comparative study has three main findings.  
First, the legal framework of IP collateralization directly determines the legal 
certainty of the transaction result, contracting time, and the incentives of relevant 
parties, which would be reflected as the transaction costs. In China, the great legal 
uncertainties come from incoordination among fragmented legal documents and the 
lack of a unitary guidance. As a result, in order to reduce the transaction cost brought 
by legal uncertainties, the first structural reform on the general legal framework in 
China should be to reduce the fragmentation with a unitary legal framework for IP 
collateralization and making rules more compatible and coherent with each other.  
Second, the legal framework of IP collateralization also helps in controlling the 
commercial risks. There are two ways of risk control, i.e., pre-control and post-control. 
Both of the UNCITRAL’s Supplement and the UCC-9 of the US have chosen the 
post-control mechanism. They do not interfere with the parties’ autonomy on 
negotiating over contract terms but offer cost-efficient registry schemes and establish 
a group of sophisticated rules for the priority order and enforcement remedies, to 
ensure that security interests can function effectively as a kind of “backup mechanism” 
upon the debtor’s default. By contrast, the Chinese legal regime has chosen the 
pre-control mechanism. With the fundamental mistrust of the risk management 
capabilities of transacting parties and a strong paternalistic bias, the Chinese law 
establishes an overly troublesome and prohibitive legal framework for IP 
collateralization. The highly restricted scope of IP eligible for being used as collateral, 
the abundant statutory restrictions on the autonomy of parties over the terms of the 
pledge contract and the burdensome document-based registry scheme with substantial 
scrutiny, may reduce some risks of fraud, but at the disproportionate expense of 
wasting the great wealth inherent in IP. The risks can be reduced in other much 
cheaper and less wasteful ways as well. Meanwhile, Chinese law does not pay 
attention to post-control at all. The vague rules on priority and enforcement remedies 
do not provide sufficient protection to all parties. The wrong way of risk control 
heavily increases the transaction cost and results in the obvious under-utilization of IP 
collateralization in China. 
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Third, this comparative study also shows that the Supplement’s way of simply 
prioritizing IP law may not be the solution to the conflicts in IP law and secured 
transaction law. This comparative study provides an opportunity to examine the 
possible effects of the Supplement on IP collateralization in a national context. It 
shows that the general security laws in China and the US, namely, the Property Law 
and the UCC-9, are actually quite consistent with the recommendations given in the 
UNCITRAL’s Guide (and the Supplement) on secured transaction law in almost all 
aspects. However, most of the problems identified above in China actually come from 
the IP-specific rules. Although the Supplement helps us to identify the problems in the 
current Chinese law, it cannot give many recommendations that can be directly used 
to make the legal changes, because it avoids a deeper exploration into IP laws. This 
finding shows that, while most legal efforts are on adapting the secured transaction 
law in order to encompass the needs for IP collateralization or other financial 
exploitations of IP, more effort needs to be done in IP laws to facilitate IP 
collateralization well. 
Therefore, the last part of this dissertation looks into a more specific issue to 
demonstrate the need for more efforts in IP law. This study is the first attempt 
employing a formal economic analysis of law to examine the problems of enforcing 
contractual restrictions on assignability in the case of secured transaction, especially 
for the licensee’s use of its rights under IP license as collateral. The employment of a 
simple debt finance moral hazard model provides an analytical framework to examine 
how different legal rules could change the negotiation time, have an impact on the 
different parties’ bargaining powers at the negotiation, and eventually on the collateral 
requirement and investment decision. 
These contractual restrictions on assignability in IP licenses give a licensor the final 
power to consent or block licensee’s investment decision, in order to protect the 
licensor from enduring the potentially detrimental effects of the licensee’s use of 
rights in the license as collateral. The IP laws and the secured transaction legal regime 
reflect very different perspectives on these contractual restrictions. The UNCITRAL’s 
approach simply prioritizes the objective of IP law, by unconditionally enforcing the 
contractual restrictions in IP license, in order to ensure the licensor’s full control over 
the license. Our formal analysis shows that this approach makes the borrower’s 
investment totally conditional on the licensor’s consent, in which case the licensor’s 
risk-preference and incentive to holdup make the borrower unable to fully internalize 
all profits from the investment, so there is an under-investment problem. The UCC 
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9-408 approach tries to balance the objectives of secured transaction law and IP law, 
by invalidating the contractual restrictions at the time of creation but still keeping 
them valid at the time of enforcement upon the debtor’s default. Our formal analysis 
shows that the change of negotiation time from the time of creation to the time of 
enforcement can solve the problem brought by the licensor’s risk-preference at the 
time of creation. The approach therefore works well in the case of public licenses like 
the FCC broadcast license where the public licensors have no incentive to holdup, but 
it does not improve much in the case of private licenses like the IP licenses where the 
private licensors have an incentive to holdup. As the UCC 9-408 just changes the IP 
licensor’s time of holdup without restricting the licensor’s power to holdup at the time 
of enforcement, the under-investment still exists.  
For the compelling countervailing reasons for inability in restricting the IP licensors’ 
right to holdup in the IP law, this study does not provide a first-best solution for the 
under-investment problem but it is an excellent example demonstrating the problems 
of simply prioritizing the objectives of IP law.  
6.2 Main Policy Implications 
This dissertation has shown what a law and economics analysis can contribute in 
discussing practical issues, from reviewing economic rationales underlying secured 
transaction law and IP law to provide plausible explanations for justifying legal or 
policy supports, to setting evaluation criteria to examine the effectiveness of the 
general legal framework, and then to adopting a formal debt finance model to make 
comparative analysis on the impacts of different legal rules upon a specific legal issue. 
Law and economics analysis can help us to have better understand the conflicts 
between IP law and secured transaction law. The dissertation derives some main 
policy implications as follows. 
First, in the efforts promoting IP collateralization, policy makers or legislators should 
advocate the advantages brought by some special characteristics of IP. They shall 
emphasize how the signaling role of IP in the ex ante selection process and the 
disciplinary role of IP in the ex post lending relationship can help the lenders to 
reduce the overall default probability in the first place. These efforts may give lenders 
more incentive to accept IP as collateral and help to expand their selection criteria for 
IP. 
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Second, China needs a structural reform on the legal framework for IP 
collateralization. It should reduce the fragmentation among different legal documents 
and make rules more compatible and coherent with each other in order to reduce the 
transaction cost brought by legal uncertainties. The policy makers and legislators 
should correct their paternalistic bias and mistrust on the risk management capabilities 
of market practitioners. They should transform the overly troublesome and prohibitive 
pre-control system into a more sophisticated post-control system. There is an urgent 
need to extend the scope of IP eligible for collateralization beyond ownership, to 
remove these legal prohibitions on the creation of security interests in future IP, to 
provide the contracting parties with greater autonomy in negotiating contract terms, to 
allow parties to make appropriate identifiable description of the IP to be encumbered 
and negotiate over matters like multi-pledge or re-pledge, to make it possible to use 
future IP as collateral, to encourage parties to make proper arrangements on 
subsequent exploitation of encumbered IP during the loan term, to establish a unitary 
general security interests registry and to largely simplify the registry scheme. After 
having removed all these obstructive prohibitions, the Chinese law also calls for the 
introduction of more sophisticated priority rules and effective enforcement remedies 
in order to provide lenders with sufficient protections and to reduce uncertainties.  
Third, the coordination of the secured transaction law and IP law is much more 
complicated than solving the superficial practical difficulties or clarifying 
inconsistencies in the text. The comparative analysis on the enforceability of 
contractual restrictions on assignability in IP licenses shows the impacts of different 
legal rules on the licensee’s funding capability and investment decisions. The 
divergence in the economic objectives and rationales under the two different legal 
protection systems and different ways of exploitation determine the need for a more 
specific law and economic analysis into the consequences of legal rules for the 
interests of the parties involved and all others who benefit from the creation and 
dissemination of IP.  
6.3 Limits and Future Research 
The efforts in the dissertation focus more on exploring the problems rather than 
giving specific solutions. For instance, Chapter 2 suggests emphasizing the signaling 
and disciplinary roles of IP in debt finance, but without proposing how exactly to do 
them. Similarly, in Chapter 4, the dissertation identifies problems in Chinese rules, 
but could not provide more direct and specific solutions, because further study is still 
 ͵ʹͷ
needed to determine the best solution, exactly as Chapter 5 has done. However, even 
in Chapter 5, by examining and comparing the different solutions, we identified the 
reasons causing the problems, but we could not propose the first-best solutions. 
Clarifying these problems to give clear and specific solutions requires further legal 
analysis and more sophisticated model setting. 
The whole dissertation is based on literature reviews and theoretical analysis. It is 
necessary to have further empirical study to test whether the theoretical discussions 
accurately reflect and predict market behavior in reality. For example, we need to test 
if the market would have positive reactions to the suggestions proposed in Chapter 2 
on emphasizing the signaling and disciplinary roles of IP in debt finance. Similarly, 
the preliminary model used in Chapter 5 has intentionally adopted some simplified 
assumptions, which allow us to provide new insights into the examination of legal 
issues. The factors that are excluded from the model may impose some limitations as 
to the application of the analysis results. Further empirical study is still needed to test 
the validity of the propositions discussed in Chapter 5 in reality. 
For future studies, there are several final remarks which this dissertation is trying to 
address on finding suitable legal rules and policies for facilitating IP collateralization 
as an alterative solution to the R&D external finance problem. First, we should not try 
to assume that IP has the same characteristics as ordinary assets nor simply assume 
that the legal rules working well for ordinary assets would also work for IP. We 
should take into account the possible effects of IP’s special characteristics on the 
fundamental theories of secured transactions law, and maybe even on property law 
and contract law. Second, simply prioritizing the objectives of IP law may not be the 
best solution to solve the conflicts between IP law and secured transaction law. Maybe 
we should also re-examine the boundaries of IP protection826 and rethink if the 
current legal regime for IP is still suitable for more advanced exploitation of all the 
potential social and economic value in IP. 
  

826 See similar discussion in Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, and Harry First, eds., 
Expanding the Boundaries of Intellectual Property: Innovation Policy for the Knowledge Society (Oxford 
University Press, 2001) (questioning how much control innovators should be given over their works). 
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English Summary 
When the idea of promoting the use of IP as collateral in debt finance as a solution to 
the R&D external finance problem comes into mind, the most intuitive concerns and 
practical difficulties are about the commercial and legal risks, and the resulting high 
transaction costs. With the overall purpose of exploring the main research question, 
i.e., “what is the preferred legal framework to optimize the use of IP as collateral in 
debt finance, in order to solve the problems in funding R&D activities and to foster 
innovation?”, this dissertation adopts a law and economic analysis into the in-depth 
examination on the impacts of these risks and transaction costs from different aspects. 
Firstly, for further exploring the economic reasons for promoting IP collateralization, 
it goes back to the basic theories of debt finance and recalls the role of collateral in 
solving the informational asymmetry problems between debtors and creditors. It 
shows that some characteristics of IP actually make them good collateral. The 
signaling role of IP in the ex ante selection process and the disciplinary role of IP in 
the ex post lending relationship can help the lenders to reduce the overall default 
probability in the first place. This finding offers new insights concerning the collateral 
selection criteria for IP, and provides plausible reasons to advocate further research on 
IP collateralization. 
Then, this dissertation moves on discussing how we should design surrounding laws 
to support IP collateralization. It re-examines the main law and economic theories 
regarding secured transaction law in the context of IP collateralization, and shows 
how the legal framework governing IP collateralization directly determines the 
transaction costs, contracting time, certainty of the transaction result and the 
incentives of relevant parties. By discussing some potential conflicts in the legal rules 
for IP collateralization, it establishes a conceptual assessment framework. The 
assessment criteria allow us to have a comparative study on the general legal 
frameworks for IP in China, the US, and the international efforts done by the 
UNCITRAL. The comparative examination shows the difficulties in coordinating 
secured law and IP law and sheds light on our understanding of how to build up an 
efficient legal regime for IP collateralization, especially for China. This might be the 
first study having a comprehensive critical discussion on the legal framework for IP 
collateralization in China. 
After the discussion of the general legal framework, the dissertation addresses a 
specific legal issue in practice to illustrate and further explore the divergences 
between IP law and secured transaction law. It looks into the enforceability of 
anti-assignment or anti-attachment clauses in the IP licenses in the case of IP 
collateralization. It is an excellent way of illustrating why the divergence in the 
economic objectives and rationales under the two different legal protection systems 
and different ways of exploitation determine the need for a more specific law and 
economic analysis into the consequences of legal rules. The comparative analysis 
shows how different legal rules can change the time of negotiation and the bargaining 
powers among parties, consequently change the equilibrium of the lending decision, 
and eventually have impacts on investment decisions. It demonstrates why we cannot 
simply assume that the legal rules working well for ordinary assets would also work 
for IP, and why simply prioritizing the objectives of IP law may not be the best 
solution to solve the conflicts between IP law and secured transaction law.  
The study calls for a re-examination on the boundaries of IP protection and an 
evaluation about whether the current legal regime for IP is still suitable for more 
advanced exploitations of all potential social and economic value in IP. 
  
Nederlandse samenvatting 
Het idee om het gebruik van IE (Intellectuele Eigendom) als zekerheid in de 
schuldfinanciering te stimuleren als oplossing voor de problemen rond externe 
financiering van R&D leidt tot verscheidene vragen. De meest voor de hand liggende 
vragen en praktische problemen hebben betrekking op de daaraan verbonden 
economische en juridische risico's en de daaruit voortvloeiende hoge transactiekosten. 
Dit proefschrift poogt de volgende algemene onderzoeksvraag te beantwoorden: wat 
is het meest aangewezen juridische kader voor een optimaal gebruik van IE als 
zekerheid bij schuldfinanciering, om de problemen rond de financiering van 
R&D-activiteiten op te lossen en innovatie te stimuleren? Daartoe wordt in dit 
proefschrift een juridische en economische analyse uitgevoerd naar de gevolgen van 
deze risico's en transactiekosten vanuit verschillende gezichtspunten. 
Ten eerste kijken we naar de basistheorieën van schuldfinanciering en de rol van 
zekerheden bij het oplossen van de problemen rond de informatieasymmetrie tussen 
debiteuren en crediteuren. Dit kan mogelijkheden blootleggen om het gebruik van IE 
als zekerheid verder te stimuleren. Hierbij wordt duidelijk dat IE door bepaalde 
eigenschappen zeer geschikt is voor gebruik als zekerheid. De signalerende rol van IE 
in het ex-ante selectieproces en de disciplinerende rol van IE in de ex-post 
kredietrelatie kan de financiers allereerst helpen het risico van wanbetaling te 
beperken. Deze bevinding biedt nieuwe inzichten voor wat betreft de selectiecriteria 
voor IE als zekerheid en het biedt goede redenen om verder onderzoek te doen naar 
het gebruik van IE als zekerheid. 
Vervolgens wordt in dit proefschrift besproken hoe de wetgeving moet worden 
ingericht ter ondersteuning van IE-securitisatie. De belangrijkste wetgeving en de 
economische theorieën met betrekking tot de IE-securitisatie worden onderzocht. 
Daarbij kan worden vastgesteld hoe het juridische kader van IE-securitisatie 
rechtstreeks bepalend is voor de transactiekosten, de afsluitingsduur, de zekerheid van 
het transactieresultaat en de prikkels voor de betrokken actoren. Door bespreking van 
een aantal potentiële contradicties/spanningsvelden in de wettelijke regels rond 
IE-securitisatie wordt een conceptueel beoordelingskader gedefinieerd. De 
beoordelingscriteria stellen ons in staat om een vergelijkend onderzoek uit te voeren 
naar de algemene juridische kaders voor IE in China en in de VS en de internationale 
inspanningen van UNCITRAL. Het vergelijkend onderzoek laat de problemen zien 
rond het op elkaar afstemmen van de wetgeving rond securitisatie en IE-wetgeving, 
en geeft een duidelijk beeld van hoe een efficiënt juridisch regime voor 
IE-securitisatie kan worden vormgegeven, met name voor China. Dit is wellicht het 
eerste onderzoek waarin een omvattende kritische bespreking wordt geboden van het 
juridische kader voor IE-securitisatie in China. 
Na de bespreking van het algemene juridische kader, behandelt het proefschrift een 
specifieke praktische juridische problematiek, ter illustratie en om de verschillen 
tussen IE-wetgeving en de wetgeving rond securitisatie verder te onderzoeken. Er 
wordt ingegaan op de afdwingbaarheid van clausules ter voorkoming van overdracht 
en beslag in IE-licenties in geval van IE-securitisatie. Dit is een uitstekende manier 
om de verschillen te laten zien in de economische doelstellingen en motiveringen in 
de beide uiteenlopende juridische beschermingssystemen, en de verschillende 
manieren waarop ze worden benut maken duidelijk dat er behoefte is aan meer 
specifieke wetgeving en economische analyse van de gevolgen van juridische 
regelgeving. De vergelijkende analyse laat zien hoe verschillende juridische regels de 
duur van de onderhandelingen en de onderhandelingspositie van partijen kunnen 
beïnvloeden, waardoor het evenwicht van het besluit om te lenen - en uiteindelijk ook 
de investeringsbeslissingen - worden beïnvloed. Het laat zien waarom we er niet van 
kunnen uitgaan dat juridische regels die voor gewone activa goed werken ook voor IE 
werken, en waarom prioritering van de doelstellingen van IE-wetgeving 
waarschijnlijk niet de beste oplossing is om de strijdigheden tussen IE-wetgeving en 
wetgeving rond securitisatie op te lossen.  
Dit onderzoek roept op om de grenzen van de IE-bescherming opnieuw te evalueren 
en om te onderzoeken of het huidige juridische regime voor IE nog wel geschikt is 
voor verdere verkenning van de potentiële sociale en economische waarde van IE. 
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